INDIA and Pakistan have engaged in unsuccessful conflict resolution efforts several times in the past. The two sides continue their commitment to the on-going peace dialogue. The two governments have exchanged high level visits, expanded people to people ties, simplified some visa rules and inaugurated bus services between two sides of Kashmir.

They have expanded modestly the level of bilateral trade, including resuming direct trade by road. The hope that these steps will generate the goodwill to permit resolution of the harder issues and eventually, lasting peace has not been achieved so far.

India’s foreign policy extends well beyond the traditional boundaries of the South Asian region. However the continuing disputes between India and Pakistan remain central to India’s geopolitical position. India’s approach to relations with Pakistan has not undergone a fundamental change.

The ceasefire agreement of 2003 remains in place, and the two sides continue the complex peace dialogue inaugurated in January 2004. The most difficult issue dividing them, the dispute over Kashmir, is the subject of one working group and the second deals with nuclear risk reduction and others address a clustre of bilateral issues.

While peace negotiations and treaties or political settlements may be the first steps to end a conflict, a healing of relationships is essential. Healing of relationships needs a commitment to reconciliation. Reconciliation needs to be understood by understanding the root causes of conflict and a shared understanding of its trajectories.

Conflicts can be managed but not transformed without the healing of relationships focused on reconciliation. Today our subcontinent struggles to build a shared future from a divided past. Without reconciliation, it will not be possible to establish the required relationship and understanding.

As we see around us, human relationships are fraught with a lot of negative pulls and pushes: egotistic preferences and rivalries. Fortunately there are many positive forces as well, altruistic feelings, benevolence, human welfare and the like, that keeps us in a social bind and keep our hope for the humanity and the world alive for good.

Nations and countries, being large groups of individuals, do reflect both the negative and positive traits of the units of which they happen to be a collection. That being the case as when two friends or relatives have strained relationships, some compromises aiming at mutual good tend to ease the situation.

Why can a similar approach not succeed between India and Pakistan? It certainly can. Today there is an increased understanding that countries are not held together simply through effective political institutions but also through processes and relationships and where the polity has experienced conflict and violence, special efforts need to be made to manage and transform these conflicts.

Contemporary literature on reconciliation has been impacted largely by its context -- namely practices associated with rebuilding fractious and fractured relationships in the aftermath of palpable, visible violent conflicts. Certainly our subcontinent which has been the theatre of violent conflicts can learn from practices culled out from scenarios across the world.

The concept of reconciliation has entered the peace-building lexicon, particularly after deep rooted, violent conflicts in the post cold war era, used in theatres as diverse as South Africa, Guatemala, Sierra Leonne, Rwanda, Northern Ireland, former Yogoslavia, East Timor and Cambodia.

We should however take note of the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. He says, “As our experience in South Africa has taught us, each society must discover its own route to reconciliation. Reconciliation cannot be imposed from outside, nor can someone else’s map get us to our destination, it must be our own solution.”

While the route to reconciliation between India and Pakistan may have its unique configurations, charting it is evidently not an exercise that can be theoretically insulated from existing vocabularies.

The understanding of reconciliation stresses that the process is essentially one of bridging the division, through improved communication and better understanding. This perspective may open up thinking spaces for contextualising reconciliation, between India and Pakistan. In a situation where faith touches the lives of people closely the reconciliation based on the teachings of various religions with emphasis on truth, forgiveness, reflections, repentance and confession can produce good results.

In Islam there is wide spectrum where the vocabulary, the principles and paradigms can be found for linkages and reconciliation with the world outside Islam. These include notions of equality, justice and stress on the intrinsic qualities of human character with an abiding sense of accountability.

In our area, everyday violence, manifest violence, structural violence and congealed violence intersect in myriad ways to create varying degrees and types of insecurity.

Can reconciliation be only a reactive post-violence concern? Alternatively, should it be equally about continuously striving to build dialogue spaces and harmony between form and function, knowledge and wisdom?

Should reconciliation be embraced as a peace time concern, as a post conflict activity? It is possible to push the envelope and posit that instead of visualising reconciliation only as an instrument of conflict resolution. It could ultimately become an attitude.

Another aspect of reconciliation is the political one, which uses insights from political science to understand the processes of violence associated with contemporary processes of state and nation building and to ask whether reconciliation can occur at the political level. The leading question here is whether political leaders possess the collective ability to forgive.

Reconciliation is a process and not a goal. It is similar to evaluate specific activities that promote reconciliation rather than search for tangible outcomes. Identifying different strands of reconciliation may prove useful. Even while accepting the plurality of approaches and definitions regarding reconciliation, it involves creating a common vision, building relationships and fashioning strategies dealing with the past. These strands of reconciliation can prove helpful in evolving the basis on which reconciliation activities can be assessed.

In the absence of a consensus on what constitutes reconciliation, the challenge is how to define the field and the activities in a way that is both inclusive and cogent. An inclusive discourse would take into account the fact that reconciliation is not a goal but a process. The process can mean different things to different people at the same time.

Conventional notions of power as domination and control pose major challenges to the practices of reconciliation. As long as these conventional notions of power persist, there is always the danger of reconciliation being appropriated by the existing power structures. The dismantling of notions of power that emphasise domination calls for a shift in paradigm that engages with radically different notions of power.

Reconciliation as a philosophy and practice is not an invention of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Cooperation and conflict, reconciliation and revenge have coexisted and crisscrossed in society from time immemorial. The appropriation of the term in the official literature and practice of peace-building is, however, a relatively new phenomenon.

In this context the biggest challenge is to examine how best to take on board the troubling questions and paradoxes generated from the field to construct an inclusive discourse on the many dimensions of this process.

The writer is a retired Major General of the Pakistan Army.

THE Provisional Constitution Order 2007, issued consequent upon the promulgation of emergency on Nov 3 by the COAS, provides that the country shall be governed as nearly as may be by the provisions of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Thus, on Nov 15, the presidential term of General Musharraf under Article 41 of the Constitution lapsed. He now continues to hold the office of the president by virtue of Article 44 and remains so till his successor enters upon his office. By virtue of Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution, General Musharraf was also required to relinquish the office of COAS on Nov 15.

However, he conveniently ignored this mandatory requirement and has vowed do so if and when he becomes his own successor as the elected president of Pakistan. The Supreme Court had restrained issuance of the notification of his election as president pending the decision on the petitions challenging his eligibility to be reelected as president under the Constitution. He had cited delay in the hearings of those petitions as a source of grave national instability and one of the reasons for the proclamation of emergency. This delay no longer bothers him now. Indeed it suits him. Whether it suits him or not, this is a flagrant violation of the Constitution.

The National Assembly stood dissolved on Nov 15. With the passage of time, General Musharraf appointed a caretaker cabinet with Senate Chairman Mohammad Mian Soomro as the caretaker prime minister. He would also retain his office as the chairman of the Senate.

This appointment is also contrary to the constitutional scheme as the Constitution provides for distinct legislative, executive and judicial organs of the state. The head of the upper house of Parliament would now be the chief executive of the country for next sixty days. By virtue of being the chairman of the Senate he also acts as president in the absence of the president.

If General Musharraf ceases to be president for any reason or even leaves the country for a few days, Mr. Soomro would simultaneously hold the office of the Chairman Senate, the prime minister and the president. Did we not have any other Pakistani besides banker Soomro to replace banker Shaukat Aziz for appointment to the highest political office of the land.

We have an unelected president clinging to his office by virtue of Article 44 of the Constitution. We have a COAS long past the age of his retirement but refusing to relinquish despite mandatory requirements of the Constitution.

We have a Chief Justice of Pakistan eased out of his office and under detention. A very sad tale of affairs.

While on the one hand General Musharraf continues to distribute high public offices to his cronies, one of the most vital organs of the state, namely the judiciary, is being starved of its vitality. The thrust of the proclamation of emergency and the PCO was against the judiciary. By one stroke of the pen, COAS General Musharraf placed the Constitution in abeyance, proclaimed emergency and removed most of the judges of the superior courts. This included some of the finest legal minds that our judiciary had ever produced.

A Constitution is the most sacred document which a nation possesses and the judges are its custodians. With Constitution in abeyance and the judiciary marginalised, where do we stand today?

Though the putative reason for proclamation of emergency was the threat of terrorism, over two weeks have passed yet not one terrorist leader has been apprehended. As against this, thousands of lawyers, political workers and members of civil society have been brutally treated and imprisoned. The gag on the media continues unabated. The farce is too obvious to even warrant a rebuttal.

The damage caused to our polity by this action is incalculable yet General Musharraf remains defiant and remorseless. Whatever is left of the judiciary is now being used to sanctify his lust for power and give semblance of legitimacy to this indefensible constitutional subversion.

Our Constitution has now become the most subverted and defaced legal document. Repeatedly suspended, it has never been restored without distortions engrafted in the name of amendments by the dictators. The Constitution would again be amended to give legal cover to this venture.

If elections are held under the present proclamation of emergency and PCO, the new assembly would be obliged to give it a legal cover. This could only be avoided by insisting on the immediate revocation of the emergency and PCO and restoration of all the judges illegally removed after the proclamation.

General Musharraf has retrospectively amended PCO 2007 to fill an evident lacuna. The COAS has now empowered the president to revoke the proclamation of emergency. The legal instruments issued on Nov 3, and after would remain unique in legal history and would continue to defy the belief of generations of law students. More laws are being enacted in the name of national interest and security curbing liberties of the citizens.

The amendments made to the Army Act, 1952, have substantially widened the net of the offences and the civilians who could now be subjected to provisions of the military law and face military courts. Freedom of the press is curbed by amending the Pemra Ordinance and the proposed code of conduct for the media.

To coerce lawyers, the Bar Councils are deprived of their power to regulate the conduct of their members. These black laws must be revoked at the earliest. It is not hard to imagine what would happen to a country where fundamental rights of the people remain suspended, judges ousted, lawyers detained, military politicised, politicians marginalised, media gagged, journalists on the run, trade and students union banned and terrorists controlling strategic areas mocking the writ of the government.

Yet not a word of remorse or contrition from the person who is the source of all of this. Rather the opposite. General Musharraf and his courtiers are determined to return to power through a farce election.

The only institution which was a check on these excesses has been pulverised. With the arbitrary removal of virtually the entire superior judiciary, the courts have disappeared from the national horizon. This damage is both incalculable and irreparable. A good judge cannot be created overnight. It takes years of nurturing, hard work and professional commitment to train a mind in the legal mould.

It takes even longer to transform that legal mind into a judicial mind. Then there is character: it cannot be acquired, one is born with it. When the mettle is tested for long arduous years then emerges a good judge.

After a very long time we had a superior judiciary we could all be proud of. With one mindless stroke of the pen by a dictator all of this dissolved into thin air. A visit to the deserted courts now presents a forlorn picture of a bright bygone era and a bleak future.

Are the courts working, inquired Winston Churchill, in the midst of the Second World War. Lord Simon, the Lord Chancellor, answered yes, the High Court is working. Good, then all is well, replied the premier. We too are in the midst of a war: Are our courts working? Unfortunately, courts, there are none.

THE insurgency in the tribal areas is largely understood through the use of meaningless caricatures of extremism and Talibanisation. Such explanations construct a mono-causal and simplified understanding of the insurgent movement in the tribal areas.

They are largely based on the assumption that ‘extremism’ is an autonomous and unitary ideological force taking over the hearts and minds of the Frontier tribesmen. The expansion and resilience of insurgent violence is presumptuously linked to the growth of ‘extremism’. There is no evidence to substantiate that it is only or largely the growth of a religious extremist ideology and activism that is driving the dynamics of the insurgency. The mounting empirical evidence points towards the fact that the participation in and support of the insurgency manifests through multiple motivations, constraints and pressures that are not necessarily always tied to an adherence to militant ideology and agenda. The emergence, growth and impact of the insurgency in the tribal areas can be better understood through a political economy perspective that highlights the interactive role of political power, economic motivations, survival strategies and war finance.

A number of varying economic dimensions of the insurgency have been clearly visible. Many local militants and tribesmen have received exorbitant payments from foreign militants and the Pakistani Taliban in return for shelter and logistical support. However, the large amounts reaching Rs50, 000 for mud houses indicate that the militants are not always simply paying for hospitality. In many cases the hefty amounts are a form of patronage and pacification of local tribesmen and tribal elders. Hence, the influx of insurgent finance has allowed certain tribesmen to accumulate substantial wealth voluntarily while coercing others into becoming dependent on and indebted to the militants.

Military operations have also presented unique economic constraints to local tribesmen. For example, economic deprivation and uncertainty during periods of government-imposed economic blockades has compelled many local tribesmen to join the militant’s fold by accepting their allowances. At the same time conflict has also brought new opportunities for many tribesmen. The inflationary markets of conflict and economic blockades have allowed economic entrepreneurs to exploit opportunities for profiteering.

For example in a stand-off between the military and militants in South Waziristan in 2004, local tribesmen used great entrepreneurial skills to take advantage of the economically precarious conditions of conflict. Militants had to pay exorbitant prices for essential items in dollars.

We can see at least three variegated economic effects of the insurgency: tribesmen coerced to participate in or support the insurgency by militants through hefty monetary pacification and tribesmen coping with conditions of conflict by assisting militants and local economic entrepreneurs benefiting through exploiting the markets of conflict. If we go by the studies on war economies of Afghanistan, we can probably say for the majority of the tribesmen, involvement in the resistance economy is motivated by the instinct to cope or survive. It is only in the hands of a few that the bulk of the wealth generated through insurgent finance is accumulating. Profiteering and financial flows at times drive the dynamics of war and certainly play a role in its perpetuation.

The insurgency is also transforming the local labour market and supply. In many cases warfare has destroyed markets, transport infrastructure, residential structures, and personal assets. The local population is increasingly becoming displaced separating people from their land, employment or subsistence activity. This has led both to migration to settled districts and more importantly a local surplus supply of wage labour.

As conflict destroys certain forms of employment activity, it also creates new forms of labour demands. In many cases this had led to the direct employment of tribesmen as fighters by the militants. Newspapers have reported that young recruits are being paid around Rs5, 000 to Rs7, 000 every month while also receiving modern weapons. This negates the commonly held notion of extremism as some ideological force taking over the hearts and minds of the Frontier tribesmen.

There is also indirect evidence that the employment of local labour in the local and regional illicit economy of drugs, arms and smuggling is expanding. Opium production in Afghanistan in the last two years has reached unprecedented levels largely in the two southern border provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar neighbouring the tribal areas. A large part of the opium trafficked through Pakistan to Asia and Europe and Pakistan itself finds its market in this area. The Taliban insurgency in southern Afghanistan is largely responsible for the increase in opium cultivation, production and trafficking. Otherwise, the UN has also reported that local opium cultivation and production has also been increasing since 2001-2002 within the tribal areas and blooming in the neighbouring Pushtun districts in Balochistan.

This has two implications for the tribal areas. First, the growth of the opium trade indicates to a certain degree that an increasing number of agency tribesmen are becoming involved in the opium trade at different levels. The local involvement in the opium trade is further intensified as the tribal areas insurgency threatens existing livelihoods. Secondly, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan maintain strong political links visible in the Afghan Taliban’s influence over the peace agreements in the agencies. It is safe to assume that these political linkages work alongside cross-border shadow economic networks. This only reinforces the increasing role of local militants and tribesmen in the opium trade and its larger role in the tribal areas’ insurgency.

The local opium economy therefore provides an avenue for financing war, economic entrepreneurialism and coping or survival strategy. The multiplicity of motivations, strategies and economic changes driving the growth of the insurgency clearly shows that we cannot attribute the insurgency simply to a monstrous outburst of passionate ideology and activism. The issue of illicit economies brings up an interesting point regarding the alleged ‘criminality’ of the pro-Taliban militants who have at times been used as a justification for acquiring coercive control over law and order. What is ‘criminal’ in the tribal areas? ‘Criminal’ is a deeply problematic and value-laden term, particularly in a context where there is a legal vacuum. Combating criminality allows militants to appropriate lucrative criminal activity while also seeking legitimation for their agenda.

Similarly, in many cases business, non-profit organisations and political parties have also been targeted by the militants. These groups are threatened to stop their activity and leave because of their un-Islamic activity. At the same time hefty ransom payments are demanded that finance militant activity. These examples conflate the ideological, political and economic imperatives of militant strategy and are evident of the fact that these cannot be easily separated as exclusive causal factors in explaining the spread of militancy in the tribal areas. They are in many ways mutually constitutive and reinforcing in explaining the dynamics of insurgent agenda, motivation and strategy.

Therefore, vigilante activism against ‘criminality’ and un-Islamic activity are evidence of a superior political economic strategy that works towards building militant authority, power and legitimacy. Religious ideology and affinity supports political economic strategy and is a crucial mobilising agent. However, it is not the supreme catalyst for all ‘extremities’.

Peacebuilding in insurgent zones therefore requires an understanding of how conflict economies can be transformed into peace economies. The participants and agents of conflict display multiple motivations and strategies including war making, profiteering, coping and survival. Peacemaking will require building an environment for these multiple actors and interests with relevant transformation incentives and political settlements.

faisalsk@gmail.com