Return of the radicals
By Farhana Ali & Mohammad Shehzad
THE reopening of Lal Masjid after a government siege in July is a direct threat to the country and to the world community fighting religious extremists and international terrorist networks.
Three months after clashes between homegrown militants and the Pakistani army, who many believed put extremists to rest in the capital city, the use of the mosque for Friday prayers and inflammatory speeches against General Pervez Musharraf are evidence of a violent trend that the army may not be able to control.
To many observers’ surprise, the army’s raid against the mosque in the summer did little to silence the extremists’ chant for an Islamic revolution. Rather than crush the militants, the government’s siege provoked extremists throughout the country to seek vengeance against the ‘killers’ during the nine-day standoff in July. Soon after the radical mosque reopened, extremist cleric Maulana Aziz called on his followers to start a revolution.
He noted, ‘The nation should be ready for jihad because only jihad can bring a revolution…The students of schools, colleges and universities should spread in the nook and corner of Pakistan and work for bringing an Islamic revolution.’ In retaliation for the death of Aziz’s brother and the students of the Lal Masjid during the siege, Aziz further stated that those who were killed ‘were dear to Allah. That’s why they have embraced martyrdom (which) has boosted our morale. Every mosque in the country is Lal Masjid’.
Echoing Aziz’s desire for martyrdom, the call for jihad by local groups and by Al Qaeda in its recent videotapes and communiqués prove that the Lal Masjid affair is far from over. On the jihadi website, Murasil al-Buraq, a Sept 20 statement entitled, ‘A call for jihad by the lion, Shaykh Usama bin Laden’ launched by Al-Sahab Productions contained a message warning the Pakistani public and its armed forces that jihad was the only answer.
In the voice of Al Qaeda’s ‘grand strategist’, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, the site offered praise for a number of Pakistani clerics, particularly Abdur Rashid Ghazi who was killed by Pakistan’s armed forces. Seeking revenge for his death, Al Qaeda urged the Pakistani public and the army to rise against Musharraf for his ‘submissiveness’ to the United States.
But how much support does Bin Laden have among Pakistanis? In a poll conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow, Al Qaeda has a 43 per cent approval rate, the Taliban have 38 per cent, and support for local extremist groups fall between 37 to 49 per cent. Overall, Bin Laden has a 46 per cent approval rating with Musharraf falling behind at 38 per cent — an astonishing figure, according to Ken Ballen, the director of the polling agency, because it reflects that the Taliban and Al Qaeda ‘are more popular than our allies like Musharraf’. Despite the apparent support for the terrorist movement, most Pakistanis (i.e. 75 per cent, according to the poll) rejected suicide bombings.
While most Pakistanis disagree with suicide terrorism, a determined, dedicated and decisive Al Qaeda in Pakistan has adopted the tactic to launch attacks against targets inside both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Through a wave of suicide bombings, Al Qaeda and local jihadis have proven the lethality of their attacks inside Pakistan which have mostly been directed at the Pakistani armed forces, paramilitaries and the police. Borrowed from the Iraqi insurgents, the use of suicide as a weapon of choice has had deadly consequences.
In the first half of 2007, there were more than two dozen suicide attacks in Pakistan. From January to March 2007, suicide bombings accounted for 67 per cent of civilian casualties, compared to 41 per cent in 2006. From 2003 to 2006, at least 150 tribal elders in Waziristan were murdered presumably by the Taliban who have publicly criticised many elders for siding with Pakistan in its war against the militants.
Unprecedented in Pakistan’s history, suicide terrorism is an emerging trend that has gained popularity among militants after the Lal Masjid event and the breakdown of a peace agreement between the tribal lords of North Waziristan and the Pakistani government.
Pakistan has witnessed a new trend in suicide terrorism — female fidayeen are being prepared to carry out suicide attacks against US interests. A sizable majority of female students of Jamia Hafsa are willing to become suicide bombers. Around 200 women are committed to striking US targets: ‘If the US tried to attack Iran or Pakistan like Afghanistan or Iraq then we will kill the Americans through suicide attacks. We will tie bombs to our bodies and stop the Americans from entering Iran and Pakistan,’ said Sidra Muntaha, a Hafsa student.
Therefore, the steady rate of suicide bombings underscores Musharraf’s claim to the world community that he alone is capable of battling a formidable foe. One of the key challenges before Pakistan is that the resurgent Taliban, allied with Al Qaeda that can manoeuvre, regroup and rearm, destabilise Pakistan’s internal security, its relationship with Afghanistan, and nurture the perception among the international community that Pakistan is a refuge for terrorists.
The exploitation of the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which analysts consider the ‘world’s (new) terrorism central’, inhabited by Pashtun tribes, has refocused the attention of Washington and Islamabad. The penetration of the tribal belt by Al Qaeda — once an ally of Pakistan’s intelligentsia — and the Taliban is publicly acknowledged by the Pakistani military.
According to a former spokesman of the Pakistani military: ‘We don’t deny the Taliban come and go, but that is not the entire truth.’ Whatever the truth may be, greater US engagement in Afghanistan creates risks for Pakistan. After the US assumed control of Nato forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban said 2007 would be ‘the bloodiest year for foreign troops’ and indicated a ready supply of at least 2,000 suicide bombers for their spring offensive against the United States.
With the Taliban-Al Qaeda merger in the tribal belt, General Musharraf will need to rethink his current strategy in the war against terror. In recent weeks, the army’s heavy-handedness against militants has resulted in civilian deaths in the northern areas and contributed to the general’s growing unpopularity.
Whether it is liked or not, the general, in charge of a country that is seen as the citadel of Islam and the only Muslim nuclear power, will continue to be a strategic ally in the US-led war on terrorism. Pakistan will continue to receive international attention so long as Al Qaeda, the Taliban and homegrown extremists threaten the state’s grip on power and so long as Pakistan is viewed by western countries as fuelling the fire of violent a jihad.
Farhana Ali is a research scholar at RAND Corporation. Mohammad Shehzad is a freelance writer based in Islamabad.

