AS THE country inches towards the forthcoming presidential polls to be followed by general elections, everyone’s eyes are glued to London where deals are being negotiated between politicians and the representatives of General Musharraf. Although there is news of some under-the-table discussion with Nawaz Sharif as well, it is believed that the PPP is a comparatively better option for Musharraf.

Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf have a history of bad personal equations which will come in their way. Otherwise, PML-N is closer to the GHQ’s heart than the PPP. This does not mean that the PPP leadership is less susceptible to considering seemingly less democratic options than any other political party in the country.

Political conditions for the regime have deteriorated to a point that it now has to show greater seriousness in its discussions with Benazir Bhutto. In fact, the latter has very clearly said that the regime will have to be more pro-active and forthcoming in showing that it is serious about an agreement. As part of her strategy, Benazir Bhutto has asked Musharraf to take off his uniform, repeal the controversial Article 58 (2) (b) and give her party one-third representation in the interim government.

Bhutto’s demands indicate her understanding that a powerful military cannot be immediately pushed back but has to be gently nudged towards an exit. It is not about Musharraf but about the military’s power. Taking a hard stance, in her estimation, would not help with the transition process.

However, it is difficult to agree with her assumption that unless given a safe exit, the military will take draconian measures. Pakistan’s military is a political military and understands its inability to remain in power without some form of legitimacy. Historically, the army has always come into power by claiming to sack questionable and corrupt regimes. Imposing a martial law now would be tantamount to removing the present army chief and at a time when military rule itself has become unpopular. A new martial law is almost an impossibility.

However, the earlier argument is not meant to underestimate the value of showing the military the way out. What is important, nonetheless, is to plan for the post-election scenario. Benazir Bhutto wants a share in the interim government. A one-third control will substantially re-energise her party. People will regain faith in the party’s power and will vote for it. There will be a lot of defections from the currently ruling party to the PPP if it controls the interim arrangement. But could one think of extending this formula to after the elections as well?

The idea is to form a national government in which power is divided on the basis of seats won during the elections. This formula has been tested and tried in South Africa as well. Dividing power on the basis of representation in the parliament would be beneficial in terms of starting a healthy political discourse and allowing parties to learn to deal with each other.

In South Africa’s case, such division of power was accompanied with the establishment of the truth and reconciliation commissions in which opposing factions came together and talked about their past bitter experiences with the objective of correcting their own behaviour and that of the other side.

Sceptics might argue that Pakistan does not need such commissions but what it certainly needs is two kinds of forums: (a) to discuss the civil-military divide and (b) for reconciliation between various political parties.

One of the reasons for the continued political crisis is the fact that military personnel know very little about the civilian world and vice versa. For instance, most military officers believe that the civil service is nothing but cushy jobs and that all bureaucrats are either corrupt or receive good financial packages. Similarly, a lot of civilians do not understand that the military’s perks are not necessarily extended to the non-officer class.

An even more important issue that the political leadership needs to strategise about are the relations amongst the four federating units which are not equal beneficiaries of economic progress and development in post-9/11 Pakistan or even earlier.

Once in power, all main political parties including the PPP, tend to represent the interest of a certain dominant ethnic elite leaving out hundreds and thousands of others. This is the time that political parties should be thinking of ways regarding the division and distribution of national resources. Financial power has to move away from the centre to the provinces and even further.

Granted that the PPP and PML-N are unhappy with the National Reconstruction Bureau constituted to facilitate the devolution of democracy, but they also have to offer an alternative mechanism to provide relief to the marginalised groups and allow for the trickle-down of power to the grassroots.

It is essential that financial powers are systematically devolved from the centre to the provinces. The provincial consolidated fund has to be strengthened at the cost of the federal consolidated fund. Currently, all resources of the federation are controlled by the federal government which has traditionally contributed to the unhealthy relations between the centre and the provinces.

Holding elections is important, but what is equally essential is for various political parties to agree to a formula for desisting from any substantive constitutional amendments in future which would challenge the balance of power between political forces. In the past, military and political regimes have tried to introduce the Sharia with the objective of empowering an individual or a certain party. The GHQ, in fact, should be made party to such an agreement and be forced to commit not to try and bring legal and constitutional changes such as the enactment of Article 58 (2) (b) which changed the balance of power.

This is a very critical time in Pakistan’s politics. The army would like to hold on to the aforementioned article as a firebreak and a control mechanism to keep ambitious politicians in check. However, it already has an alternative arrangement in the National Security Council which was established in April 2004 to keep irresponsible policymaking and politicians in check. We do not need two mechanisms. Considering that the generals have an issue of trust vis-à-vis the political leadership, there is the NSC which would allow four senior generals, who are members of the NSC, to keep an eye on policymaking and provide their input on a regular basis.

Although the NSC should not be a permanent mechanism, it can help in the interim period. The continuation of this institution along with a national government could prove to be a long-term option to find a way out of the present morass. A deal will not help the country as long as it is with the GHQ only. Perhaps, parties need to seriously make a deal amongst themselves as well. The Charter of Democracy is nothing more than an ambitious wish-list. What is needed is a much more nuanced, structured and sustainable formula for negotiating real power with the army. How the army’s political and economic power will actually be reduced demands a well-thought out strategy.

The writer is an independent analyst and author of the book, Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy.
E-mail: ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

BENAZIR Bhutto has staked her political future in her attempt to make a bid for the premiership of Pakistan for the third time. In the process, she has distanced herself from the wider anti-Musharraf political configuration on the one hand and on the other is cosying up to Musharraf even at the risk of alienating sections of her own party.

Reinforcing the popular impression of Pakistanis that the route to Islamabad is through Washington, she has been meeting US officials and members of the media, both electronic and print, and pitching herself as the force that can truly fight what Americans call the “war on terror”.

Irrespective of whether there is a deal between her and Musharraf on a power-sharing formula, Ms Bhutto’s detailed interviews to the US media outlets in the last couple of weeks offer insights into her political priorities, the shifty nature of her conditions for cooperation, the role she is trying to carve out for herself, and the state of the ruling class coalition in the country.

Before trying to decipher the spirit of her interviews, let us be clear about one thing. The opponents of any likely deal between Ms Bhutto and General Pervez Musharraf see her moves as undermining the democratic forces in the country at a crucial juncture in Pakistan’s history. We must remember that since Musharraf’s assumption of office, Ms Bhutto has always given out feelers for working with him. It was the general who rebutted Ms Bhutto’s overtures. What is new about the changed situation is Musharraf’s decision to rope in Bhutto and the timing of the move.

Thanks to the code of secrecy to which both Ms Bhutto and Musharraf faithfully subscribe to, we have to rely on newspaper reports and interviews giving hints of what is transpiring to draw inferences about Ms Bhutto’s position in behind-the-scenes parleys.

I will focus on four interrelated aspects of the deal-making politics that she has been speaking about. It tells us a lot about the nature of the political discourse in the country. Firstly, how and why she sees teaming up with Musharraf as the panacea to Pakistan’s problems and the salience of the US factor when it comes to determining the share in Pakistan’s power pie. Secondly, what is she prepared to do to make it happen. Thirdly, what is expected of Musharraf to meet his part of the bargain. Finally, what she proposes to do in case the deal falls through.

Fighting “extremism” and promoting “moderation” are the buzzwords that she repeatedly uses as the rationale for having a secret dialogue with Musharraf. This stance is geared more towards winning the support of the White House than echoing popular sentiment in Pakistan. She has a telling answer to the question as to why she deems it appropriate to make a deal with Musharraf when her party has been urging her to keep herself at a safe distance from the general. She says “the international community and the armed forces have confidence in Musharraf” (Washington Post, August 26, 2007).

“International community” is Ms Bhutto’s euphemism for the US administration. Of the 192 member states of the United Nations not many would worry whether or not Musharraf is at the helm in Pakistani. It is mainly the US government, particularly the White House, whose monetary, military and public support for the general is viewed with a mix of awe and jealousy by Ms Bhutto.

Her assessment, and probably quite accurate too, is that the White House is unlikely to ditch Musharraf to hitch its support to democracy in Pakistan. Resultantly, Ms Bhutto’s message to the American audience is that by supporting her along with Musharraf, Washington can have the best of both worlds to stem the tide of “extremism” in Pakistan and around it.

When it comes to acknowledging the US role in influencing power politics in Pakistan, Ms Bhutto in an interview with PBS (a reputable US television channel) aired on August 21 had no qualms in saying that, “we keep them (Americans) briefed. And they are certainly engaged with all the political parties in Pakistan.” In the Washington Post interview, according to Ms Bhutto, the Americans’ message is, “We want stability in Pakistan, fair elections, and General Musharraf is our ally.”

When the lifetime chairperson of the party that has garnered the biggest chunk of popular vote in the past several elections admittedly “briefs” the Americans about her political dealings within Pakistan, the less said about the country’s sovereignty the better.

She claims to have fought the “extremists” more effectively than Musharraf. If she is back in power in the near future, she wants Musharraf to be on her side because she does not “want the security forces to disagree” with her “attack on internal militancy” (Washington Post, August 26, 2007).

What can she offer to Musharraf in order to clinch the deal? Ms Bhutto is quite consistent on this front in her public pronouncements. Firstly, her party will not make a big fuss if the general seeks re-election from the current assemblies. Secondly, being the president he can control the military because he will have the power to “appoint the heads of the military”.

What does she want in return for the above political favours? Ms Bhutto’s list of conditions is reasonably fluid and seems to be shrinking. In her August 21 interview, the list contained demands such as “lifting the ban on a twice-elected prime minister…seeking a third term.” But as she correctly pointed out there are many more important issues such as the holding of fair elections which involves the nature of the caretaker government, who will be in it and the policing power.

A week later she modified this and said categorically that she expected the president to lift the ban on the twice-elected prime minister and announce immunity for public officers by the end of August.

When conditions for extending support to a military general are narrowed down to those which would mainly benefit her personally and some of her close associates whose reputation is clouded by alleged corruption, ordinary supporters of the PPP may feel a little let down by their leader.

Time is of essence for both Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf. Ms Bhutto has risked alienation from the broad coalition of opposition parties and if the deal does not come through within a few days her friendly gestures to Musharraf are likely to ignite discontent in the ranks of her own party.

Rather than take some of the steps that Ms Bhutto has suggested, Musharraf has dispatched his emissaries to London to keep the channels of communication open with her.

When asked about her options in the unlikely event of the deal falling through, Ms Bhutto snubbed the opposition parties when she said she would still come back to Pakistan and team up with “other moderate political parties in the country to try to bring about a transition.” She has also issued a veiled threat to Musharraf saying if he doesn’t take the steps she has outlined for him, she may ask her party’s legislators to resign and join an opposition movement.

If things come to that pass, she may not be welcomed back in the opposition ranks with open arms. She realises that and observes, “We can’t afford to be contaminated by his unpopularity without getting the prize for democracy.”

The prized democracy the PPP leader is searching for with the hope of having Musharraf on her side may remain an elusive quest, but the unaffordable contamination she talks about has started to show its signs in the shape of popular displeasure over the politics of deal-making in a manner that is more reminiscent of palace politics than transparent politicking.

I WAS sitting with my friend, the owner of a plant nursery, and looking at the beautiful new plants he had. He said he gets two types of customers, those who simply want plants to fill the beds of their garden and those who seem to love plants. He observed that those who love plants also are inevitably peace-loving, gentle and compassionate people.

We discussed that one of the things that plants teach us is to value time. We wait for the plant to grow anticipating its flowering season, its mature height, its shape or how we will work with its form, what we can plant next to it.

My daughter, who just returned during her break from studies, said she had forgotten how much of a rush people in Karachi are in, as she too used to be. We speed down roads as if escaping a disaster, never noticing anything along the way as if speed itself was the thing of value.

We want to hurtle through our studies in order to get that piece of paper that proves we are educated. We want to rise in our job positions very quickly, as if therein lies success and happiness. Yet goals are an ever changing thing, which once achieved only lead to new goals. The real substance of life lies in the journey.

I was relieved to learn of The Slow Movement founded by Carlo Petrini in Italy in 1986 to resist the inroads of fast food, which displaces cultural cuisine and all that it entails such as family meals, quality time and, of course, health.

The Slow Food Organisation has expanded to over 100 countries and has 83,000 members. All the justifications given, such as supporting local farmers and regional economies notwithstanding, it is really not about food or farmers, but about a way of life we are rapidly losing.

Change is good, but why does it have to be forced into such a fast pace? The quality of life lies in savouring the moment, good or bad, finding time to contemplate, to think about what we really want instead of what we are told to want.

It is about listening to what our children have to say, enjoying the company of friends, finding time to look up at the full moon. It’s time we bring back dignity to life.