THE Kabul jamboree is now over and the jirga participants, both Pakistanis and Afghans, have declared it a success. This assessment flows largely from the fact that President Musharraf decided to attend the last day of the extended jirga and made what was for him an unprecedented admission — that the problems in Afghanistan were compounded “because of support for the Taliban in areas under our control.”

If this was the time for candour it would perhaps have been worthwhile to acknowledge that assistance was coming from areas of our territory that are no longer under our control and that these same areas are also being used to spread the Taliban infection to other places in Pakistan.

Such an acknowledgment would have done no more than to confirm what people already know from reading newspapers and watching TV. But it would have underlined that the fight against the Taliban is actuated as much by Pakistan’s own national interest of being able to enforce the law in that area as by the “solemn responsibility” to fight the spread of such influences.

A jirga of this nature could not bring the desired results of denying the Taliban the use of tribal areas on both sides of the border, particularly since the maliks and the “white beards” of North and South Waziristan had refused to attend it. I do not know how many of the Afghan participants were from Afghanistan’s border areas but it did appear as though many of the heavy hitters among them were from areas very distant from the Pakistan border.

One result has been the formation of a jirga with 25 members from each side to monitor the implementation of the decisions taken, and more importantly, to hold talks with the opposition to persuade its more amenable elements to recognise the error of their ways and to join the political mainstream in Afghanistan.

One hopes that this will yield results but the experience of the Afghan reconciliation commission is not encouraging. For us, neither is the experience of the agreements reached by the Pakistani government with Taliban-dominated tribal jirgas in 2004 and 2006.

This is not to deny the truth of President Musharraf’s assertion that not all Taliban are diehard militants. It is to point out that evidence suggests that separating the moderate Taliban from the diehards did not succeed in the past and probably will not in the future, unless these “moderates” see the militants suffering setbacks and governmental activity bringing economic and social benefits to the affected areas.

Mere talk will not do. In six years since the ouster of the Taliban in Afghanistan, such talk is all the Afghans have heard, and all it has done is make them yearn nostalgically for the return of the security they enjoyed under Taliban rule.

I have not been able to see the full text of the recommendations made by the five working committees of the Joint Peace Jirga whose declaration makes no mention of it. But there was a hint in the reporting of the proceedings that the jirga would recommend the jirgas of the tribes whose members straddle the border.

This is the best way to move in tandem on the Taliban question. It will be effective if the two governments along with the coalition forces in Afghanistan can provide the support that the tribal maliks and notables will need against the Taliban and undertake the job of creating projects that are the best antidote to the Taliban’s well-financed recruitment campaign.

While there was discussion in the jirga of the nexus between drugs and terrorism, one did not note any reference to the damage that drugs are doing to the youth of the two countries. Despite all the publicity given to the Taliban-drug warlord nexus, much of the money from drugs goes into the hands of corrupt and ill-paid government officials in Afghanistan.

While the administration of Afghanistan is Afghanistan’s internal affair, one would have thought that the contribution that corruption and maladministration have made to the resurgence and growing popularity of the Taliban needed to be mentioned by the Afghan delegates. This would have been appropriate along with some comments on the steps they would recommend to their government to rectify the situation.

While the joint declaration talked of not allowing terrorists sanctuary or training centres on their soil, there was no mention of Pakistan’s view that the Afghan refugee camps inside its territory along the border were being used for this purpose or of what could be done to prevent this. This, too, is an important element that needs to be addressed in any joint effort to curb the Taliban menace. Both sides need to work together to elicit greater international cooperation for the winding up of these camps.

It was interesting that some semi-official Pakistani delegates, echoing the views of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, are reported to have suggested that the real problem in Afghanistan was the presence of foreign troops and that the solution lay in having them replaced by contingents from Muslim countries. One hopes that this was not prompted by similar thoughts in official circles.

It is true that the Afghan people, particularly in the south, are fed up with foreign troops who visit devastation upon the civilians as much as they do on the Taliban when they respond to Taliban attacks with air power and artillery fire.

Estimates by the UN, while cautioning that many reports of civilian casualties are exaggerated, confirm that over 600 civilians were killed this year and that more than half of them died at the hands of the coalition or Afghan forces. Given the spate of suicide attacks, coalition forces that are proceeding in convoys often fire upon Afghan vehicles that are deemed to have come too close to the convoy. This, too, has added to the number of civilian casualties.

It is also true that despite all the aid money that has poured into Afghanistan, the people, particularly those living in the south and east, have seen scant attention paid to their everyday needs, leave alone to the development projects that were expected to be undertaken. All the Afghans see is expatriates riding around in well protected four-wheelers or sitting in heavily secured offices expending on themselves money earmarked for the Afghans.

One project that could have made a dramatic impact — the reconstruction of Kajaki dam on the Helmand river and the restoration of electricity supply to almost two million people in Kandahar and Helmand provinces — remains unfinished. This is because, despite their best efforts, the British have not been able to secure the road along which transmission lines would run and that would be used to transport heavy machinery and turbines to the dam.

American action in Iraq has caused even more revulsion in Afghanistan than in the rest of the Muslim world because the Taliban have used this skilfully to propagate America’s and its allies’ enmity towards all Muslims, and not just the Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

There is no doubt, however, that in today’s Afghanistan talking of a Muslim force to provide security or to fight the Taliban is a recipe for a disaster that will engulf Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. The requirement is not to ask for the withdrawal of foreign forces but for discussions on how they can be made more effective and how more can be done to bring development to the area and to thus win the battle for hearts and minds.

The requirement is to ensure that there is more effective patrolling of the border areas. The requirement is to ensure that Afghan and coalition forces cooperate fully in controlling movement across the border at recognised checkpoints and at the myriad other crossing points that exist all along the border.

The declaration states that the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan “should implement infrastructure, economic and social sector projects in the affected areas.” One hopes that this laconic statement emerged from a detailed discussion of how such projects must be implemented by local contractors who would be required to employ local youth after training them and would also be used to build the political influence of anti-Taliban notables of the area.

But such cavilling apart, it does seem that as a result of the jirga and the agreement on the common threat that terrorism poses, there will be at least a temporary end to the name-calling that characterised Pak-Afghan exchanges during the past few months. But what do we intend doing next to combat extremism and terrorism? The domestic political situation in Pakistan is beset by uncertainties. If decisive action is taken against the Taliban now, it will be seen as further bowing to American demands by a puppet government that has no interest beyond its own survival which it links to Washington. The raucous debate in Washington about unilateral action against Al Qaeda hideouts in Pakistan’s tribal areas has not helped, nor have the certification requirements for the continuance of aid.

On the other hand, all evidence points towards the Taliban becoming an even more potent force in Pakistan than they are in Afghanistan. The latest evidence is Darra Adamkhel where the Taliban have taken over. The government has now decided to hold talks with them.

This newspaper carried a report which had government officials saying on the one hand that “the Taliban had neither violated any government law nor challenged its writ and, therefore, there was no need to arrest anybody” and on the other that “They (the Taliban) had not allowed the Khasadar Force, militia, DCO and parliamentarians to enter the village where they had carried out the operation by blowing up ‘houses of criminals’.”

If this was not a challenge to the writ of the state one wonders what so qualifies.

Two decapitated bodies of Afghans have been discovered in the tribal areas with notes on them saying they had been executed because they were American spies. Army check posts have been attacked. FC personnel have been abducted and their release made conditional on the freeing of Taliban held in custody by the authorities.

In the rest of the country, there was a high security alert as we prepared to celebrate the 60th anniversary of our independence, because of reports that suicide bombers had made their way into the main cities and would use gatherings for the launching of a spectacular attack. We are a country that has lost control of part of its territory while the rest of the country is under a terrorist siege. What we need to do is clear. Whether there is a will to bite that bullet is not.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

DURING the long period spent in government service, I said many prayers to the Almighty invoking His blessings for many things. Only those left a permanent imprint on the mind which I sought selflessly, and in whose intellectual and spiritual strain the objects desired were on a higher plane, far beyond material gain.

I have perused a lot of Urdu literature, though much less than my readings in English, and as part of my job I have had to go through many Urdu newspapers too. Some Urdu poetry left its mark as did a poem of Rahman Baba’s that I read during my attempts to learn Pushto. It’s pity though that so-called words of wisdom have come mostly from books in English. I suppose one should be grateful to our past British rulers for that.

The most impressive of supplications to God, and one that all who seek male offspring should always keep in sight, is “A Soldier’s Prayer for his Son” attributed to General MacArthur of the US Army. It has confronted me at various times during a long life, but I am indebted to an old friend for being reintroduced to it. For sheer beauty of sentiment and loftiness of thought it would be difficult to find its parallel. It is as follows:“Build me a son, O Lord who will be strong enough to face himself when he is afraid; one who will be proud in defeat, humble and gentle in victory. Build me a son whose wishes will not take the place of deeds; a son who will know Thee, and that to know himself is the foundation stone of knowledge.

“Lead him, I pray, not in the path of ease and comfort but under the stress and spur of difficulties and challenges. Let him learn to stand up in the storm; let him learn compassion for those who fail. Build me a son whose heart will be clean, whose goal will be high, a son who masters himself before he seeks to master other men; one who will reach into the future, yet never forget the past.

“And after all these things are his, add, I pray, enough sense of humour so that he may always be serious yet never take himself too seriously. Give him humility, the simplicity of true greatness, the open mind of true wisdom, and the meekness of true strength. Then I, his father, will dare to whisper, I have not lived in vain.”

“Wah!” in Urdu is all that I can say. And “wah” what a man, General MacArthur, to make such an edifying prayer, combining in the desired attributes for a son the best that the Almighty can grant and the noblest that civilisation can teach a father to ask for. I hope the general’s prayer was granted.

My wife and I never had a son; we have two daughters. As the idiom goes, they have been like sons to us; in fact better because there was no waywardness, no neglect of studies, no involvement with bad company, no drugs and no pistol-toting, and, above all, no frustration at their not getting into the DMG – these being the fate of most ambitious parents nowadays. Had a son been born to us I would have fervently prayed on the lines of General MacArthur.I know this is easily said. I also know that if God had seen it fit to follow the general’s prescription in our case, the poor boy would have had a sorry time, in school and college and university, and in whatever job fate would have reserved for him. If even one-tenth of the people of our social status were like him he would have passed muster, but in the present circumstances he would have been the odd man out.

An important point to consider in the context of such a prayer is: what is the father himself like? Is he anywhere near the character and personality that he wants his son to possess? Or is it that in a supreme and rare realisation of his own failings he wants the Almighty to improve upon the model?

Anyway, day and night we see fathers praying for their sons. Those of the middle class want them to become engineers so that the financial position of the family can take a quick jump for the better. At the back of their minds is the silent yearning for the good things of life that only undeserved income can supply. They want for them the clout and influence that they themselves lacked and which they believe can make much of adversity move out of the way.

Senior officers in the government would give their right arm to see their sons ensconced comfortably in the civil services, preferably the DMG. Politicians and ministers train their sons to go into politics for therein lies the coveted pelf. Even presidents and prime ministers manoeuvre so that their sons can succeed them in the rulers’ gaddi.

But nothing that I write on the subject can match the brutally realistic picture drawn by the above-mentioned friend of the current popular dreams about sons. Here is his version of the Pakistani soldier’s prayer for his son:

“Give me a son, O Lord, whom I can raise in luxury, giving him all the good things that were not my lot as a child. Make him of sound body and limb so that he can qualify for a military academy. Let him, O Lord, have a smooth sailing in his cadet years and let him be awarded the coveted Sword of Honour even if he does not deserve it, after which let me keep him in the comfort of my home as my ADC.

“Let him, O Lord, have a good time in all his courses and let him have the choicest postings, far removed from hot spots and hard areas, and throw in for good measure a long and lucrative deputation abroad. Give me the connections, O Lord, to get him inducted into a choice civil career in the military quota at the first opportunity and provide him with a moneyed bride. Then, O Lord, I shall proclaim from the rooftops that I have not lived in vain.

As you see, integrity, truthfulness, humility, self-control and other attributes sought by General MacArthur for his son find no place in this prayer.

WHEN Pakistan’s foreign policy came in the line of fire in the National Assembly last week, one wished that the level of the debate had been more informed and intelligent. But what can one expect from parliamentarians who are too busy with their own pursuits and have no time to even attend Assembly sessions regularly, let aside do their homework?

When Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri rose to wind up the debate, there were barely 40 members in the House. The quorum required is 86 and since the opposition did not point out the lack of quorum, the debate could proceed.

The opposition and surprisingly some members of the ruling Muslim League as well were childishly vociferous in denouncing President Musharraf’s close alliance with the United States in its war on terror that has brought so much humiliation to Pakistan. This made the foreign minister’s job of putting up a spirited defence of his government’s performance quite easy. He promptly listed a series of the foreign office’s ‘foreign policy successes’, as he termed them.

The entire debate was quite superficial. One member, incidentally from the ruling party, a retired major from the army and the parliamentary secretary of defence, did not even attempt to define the policy. He just lashed out in all directions, suggesting that the country should fight a jihad against India and the US, extend recognition to the Taliban – as though one mistake in 1997 were not enough – and dispatch infiltrators into the Kashmir Valley to take revenge.

A closer look at the foreign policy scenario, especially in the context of the developments taking place in the region, leaves one quite stupefied at the lack of understanding among our MNAs of how foreign policy works. Equally baffling is the ad hoc manner in which Pakistan’s policymakers treat this important area of public life.

What emerges from Mr Kasuri’s statement is that our foreign policy focuses primarily on our strategic and security ties with China, the US, the EU and the Muslim world. Obtaining economic assistance and investment from these countries also figures prominently on our foreign policy agenda. What is strange is that the foreign minister chose to brush aside the two most important elements that are actually vital to the shaping of the entire gamut of our foreign relations. These are Pakistan’s equations with India and Afghanistan.

The government appears to be shy about debating the South Asian sector of our foreign relations — notably our ties with India and Afghanistan — and would like to wish it away like an embarrassing dream. But, unfortunately, that is not how diplomacy operates and the government would do better to face squarely some of the facts of life that we have so far refused to recognise. This refusal has cost Islamabad dearly. It has led it to commit blunders of the worst kind while formulating and conducting its foreign and geo-strategic relations. In the process, the country has had to toe the American line with undignified servility.

One of the basic premises on which the foreign office proceeds is that India is our enemy number one. This is not articulated so candidly now as it was a few years ago. But in a subtle way, Islamabad continues to regard New Delhi as its detractor.

For example, take Mr Kasuri’s speech in the National Assembly. While listing his government’s achievements in the field of foreign affairs one item that he mentioned — in fact, the only one in the political context pertaining to India — was his success in blocking India’s ambition to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Kashmir is made out to be the core issue that has blocked friendship between the two countries. But only 48 per cent of the respondents in Pakistan in a survey conducted by Dawn News said that the territory should be a part of their country while 45 per cent believed that friendship with India was possible without the issue being resolved.

Pakistan has yet to become aware of some basic tenets in conducting external relations. No country opens fronts on every side. Although a dialogue is taking place with New Delhi, the government’s tone is wary and the adversarial undertone in Pakistan’s foreign policy continues to be quite pronounced. The sense of antagonism is so strong that Islamabad’s Afghan policy has been shaped accordingly.

These contradictions have also affected the war efforts against the extremists. As such Pakistan has, at least until recently, resorted to the use of covert methods by its secret agencies to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir and also in Afghanistan.

If the country now finds itself overly dependent on the United States, it is not strange. Sensing Islamabad’s limited manoeuvrability, Washington has exploited the situation to its advantage and put pressure on Pakistan when it deems it necessary, even threatening to use military action against the Taliban safe havens on Pakistani territory. Hence, the outpouring of the anti-American sentiments in the country that we witnessed last week. But swinging to the other end is no answer.

Pakistan has been behaving like a big power in the conduct of its foreign policy. It appears to forget the constraints it suffers from in terms of its resources and its relative size and status as a neighbour of India. Competing with India is not a sensible strategy since it only adds to our contradictions.

Besides it is now time for Pakistan to recognise that its moorings should be firmly rooted in South Asia. A non-adversarial relationship with India will help Pakistan to maintain a dignified distance from the US without making an enemy out of it.

A glaring example of our mishandling of our policy vis-à-vis India is the case of our fateful decision in 1998 to become a nuclear power. This was prompted by our conventional policy of waging an arms race with New Delhi. The danger we now face is that this nuclear capability might prove to be a white elephant as the US and other powers debate the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Al Qaeda.

The political crisis in the country has intensified this debate and there is now talk of America launching air strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. The Bush administration claims to have knowledge of their location. Can Pakistan resist this onslaught?