THE latest opinion polls in the US confirm the widely held view that President George Bush’s rating is at an all-time low. However, the administration continues to claim that its foreign policy is focused on fighting the war on terror and that this was being done primarily in Iraq.

The reality, however, is not only different, but an increasing number of Americans are recognising that their president took their country to war in a distant land with no moral or legal justification and thought even less about its after-effects. Their disillusionment with the Iraq adventure has been evident for some time, but its most powerful expression was the drubbing given to Republican candidates during the November 2006 mid-term elections when the Democrats gained control of both Houses for the first time in over a decade.

While the Republicans fought the election on the “terror ticket”, the Democrats made it clear that they intended to turn the elections into a “referendum on the Iraq war”.

This view was strengthened by the campaign speeches of the Democrats, particularly those such as Nancy Pelosi, the current speaker of the House, who warned that “this election is about Iraq. If it turns out the way people expect it to turn out, the American people will have spoken” and “they will have rejected the course of action the president is on.”

Confirming this view, the media stated that the Democratic victory in both Houses was like “punishing President Bush and his Republicans over a failing war in Iraq.”

Not surprisingly, the election results brought about a sea change in American politics. Bush could no longer dismiss his critics, nor accuse them of not being patriotic enough. Soon after the elections results, the administration suffered another reversal when the Iraq Study Group, headed by two distinguished Americans, submitted its much anticipated report on Iraq.

While there was nothing startlingly new or unconventional in the report, its recommendations were nevertheless deeply upsetting to the administration, which had persisted in maintaining the fiction that the invasion of Iraq would strike a blow to international terrorism.

Given the reputation for integrity and competence enjoyed by members of the group, the president could not dismiss its recommendations. He, therefore, went through the charade of consulting distinguished Americans to determine what modifications, if any, should be made to his Iraq policy. The result of these deliberations was his speech last January where he unveiled a new strategy for Iraq which he called the “New Way Forward”.

The strategy involved an increase in the number of American troops deployed in the Iraq war, ostensibly to provide security to two of the most troubled areas, Baghdad and Al-Anbar province. This meant the deployment of an additional 20,000 American troops to Iraq and thus it came to be known as the “policy of surge”.

The armed forces chiefs went along with this decision, though they expressed “concern about the erosion of the US military’s ability to deal with other crises around the world, because of the heavy commitment in Iraq and the stress on troops and equipment.”

Administration officials had then explained that the additional troops would be able to stem the tide of growing insurgency and also assist in the speedier training of Iraqi troops. The Democrats, not amused by the president’s disregard for their views, savaged him, claiming that it was “not in the national interest of the US to deepen its military involvement in Iraq.” The US media, too, expressed its scepticism over the “surge”, for it recognised that it had not found favour with the public. Polls showed that more than 60 per cent were opposed to this move.

In all these months, the situation has not improved. If anything, there has been a sharp deterioration, both in the number of attacks on Americans and in the sophistication of the weaponry used against them. Not surprisingly, a CBS poll in late June showed that the three-fourths of the American public was now of the view that US involvement in Iraq was either creating more terrorists (51 per cent) or having no effect on the number of terrorists (24 per cent), with only 17 per cent believing that the US was eliminating terrorists who might attack the US because of its presence in Iraq.

While on the subject of American occupation of Iraq, Robert Fisk, a voice of understanding and integrity on the Middle East, recalled in a recent report the writings of the legendary Lawrence of Arabia on the subject of Arab resistance to Turkish occupation, wherein he had written that to control the land, the Turks would need 600,000 men “to meet the combined challenge of the ill-wills of all the Arab people.”

Lawrence had pointed out that for any rebellion to be successful, it “must have an unassailable base. It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movement to the enemies. Rebellions can be made by two per cent active in a striking force and 98 per cent passively sympathetic. Granted mobility, security, time and doctrine, victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.”

What profound wisdom encapsulated in a few words. If only Bush and his generals had read Lawrence’s warnings, they would have saved themselves much pain and ignominy.

While most American academicians are convinced that salvation lies in an early withdrawal from Iraq, the neo-cons are, of course, not impressed. They are on a mission and for them the end justifies the means, even if it results in the death of thousands of Americans and the destruction of a sovereign state.

This view is best articulated in the writings of that doyen of the Cold War school of realpolitik, Dr Henry Kissinger, who fearing a decline in American resolve and grit, gave vent to his frustration, and in his usual persuasive style castigated those who advocated the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq.After admitting that the Iraq war had created both public disenchantment and Congressional opposition, he has warned that “precipitate withdrawal would produce a disaster. It would not end the war but shift it to other areas like Lebanon, Jordan or Saudi Arabia.” And in what has now become the refrain of the American neo-cons, he has warned that “the demonstration of American impotence would embolden radical Islamism and further radicalise its disciples from Indonesia and India to the suburbs of European capitals.”

Henry Kissinger has not been satisfied with merely raising these phantoms, and has raised the spectre of Iran in his attempt to put the fear of this “monster” in the hearts of conservative Arab regimes. He has voiced his fear of the “Baghdad regime becoming a satellite of Iran” and pointed to the disaster this would be for countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Finally, he has cautioned that “no American president will, in the end, acquiesce once the full consequences of Iranian domination of the region become apparent.”

Kissinger is, of course, a man of great intelligence and wisdom, but he fails to appreciate that the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has opened a Pandora ’s Box that is likely to have far-reaching consequences for the region and even beyond.

A strong, stable and prosperous country, where various communities had lived in reasonable harmony for centuries, has been shattered. Ethnic, linguistic and sectarian differences have emerged that are tearing the country apart. Each group believes that its survival requires the annihilation of others. No part of the country is safe, with the American-installed regime confined to the fortress known as the “Green Zone”. The country has been in a state of civil war with more than half a million Iraqis killed in sectarian clashes and punitive US strikes.

But what is most worrying and ironic is that though the Americans had gone into Iraq ostensibly to destroy terrorist cells, the place has given birth to that very monster which has haunted them since 9/11. It is now widely recognised, even by western scholars, that the US occupation of Iraq has been a terrorist dream ticket to success and stardom. More than any other country, Iraq has become the frontline of international terrorism, providing an ideal training ground for radicals the world over, both as regards tactics and weaponry.

In this context, it would be recalled that some US officials had claimed that their presence in Iraq would turn the country into a pot of honey that would attract all terrorists, making it convenient for the US to eliminate them with little effort. Well, the pot of honey has become a bitter pill that the US does not know whether to swallow or spit out. If current sentiments in the US are an indicator of the shape of things to come, it is quite clear that the Bush administration, too, is now veering towards a gradual withdrawal from Iraq.

This would be a welcome development but does the US recognise the scourge unleashed thanks to its policies? While it strengthens its own defences, how should Muslim countries deal with a phenomenon whose impact is now being felt in Pakistan in a dramatically disastrous manner?

No amount of US aid or propaganda by Islamabad is likely to convince Pakistanis that their country’s participation in the global war on terror is to their advantage. Most view the war as part of the American agenda to marginalise Muslim countries and justify their depiction of Islam as an “evil religion”.

What should Washington do in such a situation? First of all, the US has to bring about a fundamental change in its strategy for the entire Middle East, and this should start with the promotion of a just and fair resolution of the Palestinian problem.Secondly, it has to abandon its collusion with repressive, authoritarian regimes of the region. A democratic dispensation may appear slow and messy, but it is far better equipped to reach out to its opponents and build bridges with all sections of society — an essential factor for arriving at a consensus on critical issues such as the war on terror.

Only elected, democratic governments can be credible and effective partners of the US in these troubled times. Let the US initiate this strategic shift with its policy on Pakistan.

The writer is a former ambassador.

The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the war; it is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.
–– Carl von Clausewitz (1832)

THE recent hike in terrorist bombings and suicide attacks is fuelling the perception that the state’s existence is imperilled. There is no denying the lethal ferocity with which religious extremists are challenging the state’s already tenuous writ.

That is probably one reason why some ‘liberals’ are calling for concordance between the military and secular politicians. In this view, while democracy is a desirable goal, the more urgent problem of tackling the threat of radical Islam means that ‘pure’ democracy will have to wait.

Instead of deriding and opposing Musharraf at this critical juncture, therefore, secular political parties should make common cause with him in his mission of ‘enlightened moderation’. The actual formula is simple: the Pakistan People’s Party as the civilian partner in a Musharraf-led government which would provide the general the popular base and legitimate authority needed to effectively take on the rabid mullahs.

But is this seemingly pragmatic recipe useful against the goals its proponents would like it to serve? The answer is not really clear. First, if the past is any guide, civil-military power sharing is a recipe for political instability and policy paralysis. In the 1990s, such arrangements failed repeatedly because of the military’s chokehold on defence and foreign policy which left civilians little autonomy to govern. Elected governments can hardly be absolved of culpability. But their flaws were less than the cause and more the effect of military intervention and rule.

In any case, dual executives are inherently prone to confrontation because shared powers insert conflicts into the system. For example, the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces but the prime minister is the chief executive and defence policy falls under the elected cabinet’s domain. In case of disagreement, the president armed with 58 (2) B can show the PM the door. In the past, even when the president and the prime minister were from the same party, as the Leghari-Benazir Bhutto combine from 1993-1996, it didn’t take long for their ‘duet’ to change into a ‘duel’.

The moral of the story: transitions from authoritarian rule in which directly elected members are subject to censure or dismissal by means other than a parliamentary vote of no confidence, are prone to conflicts, crises and even breakdowns.

Second, there are no logical, theoretical or empirical grounds for making a case that a democratically elected government is any less competent than a presidential one in dealing with threats to Pakistan's internal stability.

The effective use of state authority against non-state challengers requires the legitimation of that authority by popular consent. Based on their share of votes and parliamentary seats in the last five general elections, the PPP and the PML-N are the two most likely governing parties in case democracy is restored. Both are moderate forces opposed to extremism. Empowered by the popular will, they are more likely to succeed in facing up to religious extremism through a broader political and military effort.

This is because civilian governments have the potential to make balanced threat assessments, especially because they are likely to take both civilian and military opinions into account. In contrast, in a military-dominated setup, decision making on national security matters either excludes systematic input from civilian institutions or ignores it.

The trouble is that the military itself has little capacity for political analysis. The result is an occupational bias towards the ‘unity of command’ that translates into reckless incompetence when applied to political problems.

Studies have shown that during the 1971 crisis, civilian institutions had little input into decision-making which was restricted to a coteries of generals led by Yahya Khan. In the end, the military failed to consider the consequences of its preemptive strike against India as it had made the ill-informed assessment that the US or China would come to its rescue. The ultimate result, as we now know, was war and the break-up of the state.

Third, states function on the basis of the rule of law. Political institutions aid the rule of law by channeling social conflicts into constitutionally established structures. In the absence of such institutional mechanisms, politics becomes an ‘anything goes’ game in which those with the capacity to inflict the most lethal violence usually win out. The expanding clout and boldness of extremist groups should be seen in this larger context of authoritarianism in which political institutions, such as political parties and legislatures, are subordinated to the rule of brute force.

Given the entrenched nature of military influence, it would be naïve to expect that it is going to give up state power easily. The more things deteriorate in terms of law and order, the more the opportunity for the military to project itself as the bulwark against anarchy – and delay democracy.

In the worst case scenario, some observers suspect that the military could opt for an emergency to prolong the status quo. Until General Musharraf's attempt on March 9 to force the Supreme Court Chief Justice into resigning, the military could take its dominance for granted as it faced no tangible resistance to the expansion of its role into non-military spheres.

But since that fateful step, things are in a flux. The conseuqent pro-democracy consensus in civil society shows that military dominance or rule has few bases of public support or legitimacy left. In fact, the most vocal pro-democratic sections of civil society, notably the lawyers’ associations, are actively struggling to civilianise the framework for political rule. In the face of strident public opposition to its illegitimate political status, the military's dominance appears to be on shaky ground. The crux of the matter is this: civil-military integration, as is being suggested by some, is a utopia. If the end is political stability, the most appropriate means is the separation of the civil and the military into clearly demarcated spheres of responsibility. Civil-military separation does not rule out the use of the state’s coercive apparatus against enemies of the state. But it does mean that all civil-military interaction must take place within the bounds of the original 1973 Constitution or as it stood on October 12, 1999.

That Constitution subordinates the armed forces to the elected executive responsible to the parliament. It also censures the political role of the military as an act of high treason. The only role the military can legitimately play in the civilian sector is to ‘act in aid of civil power’. In case they have forgotten, military officers take a constitutionally prescribed oath of service which explicitly debars them from interference in politics.

In sum, the Clausewitzian subordination of the military to democratically established civilian authority is “the only thing which is possible”. Free and fair elections which decide “who governs” Pakistan is a necessary step in that direction.

The writer is a PhD candidate in political science at Columbia University, US.