IT has been a hot, humid and turbulent summer in Pakistan. While major cities have been hit by massive load-shedding, large areas of rural Pakistan lie submerged under floodwaters.

In the capital, the nation’s attention was focused on the Supreme Court where government attorneys were engaged in a desperate effort to shore up their collapsing case against the Chief Justice. As if this were not enough, a bizarre drama was enacted (and captured live on television) within a stone’s throw of the country’s most powerful institutions.

General Musharraf has always prided himself on ensuring law and order in the country along with efficient, clean and effective governance. Notwithstanding his hands-on approach, the country has seen a regrettable slide on both fronts. But it is not only the collapse of law and order that is deeply worrying. The economy, too, may be entering into a period of turbulence, with inflation turning the middle class into paupers.

The much touted privatisation programme has also become a victim of malfeasance with the Supreme Court questioning the manner in which Pakistan’s only steel mill was privatised.

The country has been wracked by major disturbances as well. In Balochistan and the Frontier, large swathes of territory have been in a state of near insurgency. In the former, it has resulted in army action against major tribes. One of these led to the killing of Sardar Akbar Bugti whose death has given the Baloch what they lacked all these years — a powerful symbol of defiance.

In the case of the Frontier and Fata, nearly 100,000 of our regular forces have been engaged in military operations that have caused numerous casualties on both sides. While in the case of Balochistan, the operations were meant to enforce Islamabad’s writ on a turbulent province, the army action in the tribal areas has been carried out at the behest of our foreign friends. Pakistan’s sacrifices have, however, proven inadequate in convincing the Bush administration or Kabul of the government’s sincerity and resolve.

Irrespective of whether Washington’s demand that Islamabad “do more” against extremists and terrorists is justified, there is no doubt that the Musharraf regime has continued to send out mixed signals on the issue of religious extremism. While it has attacked many Al Qaeda and Taliban hideouts, earning kudos and monetary benefits from the West in the process, it has also treated many extremists with kid gloves. There is thus an impression that the regime has tried to play both sides: providing succour and support to some and coming down hard on others.

Even on the issue of madressahs, there has been considerable waffling. While publicly committed to carrying out major reforms in these institutions, in reality little has been done. Many madressahs continue to pursue their own agenda. Notwithstanding the repeated assertions by Musharraf of his commitment to progressive policies, this has been more for the consumption of our foreign patrons.

However, nothing could have been more disturbing than the manner in which the government chose to handle the Lal Masjid crisis. For months, if not years, it had been known that Lal Masjid was becoming the centre of religious extremism and its custodians were engaged in prohibited activities. Instead of treating the two brothers — Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi — as suspects, the regime not only acquiesced in to their actions, but chose to view them as engaged in pious activities. Each time the Lal Masjid gang broke the law, the regime would dispatch its luminaries to plead for “responsible behaviour”.

It was only after Chinese nationals were kidnapped that Islamabad woke up to the disastrous consequences of its policies. The Chinese were so dismayed by the handling of the Lal Masjid crowd that their president personally conveyed his country’s displeasure over the event.

Though the military action, now known as Operation Sunrise, has concluded, the loss of so many lives is regrettable. Moreover, the manner in which it was conducted was most confusing. Even though the Lal Masjid leadership had been on the path of defiance for months, our intelligence and security agencies appeared unaware of the number and origin of militants, or even their weaponry.

Such elementary steps as cutting off gas, electric and water supply to the premises were not carried out until four days after the operation began. At the same time, government emissaries and other luminaries, with no experience of negotiations, continued to offer the militants all kinds of incentives. This even after the president claimed that the intelligence agencies were convinced that terrorists had taken refuge in the mosque.

The long stand-off and its amateurish handling led political commentators to suspect that the drama had been scripted in advance, but that in its execution things went wrong more by accident than by design. If in the initial days, the government’s bold and decisive measures earned it goodwill, the opportunity to act on the positive impressions created was frittered away when it embarked on contradictory steps.

Foreign analysts, too, were constrained to ask how the government could declare the Lal Masjid administration terrorists and still engage with it as if it were a legitimate political organisation. Was it on account of the fact that the two brothers had enjoyed official patronage and government largesse all these years?

Some analysts claimed that the timing of the siege appeared to be linked to the harsh criticism of the state’s intelligence agencies by the Supreme Court in the reference against the Chief Justice. The Supreme Court had rejected some of the papers filed by government attorneys and ordered the intelligence agencies to stay away from court premises. These unprecedented orders caused quite a stir. Nevertheless, thanks to the Lal Masjid operations, the Supreme Court’s historic proceedings faded away from the front pages of newspapers.

The long drawn-out episode was also helpful to the government in blanketing out the media blitz that the multi-party conference in London would otherwise have garnered. This first-ever gathering of opposition parties at the initiative and behest of Mian Nawaz Sharif revealed the many compromises that had to be made for the gathering to agree on a common stand.

With Benazir Bhutto determined to keep alive her option of a deal with the current military dispensation, it was inevitable that the opposition parties would find it extremely difficult to forge an effective alliance. These fears turned out to be true a couple of days later when it was announced that a mini-summit of the MPC had launched a grand alliance, but without the PPP it has lost a liberal party with a substantial vote bank, and this should come as a relief to the regime.

The regime will capitalise on the successful completion of the Lal Masjid operation as an evidence of its resolve to fight terrorism. Its domestic fallout is evident from favourable comments emanating from Benazir Bhutto as well as MQM chief Altaf Hussain. The media and most television commentators have been generally positive in their appraisal of the army action, though questions will soon begin to be raised about shortcomings and failures.

In the short term, the government will face a strong backlash from religious elements, who will feel betrayed by the regime, However, in the long term, the regime should benefit as it will be able to reassure its urban vote bank and the West (as the president did in his address to the nation), that it remains committed to the global war on terror and to pursuing a liberal and progressive agenda. But they will want to know if the operation was a one-time exercise or represented a strategic shift in policy.

The regime will also find sustenance in the laudatory messages from foreign quarters, especially from the US and Britain that are the general’s primary supporters. President Bush was the first to come out in praise of Musharraf, calling him “a strong ally in the war against extremists” and adding: “I like him and I appreciate him.”

China’s expression of support will also be valuable, especially in the context of the perception that it had been deeply upset at the manner in which its nationals were being targeted by militants in Pakistan.

However, much more will need to be done to reassure the growing number of critics in the US and the UK where the media has become increasingly hostile. This week’s Washington Post held the government’s mistakes during the past eight years responsible for the Lal Masjid crisis. It noted: “The general has had far less patience for the secular parties and civil society groups that could be his allies in fighting Talibanisation of Pakistan.”

Claiming that the regime was unlikely to survive for long, the Post urged Washington to reconsider its policies. “Rather than doubling and redoubling its bet on one very shaky general, the Bush administration should insist that he begin to build a secular and democratic regime that can survive him,” the newspaper concluded.

On a similar vein, the influential New York Times urged the Bush administration to “disentangle itself from the sinking fortunes of General Musharraf”, adding that “Washington needs to make clear to the Pakistani people that America is the ally of their country not of their dictator.”

The think-tanks, too, have started changing their tune. Only this week, the prestigious Carnegie Endowment for International Peace charged that “Pakistan’s military is complicit in the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, including the resurgence of the Taliban, terrorism in Kashmir and the growth of jihadi extremism and capabilities.” It recommended that the West help in “restoring stable civilian rule”, and that Musharraf ensure “free and fair elections, with international monitoring.”

While one need not accept all that emanates from US think-tanks, there is considerable truth in what this report states. Pakistan can neither be considered a “normal” state nor can it be a respectful member of the international community as long as it remains under military rule. It is only an elected civilian democratic dispensation that will have the legitimacy to help forge a national consensus on making Pakistan a credible partner in the global war on terror and the credibility to arrest fissiparous tendencies that threaten to tear the country apart. This was the message of the combined opposition parties’ meeting in London. The regime would do well to heed it.

The writer is a former ambassador.