Threat of Talibanisation

THE National Security Council in its meeting held on June 4 was reportedly briefed on the menace of creeping Talibanisation which, according to the high-level presentation made on the occasion, could pose a serious threat to national security.

It was pointed out that the foreign occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the war on terror, long-festering disputes in the Muslim world and a growing feeling among the Muslims that they were under attack from the West had contributed to growing militancy in the region.

While referring to the growing extremism and militancy in Fata and the adjoining settled districts, the presentation called for immediate action to eliminate this phenomenon before it was too late. The briefing coming from a military regime was full of irony, contradictions and half-truths. It has become fashionable in Pakistan to lay the blame for Talibanisation at the doorsteps of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation. This is only partially true. Pakistan, aided by the United States, many Muslim countries and other members of the international community, did extend valuable assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen in their struggle to liberate their homeland.

Both the Afghan jihad and the assistance provided to it were justified as a historical necessity to stop the Soviet advance into the heartland of the Muslim world. This had started with the occupation of Central Asia by the Czarist Russia in the 19th century.

While the Afghan jihad was crowned with success with the Soviet withdrawing in 1989, Pakistan had to face the repercussions of its support to it in the form of extremism, militancy and the easy availability of guns. The end of the Afghan jihad also coincided with the start of the freedom movement in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

For well-known reasons, the trend towards growing extremism and militancy in Pakistan was maintained as the freedom struggle in Indian-held Kashmir, which was essentially indigenous in character, gathered momentum.

As if this were not enough, Pakistan was also dragged into the civil war in Afghanistan, which ensued after the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992 and led to the emergence of the Taliban in 1994. The support that the Taliban received from official and non-official quarters in Pakistan in their fight against the regime of Burhanuddin Rabbani and the forces of Ahmad Shah Masood had far-reaching implications for Pakistan’s internal peace and harmony.

There is little doubt that this support, more than anything else, promoted extremism and militancy in the country, brutalised Pakistani society through encouraging the kalashnikov culture, and sowed the seeds of creeping Talibanisation which threatens Pakistan now.

The policy of support to the Taliban was championed in Pakistan by a powerful section of the establishment both on the military and civilian sides (including most of the leadership of the foreign ministry at that time), who lacked the vision or the foresight to anticipate its adverse repercussions on Pakistan’s internal situation.

However, considering that the operational aspects of Pakistan’s Kashmir and Afghanistan policies have remained firmly in the hands of the military establishment since the days of General Ziaul Haq, it would have to shoulder most of the blame for this ill-considered support for the Taliban. Predictably, this policy of support was continued by the government of General Musharraf till the American ultimatum forced a U-turn soon after the events of 9/11.

The problem of creeping Talibanisation, thus, can be directly traced to Pakistan’s policy of support to the Taliban pursued from 1995 to 2001 with scant regard to its dangerous repercussions for Pakistan at the international, regional and national levels. It is, therefore, ironical now to listen to sermons from General Musharraf and his supporters on the dangers of Talibanisation for Pakistan’s security and on the benefits of moderation and enlightenment for our country.

The risks involved in our pro-Taliban policy for Pakistan’s internal situation could have been minimised if we had a stable and vibrant democratic set-up, capable of filtering out negative repercussions through vigorous political debate and free and fair elections thus allowing the moderate tendencies of the people of Pakistan to prevail. Instead, during most of the 1990s Pakistan was saddled with unstable civilian governments and, after October 12, 1999, by a military dictatorship.

The civilian governments lacked the political strength to control these negative repercussions because of their inherent instability and also because of the autonomous character of the military establishment which effectively controlled Pakistan’s Afghanistan and Kashmir policies.

The situation worsened after the military takeover of October 1999 as the two mainstream moderate political forces were sidelined by General Musharraf’s government. The resultant vacuum was filled by extremist religious forces. Little wonder that we see in the country extremism on the ascendancy and creeping Talibanisation.

The briefing in the National Security Council, therefore, told only half the story when it attributed growing Talibanisation in Pakistan to the foreign occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the war on terror, long-festering disputes in the Muslim world and a growing feeling among the Muslims that they were under attack from the West.

While these factors are undoubtedly relevant to the phenomenon of growing Talibanisation, it is necessary to underscore that the present military regime under the guise of democracy is equally to blame for the deplorable internal situation in which Pakistan currently finds itself.

A military regime, which lacks grass-root political support and relies on patronage and coercion for its survival, is ill suited for overcoming the problem of growing extremism and militancy which, in the ultimate analysis, is a political problem.

Unfortunately, according to the report carried by the press, the NSC briefing treated Talibanisation primarily as a purely law and order problem even though the law and order machinery can, at best, provide temporary relief in dealing with such problems.

Instead, we need to adopt a comprehensive strategy if we are serious about overcoming the problem of creeping Talibanisation or growing extremism and militancy in different parts of Pakistan. The strategy must cover the political, administrative, security, educational, economic and foreign policy dimensions of the problem.

Perhaps the most important element in this anti-Talibanisation strategy should be the restoration of a democratic framework in the country in place of the current political dispensation dominated by the military.

This democratic framework must encompass the restoration of the constitution as it was on October 12, 1999, free and fair elections under the supervision of an independent and powerful election commission and the return of the armed forces to the barracks to concentrate on their professional duties in accordance with their oath and the relevant constitutional provisions. It must also encompass an independent judiciary, the rule of law, an independent press and the adherence of political parties to the rules of the game in which the majority is allowed to rule the country for a specified period and presents itself for accountability by the people in elections thereafter.

In addition, General Musharraf must take off his uniform, allow political leaders in exile to take part in the forthcoming general elections and present himself for election as the president by the new assemblies after general elections, if he is interested in being elected to that position.

This, however, would require the highly desirable process of political reconciliation in the country rather than a policy of confrontation which General Musharraf has pursued so far vis-à-vis the opposition, especially the two mainstream political parties and their leaders in exile.

Of course, the political steps enumerated above must be supplemented by other measures in the administrative, security, educational and economic spheres to root out the problem of Talibanisation in the country. The thrust of these measures should be to encourage moderation and enlightenment through a conducive administrative, legal and security environment and a programme of educational reform while remaining faithful to our core religious and cultural values.

These reforms must be supported by economic measures to enhance public welfare in contrast with the current military government’s past policy of neglecting issues of concern to the common man. This resulted in increasing inequalities of income and wealth in the country and the growing misery of the average Pakistani.

Finally, there is no doubt that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, Washington’s hegemonic policies in the Middle East, its support to Israel’s policy of occupation and persecution in the Palestinian territories and the disturbed conditions in Afghanistan have fanned the fires of extremism and militancy in the Muslim world including Pakistan. The briefing in the NSC recognised this problem but apparently failed to recommend any remedial measures. The situation calls for a reconsideration of our foreign policy to bring it in line with long-term national interests on the basis of a well thought-out grand strategy. The limited space of this column does not allow the elaboration of the essential elements of such a grand strategy.

However, we must tell Washington in no uncertain terms that while we will continue to be a partner in the war on terror, the US has a corresponding obligation to eschew its own extremism and bias against the Muslims in dealing with issues of concern to them.

Further, since the fighting in Afghanistan has a direct fallout in Pakistan, especially in its tribal areas, in the form of increased militancy, we should also call for the restoration of peace and harmony through a process of national reconciliation and an agreed power-sharing formula among the various political forces in Afghanistan, leading to the withdrawal foreign forces from there as soon as possible.

It should be obvious by now that the coalition forces, that are seen as occupation forces by many in Afghanistan, have themselves become the problem rather than the solution as regards insecurity in that country.

The writer is a former ambassador.
Email: javid_husain@yahoo.com

The Lal Masjid defiance

THE issue of Lal Masjid has been in focus for several months now and has baffled everyone. How is it that the administration and students of a mosque-cum-madressah located in the middle of the federal capital and whose imam is a government employee, have taken upon themselves the task of improving the moral standards of Islamabad residents?

They seem to have arrogated to themselves the powers of the district administration/police for tackling ‘vice’. They have become the unsolicited anti-vice squad of the city.

According to one press report on the recent release of Chinese workers abducted by the seminary students, they were freed only after the DC and SSP Islamabad held talks with the Lal Masjid administration, beseeched it for five hours and even touched the knees of some leading clerics begging them to free the Chinese.

It is difficult to comprehend how a government which has not refrained from using force in Waziristan or Balochistan or for that matter Karachi (May 12), can touch the knees of the Lal Masjid management.

The importance of these incidents can be gauged from press reports that the kidnapping of the Chinese from Islamabad’s F-8/3 sector was being monitored closely by the president and prime minister.

The importance assumed by the Lal Masjid administration is such that they are inviting the ambassadors of countries they have issues with to their premises as if it were the government. And the envoys are obliging them. According to press reports, the Saudi ambassador visited the Lal Masjid, one assumes in lieu of the imam of Kaaba who criticised the conduct of the Lal Masjid brigade, in response to which the Lal Masjid management wanted to explain their position.

As for the number of high-ranking officials visiting the mosque to negotiate, one has lost count. Not to mention the president of the ruling political party. So we have a situation where the mosque management has developed clout which it could not even have dreamt of a few months ago. They are the hottest candidates for TV talk shows and all channels request them for priority time when such incidents take place, even though one of the maulanas does not want his face to be shown on the screen.

Won’t this win-win situation that this particular madressah has devised for itself provide an incentive to other madressah bosses, especially those in Islamabad?

In Islamabad alone, there are 127 madressahs with thousands of students of which the majority are boys. These madressahs are located mostly in residential areas while a few are located in green belts. Almost all the students come from outside the city. Most come from the Northern Areas and the NWFP and some are as young as four years.

Interestingly, these are the only residential education institutions allowed to operate in the city. For regular schools, CDA has strict rules and discourages the opening of new schools in residential areas even though they are only day schools.

As per the ultimate objective of CDA, it is planning to give space to these regular schools in special school sectors so that they can be removed from residential areas. There are no such plans for Islamabad’s madressahs located in residential areas.

Most regular residential schools, like cadet colleges, are in the hinterland or in the suburbs of the cities, so that children can have more space to themselves, cannot disturb the general population and are not adversely influenced by interacting with the general public which comprises all types of people.

The Lal Masjid saga is likely to present a role model to the more than 14,000 madressahs in the country, specially the ones in the capital. From all accounts it is a win-win situation for the Lal Masjid management.

The viewpoint repeatedly expressed by the administration is the fear of loss of life in a confrontation strategy. Now, in a law-enforcement action of any sort, loss of life cannot be ruled out but that does not deter governments from doing their duty. Similarly, a crime does not decrease in its seriousness because it is committed by women, however chivalrous the law-enforcement agencies may want to be.

The fear created by the implicit threat of suicide bombing is a factor which apparently weighs with the government. Unfortunately, this new weapon, though in a few cases real, is mostly being used as a threat.

In the case of the government’s confrontational stance against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the danger of suicide bombings is enhanced. The president and prime minister have faced such attacks in the past for following tough policies. But that has not deterred the government in continuing with its hard stance against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Why then is it being deterred in this case?

Let us assume a scenario in which the government continues to follow a policy of “knee-touching”. We should not be surprised to see raids on more “unIslamic” establishments and, in due course, when a certain momentum has been gained, raids on ordinary residences on the suspicion of unIslamic activities being carried out there.

Can the government afford to allow such arbitrary implementation of values held by such groups? Tomorrow another group of people, from a different school of thought or religious sect, will take their cue from the current situation, threaten suicide bombing, and start enforcing its own point of view by raiding homes and kidnapping people.

The government’s perplexing inaction has given rise to many theories. One is that it is behind the whole affair to distract the public from the general political crisis in the country. Another is that it does not want to open another front by annoying the maulvis, although in this case, the actions of the Lal Masjid has not received the support of mainstream religious parties.

Whatever the reason, this continuing saga, apart from encouraging other groups, is nerve wracking for the representatives of foreign countries based in Islamabad. This is all the more significant as these diplomats’ reports to their capitals and foreign journalists’ reports to their papers are the ones which develop international perceptions about Pakistan.

Unless we sort out this crisis sooner than later, we should not be surprised to see Pakistan slipping a few notches from its already rock-bottom position in independent international surveys under the category of the “most dangerous country”’ or “states on the threshold of failing” etc.

Border vigilance

WHAT a difference three weeks makes — not to mention a few billion dollars. On June 7, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid could muster only 45 votes — 15 too few — to limit debate and proceed to a vote on a "grand bargain" immigration bill. On Tuesday, 64 senators voted for cloture, ratifying a bipartisan deal to resurrect the legislation and allow a mixed bag of amendments from both parties.

That 64 senators voted to revive debate on the bill is a tribute to both Reid, who recognised that he had overplayed his parliamentary hand, and President Bush, who amped up his advocacy by endorsing a $4.4-billion "direct deposit" for border security. But as important as Tuesday's vote was, it's no guarantee that an acceptable bill will emerge from the amendment process in the Senate, much less survive consideration by the House or a tug of war in a conference committee.

During the next few days, supporters of the original grand bargain — including Bush and his political team — must be vigilant to preserve all three elements of comprehensive reform referred to in the bill's unwieldy title: the Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007. Those elements are better border security, a temporary-worker programmeme to meet the needs of American business for skilled and unskilled workers and the legalisation of millions of immigrants already living and working in the United States. Even before the previous cloture vote, one of the three pillars — the guest worker programme — had begun to wobble. With a Machiavellian helping hand from Republicans eager to doom the whole enterprise, Democrats succeeded in limiting the life of the programme to five years.

In the coming debate, some senators will attempt to weaken another pillar: the generous but necessary legalisation of millions of illegal immigrants. These are men, women and children who cannot be rounded up and deported but who will be reluctant to emerge from the shadows if the path to legal status is too tangled and tortuous.

—Los Angeles Times