When the corps commanders speak
By A.R. Siddiqi (Retd)
AN angry military commander facing a crisis is likely to lose his grip on the smooth and calculated conduct of the operations at hand. The problem deepens when a whole high command gets into a temper to trade the next planned strategic step (NPSS) for impulsive action.
The official coverage of the recent Corps Commanders’ Conference (CCC) reflected a degree of irrascibility and annoyance somewhat out of character with a high-powered conclave of our top brass.The CCC now acts almost as the supreme presidium, the ultimate arbiter of peace and war, a surrogate parliament, and a vote bank all rolled into one. Too many strong words were used denouncing vested interests and ‘opportunists’ acting as ‘obscurantist forces’ in pursuance of their personal interests and agenda at the cost of flouting the rule of law. Strong words without lending weight to sober argument tend to deprive it of much of its rationale and force.
Was it a loosely reported version of the CCC or a deliberate warning to the media and civil society to behave or be prepared to face the worst of khaki power yet to come? The question may be viewed and answered either way depending on one’s perception.
A small minority as opposed to a vast majority would not be allowed to “derail the nation from the path of progress and prosperity,” the statement said. There was democracy in the country, the media was free and a parliament was functioning.
The top military command minced no words in regard to lending its support to Gen Pervez Musharraf and standing firmly behind him. That was only to be expected from all ranks of the army vis-a-vis their chief, regardless of personal preferences.
Loyalty is the one abiding pillar of the unity of command. The real argument relates not to the absolute loyalty of the high command to the chief of staff but to his essentially civilian status as the elected president of the country. That is where the split occurs between absolute loyalty to the supreme military commander and a party-based head of state.
Despite his declared pledge to stand by his military chief, a soldier might be left with a difficult choice between his loyalty to the individual and the institution. It has indeed been reassuring to see professional cohesion and structural harmony at the highest level of the top brass. But, it is indeed a moment of truth for the chief, his PSOs (principal staff officers) and corps commanders. Can the CCC’s declaration be seen as an admission of the army being gradually hustled into the political blind alley without an easy exit within sight?
President Musharraf appreciated the unstinted support of his top military generals for him and his policies and his ‘pivotal’ role and vision for a dynamic, progressive and moderate Islamic state. Shouldn’t such unstinted support he taken for granted as part of the duty of a disciplined force without being publicity appreciated and acknowledged of Routine matters, when overemphasized, may well leave the people wondering about the immediate provocation and compulsion behind it.There was just one essentially (experimental ‘X’ corps under Lt-Gen Bakhtiar Rana) during the 1965 war. In 1971 there were three corps – the Kharian-based 1 Corp under Gen Irshad, Lahore-based 4 Corps under Gen Abdul Hamid Khan and Multan-based 2 Corps under Gen Tikka Khan, as against about a dozen now.
Besides the increase in the number of corps, there has been the process of democratisation within the army itself to change the nature of decision-making at the high command level. Although the chief’s remains the last word in high policy matters in peace and war, he remains the first amongst equals. Unlike his predecessors designated commander-in-chief, today’s chief of the army staff has, in theory, surrendered the command element to the head of the state who is also the commander-in-chief. Gen Musharraf, however, wears both hats as his own master and immediate subordinate.
The tense situation facing Gen. Musharraf and the army ever since making the Chief Justice ‘non-functional’ had been a truly unprecedented one. Not even the fall of Dhaka exposed the army, the army chief in particular, to public protest like the one in evidence now – from one end of the country to the other.
How long can such a situation be allowed to last? Not for long under any circumstances. What’s going to be its fallout? For the country and the army it can only be traumatic unless resolved at the earliest in the supreme national interest. The depressing impact of the unseemly anti-Musharraf rallies may have already made on the rank and file should not be hard to guess.
There is nothing more demoralising for the fighting force, as a body, especially its younger elements, men and officers, than seeing their chief defamed publicly.
The commander in his person embodies the dignity and honour of the force. Therefore, when his uniformed effigy is publicly torched, it hurts the pride and morale of his command all the way up and down the line. Such disorderly street scenes as well as those behind the scene, as had been in evidence since (May 12) betray “attempts at pulverising the system” in the language of the CCC’s declaration.
CCCs’ declaration about the ‘multiple security steps coupled with other measures’ that are likely to be taken by the government when required makes grim reading. These are being withheld for the time being in view of the approaching budget session.
While all loose talk about the declaration of a state of emergency or martial law is firmly denied; the mere mention of ‘multiple security steps’ in the offing hardly makes good news.
Unless the on-going stand-off between juridical and political set-ups comes to a quick and amicable end, the prospect of the ‘multiple security steps’ (MSS) will continue to overcast the national horizon.
Some senior officers at CCC even recommended recourse to a realistic approach to deal with the crisis and to refuse to come under pressure. In the absence of the exact words of the observation, one would rather avoid reading too much into the question of a ‘realistic approach’. However, realistic approach coupled with the advice not to ‘come under pressure’ suggests an uncompromising approach. Bad news!
The role of the CCC acting as the highest tribunal for the appraisal and resolution of vital national issues virtually sidelines constitutional mechanisms like the National Assembly, the Senate and the judiciary – not to speak of the media and the public at large. It is not the same thing as outright military rule or martial law, but not far removed from it either.
To be sure, the high command would have taken stock of the situation and hammered out its contingency plans on both a short and long-term basis. What is truly worrisome is the looming prospect of the situation getting out of control seriously damaging harmonious civil-military relations – the linchpin of national stability and the rule of law.
The writer is a retired brigadier.

