Egypt’s pivotal role

A TRIP to Egypt last week for a series of meetings with its diplomats, scholars and journalists was a most fascinating and rewarding experience. Egypt has always been an important link between North Africa and the Arab world on the one hand and Europe (and later the US) on the other, playing what many consider to be a pivotal role in the region.

In more recent times, Egypt has been in the forefront of the US effort to maintain regional peace with Israel, promote “moderate policies” in the Middle East and contain the spread of extremism.

President Hosni Mubarak has governed Egypt ever since Anwar Sadat’s assassination in October 1981. He has used “an iron fist in a velvet glove” policy to ensure both political order and economic development. Though the status of human rights has improved, Egypt does not yet enjoy a democratic dispensation. The justification advanced is that the government is engaged in the war on terror.

On the economic front, Mubarak’s effort has been to broaden the base by promoting local and foreign investment. A process of successful privatisation has started, the stock exchange has been revived and reform programmes with the IMF and the World Bank, have been signed and implemented.

Egypt is also fortunate in having Ahmad Abu al-Gheit, an extremely intelligent, highly experienced and articulate diplomat as its foreign minister. He has succeeded in building a relationship of trust with the Bush administration that enables him to speak out with unusual candour, thereby giving Egypt’s diplomacy considerable credibility.

I was privileged to get a unique insight into the principles and priorities that drive the country’s leadership. The foreign minister strongly believes that as a powerful and developed country in the region, it is Egypt’s destiny to lead on issues of critical importance. His words remind one of what Dr Henry Kissinger was fond of saying, that there could be no war in the region without Egypt and there could be no peace without Syria.

It was emphasised that the country’s foreign policy has always been subject to strong conflicting trends. There are those who advocate the primacy of an African and Euro-Mediterranean orientation, while others believe passionately in the traditional Arab-Islamic orientation. But the leadership is convinced that the country’s salvation lies in forging a healthy mix of both, ensuring a balance between the two requirements, so that the country can have greater opportunities and wider room for manoeuvre.

If in the fifties and sixties the focus was at ending colonialism and helping national liberation movements, the current policy emanates from the requirement of its peace treaty with Israel and from Sadat’s dictum that the 1973 war should be the last war involving Egypt. Resultantly, the treaty is virtually a “cold” peace, without trade or other relationships. Many Egyptians have also become hostile to anything beyond a formal relationship with Israel, especially in the face of the latter’s brutal policies against the Palestinians and its refusal to even countenance a dialogue with Syria.

It goes to the credit of the Egyptian leadership that it recognised early on that the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was having a highly negative impact on the region. It may have extended logistical support to the US invasion, but Foreign Minister Gheit has not shied away from telling his American counterpart that current US policies in Iraq are counterproductive.

This has not been easy, given that Egypt and the US enjoy the closest of relations on a number of issues. Egypt was described during the Clinton administration as “the most prominent player in the Arab world and a key US ally in the Middle East”. The two countries have a convergence of interests in many areas, whether in maintaining regional stability or countering and eliminating extremism and terrorism. In all this, the US wishes to ensure that the “friendly regimes” in the region, especially those that possess massive oil and gas resources, are kept stable and strong.

Military cooperation between the US and Egypt is possibly the strongest aspect of their strategic partnership. General Anthony Zinni, the former chief of the US central command (Centcom) once said: “Egypt is the most important country in my area of responsibility because of the access it gives me in the region.” US military assistance to Egypt has always been considered part of the administration’s strategy of ensuring continued availability of Persian Gulf energy resources and to secure the Suez Canal, which serves both as an important international oil route and as a critical route for US warships transiting the Gulf.

This accounts for the fact that Egypt has so far received more than $50 billion dollars officially since 1978. This has not only contributed to the modernisation of its armed forces and the acquisition of sophisticated weapon systems, but has also enabled the country to engage in important and worthwhile economic projects, in both the agricultural and industrial fields. An opportunity to see some of this was provided on a visit to the “Smart City.” An impressive metropolis of elegantly designed, modernistic buildings, it has brought together the world’s best known IT-related companies, that are likely to make the country the regional leader in this field.

Notwithstanding the extensive cooperation between Cairo and Washington, the latter’s unilateralist policies have nevertheless caused considerable strain in relations between them. The Egyptians are not too enamoured of the Bush administration which they feel has gone out of the way to give a carte blanche to Israel, while exhibiting contempt for Arab sensitivities.

Therefore, on some issues, such as Sudan and nuclear proliferation, Cairo has adopted a somewhat independent line, leading political commentators to describe it as Egypt’s Gaullist foreign policy, meaning cooperation with the US on strategic issues, while maintaining some distance and a degree of independence on tactics and approaches.

Some scholars told me that a couple of years ago, the issue of democracy had become an irritant in ties with the US. While this was welcomed by liberal sections, President Mubarak was not happy with what he suspected was Washington’s encouragement of anti-regime politicians. However, as soon as the US waded deep into the Iraqi quagmire, Washington pulled back, abandoning any pretence of supporting advocates of democratisation in Egypt. When the government decided to crack down on political opponents and dissidents, the Bush administration chose to look the other way, which led liberals and human rights advocates to accuse Washington of betrayal.

However, despite occasional friction between the two countries, US-Egyptian relations under Mubarak have remained strong. In fact, ties between them have evolved beyond the Middle East peace process, becoming an independent bilateral relationship in its own right. The US looks at Egypt as a powerful voice of moderation in the Arab world and as influential enough to persuade others to align themselves with the US.

Some Egyptians do, however, admit that Cairo’s refusal to send troops to Afghanistan and Iraq in peace stabilisation missions had upset Washington. Public opinion in Egypt has swung sharply against continuing American occupation of a fellow Arab country.

My week in Egypt coincided with major developments in the region and this added to the range and depth of my exchanges with the locals. The turmoil in Lebanon was obviously a major story in the Egyptian media, with sharply divided opinions. The government was supportive of the Lebanese army’s efforts to end the turmoil; but sections of the public opinion were sympathetic to the Sunni Islamist group, called the Fatah Al-Islam.

The situation in Palestine, with daily reports of Israeli air strikes, accompanied by kidnapping of Hamas leaders, including government ministers, left the Egyptian government in an untenable situation. Iran too remained in the spotlight when the UN nuclear inspectors confirmed that Tehran had failed to meet another deadline to stop enriching uranium.

In fact, Iran occupies centre-stage on the radar screens of the Egyptian establishment. The Islamic regime is looked upon with deep suspicion for the leadership is convinced that Iran is up to no good and that Tehran is channelling its resources into groups and organisations that are determined to overthrow the conservative pro-US regimes in the region.

Egypt has, therefore, been using its political influence as well as its civil and military intelligence to counter the activities of pro-Iranian groups. The election victories of Hezbollah and Hamas carry little credibility with the leadership, which accuses these parties of promoting Iranian interests, at the cost of larger Arab interests.

As if Iran’s political activity were not enough of a concern for Egypt, Tehran’s nuclear programme has added to its worries. Cairo is convinced that Iran’s ultimate objective is to acquire nuclear weapons that will enable it to bring the Gulf into its sphere of influence. At the same time, Cairo wants to use international concern about Iran’s nuclear programme to remind the world that Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons is also a matter of concern to the region.

On December 25, 2006, the Egyptian foreign minister called for an end to “nuclear double standards”, where sanctions are imposed for enriching uranium but where the Israeli nuclear programme is not subject to any control by the IAEA.

Some Egyptians still reminisce about the 1950s and 1960s, when Gamal Abdel Nasser dominated the Arab world and the African continent. The Egyptians saw themselves then at the centre of three “circles”: the African, the Arab and the Islamic. This permitted Egypt to play the great powers against each other and assume the leadership of the non-aligned bloc. But this is an altogether different world, with the days of the Cold War gone forever. Egypt’s foreign policy may lack the flair and exuberance of the Nasser years, but it goes to the credit of its current leadership that its policies are grounded in realism and pragmatism, aimed at promoting its national interests.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Ayub’s hatred of India

I DO not know whom General Ayub hated more, the Hindus or Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Both come in for maximum derision in his diaries from 1966 to 1972. He suspected the bona fides of Hindus and did not believe them to possess any worthwhile quality. In his book, Friends, Not Masters, Ayub was contemptuous of the Hindus. But the diaries beat all earlier references.

As for Bhutto, Ayub runs him down all the time. A typical observation by the general after dismissing Bhutto is: “Demagogy became his (Bhutto) stock in trade. Several warnings went unheeded. So there was no alternative but to tell him to go. Besides, he started drinking himself into a stupor and led a very loose life.”

Ayub’s notes in his diaries are like obiter dicta. He makes pronouncements, off the cuff, without realising the effect they can have. He has preconceived notions and interprets events and situations accordingly. In fact, this has been the problem with military dictators all over the world. They have a simplistic and naïve approach to politics. For them, there are no shades, there is only black and white, friend or foe.

The manner in which Ayub presents his views as policy statements leaves you cold. He was the man who guided the destiny of Pakistan for almost a decade. Some in Pakistan still remember him as the ruler who gave them stability.

Writing on India on September 8, 1967, Ayub says, “the real trouble is that India has no ideology (curious), this is exactly what I told Nehru when he came to Pakistan in 1962, to act as a force for integration and cohesion. Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence was supplemented by Nehru’s secularism and non-alignment. Both have met their doom because how can Hindu society be turned secular and non-belligerent? It is in any case in a shambles because of changed world circumstances. It is now an empty slogan with no relevance to realities.”

The Pakistan high commissioner in Delhi at that time was equally out of his depth when it came to analysing the Indian political scene. He said in a dispatch which Ayub quotes: “The rightists and Hindu bigots, all parties, are getting together. Chances are that they will throw out Indira (Mrs Indira Gandhi) and put a man like (Y.B.) Chavan in her place. The anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim feelings will grow. They will seek to undo Pakistan and settle Kashmir by military means. So, security problems will assume much more serious dimensions as turmoil and instability increases in India and bigoted and narrow-minded Hindus assume power.”

Ayub quotes in his support one Dr Berg, the head of a German TV organisation, as saying: “Nehru is largely to blame for India’s misfortune. He ruled India as a private property, history will never forgive him for not coming to terms with Pakistan and even China. Any chance for revival of India is out of the question.”

Perhaps, these kinds of analyses have been the bane of Pakistan’s jaundiced policy on India. Islamabad depended on some nitwit and the clueless high commission which collected yarns and passed them on as the thinking in the country. That is why Islamabad lived in a make-believe world as far as India was concerned and seldom differentiated between facts and bazaar gossip.

I believe there is a better appreciation of the situation in India now than before. In fact, it has been so for the past few years. A democratic society may look chaotic and disorderly and, for that matter, every developing democratic polity is so in a way. Institutions are the backbone of a democratic structure, not a set of rules or stern warnings.

Ayub believed that India would fall apart. The same view was aired by his son Gohar Ayub as far back as 1984, when I met him at Abbottabad, nearly 18 years after his father’s foreboding. Gohar said that Pakistan was waiting for India to disintegrate into six parts before holding any serious talks with it. The basic unity of India remains intact.

A country like Pakistan which has been ruled by the military for more than three decades has developed a different kind of ethos. It does not mean that people have ceased to believe in democracy. It means that they have come to reconcile themselves to a situation which they believe they cannot change. It is an act of resignation, not renunciation.

That is the reason you see at times a glimpse of the fire burning within people’s hearts. The lawyers’ movement over the suspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry indicates that unquenchable spirit. Man, however long he remains shackled, asserts himself in one way or the other.

India itself lost democracy for nearly two years, from 1975 to 1977, when the emergency was imposed. Dissent was smothered, the press gagged and arbitrary arrests were made in the thousands. A nation inured to free, democratic living was initially in a state of shock, unable to realise the directions and implications of actions by the government and its functionaries. The rulers did not assess the people’s anger. When it came to assertion, even Mrs Gandhi, the architect of the emergency, was defeated at the polls.

Ayub also did not appreciate the volcano rumbling in East Pakistan. Instead, he had contempt for its people and all those who wanted to rule themselves. This is what he wrote on August 14, a few months before Bangladesh liberated itself. “Today is the 27th anniversary of Pakistan. Normally it should be a day of rejoicing but I wonder how many people feel that way. The idea that had brought Pakistan into being can never lose validity, but its spirit has lost attraction, certainly for the generation below the age of 30 who form the bulk of the population. Regionalism and provincialism has supplanted it, specially so in East Pakistan. We have no constitution and there is no consensus as to what it should be like. East Pakistan is on the point of breaking off. What will happen in

West Pakistan remains to be seen.”

Ayub’s panacea like that of any dictator was the use of force. He said: “The only binding force left is the army. It has the formidable task of holding the country together and meeting the threat of Indian aggression, which is getting ever louder and provocative.”

No wonder, President Pervez Musharraf believes that he is providing cohesion and order to Pakistan as he goes on justifying the parallel rally against the lawyers and their supporters in Karachi the other day. Certain things are simply not defendable.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

The Tories and Tony

LIKE the blaze that swept through the Cutty Sark last week, the Conservative row over grammar schools has been a destructive interruption to a long-term programme of restoration. But the iron core of the Cameron project has remained intact, its structure more exposed than ever before to public view.

On Wednesday, in an audacious speech, George Osborne, the shadow chancellor and the Tories' Brown-baiter-in-chief, spoke of his party's intention to stroll into the political space being created by Tony Blair's departure. He talked of a "growing consensus between the current prime minister and the Conservative party" over health and education policy, and sought to portray Gordon Brown as the antiquated exception, stuck in a statist mindset of command and control.

Some of this is just sharp political strategising, another attempt by Mr Osborne to darken the chancellor's name as a "roadblock to reform", whatever the evidence to the contrary. He argued that Labour is being pushed to the left by its change of leaders, and especially by the contest for the deputy's job. This has seen candidates position themselves against the more radical aspects of Blairism: Alan Johnson speaking of capping the number of academy schools and Peter Hain pointing to the "limits to reform."

Mr Osborne has a point when he suggests that the chancellor is keeping quiet about whether he agrees with them. Mr Brown's tour of the country, visiting literary festivals and party hustings from Hay to Glasgow, has seen him keep his powder dry.

This will change once Labour's handover is complete. Mr Osborne might want the new prime minister to break with public sector reform. But it is not about to happen. Mr Brown has been integral to this over the past decade. He has shown no fear of involving the private sector. If he has had his doubts about some Blairite pro-market policies, such as student fees, then so did the Tories. Unlike Mr Brown, they also voted against them.

What is changing, however, is the Conservative party. Once, Tories were embarrassed to be told that their leader wanted to be the "heir to Blair". Now they boast about the fact. The change is extraordinary. In the speech that created Tory collywobbles over grammar schools, David Willetts claimed that the next Conservative government would "use Tony Blair's legislation to deliver the promise of Tony Blair's rhetoric".

On Wednesday, Mr Osborne tightened this Tory embrace of Labour's departing leader by issuing a shared philosophy: "The state offers a framework in which things like education and healthcare are paid for by the taxpayer, but not always delivered by the state itself."

Much about this is refreshing. Opposition should be about more than promising to scrap policies and start again, as Mr Blair did, to his later regret, with the NHS internal market and city technology colleges in 1997. The Tory analysis of the services voters want, how to provide them and how to pay for them, has merit, especially its emphasis on decentralisation.

But in his rush to occupy the centre ground, Mr Osborne ought to remind himself that the fact that Mr Blair backs something does not always make it right. Academies are an interesting experiment but the early results are mixed. GP commissioning, which Mr Osborne wants to expand, is not necessarily an efficient way to spend public money.

Privately, many Tory MPs hate the praise being heaped on Mr Blair. Politically, the strategy is spot-on. But it will only come to mean something if the Conservatives can sustain it with ideas of their own. For now, Mr Osborne's enthusiasm looks more opportunistic than heartfelt. Dressing up in New Labour clothes is a clever way for his party to change its appearance.

— The Guardian, London