Battlefield Karachi

AS most people dreaded, Saturday’s ‘peaceful’ rallies turned Karachi into a battlefield, leading to a tragic loss of life and limb. The full casualty toll will of course be known later, but it appeared at times as if there was no government in Karachi and it was gunmen who ruled the nation’s biggest city. Writing in this space on Friday we had pleaded with the two sides, “If the rule of law and the people’s interests were dear to them, one or the other should have had the good sense and decency to defer or advance the date of its rally.” Regrettably, neither side bothered to heed this warning. Later in the day, a notice was served on the lawyers accompanying Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry asking them to leave Karachi. If the arrival of these lawyers was the cause of violence, the Sindh government should have anticipated it, acted a couple of days earlier and coordinated its action with the Punjab government. Asking them to leave just showed that the provincial administration had no clear-cut strategy for the day. Besides, freedom of movement and the right to protest cannot be denied to any citizen.

While no one was surprised by the violence, what was shocking was the extent of disturbances, for the entire city of over 10 million witnessed total lawlessness. Armed groups exchanged fire, torched vehicles, opened up on caravans of political activists coming to the city to take part in the rallies, kept attacking the offices of Aaj TV for hours and fired even on ambulances, while the security personnel looked on. The dead included an Edhi ambulance driver, political activists and innocent passers-by. The administration barricaded all key traffic points, ostensibly to block the CJ’s supporters from proceeding to the airport, thus denying the right of movement to normal traffic. This turned out to be a tragedy, for ambulances carrying the wounded were stranded. Only details will later reveal how many of the injured died in the ambulances because of this thoughtless blocking of thoroughfares. Such was the callousness with which the police impounded trucks and minibuses to serve as roadblocks that most public transport went off the roads on Friday evening, thus causing hardship to hundreds of thousands of commuters.

The administration had claimed that it had taken all possible measures, deploying 15,000 security personnel, to ensure that the activists of the two sides would not come face to face with each other. However, by mid-day political activists armed to the teeth were often found locked in confrontation, and those who fell were mostly innocent citizens. Millions of TV viewers saw gunmen roaming the streets with impunity and firing from positions taken on buildings and bridges, with some unashamedly waving party flags. The offices of Aaj TV remained under attack for three hours, even though the Sindh home secretary claimed that he would provide security to it within 30 minutes of the complaint.

As the day ended, one could see that there wasn’t much of ‘processioning’. Caravans coming from the interior were few and far between, and even the MQM rally was not its usual self. The violence stemmed from two causes: an inexplicable desire on the part of the governing Sindh coalition, which has the MQM as a major partner, to ‘discourage’ the CJ from visiting Karachi. The CJ camp could have backed off; it too did not. Two, the law and order machinery completely failed to do its job, the Sindh governor and the chief minister’s tall claims assuring the people of complete peace notwithstanding.

President’s amnesty offer

ROCKET attacks and bomb blasts are nothing new in Balochistan. On May 10, the day President Musharraf addressed a public meeting in Sui, explosions were reported from Sibi, Dera Allahyar, Dera Bugti and Khuzdar. As President Musharraf pointed out in Sui, the situation today is nowhere near as volatile as it was when tribal militants were engaged in running battles with the security forces. However, though the full-scale insurgency may be over, heavily-armed saboteurs are still blowing up railway tracks every now and then and attacking government installations with impunity. Sadly, so battle-weary is Balochistan that such incidents hardly raise any eyebrows within the province, let alone in the rest of the country. Balochistan’s dilemma is that it needs large-scale economic and social development to make life more liveable, but such plans may not materialise if insecurity and lawlessness continue as at present.

If followed through with honesty of purpose, the amnesty announced by the president for militants who surrender their arms can help pacify the province. A reprieve alone, however, will not suffice. Jobs will have to be found for the militants who, once they have laid down arms, will be left without employment as well as a sense of purpose. Recruiting locals in the police force which is to replace the Levies in areas such as Dera Bugti is also a positive step, a policy that must be followed through to its logical end. The money being invested in Balochistan — President Musharraf says that development projects worth Rs135 billion are already under way — must be strictly monitored to prevent misappropriation by unscrupulous elements. At the same time, emphasis must be laid on schools and vocational training centres so that local people are not turned away by employers for lack of qualification. But for any of this to happen, all representative sections of Baloch opinion will have to be taken into confidence so that a solution can be reached that is considered equitable by all.

High gastroenteritis cases

IT was shocking to hear Sindh Health Minister Sardar Ahmad’s disclosure on Thursday that in the previous few days around 1,600 cases of gastroenteritis were received at various hospitals in the province. Worse, from April 23 to May 9 the number totalled 18,000, of which 5,500 were admitted for treatment. Figures from May 9 show that around 200 patients went to healthcare centres in Thatta, 157 in Matiari, 88 in Sukkur and 87 in Khairpur. In Karachi, on that same day, 343 cases were reported from government hospitals. These are disturbing figures that crop up every year showing that the government has not devised a comprehensive strategy to prevent the outbreak and spread of gastroenteritis. It is not in Sindh alone where gastroenteritis outbreaks are causing misery. On May 7, this newspaper reported that three hospitals in Islamabad were treating 15 to 20 patients a day. The causes are the same: contaminated water and unhygienic food. Mercifully, there have not been a high number of fatalities from this waterborne illness. The health minister says his ministry is working hard, as are authorities in Islamabad, to contain the affliction by treating patients along with handing out chlorine tablets as well as ORS. The government must make sure that treatment facilities are taken to the rural areas where health facilities are inadequate and medicines for gastroenteritis are needed most.

What are urgently needed are awareness campaigns in the media highlighting the dangers of contaminated water and the ways to overcome them. For example, it is crucial that people know that they must boil water for drinking and that food must be thoroughly washed before consumption. These messages can help prevent waterborne diseases.

Fallout of post-9/11 turnaround

THE events of 9/11 represented a critical threshold in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Gen Musharraf was among the first foreign leaders to have received a clarion call from Washington.

The Bush administration officials made it clear that they would “not be satisfied with condolences and boilerplate offers of help from Pakistan.” The choice was between being a target or partner. It was a moment of reckoning for Pakistan which because of its known links with Afghanistan’s Taliban regime was in the line of fire.

In Gen Musharraf’s own words, 9/11 “came as a thunderbolt” presenting acute challenges as well as opportunities. He was right in claiming that he had to “absorb external pressure and mould domestic opinion” in readjusting Pakistan’s policies to the new global environment. He chose, perhaps rightly, to avoid the “wrong side” of a “wounded” superpower, and made Pakistan a vital ally in the US-led anti-terrorism coalition.

Although the Musharraf government did not seem to have any other option, the quick and unconditional post-9/11 about-turn in Pakistan’s established policies surprised even the Americans. Within the course of a week, the military government took an about-turn to become a pivotal lynchpin in the US-led military operation against Afghanistan.

The former foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, in his book on Pakistan’s foreign policy, tries to create another myth by claiming that the “post-9/11 policy” was made in Chaklala at “a meeting of top-level officials” convened by Musharraf on September 12 before receiving US threats.

This claim needs closer scrutiny on two counts: one, Gen Musharraf does not talk of any Chaklala meeting in his book, In the Line of Fire, and two, he explains at length in his book how he had to take the fateful decision in the “best national interest” all alone after having “his own dispassionate, military style analysis” of options available to him.

According to Musharraf, “it is at times like these that a leader is (always) confronted by his acute loneliness. He may listen to any amount of advice he chooses, but at the end of the day, the decision has to be his alone. He realises then that the buck really stops with him.” And the buck really stopped with him, there and then.

Apparently, there was no amount of advice available to him at that time, because his advice-dispensing prime minister was still on probation. General Musharraf in his own authority and wisdom not only rolled back the controversial policy of support for the “oppressive and reactionary regime” in Afghanistan but also decided to become part of the evolving US strategic end-game in the region.

US Secretary of State Colin Powell telephoned him on September 12 (Musharraf says it was September 13) asking for Pakistan’s support and cooperation in fighting terrorism. In a sombre message “from one general to another,” he conveyed to General Musharraf that “the American people would not understand if Pakistan did not cooperate with the US in fighting terrorism.”

According to Musharraf, “Powell was quite candid” in making it clear that “you are either with us or against us.” He took this as a “blatant ultimatum” to which his spontaneous response was that “we were with the United States against terrorism and would fight along with his country against it.” Musharraf thus took no time in pledging the needed support and cooperation.

It is obvious that Pakistan’s post-9/11 “turnaround” was not the result of any considered institutional policy review. There was no parliament in place at that time. There were no consultations at any level, nor did the military government make any visible effort to build a political or quasi-political consensus on abandoning its policy which for more than two decades had constituted the mainstay of its strategic end-game in the region.

No matter how necessary or justified the policy turnaround was, it only showed the ad hoc and arbitrary nature of the decision-making process in Pakistan on national security and foreign policy issues during the days following 9/11. This was also reminiscent of many earlier policy decisions, including the one of “inventing” and then recognising and supporting the Taliban regime.

After a pro forma meeting of cabinet ministers and senior military officers to let them know of his decision, General Musharraf addressed the nation in the wee hours of September 19 in which he reiterated Pakistan’s unstinted support for the US in its war against terrorism. He spelt out the three main elements of support that the US expected from Pakistan: sharing of intelligence information, use of air space and logistical support.

In practical terms, however, Pakistan was required to do much more. On September 13, as a follow-up to Colin Powell’s conversation with Musharraf, US ambassador Wendy Chamberlain delivered to him a list of seven demands asking Pakistan to inter alia seal its border with Afghanistan, cut off fuel supplies to the Taliban, block any operations or movements of Al Qaeda members and provide “blanket over-flight and landing rights as well as access to Pakistan’s naval and airbases and borders.”

The same day, President Bush, while appreciating Pakistan’s readiness to cooperate, spoke of giving it a “chance to participate” in “hunting down the people who committed the acts of terrorism.” According to a senior US official, Pakistan was told that “it ain’t what you say, it’s what you do.”

It was clear that Pakistan was under tremendous pressure to comply with US demands to sever relations with the Taliban and to assist in apprehending Osama bin Laden. Through UN resolutions, Washington had already built an international legitimacy on combating terrorism which Pakistan could not ignore. Given the prevailing mood in Washington, any reservation or reluctance on Pakistan’s part would have been seen as defiance that could lead to unwanted consequences including economic sanctions and military reprisal.

For a military government, defiance is the last thing it can afford. Pakistan’s post-9/11 quick policy turnaround made it a pivotal player in the US-led global war on terror, and gave it prominence in the international community that helped the military regime in its quest for legitimacy. It started receiving special attention in Washington and European capitals.In a US effort to shore up the Musharraf government, sanctions relating to Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup were quickly waived. In October 2001, large amounts of US aid began flowing into Pakistan.

In the spring of 2002, US military and law enforcement personnel began engaging in direct, low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory. Since then, Pakistan claims to have captured or killed several hundred Al Qaeda members. A large number of them were handed over to the US in return for prize money worth millions of dollars. Who was the beneficiary remains a question mark.

Pakistan, however, did receive in 2003, a three billion-dollar aid package payable in five annual instalments of $600 million each commencing from FY 2005 to be split evenly between military and economic aid. Besides extending grants to Pakistan totalling a billion dollars during the first three years after 9/11, the US also wrote off an equal amount in debt.

In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-Nato ally of the US, a move that was more symbolic than practical. In March 2005, President Bush authorised the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. The US also reinstated a military-training programme for Pakistani officers in US institutions.

The US departments of state and defence publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s role and “unprecedented” levels of cooperation in terms of allowing the US military “access to its air space and bases, helping to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.” Top US officials regularly praised Pakistan’s anti-terrorism efforts. General Musharraf was credited with “great courage” and for making “one of the bravest decisions” in completely reversing Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban.”

There were others in Washington who had a different view. Some analysts in the US continued to call Musharraf’s efforts “cosmetic, ineffective, and the result of international pressure rather than a genuine recognition of the threat posed.” He is being accused of “double game” and not doing enough to crush the Taliban. The Bush administration itself has been voicing concern that Musharraf was not doing enough and telling him that he ought to do more.

President Musharraf now walks a fine line. On the one hand, he remains under pressure from the US, India and Afghanistan to deliver on their terrorism-related agenda and on the other, he is involved on multiple domestic fronts ranging from military operations in Balochistan and Waziristan to the judicial crisis and the Jamia Hafsa stand-off.

Musharraf should realise the enormity of Pakistan’s ailments and challenges. He should not be looking for shortcuts or easy diversions. Politically-motivated deals will only divide the nation and will be counter-productive. Musharraf’s re-election through the present assemblies will be yet another constitutional disaster and an ethical misdemeanour.

Those who tell him that he is the global superman are either sycophants or have an axe of their own to grind. By doing everything for others, and not for his own people, he is carving a niche for himself in historic ignominy. His foremost challenge in today’s world is not what Pakistan is required to do for others; it is what it should do to serve its own national interests and to safeguard its national sovereignty.

Unfortunately, in Pakistan, on all vital issues, policy-formulation and management has always remained the exclusive concern of those who wield military power in the country. In many cases, non-institutional processes bypassing elected leaders and bodies were instrumental in laying down policies that did not stand the test of time, and had to be re-adjusted or reversed altogether. History alone will judge why and how we adopted those policies.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.