Closer to the endgame?

THERE is a widely held perception in the Third World that governments can do whatever they choose with their people. This attitude arises primarily from their belief that as custodians of state sovereignty, they are above the law and what happens within a state’s frontiers is of no concern to others.

This may have been the case until the Second World War, but with growing acceptance of concepts such as human rights and crimes against humanity, there has been a remarkable erosion in a state’s right to do what it wishes with its own people.It is in light of this background, that the episode surrounding the Chief Justice has outraged the people of Pakistan and also created an extremely poor impression the world over about the status of the judiciary in Pakistan. The result of this ill-thought and poorly executed “game”, as President Musharraf has characterised this episode, is that the government has found even its erstwhile beneficiaries desert it in its hour of need.

Though the current crisis appears to be the defining moment in this regime’s history, it is not the purpose here to comment on the legal aspects of the turmoil. Instead, one must take note of how the arrogance of power leads to contempt for individuals and institutions, especially those that do not toe the “party line”. This leads to an inevitable clouding of judgment and then to mistakes that become disasters.

The current crisis has not only galvanised disparate sections of society to unite on a single issue, but has also unnerved the country’s foreign friends, especially those who have been its most enthusiastic supporters. For all these years, the regime was able to convince the West, especially the US, that it would not only promote moderate, progressive policies at home and abroad, but that it was the only obstacle in the path of Islamist extremists taking over the reins of power.

This argument was used skilfully to garner support from the international community and to silence critics at home.

Consequently, there was little debate in western capitals on how and when the regime should be encouraged to transfer power to genuinely elected representatives. Now for the first time, there appears to be evidence of re-thinking, though still tentative, that the western powers and, in particular, the US, may be beginning to understand the risk in standing by the current political dispensation.

In fact, since early this year, the sentiments being expressed by senior US officials, as well as influential legislators, have been exceedingly critical of the government. The refrain has been that Islamabad should “do more” on the war on terror as well as improve its performance on issues such as democracy, human rights, etc. In both Houses of Congress, bills have been passed that call upon the administration to reduce the aid package to Pakistan, or make it contingent on the fulfilment of certain conditions.

These misgivings in Congress notwithstanding, Islamabad insisted that President Bush and senior members of his team remained committed to Musharraf as the only option available to Pakistan. It was argued that the US felt very comfortable working with the current leadership. After all, it had proven itself both efficient and willing to do Washington’s bidding.

It was also the view that the US intelligence and security agencies appreciated that Musharraf had “the virtue of being a known quantity” and that “with Iraq spiralling out of control and an emboldened Iran flexing its muscles throughout the region, are not things complicated enough without taking a chance on a nuclear armed Muslim nation of 165 million people?”

It was therefore expected that Washington would say or do nothing to weaken Musharraf, though it would, of course, maintain pressure on Islamabad, to extract the maximum from it on issues close to its heart. Nevertheless, recent pronouncements from Washington indicate a perceptible shift in US thinking.

This is borne out by the latest observations of senior CIA officials who have dismissed the possibility of extremists coming to power any time soon, Robert Richer, who was associate director of operations for the CIA, told The New York Times recently, that there was recognition now that “this fear within Washington that Islamic extremism has been a dominant force in Pakistan, has been started in part by Musharraf himself”. More significantly, he indicated that “the succession plan has the seal of approval from the agency”. Does this mean that “other options” are already under consideration?

The media in the West is also slowly coming to grips with the fact that Pakistan’s strong man may be faltering and that he may be facing his severest crisis since seizing power from an elected civilian government some seven years ago. Britain’s prestigious daily The Times was the first to come out with the advice that as “a good general always knows when to retreat”, Musharraf should prove himself a good general “as Pakistan is literally without the rule of law”, after the Chief Justice’s removal.

The advice was particularly sombre as the newspaper had been a vocal supporter of the president. It also accused Musharraf “of showing little enthusiasm for returning Pakistan, as promised, to democratically elected government”. The paper went on to charge that the government stood “accused on all sides of tampering with the independence of the judiciary, a particularly sensitive issue in Pakistan, where judges have been held in high esteem as they are perceived to be the only bulwark against dictatorship and civilian misrule alike”.

It may have been a mere coincidence, but US Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher’s short visit to Islamabad at this time became the occasion for considerable speculation. He denied that it had anything to do with the judicial crisis, but did point out that the US understood “the sensitivity of accusations and this needs to be handled very carefully”.

Boucher’s attempt to be “diplomatic” in his remarks, was, however, noted by The Washington Post, which severely criticised the administration for its support for the “military ruler”. At the same time, it chided Boucher for having said in Islamabad that Musharraf was leading Pakistan towards being “a moderate, stable, democratic Muslim state”.

The Post claimed that far from leading Pakistan towards democracy, Musharraf was dismantling liberal and secular institutions in the country already threatened by Islamic extremism. Finally, it asked why Bush believed that its support for Musharraf would change him. A couple of days later, The Los Angeles Times too charged that it was “short-sighted in the extreme” of the Bush administration not “to distance itself from Musharraf, or to at least express disapproval of his behaviour”.

It was no less significant that the EU Troika Heads of Mission in Islamabad decided to make an official demarche at the foreign office on March 19 to express their concern with developments relating to the Chief Justice. The demarche caught the government off-guard, for it expected the EU to stay away from the fray. Later, the EU issued a statement that said that “the Troika had stressed the importance the EU attaches to the respect and independence of the judiciary, especially in view of the upcoming election process”.

The foreign office may take umbrage at this but it knows well that when we were pleading for the EU parliament’s ratification of the Third Generation Agreement, we committed ourselves to being a functioning democracy.

The prestigious Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also decided to come out with a special commentary on Pakistan. It claimed that recent developments had “shaken the aura of invincibility that Musharraf has enjoyed until now” and warned that “when the political trends shift in Pakistan, they generally go down by sharp and unexpected steps…”

Stratfor, a private intelligence firm with close ties to US security agencies, too stepped in with the warning that “Musharraf might not be the only casualty of this crisis; the military’s hold on power could be weakened once the dust settles”.

Whatever doubts there may have been on this score were removed when a US State Department spokesman hinted that the US expected Musharraf to give up the army chief post by the end of the year. Indicating a shift in policy, the spokesman emphasised that the US expected the current judicial crisis “to be resolved within the confines of Pakistani law” and in a “transparent” manner.

Since this represented a change from current US policy, the spokesman had to engage in a skilful balancing act, calling the president a “solid friend” and insisting that the US was “not going to dictate to him or to anybody else on how we should follow through on his commitment to democracy.” He added that the US was prepared “to offer guidance and counsel and encouragement to continue along the pathway of democracy”.

Given the blanket support that the Bush administration has always provided to the regime and its willingness to disregard its transgressions, the spokesman’s remarks caused an understandable stir in Pakistani political circles.

The question now being asked is whether the US has taken a fundamental decision to gently nudge Musharraf to give up his position as army chief, which is his real source of power. If so, it would not be the first time that the US would be abandoning a “friend”, when no longer required. But if it were to encourage the return to Pakistan of a genuinely elected democratic government, it would do itself a favour and earn the goodwill of the people of this country.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Assault on the judiciary

LETTER FROM NEW DELHI

I PICKED up the thread on the suspension of Pakistan Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry at Lahore from the day when lawyers from all over the country assembled to take a procession from the High Court to the Punjab Assembly, a distance of one kilometre.

Theirs was a protest against the onslaught on the judiciary. But the government’s response was a display of authority. Hundreds of policemen practically took over the high court building and the places around it. The traffic on the roads in the vicinity was stopped. Lawyers were baton-charged and tear-gassed so as to confine them to the premises of the High Court. Many lawyers were hurt, some badly, and a number of them had their black coats torn. It was mayhem and several lawyers wound up in hospital. Pakistan’s Supreme Court was so horrified that it took suo motu notice of the lawyers’ manhandling. The legal fraternity all over the country wore black badges.

When the top police brass in Islamabad had been arraigned before the court for mishandling Justice Chaudhry, the use of brutal force by their counterparts at Lahore looked as if the police had been told to go after the lawyers. Some media hands were also thrashed. I think that the word “mishandling” does not convey what really happened. It was not maltreatment or something done unwittingly. It seemed deliberate – meant to be excessive and designed to teach a lesson. In both cases, the message was loud and clear: how dare you?

President General Pervez Musharraf did well to clarify that Justice Chaudhry was not summoned as was the general impression. He was there because he wanted to meet President Musharraf. Yet the fact that the latter met the Chief Justice at the Army House and that too in uniform was obviously for flaunting authority. The chief justice was reportedly made to wait for five hours and told about his suspension. It is another matter that Justice Chaudhry stood his ground and refused to step down.

In fact, the history of Pakistan would have been different if there had been an Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry heading the Supreme Court when the military took over the country for the first time in October 1958. General Mohammed Ayub, chief of the army staff, staged a coup to oust the civilian government. The then Chief Justice Mohammed Munir, otherwise brilliant, lacked the courage to stand up. He invented the “doctrine of necessity” to give legitimacy to the military takeover.

Chief Justice Anwarul Haq followed Munir’s example to invoke the same “doctrine of necessity” to legalise General Ziaul Haq’s coup to replace Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. When General Musharraf threw out the then elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the two-time precedent was followed once again.

Whatever Justice Chaudhry’s limitations, he has become a focal point. His troubles appear to have begun when he is said to have observed in reply to a question that combining the offices of the president and the chief of the army staff was a controversial point. General Musharraf wanting another term to sustain the status quo could not have been happy at this remark.

That the chief justice refused to use an official car is commendably repeated in Pakistan. When he wanted to walk to the Supreme Court for the Supreme Judicial Council hearing, the police roughed him up. Correctly, the acting chief justice took notice of the police behaviour. Yet it was difficult to believe that the police could have done so without the government’s connivance.Eyes are now fixed on the Council’s decision regarding the presidential reference filed against Justice Chaudhry. Something similar had sparked defiance against Prime Minister Indira Gandhi when three judges were superseded in 1973 to elevate A.N. Ray, her own choice, to the office of chief justice. This was the beginning of her downfall. She tried to shore up her image and silence the critics by imposing the Emergency in 1975.

Two years later when she held elections, she, her son Sanjay Gandhi, who exercised extra-constitutional authority, and the Congress party were wiped out from northern India. The resentment I witnessed at Lahore makes me believe that General Musharraf has committed the same type of mistake. The Emergency united the opposition. Justice Chaudhry’s suspension has brought together the forces opposed to military rule.

The movement has another advantage: civil society in India had caved in during the emergency while the intelligentsia, led by lawyers, has dug in against President Musharraf’s rule. Lawyers even at the tehsil level are up in arms.

Suppressed societies require only a prick for their pent-up feelings to ventilate. It looks as if the chief justice’s suspension has given them that outlet. By sending him on forced leave the government may have overcome some technicalities. But the basic fact remains unchanged – the attack on the judiciary.

President Musharraf has admitted that Justice Chaudhry was maltreated. Mrs Indira Gandhi also admitted that she made the mistake of imposing the Emergency. Still, she was defeated at the polls. President Musharraf assures the nation that he will not impose an emergency or postpone elections scheduled to be held towards the end of this year. People would applaud this. But fair and free elections are not possible so long as the military is at the helm of affairs. The polls may have credibility if they are held under the direct supervision of the Supreme Court.

It is argued by some in Pakistan that lawyers cannot agitate for long since they have to return to practise in order to earn their livelihood. This is probably true. But the stir is beginning to take a different shape. Political parties are already associating themselves with the lawyers.

Despite Musharraf’s warning, the agitation is acquiring a political edge. It is rumoured that Benazir Bhutto may return to the country any day. Her presence in Pakistan, even in prison, will stoke the fires that are already burning. Nawaz Sharif would also like to return. But the government is determined to put him on a special plane and send him out.

It is difficult to say what turn the events in Pakistan will take. Even if Benazir Bhutto does not return or the lawyers’ agitation peters out, one thing that can be said with certainty is that Pakistan will not go back to the same old days of “managed democracy”.

I could see a change in the body language of the lawyers, the political leaders and the members of the intelligentsia. Even the religious parties are coming around to the viewpoint that a democratic set-up is a better alternative to a theocratic state, especially when the latter is elusive and impossible to establish.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

Billionaire boom

IT should simply be called the green list. Forbes magazine's annual tally of the world's billionaires is all about those who have a lot of greenbacks — the magazine estimates there are 946 billionaires around the world — and the 6.5 billion rest of us on the planet who are green with envy.

Actually, being on the list is a bit of a mixed blessing, as Carlos Slim Helu well knows. The Mexican billionaire is ranked No. 3, worth about $49 billion. Thanks to a strong year for Mexico's stock market, Slim was a staggering $19 billion richer than the previous year. And he is sure to pass Warren Buffett and Bill Gates to assume the top spot in the rankings if those other two keep giving away money.

This is all a bit awkward for Slim, especially because most of his wealth stems from his control of Telmex, the once state-owned telecom giant privatised in 1990. In a relatively poor country renowned for its crony capitalism and lack of true competition in too many industries, the vastness of Slim's wealth raises plenty of questions and eyebrows. So much so that Slim called a news conference this week in response to his Forbes ranking. His reassuring message, beyond arguing that he was engaged in competitive markets, boiled down to a pleading, "Hey, I could get a lot poorer"; most of his wealth is tied to the stock market. Indeed, since Forbes crunched its numbers Feb. 9, Mexico's leading index has declined by nearly 4 per cent.

Slim may have garnered the headlines this year, but there is plenty to marvel at in this snapshot of $3.5 trillion of global wealth. Ingvar Kamprad, the Swede responsible for IKEA, is worth $33 billion. Imagine how much more he'd be worth if he started a side business to help people put together that furniture once you got it home.

The global distribution of billionaires is also quite interesting. Turkey is home to 25 billionaires; Hong Kong accounts for 21; but France has only 15. The oil-rich former Soviet Union (adding those in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) would rank second to the United States as home to 65 billionaires. Quite a few of these billionaires in emerging markets such as Mexico and Russia were helped along the way by cronyism and weak antitrust laws.

Some of the fortunes ranked really are the product of sheer imagination and merit, as shown by the appearance of directors Steven Spielberg and George Lucas among the 415 US billionaires. On a reassuringly Horatio Alger-like note, Forbes editors point out that 60 per cent of the billionaires made their fortunes from scratch. Once you have your first few hundred million, we hear, it gets easier.

— Los Angeles Times