DAWN - Opinion; March 04, 2007

Published March 4, 2007

Looking for a way out

By Anwar Syed


MANY of us are probably disturbed over a state of mind that has been gaining ground in our society. Even if no more than 10 per cent of our people have turned intensely zealous in matters of faith, we end up with some 15 million “extremists,” looking for persons who think differently and upon whom they would want to visit their wrath.

Two major Muslim sects disagree over rightful succession to the Prophet (PBUH) following his death in 632, that is, some 1,375 years ago. Their followers have killed one another from time to time even though the issue between them has little bearing upon their current affairs or destinies. Men committed to certain notions of modesty have splashed acid on the faces of women who were wearing makeup or whose bearing and carriage did not meet with their approval.

As recently as February 20, 2007, a cleric in Gujranwala killed Zille Huma, Punjab minister for social welfare, because he regarded her personal clothing and public functions as un-Islamic. It came to be known subsequently that he had previously killed four women models and had intended to kill Benazir Bhutto.

Several interpretations of this state of mind can be offered. Intolerance of an opposing view, and violence against those who hold it, have been witnessed in all ages and in most societies, even when the controversy related to matters that would appear to many of us as trivial.

Consider, for instance, the debate between the Mu’tizila, who maintained that the Quran was a creation of God, and those who insisted that, being the word of God, it was coeval with Him, and that like Him it was eternal, with no beginning and no end. This was a questionable controversy, for a believer would obey the Quranic injunctions regardless of whether they did or did not have a beginning and an end.

Yet, a great many judges and jurists, who did not subscribe to the Mutazilite doctrine, were dismissed and some of them even killed, during the reigns of Al-Mamun and his two successors. Less than 100 years later, the Mu’tizila were persecuted to the point where they vanished from Muslim theological discourse. Of the same order, and potentially just as volatile, is the ongoing debate on whether the Prophet was divine or earthy.

It may then be safe to say that intolerance of the opponent and the disposition to hurt him are recurrent aspects of the historical experience of most societies, including our own, and that they are deeply embedded in many cultures. These attitudes may have subsided a bit with the spread of education, secularisation, and material prosperity in some places, but they are not likely to disappear from our environment in any near future. We still have to ask, however, why these attitudes have become a lot more intense during the last 25 years or so than they were earlier.

Other explanations link the development under discussion here with the changing states of world politics. As the Soviet army came into Afghanistan towards the end of December 1979, and as certain native elements mounted resistance, the United States saw an opportunity of bleeding its Cold War foe of the preceding 30 years to exhaustion and ultimate defeat.

The United States government paid Ziaul Haq’s regime in Pakistan handsomely to serve as a conduit for providing funds and weapons, training, and ideological indoctrination to the Afghan guerillas. It became the American-Pakistani mission to convert these fighters into “Mujahideen”, infused with the militant determination to expel the enforcers of communism who were, ipso facto, enemies of Islam.

Tens of thousands of Afghans, Pakistani Pashtuns, and Muslims from other countries were recruited, trained, and paid. Some of these fighters later came to be known as Taliban. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, the Americans, their work done, also went home.

For the most part, the “Mujahideen” were not farmers, sheep herders, or craftsmen of any kind. Fighting was the only kind of work they knew. Left with nothing to do, they fought among themselves and looked for causes for which they might want to fight in other places.

Many of the Taliban (mostly Pushto-speaking people) settled in the tribal areas, inhabited by fellow-Pashtuns, in Pakistan and across the border in Afghanistan. After a few years they reorganised themselves as a fighting force, took over much of Afghanistan, and established their government in that country.

Then came the terrorist attack on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. The Americans concluded that the planners and directors of this attack were harboured by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. They invaded that country, dislodged the Taliban, and set up another government in Kabul.

Since shortly after these events, the Taliban have been fighting the American and allied forces in Afghanistan. The Americans want the Taliban to be eradicated, and they expect Pakistan to do it. It is a mission whose requirements far exceed the capabilities of its government.

Those who offer the above explanation will remind us of an elementary rule of prudence which says that when a man wills an act he must will its consequences also. They will conclude their case with the observation that if the Taliban are something of a Frankenstein, it is one that the Americans themselves had called into being and they must now live with the consequences, even if unintended, of their own earlier actions. There is no way Pakistan, or any other agency, can do away with those consequences.

That may be an explanation of the Taliban’s attacks in Afghanistan. But what about the countless acts of terrorism perpetrated in Pakistan itself?

According to another interpretation, western policymakers, and quite a number of their intellectuals and media persons, have been posing Islam as a threat to their civilisation and vital interests. They may be willing to tolerate the “enlightened” Muslim moderates who do not object to the projection of their power in the Third World, but they want to do away with Muslims who take their faith seriously, assert their distinct identity, and act according to their own lights, independently of western, especially American, wishes.

The western powers cannot roll back Islam or eradicate devout Muslims. They have parcelled out this task to the self-serving ruling elites in Muslim countries. The serious-minded Muslims view their governments as puppets of the western powers, assisting the latter with their anti-Islam and anti-Muslim drives. It is then fit and proper for true Muslims to destabilise and eventually overthrow these traitorous regimes.

In this train of reasoning, Zille Huma is seen as an agent of a regime that had chosen to serve the anti-Islamic western powers’ hegemonic designs. Her killing might then be seen as a gesture of disapproval of her government’s subservient role. Killing of innocent bystanders is likewise calculated to destabilise such governments by bringing out their inability to protect their citizens. Attacks on men and women who adopt western ways of life may be seen in the same light.

Western powers have been dominating and exploiting Muslim lands for more than 100 years and, given the presence of oil and other natural resources in these lands, they intend to further tighten their hold over them.

As one might expect, the generality of politically aware Muslims disapprove of western dominance and exploitation. They would like to expel western influence from their lands. But they are not men of action, and their denunciations of the West are confined to drawing room conversations with their guests. The Taliban and the Al Qaeda are doing the job for them.

It is not surprising then that several of my old friends with whom I was discussing these matters the other day said to me: “we are all Taliban, we are all Al Qaeda.”

In saying so they were thinking of the Taliban’s opposition to western dominance. They may have understood the state of mind of the cleric who killed Zille Huma, but I am sure they did not approve of his act.

Still another interpretation has it that the conflict between the extremists (Taliban and the likes of them), on the one hand, and foreign hegemonic governments and their puppets in Muslim countries, on the other, is all a struggle for power. The extremists, militants, or whatever else one may call them, do indeed want to expel western systems of control from their countries but, having done so, they do not intend to leave governance to such domestic forces as may covet and seize it. They fully intend to take power and remake the polity and society in their own image, based on their understanding of Islam. It is reasonable to assume that the regime of their choosing would be similar to the one they had established in Afghanistan.

Surprisingly enough, persons will be found who think of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as a model that Pakistanis might adopt to their greater advantage. They have the impression that the citizen’s life, property, honour, and chastity were secure under their rule. But many of the rest of us have the impression that in their puritanical zeal the Taliban had set up a regime that was extremely harsh, retrogressive, and oppressive. Crime did indeed disappear except that which the regime itself committed. Life, property, and honour of its opponents were constantly at risk.

We would applaud all those who oppose foreign domination and those who wish to preserve the nation’s cultural identity, but the “Talibanisation” of our polity and society is not the way to achieve these ends. The right way is to have governments that are firmly grounded in popular support and, thus made secure, have the will and the capacity to decline support to the outsider when his goals go against their own national interest.

We need governments that value national honour highly enough to reject the role of errand boys for external powers even if the pay is substantial, governments that can persuade their own elites to live within the means they are capable of generating.

The writer is a visiting professor at the Lahore School of Economics for the spring semester.
Email: anwarhs@lahoreschool.edu.pk

Mosques and writ of the state

By Kunwar Idris


NO government had ever tried to enforce its writ in the tribal borderlands and the wilds of Balochistan with the ferocity as this one has. And no government had abandoned its writ so meekly as this one has at the centre of power. In bombing the restive tribes and their defiant chiefs into submission, the law may have been on the side of the government but not tradition or prudence.

In dealing with the shrouded, armed madressah women who forcibly occupied Islamabad’s children library (and still do) the law and tradition were both on the side of the government - and the protesting women for their violent behaviour deserved no concession.

The images of our troops dying in hundreds and tribal settlements reduced to rubble with Nawab Akbar Bugti buried underneath with uncounted kinsmen on the one hand, and the religious affairs minister sheepishly laying bricks to rebuild a mosque in Islamabad that was earlier pulled down for it encroached on public land, on the other, will for ever remain etched in public memory.

It did not take the government long to regret the use of force against the tribes. It is now trying to repair the damage by negotiating with their elders as governments of the past - our own and the British - had done for 200 or more years. The government, surely and soon, will equally come to regret negotiating with the clerics where force could have been legitimately used.

The damage done by ruthless action in one case and abject surrender in the other could have been avoided if the government had uniformly followed the rule of law and fairness in dealing with all manner of people in all situations unmindful of the consequences. In handling the two situations discussed here the government seems to have determined, weighing its electoral prospects, that it could afford to lose the support of the tribal sardars but not of the clerics.

It is such pursuits of personal and factional interests by successive governments that has undermined both democracy and the rule of law in Pakistan. And when it comes to dealing with religious matters, equal and fair treatment under the law remains a fading hope as long as the sectarian fanatics hold not just the government but also the judiciary in thrall.

Even in the best of times, as it is now, the religious groups - all combined and coordinating - have not polled more than 11 per cent of the popular vote. The source of their power, thus, is not the electorate but the mosque and the madressah. Both generally go together and their number is fast going up, as they are being built, unchecked, on encroached public land. This government has only imparted fillip to the growth of madressahs by giving public funds while traditionally they subsisted on local charity or grants from like-minded institutions abroad.

The number of madressahs in the country is put anywhere between 10,000 and 20,000. The number of mosques is much larger but difficult to estimate. This much, however, is certain that they exist in greater numbers on public lands, parks and even roads and that too without the permission of the owner or the approval of the concerned authority. Islamabad’s Hamza mosque admittedly falls in this category. It is unauthorised not under the law of the land alone but also when judged in the light of the precedents from the early days of Islam.

Most jurists agree that a mosque can be built only on land which is purchased from its owner, the ownership is not in dispute and public passage is not obstructed. It is reported in Sahi Bokhari, the most authentic of all compilations, that looking for a mosque site on arrival in Madinah the Holy Prophet (PBUH) did not agree to start its construction on a piece of land unless he had paid for it, even though the owner had offered it gratis, because two orphans also had a share in the land.

It is also reported from that very period that when Hazrat Umar decided to enlarge Masjid-e-Nabvi, Hazrat Abbas’s house fell in the way. He was not inclined to sell it. Hazrat Abi Kaab who was appointed to mediate ruled that construction could not proceed without the consent of the owner. Abi Kaab based his verdict on an example of the Holy Prophet. Hazrat Umar then left the decision to Hazrat Abbas who donated it free for the expansion of the mosque.

For sanction to the shifting a mosque from one place to another, Imam Ahmad bin Hambal (one of the founding jurists of Islam) relies on a deal Abdullah bin Masud (a companion of the Holy Prophet) had made with a merchant for the transfer of a mosque from Madinah to Kufa. It is also reported in Fatawa Ibn Tamima that Hazrat Umar surrendered a part of the mosque to widen a public path. Similarly, he ordered the shifting of a mosque from a site where the treasury attached to it had become vulnerable to robbery.

There are other similar instances from history and opinions of jurists on the construction and shifting of mosques. Following them, Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology has ruled that building of mosques on lands forcibly occupied is illegal as well as un-Islamic. This rule, the council has held, also applies to the lands owned or controlled by the government or by any other public organisation.

Notwithstanding the historical precedents dating from the times of the Prophet and his companions and the ruling of the ideology council (which is a constitutional body) the construction of unauthorised mosques has gone on unabated, be it the time of bigoted Ziaul Haq or enlightened Pervez Musharraf.

In Karachi alone, a survey in the mid-1990s showed mosques and madressahs built (and expanding) on at least 44 public parks, the most conspicuous being the Byram Jehangir park in the congested heart of the city gifted to the citizens by a Parsi philanthropist of that name. Now whatever part of the park the mosque and madressah have spared has become a hang-out for the unemployed, mendicants and addicts.

The state authority at the highest level surrendering to the intimidating madressah women of Islamabad will only embolden the encroachers. This immunity is, however, enjoyed only by the dominant Islamic sects. It is hurting to reflect that while the government buckles in the face of protest over illegally constructed mosques, temples and churches legitimately established and used are routinely attacked or burnt down without the government raising a finger.

The Ahmadiyya community alone has reported that 45 of its places of worship have either been demolished or forcibly occupied over the years. The authorities intervened but only to seal another 25 to save them from the same fate. The contradiction between what the government says and what it does, or fails to do, is obvious and serious.

The biggest rubber stamp

THE largest parliament in the world opens in Beijing on Monday. The National People’s Congress has 3,000 delegates, but lasts for only 10 days a year and has never rejected a government budget or bill. A true reflection of Chinese-style “democracy”, the congress is huge, showy and toothless.

But this rubber-stamp parliament will be keenly watched. Top of the agenda is a “property rights bill”, seven years in the drafting, which would contentiously give private firms equal status with state enterprises. Opponents say it rolls socialism back too far, and that it will protect the ill-gotten gains corrupt officials have made out of privatisations. Supporters say it is the indispensable next step in a transition that is producing unprecedented prosperity.

The measure’s likely passage should not delude the outside world that China is now set on major political change. Earlier this week an article attributed to Premier Wen Jiabao in the official People’s Daily warned China against running ahead of itself. It argued that the country “must stick with the basic development guideline” appropriate for the primary stages of socialism “for 100 years”. It does not necessarily follow that democracy is a full century away, but the argument is a reminder that political change is likely to continue to lag economic reform for some time yet.

Wen’s pronouncements matter because he has been tasked with preparing the ground for the all-important party congress. They corrected the impression given by a number of reformist voices that China is about to democratise swiftly. One has said that democracy could lessen the social tensions of industrialisation; another that China could become a Scandinavian-type social democracy.

But if damping down expectations is one of Wen’s tasks, another is showing that China’s society and politics are not fossilised, so one of the proposals that the delegates will consider is for “modifications” (of what type is not known) to the system allowing the police to send suspects to labour camps without trial. “Re-education through labour” has been in place since 1957 and has been widely used to detain dissidents and religious activists for stretches of up to four years.

The most powerful motor for reform may not be the stirrings of an industrial workforce, or rural turmoil over the dwindling stock of arable land, but the need to clear the decks before the 2008 Olympics. Either way, the coming year will be a critical one for China during which it will become clearer how bold the leadership is prepared to be in contemplating change.—The Guardian



© DAWN Group of Newspapers, 2007

Opinion

Editorial

Judiciary’s SOS
Updated 28 Mar, 2024

Judiciary’s SOS

The ball is now in CJP Isa’s court, and he will feel pressure to take action.
Data protection
28 Mar, 2024

Data protection

WHAT do we want? Data protection laws. When do we want them? Immediately. Without delay, if we are to prevent ...
Selling humans
28 Mar, 2024

Selling humans

HUMAN traders feed off economic distress; they peddle promises of a better life to the impoverished who, mired in...
New terror wave
Updated 27 Mar, 2024

New terror wave

The time has come for decisive government action against militancy.
Development costs
27 Mar, 2024

Development costs

A HEFTY escalation of 30pc in the cost of ongoing federal development schemes is one of the many decisions where the...
Aitchison controversy
Updated 27 Mar, 2024

Aitchison controversy

It is hoped that higher authorities realise that politics and nepotism have no place in schools.