AFGHANISTAN has a conventional campaigning season. It has been an unbroken cycle ever since the Afghan Marxists staged their Saur Revolution a long time ago. There is no reason to doubt the Taliban commander’s claim that thousands of his warriors are just waiting for the snows to melt. Regardless of the Taliban’s seasonal surge, Nato would in any case launch a major spring offensive.

Its mission continues to be defined mostly as physical extermination of resistance even though the year 2006 brought no decisive victories. On February 15, President George Bush went to the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) to announce that he was diverting 3,200 troops from Iraq to Afghanistan and asking Congress for $ 11.8 billion for two years to ensure a Nato victory.

There is obvious symbolism in this institute being the venue of his latest address. It is a major centre for planning and advocating a perpetual hegemonistic role for the United States. President Bush drew frequently upon his past rhetoric about the liberation of Afghanistan and upon rather worn-out statistics showing the triumphs of reconstruction.

Apart from the ritual reference to the election of a president who is still struggling to extend his writ beyond the capital and a parliament which has yet to discover its vocation and authority, Bush mentioned the return of 4.6 million Afghan refugees and a five-fold increase in school enrolment. The AEI speech was no less remarkable for reminding Nato member-states that they must provide commanders on the ground with the troops and equipment that they need, fill the security gaps and give the military flexibility of action required to defeat the enemy.

Given the proceedings in the recent high level consultations in Nato, this message was as important as the portion of the speech dealing with moves in Congress to restrain the president’s preference to settle issues by force. In essence, it was the drumbeat of war.

During 2006, the Taliban and their allies were able to expand their area of operation. A new frontline extending from Farah through Uruzgan to Kunar showed up the inadequacies of ISAF/Nato. There were also signs of Iran-related unease in Hazarajat and Herat that suggested that resistance was crossing the ethnic divide. The relentless American campaign against Iran was one of the ingredients in the new Taliban propaganda strategy to paint the conflict as a war against Islam.

Pashtun deprivation, apprehensions of a religious crusade, unjustified civilian deaths and an increased ability to add material incentives to these emotive factors provided the resistance with better recruitment opportunities since anytime after 2001. I have written before in this space about the huge gap between military spending and investment in reconstruction and also between claims and performance in executing reconstruction projects. The ‘ring road’ – roads connecting the capital to some provincial headquarters – that President Bush cited as an indicator of success is still basically committed to military logistics and has to yet to become a highway of economic development.

The neo-conservative establishment in the United States is no less ambivalent about Pakistan than some traditional elements amongst the Democrats. The reasoning may, however, vary. The Democrats are often genuinely irked by questions of democracy, human rights and nuclear weaponisation. The so-called pro-Pakistan conservatives have always had difficulty in understanding Pakistan’s reservations about slavish fulfilment of their dictates. In 2006, we saw an extraordinary conjunction of criticism from these two streams on Afghanistan. Pakistani sensitivities apart, it became a barrier to an honest assessment of factors indigenous to Afghanistan that were pushing the coalition into a quagmire.

Cross-border movement of militants got exaggerated to a point where it provided a perfect alibi for a policy review. A vocal section of the Pakistani intelligentsia is terrified enough of Talibanisation to accept attenuation of sovereignty, societal polarisation and damage to long term national interest.

It is instructive to note that in 2006, some of these commentators used frequent cut-and-paste compilations from western sources to increase the do-more pressure on President Musharraf. Their faith in the efficacy of force as a solution for deep seated political and cultural crises was truly amazing. One has heard from a few western proponents that their theory about Musharraf running with the hare and hunting with the hounds had, in fact, originated with this group of Pakistani analysts.

Having lost 700 soldiers in a war against terror that his theoreticians and these otherwise articulate analysts have never been able to conceptualise and project successfully, Musharraf was not always amused. There have been some memorable moments when he looked or acted exasperated with the demands on him.

I have a vivid memory of an earlier visit of Robert Gates when he presented a particular interpretation of the 1990 Indo-Pakistan confrontation to persuade late Ghulam Ishaq Khan that Pakistan would be well advised to roll back its nuclear programme. His approach during his recent visit to Islamabad as the new defence secretary was cast in different semantics.

The mix of appreciating Pakistan’s performance to date with greater expectations for future was skilful and may shape the tone and tenor of later consultations in Islamabad with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Where we all seem to be stuck is the continued absence of recognition that the open-ended occupation may become the principal cause of interminable conflict. The new mantra of a ‘long haul’ which Pakistan’s ruling elite may welcome for reasons unrelated to the cause of peace and progress in Afghanistan may itself be the jinx for the years ahead.

Afghanistan has a history of being the victim of other peoples’ great games. Three clear perspectives on Nato illustrate a new game shaping up fast. Nato re-invented itself at the end of the Cold War but powerful voices now argue that it has to go far beyond that period and become a global enterprise to justify its existence. A recent CNN interview with the US ambassador to Nato centred around Nato as an expeditionary force capable of intervening militarily in distant lands and even more ominously as a shield for disseminating western values and principles across the world. Western statesmen fear that failure in Afghanistan would lead to its demise.

The second view which is not popular with the United States and the UK still believes in Nato’s original treaty area. The third is the growing Russian resolve to resist the globalisation of Nato’s military role. Even under Yeltsin, Moscow tried to set up red lines for Nato’s eastward drive. Russia’s remarkable economic recovery, made possible amongst other things by windfall profits in the energy sector, has enabled President Vladimir Putin to articulate an increasingly independent posture on international affairs.

Suffice it to say here that the cluster of states around Afghanistan will witness a particularly keen contest for influence in the coming years. Destruction of the Taliban regime by the United States was welcome to all the regional states but a perpetual occupation of Afghanistan and its military bases by Nato/United States would inevitably trigger off countervailing political initiatives.

The alleged culpability of Pakistan in the resurgence of the Taliban has kept its government on the defensive. Prompted by Tony Blair, President Karzai has now toned down his criticism of Pakistan and there has been acknowledgment of Nato and Pakistani forces acting in tandem to squeeze the Taliban. President Musharraf proposes to go ahead with selective fencing and possible extension of tribal peace accords. But concerned Pakistanis are not at all confident that the government is fully cognisant of the implications of a long drawn out conflict for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in general and the Durand Line in particular.

Existing cooperation in the so-called war against terrorism should by now have been embedded in a clear enunciation of principles and purposes governing Pakistan-Afghan relations. One of these principles should have been the affirmation of the inviolability of the international frontier regardless of the history of the colonial era. All over the world that particular legacy has been rationalised by the acceptance of ground realities and the overriding importance of the logic of peaceful coexistence.

Even the most intractable of such problems such as the Sino-Indian border dispute are inching towards such a solution. The Musharraf era is noticeable for instant rewards, not a quest for long term national gains. It is time that our Afghan policy begins to aim at long term strategic objectives and an enduring framework of stable regional relationships.

The Taliban leadership has not shown a capacity for realistic thinking in the past and may well be ready for more blood-letting this spring. President Bush has obviously not tired of war either despite horrific loss of life in the region. Nato is sliding into a new paradigm of military interventionism and is being perceived as the armed wing of American global policy.

These and other factors portend a fearful period which may relegate Afghan reconstruction to a secondary order. Given the high stakes, Pakistan should still strive to strengthen peaceful approaches to this conflict. Sadly, President Karzai failed to appreciate the promise of the visits to his capital by Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. Their undiminished goodwill for Afghanistan will, however, still help build peace. This task is difficult but not impossible.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

MR M.P. Bhandara, an MNA of the ruling party, appeared to have nicked the nerve of the Law and Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Mr Sher Afgan Khan Niazi, and ruffled a few feathers in the National Assembly when he proposed that a highly significant speech of the founder of the nation should be incorporated into the Constitution.

He was referring to Mr Jinnah’s address to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, three days before the state of Pakistan came into being, in which he said that religion should have nothing to do with the business of the state.

There is a passage from the speech that is etched in the liberal and secular mind, which often pops up in the media whenever a writer feels that religious oppression and intolerance is about to rear its ugly head. This is the one about the citizen being free to go to his temple or mosque or other place of worship, for this has nothing to do with the business of the state.

A citizen might belong to any religion, caste or creed. This is a purely personal matter and has nothing to do with how the country is governed. Mr Bhandara did make it clear that he wanted to incorporate only a selected passage, and not the whole speech, into the Constitution. Reproducing the text in its entirety would be unnecessarily cumbersome.

Mr Niazi, in his private capacity, might have been in sympathy with the sentiment expressed in the gesture. Publicly he stated that the Constitution was not the place to park the Quaid’s speech, and pointed out that nowhere in the world is the speech of the founder of a country incorporated in a constitution. Maxims and aphorisms are all right; but not speeches.

Since this writer is familiar with the constitution of only one other country beside the one under reference, he must take the minister at his word and commend him for his deep research. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the National Assembly should not create an exception to the rule. There’s always a first time for everything.

While a number of legislators from both the treasury benches and the opposition have given Mr Bhandara the thumbs up sign and an encouraging nod, and the bill has been referred to a house standing committee by the speaker, the ultimate fate of the proposed amendment is not at all certain.

With the infinite reluctance of members of the National Assembly to attend parliament and to return a two-thirds majority, it might turn out that Mr Bhandara has been tacking against the wind. And then one can never rule out the hostility of the MMA.The fact that the bill was introduced on a day when the holy warriors were going through their customary ceremonial ritual of boycotting the Assembly proceedings, has not been lost on the leadership of the clergy. One would have thought that the men of the cloth would be exhausted after their prolonged protests over the enactment of the Women’s Protection Bill, which has made little or no impact.

But reports suggest that they are currently recharging their batteries and gearing up for another round of protests. This time the wrath will be directed against two causes. The government’s continued attempts to extricate women from the barbaric customs of a Stone Age culture, and an MNA’s attempt to incorporate into the Constitution what is possibly the most important and crucial of the edicts of the founder of the nation – the one that ensures that Pakistan is never turned into a theocracy.

There is a pretty good reason why Mr Bhandara made the proposal that he did. The inclusion of the relevant portion of the Quaid’s speech would restore what he referred to as ‘an ideological balance’ as envisaged by the founder of the nation. This balance had been disturbed by the insertion of Article 2-A which made the Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the Constitution.

A switch was certainly indicated. The suggestion about including the salient points of the Quaid’s speech as Article 2-A, and turning the Objectives Resolution into Article 2-B has a lot of merit. It gives the founder’s pronouncement the prominent place that it deserves, and ensures that the two articles follow a natural sequence.

The Objectives Resolution was part of the preamble of the original 1973 Constitution. But it wasn’t until the advent of the obscurantist dictator General Ziaul Haq and the passing of the controversial Eighth Amendment, that the resolution was made a substantive part of the Constitution.

Ziaul Haq made doubly sure that the bit about the temples and mosques and other places of worship was permanently banished from the ether and that the only one of the Quaid’s sayings that was allowed to appear on television was the one about faith, unity and discipline.

However, irrespective of how things turn out in the end, Mr Bhandara’s efforts should be acknowledged and commended. He is not only voicing the concern of the minorities but also reflecting the views of liberal and secular sections of society. Even if the religious right manages to influence members of the Muslim League, as they have done in the past, and succeeds in corking the bottle, it would have given the two Houses of parliament something to think about.

Passing the bill would represent cutting the umbilical cord with the religious right whose politics are becoming increasingly obstructive. Opposing the bill would indicate that the Muslim League MNAs and senators would be officially endorsing the fact that they no longer attach any importance to the sayings of the founder of the nation.

Even if the bill goes through, one wonders what impact the amendment will have on policies and politics in the country.

One view, albeit a cynical one, is that the amendment will, in the final analysis, be of purely academic interest. Except for constitutional lawyers, judges, a clutch of journalists who specialise in the law, and the occasional man of letters, this writer hasn’t come across anybody else who has actually read the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and pencilled in comments in the margin. The vast majority of the population would remain untouched.

Another view, equally cynical, is that since a number of people in positions of power have violated and continue to violate various articles of the Constitution, especially the ones which involve breaking various oaths which have been taken, it won’t make the slightest difference which of Mr Jinnah’s quotations is enshrined in the Constitution, or if the sayings are omitted altogether, because few people take notice of this all important document. As Thrasymachus put it so nicely in Plato’s Republic, “justice is the interest of the stronger”.

Of course, the thinking man cannot agree with this view. There is a very sound reason for including a section of the Quaid’s speech in the Constitution. Not only does it create a balance to the Objectives Resolution, it is the only protection that future generations have of preserving the liberal and secular heritage bequeathed to the nation by its founder. And it is the only real and effective counter to keep the extremists in check.

THE tentative deal on North Korea's nuclear weapon programme on February 13 is worse than the deal that the Bush administration wrecked in 2005, and considerably worse than the one the Clinton administration made but did not abide by in 1994.

This deal lets North Korea keep whatever nuclear weapons it has already built, plus whatever others it can build with fissile material that it has already produced. But it's probably the best deal left.

The pattern of bargaining by nuclear blackmail that is now so closely identified with Kim Jong-il's regime actually began in the final year of his father's rule. In 1993, Kim Il-sung's regime refused an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency of North Korea's nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Instead, he announced, Pyongyang would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and reprocess 8,000 spent fuel rods from Yongbyon to extract plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons.

By June, 1994 the Clinton administration was seriously discussing air strikes against Yongbyon, but former president Jimmy Carter sensed that this was actually a bargaining ploy by a regime that was in desperate economic trouble. (Like Cuba, North Korea had depended heavily on Soviet economic subsidies that ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in late1991.) Carter went to Pyongyang and substituted bribery for threats. Within days, North Korea agreed to remain under NPT safeguards, admit IAEA inspectors, and stop trying to reprocess plutonium.

In return, under the "Agreed Framework", the United States, South Korea, and Japan promised to supply Pyongyang with two pressurised-water reactors (whose spent fuel would not yield fissile material), after which North Korea would shut down its plutonium-producing reactor at Yongbyon. They would also provide North Korea with 500,000 tonnes of fuel oil annually for free, and facilitate the shipment of a large volume of food aid by various international aid agencies.

Pyongyang stuck to this agreement for the next eight years, although it soon discovered a loophole: the deal did not explicitly ban North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons by the alternative means of mining uranium ore and enriching it. And although the free oil arrived faithfully each year through the later 1990s, enabling the North Korean economy to stagger on, the United States never kept its commitment to build two pressurised-water reactors for North Korea. Then the Bush administration took office in 2001, and disavowed the deal entirely.

President Bush denounced Kim Jong-il as a monstrous tyrant, and formally abandoned the US commitment to build two pressurised-water reactors for North Korea. Shortly afterwards he ended free oil shipments to the country -- and a year later, after 9 /11, Bush declared the North Korean regime a member of the "axis of evil" that the United States was going to dismantle.

Pyongyang panicked, and Kim Jong-Il did exactly what his father had done in 1993. In October, 2002, North Korea openly acknowledged its secret uranium enrichment programme, and in January, 2003 it withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Soon afterwards it began reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods from Yongbyon that had been in storage since 1994.North Korea just wanted the "Agreed Framework" back -- but this was the time when the neo-conservative tide was in full flood in Washington, and the Bush administration was in no mood for shabby bargains with a regime from the Dark Side. Pyongyang was told that it had to renounce its nuclear programme before the United States would deign to negotiate with it.

"North Korea has been going through its blackmail handbook, but we're not going to play," declared US Deputy Undersecretary of State John Bolton. "We are not in the marketplace to buy off North Korea's accumulation of weapons of mass destruction. For us, all options are on the table." All very well, except that Washington, already fully committed to the invasion of Iraq, really didn't have any military options against North Korea.

The so-called "six-party talks," including North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea, finally got underway in August, 2003. Everybody else involved was well aware that any agreement would have to resemble the 1994 deal, but the Bush administration desperately resisted that conclusion. On several occasions North Korea flounced out of the talks, and eventually an agreement was reached along the predictable lines.

In September, 2005 North Korea agreed to rejoin the NPT, end its efforts to produce nuclear weapons, and re-admit IAEA inspectors. In return, the other parties agreed to resume oil shipments to North Korea and to build the promised pressurised-water reactors, and the United States promised not to attack North Korea or try to overthrow its regime.—Copyright