How US views our policies

THE US capital is home to several think-tanks subscribing to diverse views. Over the past decade, the military too has found these a most convenient instrument to enhance its academic endeavours. It was a welcome opportunity to spend three days in the company of well-known American civil and military scholars on South Asia and the Middle East.

In contrast to past practice, this time our interlocutors did not raise any major concerns about Pakistan’s relations with India. In earlier years, the Americans would express alarm at the inability of the two countries to behave with maturity.This time most participants held the view that India being a mature, functioning democracy was also a responsible regional player and that it could play a helpful role in global politics as well as in the promotion of values that it shared with the US. The Americans appeared satisfied with the way the Pakistan-India peace process was proceeding and were convinced that the leaderships in both countries had their hearts in the right place.

On Kashmir, the general view was that it no longer represented a potential flashpoint and that while a permanent solution might be some years off, the LoC would eventually become the international border. Pakistan’s leadership was lauded for honouring its commitment to end assistance to Kashmiri militants. Islamabad was praised for the skill and determination with which it is engaged in the composite dialogue process, while India’s inability to respond with “out of the box” initiatives was said to be inevitable in a democracy.

On Pakistan-India relations, we expressed strong concern that while the peace process had succeeded in establishing a “favourable ambiance”, the two sides had failed to move beyond confidence-building measures. These fears were, however, brushed aside, as arising from a misreading of India’s constitutional and institutional limitations.

We, nevertheless, emphasised that unless the Indians showed serious interest in discussing the core political issues between the two countries, there was a real danger of the CBMs losing their appeal and leading Pakistanis to believe that the other side was not interested in a peaceful, political solution of the Kashmir issue.

It was, however, the exchanges on Afghanistan that proved the most interesting, in that there was hardly anything to distinguish between the views of senior administration officials and the scholars. It will be recalled that quite recently the former US intelligence head, John Negroponte, had been scathing in his criticism of Pakistan’s Afghan policy.

It was, therefore, not a surprise to hear similar sentiments from scholars, except that their criticism was even more blunt. They were convinced that notwithstanding Pakistan’s denials, Al Qaeda had established a safe haven in areas close to Pakistan’s side of the border with Afghanistan, while the Taliban’s headquarters was in Quetta and that both these organisations were launching their operations against Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan.

Even more disturbing was the assertion that the allied commanders had “found evidence of the ISI supporting Taliban activities”.

There was, however, grudging recognition that the government of Pakistan faced strong opposition from a wide spectrum of public opinion in the country to any enhancement in its cooperation with the US. Some scholars admitted that Islamabad appeared to have made fundamental changes to its policies by deciding to abandon its earlier support for Islamist extremists. Islamabad now appeared to accept the rationale that since the country needed economic and social development, it was imperative to focus on regional security and cooperation and on building a society that encouraged progressive interpretations of Islam.

There was also reference to Pakistan’s concern over “activities by Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies among Pashtuns and Baloch in Pakistan”, but the advice offered was that these should not influence Islamabad’s commitment to its “overriding principal interest which was in stabilising Afghanistan under its current government”.

There was some understanding for the view that it did not serve the interests of either Islamabad or Kabul to remain engaged in a counterproductive blame game. But the general view was that Karzai had genuine grievances, if not against the government then certainly against the activities of some of its field intelligence operatives.

A strong effort was made to convince us that the Bush administration recognised that the US had made a strategic mistake in abandoning Afghanistan and, by implication, Pakistan after the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

One of the scholars said that Pakistan had been “forced to turn to the Taliban to stabilise Afghanistan in large measure because the US abandoned both Afghanistan and Pakistan after 1991, while India, Russia and Iran exploited their ties with the Northern Alliance.”

Some said that Pakistan’s presentation on Afghanistan was faulty. Instead of claiming that the Karzai government was corrupt and ineffective, which it was, Islamabad would do better to explain that fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda would be a long-term, complex operation. In the meanwhile, Islamabad would have to begin taking concrete steps to arrest the Taliban leadership in the Quetta-Chaman area, break up shuras in Quetta, Miramshah and Wana, dismantle bases and camps like Shamshattu in Peshawar, break up Hekmatyar’s networks and close militarised madressahs in the tribal areas.

There was also some criticism of the Afghans for denying that there were no problems in their country and that Pakistan alone was responsible for the mess there. Most speakers felt that the “source of the problem was in relations between the two countries and in the border region between them”. While it was acknowledged that

the insurgency was the result of “international policy mistakes, poverty and bad

governance in Afghanistan”, Islamabad could not be absolved of responsibility for showing support for Taliban networks in Pakistan.

It was gratifying to hear American scholars acknowledge that as a developing country, Pakistan would require generous assistance over many years and that the US should focus on economic support and assistance to transform the tribal areas. Without this, it would not be possible to rid the country of extremists.

As to why the Taliban found Pakistan such a welcome sanctuary, the feeling was that this was primarily because over the past many years the groups that supported the Taliban had been “well-nourished by US and Pakistani strategic objectives”. The Middle East and Gulf states had also contributed generously to their cause, while revenue from drug trafficking added to their financial strength.

It was claimed that the insurgency’s strategic leadership had three centres of gravity. These were the core Kandahari Taliban leadership based in the Quetta-Chaman-Spin Boldak area. It had few Al Qaeda members in the region but was a major drug trafficking corridor. The second was the network of Jalaluddin Haqqani, now run by his son and based in North Waziristan and Khost. It included Uzbeks, Chechens and Arabs from Al Qaeda. The third consisted of Hekmatyar’s forces operating out of Shamshattu camp with bases in Momand, Bajaur, Kunar and Nuristan. It was providing refuge to the senior Al Qaeda leadership.

There was recognition of our point of view that the Taliban represented “a genuine part of Pashtun society on both sides of the Durand Line.” How then could the Taliban be brought back into the fold? The Americans were convinced that “a political settlement with the Taliban would have to involve their renunciation of ties with Al Qaeda and entry into the Afghan political system as a party or a movement, rather than as a militia”.

This would not be possible as long as the current leadership of the Taliban and Al Qaeda retained the freedom to operate from safe havens in Pakistan and had the ability to generate financial and political support for the “jihad”. There was also some acceptance that extending the war on terror to Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon had radicalised the Taliban and linked them to global terrorism.

There was, however, no support for Pakistan’s mining and fencing proposals as it would “not work” and “would produce the kind of reaction of ethnic revolt that Musharraf claims to want to avoid.” At the same time, there was recognition of the need for the US “to have a comprehensive policy towards the Pak-Afghan relationship aimed at ultimately resolving the conflicts that have set these two states against each other for as long as they have existed.”

One observed in the discussion not only the currents but also the undercurrents of American thinking on South Asian developments. There are a number of simple facts that can be stated without fear of contradiction. First and most important was the confirmation that the US is deeply appreciative of Musharraf’s policy towards India in general and Kashmir in particular. With its hands full in coping with the insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, the last thing that the US wants is to worry about renewed tension between two of its friends, namely India and Pakistan. But this does not mean that the administration will use its influence with New Delhi to promote a settlement of the Kashmir issue that Pakistan would have favoured.

US scholars were also oblivious to Pakistan’s concern regarding Washington’s plans to assist India to become the regional hegemon. India is perceived as a peaceful, secular democracy that may not be willing to toe the American line but nevertheless, Washington sees no contradiction between its strategic interests and those of India. It was therefore not surprising that our concerns about the Indo-US nuclear deal and their growing cooperation in other strategic plans were given short shrift.

Instead, what worries Washington is its view of Islamabad’s Afghan policy, especially the perception that sections of Pakistan’s intelligence and security establishment continue to view the Taliban as a long-term insurance, even though the president was faithful to his commitments.

While there was little sympathy for Karzai’s tendency to engage in the “blame game”, most Americans believe that Karzai’s problems have been complicated by Islamabad’s refusal to cut off all linkages with the Taliban. The Americans were convinced that there was a lot more that Islamabad could do about the closure of Taliban “sanctuaries”.

A few of the scholars did refer to their concern over Musharraf’s perceived failure to usher in a civilian, democratic political dispensation, but this is not a view shared by the administration which has been burnt so badly in the Middle East that it has abandoned its plan of promoting democracy in Muslim countries. All it wants to do now is to promote its own interests.

The rulers in Islamabad need have no worry. Congress and the think-tanks may continue to speak of their desire to see genuine democracy in Pakistan, but the US administration has no wish to weaken the current dispensation in Islamabad which has made itself indispensable to America’s global strategic objectives.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Corruption in high places

CORRUPTION in India or, for that matter, in any country has ceased to be big news. Governments and societies have become so tainted at every level that the people, although unhappy, take scams in their stride. Yet, once in a while, a nation is rudely shaken by the disclosure of a scandal that it knew was there but about which it could not obtain any details at the time.

A topmost retired official of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has provided flesh to the bones of the Jain hawala case in a book. Ten billion rupees exchanged hands and the people involved included then Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, the then chairman of the Steel Authority of India V. Krishnamurthi and the ineluctable Quattrocchi, an Italian national who was known for his contacts.

The Jain hawala scandal rocked the country in the 1990s and engaged the attention of even the supreme court for more than two years. The then chief justice of India, J.C. Verma, said that he was under pressure and threatened to speak out. But his threat turned out to be a whimper. The case ended tamely because the CBI was inert when it came to taking action against the powerful sections of society. It was proved once again, if any proof was required, that the CBI functioned like any other government department to carry out executive commands rather than working impartially and fearlessly to uphold the law of the land. The truth about the Jain hawala scandal is stranger than fiction.

The case began with the arrest of Ashfaq Hussain who was engaged in funding terrorists in Kashmir. He received money from abroad through the hawala, a private channel which foreign banks used. While conducting raids on a hawala dealer in Delhi, the CBI seized some diaries containing the abbreviated names of serving and former ministers and bureaucrats.

The amount passed on to them was indicated against their abbreviated names. These were kickbacks that the officials and politicians holding high offices had received for favours shown to Jain in various projects and economic deals.

The case was registered against 115 people. J.K. Jain was the main culprit. He told the CBI about the mechanism: how he was managing sanctions of various projects at inflated rates and distributing the money thus earned among the high-ups. Quattrocchi worked at the highest political level – that of the prime minister's office as well as the prime minister.

During the interrogation, according to the top retired CBI official, Jain said that he had “passed on Rs3.35 crore to P.V. Narasimha Rao” who took over as the Congress president after Rajiv Gandhi's assassination and subsequently became prime minister. “On the direction of Narasimha Rao, the money was moved to his account through Captain Satish Sharma, Chandraswami, etc.”

A total of 10 per cent was passed on as kickbacks. Jain got three per cent and Quattrocchi seven. The latter was helped by the government first to escape from India and then to get the kickbacks which the banks abroad had frozen at New Delhi's request.

The supreme court has caught up with the CBI and asked how Quattrocchi got the money. Krishnanamurthi was the chairman of the Steel Authority at the time when the Durgapur Steel Plant was being modernised at high costs. A Russian firm gave a cheque of Rs15 crore as kickback under the cover of payment for a consignment of some cast iron equipment that was taken from India but shipped back in the form of components.

The firm inflated the cost of consignments to be able to pay Rs15 crore. But the whole transaction was all on paper. The top retired CBI official says that he wanted to “investigate Narasimha Rao, search if need be and charge-sheet if the evidence so warranted.” The then CBI director not only stopped him from going ahead but shunted him out of the agency. I corroborated the facts when I met the retired official. He is a forthright person who was transferred 23 times in 12 and a half years.

Some days ago, when the present CBI director told newsmen in Delhi how the agency had functioned successfully last year, he naturally could not talk about pressures. But he was quite embarrassed when he was asked why the CBI was tardy in taking action against the Bahujan Samaj Party leader Mayawati for the Taj corridor scam. However, since his press conference the CBI has filed a case, after the supreme court’s admonition.

Again, the director had no cogent defence for not filing an appeal against the acquittal of former Bihar chief minister Laloo Prasad Yadav and his wife in the case of accumulating disproportionate wealth. When pressed, the director admitted that the central government would have to give permission for filing the appeal.

True, some CBI directors have been more loyal than the king. They did not want to take any action against those people who were either in authority or had connections with those who were. For example, the retired CBI director K. Vijaya Rama Rao did not want to move against Narasimha Rao. The present director Vijay Shankar seems to be dragging his feet over the case of Laloo Yadav. It is apparent that the Manmohan Singh government, which has the CBI under it, does not want to displease Mayawati and Laloo Yadav, the allies at the centre.

The Congress-led coalition needs to keep its brood together. It cannot afford to alienate any of its supporters. Laloo Yadav's acquittal may still be challenged because the Bihar government, headed by his political rival Nitish Kumar, proposes to file an appeal.

Still, the National Human Rights Commission's suggestion to have the CBI on the concurrent list has merit. Federal crimes are increasing and New Delhi is feeling helpless because the CBI needs the permission of the state concerned before instituting even an inquiry. There is only one inference: the CBI should be made autonomous if it has to be effective.

Even the proposal of supervision by the vigilance commission has been shot down. By changing masters, the CBI cannot become independent in its functioning. Important investigating machinery like the CBI has to be directly under parliament. Only then can it perform. Whatever else is done will only be a palliative. The malady is too deep. As long as the chief ministers are the ones to decide who will be prosecuted by the CBI and when, corruption in high places will not be eliminated.

When the administrative reforms commission, appointed by the Manmohan Singh government, says that the prime minister should not be brought under the ambit of lokayukta (ombudsman), how does one deal with the corruption cases of prime ministers like Narasimha Rao?

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

Nuclear bargaining

THE "Action Plan" on North Korea's denuclearisation issued on Tuesday by the "six-party" talks in Beijing offers the advantage of focusing, initially, on a single and relatively modest exchange.

Within 60 days, the North Korean regime is to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant under the monitoring of international inspectors, who would return to the country after a four-year absence. In exchange the North is to receive 50,000 tons of fuel oil, the "resolution" of US banking sanctions and the beginning of bilateral talks on the normalisation of US-North Korean relations. If the shutdown takes place, North Korean production of plutonium for nuclear weapons will also stop -- a welcome if very limited step forward.

Unlike the failed "Agreed Framework" between the Clinton administration and North Korea, the new deal is not open-ended: North Korea will get no more than the one-time "emergency" supply of oil, worth about $12 million, unless it takes further action. This accord also includes China, South Korea, Japan and Russia, whose involvement raises the chance that Pyongyang will comply and demonstrates that the six-party approach the Bush administration embraced more than three years ago can produce results. In that sense it is wrong to argue that the administration has simply reverted to the Clinton-era arrangement that it repudiated in 2002, and if it is rewarding North Korea's misbehaviour, the bribe is a small one.

—The Washington Post