Developing the tribal belt

THERE is now a raging debate on the role Pakistan is playing — or not playing — in the revival of the Taliban in the southern districts of Afghanistan. The debate is being conducted in a number of different forums. It is the subject of inquiry and discourse in several Washington-based think-tanks. It has begun to interest several national newspapers, most notably The New York Times and The Washington Post.

Most disconcerting from Pakistan’s perspective, it has begun to inform the thinking of the administration of President George W. Bush. There are now several senior level officials in the administration who believe that the successes recently achieved by the Taliban across the border in Afghanistan could not have been possible without the support of Pakistan.

What kind of support is being given by Pakistan? The answer to this question, as provided by the Washington-based experts, gets to be a bit confusing. This is particularly the case in the coverage provided by the press.

As I write this, a long, front-page story appeared in The New York Times signed by Carlotta Gall, the newspaper’s correspondent based in South Asia. She filed her story from Quetta which is now regarded by the Americans to be the capital of the resurgent Taliban movement. The most damaging part of the story is a claim by her that she and her photographer were roughed up by some men. She suspects that the attackers belonged to the Pakistani intelligence agencies. “One agent punched me twice in the face and head and knocked me to the floor. I was left with bruises on my arms, temple and cheekbone, swelling on my eye and a sprained knee,” she wrote in her report.

This account appeared in a box inserted in the main story in which Ms Gall reports on the interviews she conducted at the Jamiya Islamiya madressah and with some villagers in Pashtunabad near Quetta. Several people interviewed by the journalist claim that their young men were being trained to become suicide bombers. The training and encouragement was being provided by people with some connections — past or present, it was not clear — with the Pakistani intelligence services.

That all nations must follow their own interests is not something readily recognised by the people who make policies in powerful countries. The “you are with us or you are against us” approach adopted by President Bush after 9/11 put America’s interest above the interests of all other nations. In September of last year, President Pervez Musharraf, while launching his book, told of the way he was pressured by Washington. The Pakistanis were given the message that they would be bombed back into the Stone Age if they did not cooperate with America.

Did Pakistan side with America because of that threat or did it choose to do what it did because it believed it was in its national interest to withdraw support from the Taliban? Would Islamabad launch a major military action in the tribal areas on its side of the border to awe the Pashtun population into submission? This is being demanded by several influential circles in Washington.

In several pronouncements, including those in The Line of Fire, his political autobiography, General Musharraf has asserted that his policies are based on what he views as Pakistan’s national interests. In that he is absolutely right. But what is Pakistan’s national interest?

The answer to this question needs some careful reflection and informed debate in the country. In the days of General Ziaul Haq, the Pakistani state deliberately promoted Islamic radicalism as state policy. President Zia had several good reasons for doing this. He was a genuinely pious individual, convinced that a state founded for the Muslims of South Asia should follow the teachings of Islam.

Islam was to inform all facets of life in Pakistan — economic, political and social. In addition to personal piety, he also used Islam for political advantage. He believed that by becoming an advocate for Islam in politics and economics he could create a political base for himself. And then the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and offered an opportunity to the Pakistani president to rehabilitate himself with the West. His earlier intervention in politics was not appreciated by the world that had convinced itself that the military should not involve itself in civilian affairs.

By sending the deposed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to the gallows, General Ziaul Haq had further upset the western world. With the Soviets in Afghanistan, he could get back into the good books of the West by committing himself and his country’s resources to expel the invaders. In the eyes of Washington, the Soviet Union, by invading Afghanistan, had committed a crime which was more severe than those for which President Zia was held responsible.

The West won with Pakistan’s help but the latter paid a heavy price for this victory. In a country that had always practised a more relaxed form of Islam — based on the Sufistic tradition — the more conservative Wahabist version now began to take hold. It came with the support of the Saudis who financed the establishment of a number of madressahs strung along Pakistan’s long border with Afghanistan. These seminaries not only taught an extremely austere form of Islam, they also prepared soldiers – jihadis — to do battle against the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan. The Mujahideen succeeded in expelling the Soviets but left a disastrous legacy for Pakistan.

The cost to Pakistan of the war in Afghanistan included radicalisation of politics in the provinces of Balochistan and the North West Frontier, increasing penetration by religious parties in the country’s body politic, and the perception in the West that the country had become a dangerous place to do business in.

The last was a particularly serious development. Pakistan has always been dependent on external capital flows for financing a significant part of investment needed for economic development. Without these flows, the economy has gone into a nosedive and it will happen again if relations with Washington deteriorate to the point that the flow of external capital gets disrupted. Private capital flows for not-so-poor nations such as Pakistan are now a much more important source of finance than official development assistance.

With the current negative perception of Pakistan in the world’s financial markets, the Middle East is the only source from which large infusions of capital are being made.

What are the choices available to Pakistan? What strategy should it pursue at this time? Islamabad should begin to use economics more rigorously and more aggressively to bring about change in the tribal areas. It should not be deterred by the usual argument that it is practically impossible to change this part of the country — to modernise and develop it.

These arguments, advanced mostly by the groups that will lose control and power if serious development begins to take place in the tribal areas, should not be allowed to inhibit public policy. There is a myth that has been allowed to take hold of the thinking about the development of the Pashtun areas. There is a belief that the people who inhabit this part of the world wish to remain backward since economic progress would disturb their lifestyle.

That there is little substance in this view is shown by an interesting statistic about this area. The rate of population increase in the Pashtun areas is estimated at 2.1 per cent a year, almost half a percentage point less than the average for the country. The reason for this is not a lower rate of fertility but a higher rate of out-migration. Pashtuns leave to find work wherever it is available — in the settled areas of the NWFP, in Islamabad, in Karachi, in the Middle East. Remittances from this migrant work force have become an important source for livelihood in the tribal belt.

The tribal Pashtuns are poor not because they wish to remain backward; they are poor because the areas in which they live lack the infrastructure — physical, human and institutional — without which development cannot take place.

What is the best way of bringing about the economic development of the tribal belt? The same approach could work on both sides of the border. I define the tribal belts as the seven “federally administered areas”, the five tribal regions in Pakistan and the southern parts of the provinces on the other side of the border with Afghanistan.

These two regions share the same geography. They are inhibited by the people who share the same ethnic background and follow the same religion. They are all Pashtuns and all of them are Sunni Muslims. In their belief they are not as conservative as the Wahabis but can be influenced in that direction by teachers and clerics who are of that persuasion. That is why it is important to reform the madressahs located in the belts. It is also important to provide these people better sources of livelihood. The land which they inhabit is mountainous, with a few valleys where agriculture is possible and gets to be practised. The area under cultivation is only 8.8 per cent of the total. Only 3.5 per cent is irrigated. For most of the people economic life is pastoral.

There are some 25 million to 30 million Pashtuns in Pakistan and about 13 million in Afghanistan. Only a small proportion of these live in the two tribal belts. The Pakistani tribal belt has a population of 3.5 million, the Afghan about two million. These 5.5 million — or about eight per cent of the Pashtun population — are socially and economically more backward than other segments of the populations in the two countries.

According to the Asian Development Bank, the rate of literacy on the Pakistani side is only 17 per cent of the total; it is much lower for women, about two per cent of the total. There is only one hospital bed available for every 2,500 persons and only one doctor for every 7,500.

There are now plans to bring social and economic development to the tribal belts on both sides of the border. This will be done by starting government funded programmes that will build more roads, construct schools and clinics and bring water to irrigate land that depends entirely on rainfall.

On the Pakistani side of the border a new public agency, the Fata Development Authority has been given a budget of $310 million to spend over a four-year period. It is the government’s claim that the plan will focus on women and on unemployed youth. On the Afghan side of the border, there are reports that Washington is planning to spend additional money on the same type of projects.

These efforts may result in weaning the young from the pursuit of extremist causes but ultimate success will depend on considerably larger programmes as well as on institution building.

The Pakistani government estimates that it needs eight billion dollars over a 10-year period to bring about real change in the tribal belts. About five billion dollars to six billion dollars are needed on the other side of the border. These amounts should be made available rather than spent on a more vigorous military campaign.

Democracy in Muslim lands

THE concept of democracy is not alien to Muslims. It is inextricably intertwined with Islam’s political system. Unfortunately, however, over a long period, of time, successive ruling elites in the Muslim world systematically undermined it with a view to advancing their interests.

Today, a majority of states in the world are democratic and their numbers continue to grow. Regrettably, however, of the 57 Muslim countries, 38 are governed by dictators or traditional monarchs who have stifled the development of viable democratic institutions making it extremely difficult to create a culture of democracy in the countries ruled by them. In other Muslim countries that profess to be democratic no perceptible move to enforce true democratic traditions is also discernible.

It is, however, heartening to note that throughout the Muslim world the clamour for a genuine and undiluted democratic system is growing louder. The people of most of these countries have suffered, for a long time, under colonial rule and want to have their inalienable rights which may be possible only in a truly democratic society. This would, however, necessitate the creation of conditions that are conducive to exercise these rights and elimination of obstacles that may prevent, hinder or inhibit this exercise.

There is a worldwide belief that democracy is the only system that confers legitimacy on a government. Free, fair and periodic multiparty elections are, therefore, considered a key component of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. The conduct of elections has also to be entrusted to an independent and impartial election commission that is completely free from the influence of the executive to ensure the fairness of elections. The Declaration on the Criteria for Free and Fair Elections, adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in March 1994, has also affirmed that in any state the authority of the government can derive only from the will of the people as expressed in genuine and free elections.

Unfortunately, however, in most of the Muslim countries claiming to be democratic, their rulers, while keeping up the appearance of democracy, freely indulge in electoral manipulations. They even place unnecessary restrictions on the right to stand for election on the basis of gender, religion, education and even political affiliations. They also prefer a weak parliament, a subservient executive, state controlled media and an obliging judiciary which run counter to the universally recognised norms of democracy.

The deficit of democracy in the Muslim world is attributable to the flawed strategic vision of its leaders who want greater power for themselves. It is obvious that while bolstering their authority, the ruling elites ignore the fact that authoritarian mode of governance is bound to be afflicted with political uncertainty that could present undemocratic elements in society, particularly the extremists, with an opportunity to grab power. Needless to say, the extremists are not fighting for democracy; they have their own agenda of imposing their version of Islam on the Muslim countries.

This factor should not be underestimated or downplayed. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on promoting political freedom and democracy in the Islamic world to avoid a grave situation that may be fraught with serious consequences. The Muslim nations must also come to terms with the fact that defending authoritarianism in the presumed interest of political stability and development will be a terrible mistake as it would give legitimacy to the very force that seeks to suppress the peoples’ quest for democracy.

Some people assume that democracy is a construct of the West. It may, however, be recalled that when Europe was being ruled by emperors, only to be succeeded by fascist dictators, the Muslim-majority countries were scrupulously adhering to the precepts of democracy as ordained by their religion. The principle of Shura, or consultative decision-making, is the source of democratic ethics of Islam. For obvious reasons, they did not adopt the Westminster or American models of democracy but the political system they followed was rooted in democratic principles.

The leading political theorists have offered competing definitions of democracy from time to time, and acknowledged that there are different ways to foster democracy provided they do not conflict with its basic concept based on the universally accepted principles and norms of democracy that are enshrined in various international instruments.

There should, therefore, be no objection if the Muslim countries adopt the ways of freedom and democracy based on their own centuries-old political, cultural and social traditions that might be different from the western style of democracy in appearance but not in substance. The desire for democracy in the Muslim countries is fairly common but the specific institutional expressions of it could vary. The West must accept the fact that the Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East, will reject the imposition of a system from outside the Arab world with western overtones. The West should also not consider the emergence of such a system anathema to its interests.

There is a strong public demand in the Muslim countries for democracy. One should not, however, ignore the fact that in keeping with its short-term interests the United States, claiming to be one of the leading proponents of democracy throughout the world has actually been promoting undemocratic, even authoritarian, regimes in the Muslim countries. This could cause serious rifts between the masses and the autocratic rulers over the issue. It is generally believed that the United States considers that the repression in the Muslim world is the best way to prevent the emergence of forces that may pose a serious threat to its geopolitical interests.

The empty rhetoric employed by the US for preaching the democratization of the Muslim countries is indeed disheartening as it could cause set-backs to the attainment of the goal of democracy by their people. It is, however, believed that the struggle for democracy in the Muslim countries stands a reasonable chance of success, despite its being an arduous task, provided it is pursued by them with dedication and perseverance.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Lapses in education system

IN the last days of 2006, the education ministry came out with a White Paper titled ‘Education in Pakistan’. It is a draft document, of course, and is meant for discussion. It was prepared after much discussion and is the product of hard work and good intentions. A lot of it makes sense.

What I am about to criticise, or discuss, is only a part of it. I hope it does not give the impression that there is nothing positive in the paper. I am giving my opinion on areas I disagree with or find myself able to comment on.

The White Paper points out that there are gender, geographical and economic disparities in our education system. It talks of English-medium schools and the fact that the private sector has captured some 30 per cent of the education sector. But it stops short of saying that most of the private entrepreneurs are there to make money. It talks of public-private partnerships as if that will reduce the burden of fees on parents. Moreover, it approves of the private sector’s expansion in higher education.

If the existing apartheid is allowed to carry on to the university level would we have a less unjust society or a more unjust one? The White Paper does not say so nor does it actually say much about ending apartheid education. As for awareness, it has been there since the 1970s. Before that, the state pretended that the rich did not have a parallel system of education.

The document does not mention the schools of agencies of the state or those supported by state functionaries. There are the so-called public schools, cadet colleges, cantonment board schools, Fauji Foundation schools, PAF Model Schools, etc, which are patronised by the armed forces. They do not follow the policies of the education ministry as far as the medium of instruction or the curricula are concerned. Instead, they veer more towards the elitist English-medium model. They are given large areas of land, endowments, and gifts and so on. In short, they are subsidised in varying degrees by the state.

This being so, does the Constitution allow them to function in elitist ways? This question was raised in a 1966 report on student disturbances where it was said that using English as the medium of instruction in cadet colleges was a violation of the principle of the equality of all citizens. However, Justice Hamoodur Rahman, the president of the commission, could hardly rock the boat too much so the state of affairs remained as it was. This paper does not mention it at all.

The document then goes on to consider the medium of instruction. Some of its policies are most enlightened on the face of it. There is the provision of using the mother tongue up to class five. This is exactly what Unesco’s paper (2003) on this issue says.

But this is to be left to the discretion of the provincial governments. We have always had this liberal provision in our Constitution but the problem is that it is not easy to implement.

In Sindh, urban Sindh goes into revolt the moment someone talks of using Sindhi instead of Urdu. And, most urban Sindhis do not have Sindhi as a mother tongue anyway.

In Punjab, middle-class Punjabis are reluctant and embarrassed about making any serious effort to substitute their mother tongue for Urdu. In the NWFP, some nationalist Pashtuns might agree to teach everything in Pashto but in Hazara, Chitral, Kohistan and some other areas they do not speak Pashto.

Moreover, inner cities do not use Pashto as a mother tongue. In Balochistan they did try using Balochi, Brahvi and Pashto for classes one and two in 1990 but the parents knew their children would be over-burdened because richer children were learning Urdu and English only.

In short, such experiments fail because they are tried only on poor children. Moreover, our provinces are not linguistic units nor are there any benefits or returns for learning our languages. Thus, if mother tongues have to be preserved, honoured and encouraged then areas speaking the same language must be demarcated first.

Interesting books supported by poetry, drama, films and features of local events — here I agree with the White Paper — should be prepared because local colour is important. Then a certain language should be taught but taught to all. Cantonments and big cities cannot be spared though they will plead to having different mother-tongues. But, if we spare them, Pakistan’s indigenous mother tongues will remain impositions on the poor while the rich will acquire languages with cultural capital i.e. English and Urdu.

We should be like the Catalan-speaking area in Spain and French-speaking Canada where you have to speak Catalan and French no matter what your mother tongue is to get public education or jobs.

The White Paper says that English should be started from class three onwards. Moreover, it should be the medium of instruction for mathematics and the natural sciences and higher education. Urdu, it says, should be taught from class one where it is not the medium of instruction (only rural Sindh and some parts of the NWFP) and should be used for the social sciences.

Again, this policy is for the poor and the powerless. The rich and the powerful will study everything in English throughout — all the way from pre-nursery to university. Those who study English as a subject — and we know how awfully it is taught — will never be able to compete with those who study everything in it. The apartheid between the arts and sciences will widen. Even now the arts students in colleges study in Urdu while science students attend lectures in English. This tendency will be strengthened.

In the interest of equity, it is not possible to teach everyone in English. The resources and expertise are not there. It might, however, be possible to teach everyone in their mother tongue (up to class five) and link languages such as Urdu till school (12 years). English should be used from class 1 but as an auxiliary language.

The four-year Bachelor’s degree can be in Urdu with very strong support of English. The university, meaning a two-year Master’s and research degrees, should be in English. This is not a good system but it is a more equitable one. One assumes the elimination of those bastions of privilege — the elitist English-medium schools.

The state should make its own schools so good so as to eliminate them and to create at least a few really superior schools in all big cities to be attended purely on merit.

The White Paper has very positive proposals about teaching elementary students. One is glad to see that the environment is mentioned. To this should be added women’s rights, animal rights (they make dogs fight bears in our villages), pro-peace lessons and messages against honour killings and forced transactions of girls. Children should be shown films because school teachers have a tendency to make everything too boring for them.

Another welcome recommendation is that curricula and textbooks should not foster, or lead to, sectarian attitudes. This is very well but there was no book encouraging sectarianism earlier. There are books in madressahs conveying beliefs of sub-sects. Such books convince people about the correctness of their own dogma and, therefore, the falseness of others. But this is part of South Asian Islam. Nobody can change this. Nor is it necessarily violent in nature.

Sectarianism of the violent kind was the product of the excessive religious zeal which Ziaul Haq’s regime created. Even that would not have led to so much killing if there had not been a policy to use religious cadres to carry on a proxy war with India in Kashmir. The White Paper has not mentioned this policy nor has it promised that it would never be used again.

Even worse, it does not specifically mention that there should be no hate material against foreigners, including India, while not concealing the truth about historical events. It does not tell us that students should be told about Pakistan’s failings of policy and excesses against East Pakistanis in 1971. Unless the truth is told how can there be a break from the past?

Although it is a commendable effort, the document evades major issues of class and the state’s role in producing wrong and hate-filled history. We need people-friendly policies. This means that class apartheid which goes by the euphemism of ‘medium of instruction’ should be dealt with. It also means that we should promote democratic values and stop teaching the kind of books which create a garrison state.