A deeper sectarian split?

A SENIOR Iraqi judge reportedly remarked that the execution of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was illegal because it violated a local law that forbids hangings during Eid ul Azha. This may or may not be true, but in the context of Iraq and the life led by the former dictator, such technicalities amount to quibbling with irrelevancies.

Saddam Hussein himself never believed in the sanctity of law, viewing rules and regulations as nothing more than irritating impediments in the march of history. Iraqi history is brutal and bloody beyond belief. Saddam may only have been a little more efficient and callous than his predecessors.

Iraq has had a history of frequent revolts and uprisings and only those willing to rule with an iron hand have been successful in maintaining order. In that sense, Saddam was a success, for thanks to his iron grip on the levers of power, Iraq was an orderly country. At the same time, he spent huge amounts of money on education, health and cultural activities, with the result that the country saw considerable progress in these sectors.

However, what interests us here are the likely repercussions of his death. As happens with megalomaniacs, Saddam envisioned his country as a regional superpower. In this he was greatly encouraged by fellow Arab rulers as well as by the US and the UK, all of whom felt that with Iran in a state of disarray after the Islamic revolution, Saddam could be used to bring an end to the Islamic regime or cut the country down to size. To this end, Saddam was extended massive credits by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf emirates while the Reagan administration sent its senior emissaries, including Donald Rumsfeld, in 1983 and 1984, to ensure that no setback to Iraq’s war aims should weaken Saddam’s resolve to humiliate Tehran’s mullahs.

The US also provided valuable satellite photographs and other sensitive information to the Iraqis that enabled them to target the Iranians with chemical weapons. The US backed arms sales to Iraq by allies including Britain, France and Germany — simultaneously, encouraging Israel to sell sophisticated arms to Iran. Nothing could explain this contradiction better than Kissinger’s advocacy of “realpolitik”. The war that lasted from 1980 to 1988 devoured at least a million people and destroyed the economies of both.

When the Iraqi leader later found himself totally denuded of his finances, he decided that Kuwait was a fruit ready for the picking. According to reliable sources, the senior Bush administration may have encouraged Saddam to undertake this adventure when it conveyed a highly ambiguous message through Ambassador April Gillespie, who told the Iraqis that inter-Arab differences were of no interest to the US. But when Saddam invaded Kuwait, the Bush administration built a global coalition that ousted the Iraqis from Kuwait and also ensured that the country was placed in the straitjacket of UN sanctions, crippling its economy and destroying its military strength.

In the process, the Kurds were encouraged to create a near-independent state, while large areas were taken out of Baghdad’s control by imposing no-fly zones. When this policy, coupled with UN sanctions virtually crippled Iraq, the expectation in the US was that Saddam’s ouster or elimination by his own comrades was inevitable. The senior Bush rejected firmly any suggestion that his forces march on Baghdad and in this he was supported by his commanders, particularly Colin Powell, who were convinced that it was not only militarily inadvisable, but also in violation of UN resolutions.

Bush did, however, have a certain sense of discomfort seeing Saddam remain in power, confiding in his diary in February 1991, that he had “still no feeling of euphoria”, adding that “Saddam has got to go”. It took his son, the young, inexperienced and impetuous George Bush, to finally bring an end to the life of the brutal dictator. But instead of being tried for the death of thousands of Kurds and his chemical attacks on Iraqi Shias and Iranian soldiers, Saddam was sentenced to death in a farcical trial for his role in the 1982 deaths of about 150 people in the Shia town of Dujail.

This has led many observers, including American commentators, to claim that his execution was carried out swiftly to prevent any investigation into Saddam’s other crimes, in particular the chemical gas attacks, as the Americans were not too keen to see Saddam being tried for crimes such as the Anfal operation of 1987-88 or the gassing of Kurds at Halabja, as they may well have revealed embarrassing details about American and British involvement in these grisly acts.

It would, however, have served American and Iraqi interests and, in fact, the cause of human rights and freedom in the region had Saddam been tried under international law or in a court of repute. Instead, Saddam’s fate was placed in the hands of a puppet Iraqi regime, dominated by Shias and Kurds, all of whom had suffered grievously under Saddam. Did Bush’s people not understand the consequences of their action? Or were they simply demonstrating the kind of callousness that has marked their actions in Iraq including their failure to understand that their policies were promoting age-old sectarian divides in Iraq, rather than healing the wounds inflicted by Saddam.? To cap it all, Washington may have rushed through — although it denies it did — with the execution, because both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Bush wished to end the year on a high note and claim Saddam’s death as proof of US “success’ in Iraq that would divert attention from the daily grim death toll in that country.

The execution may temporarily boost Bush’s sagging popularity. It may even burnish Al-Maliki’s credentials with both Bush and the Shias who have asked the puppet prime minister to demonstrate greater firmness and resolve. But, while there is no doubt that Saddam was responsible for horrible crimes, his farcical trial and botched-up hanging are not likely to serve the cause of Iraq’s sectarian unity or its political stability.

Some commentators have claimed that with Saddam’s death, the Sunnis will be more amenable to reconciliation with the Shias, others that with the Baath party deprived of its leader it will become a less effective organisation and a weaker challenge to the rulers. But the Sunnis are likely to see in the manner of Saddam’s trial and execution, evidence of their further marginalisation. Whatever the Americans may say, Saddam’s death will be seen by Iraqi Sunnis and many in the Arab world as a farce, reflecting only the victors’ vengeance.

Sadly for Iraq, there appears to be no end to its miseries. The country is already in a state of bloody civil war. Richard Haass, an eminent American scholar and former Bush administration official, has described Iraq in a recent article as “in part a failed state, in part a civil war and in part a regional war”. With Iraqi Shias set to achieve power for the first time in over a millennium, it is not the local Sunnis alone who are fearful of their future. Neighbouring states, especially those with substantial Shia minorities, are gripped with uncertainty as to what a Shia Iraq, in league with an assertive Shia Iran could mean for the region.

In Kuwait, Shias account for 25 per cent of the population and in Saudi Arabia 15 per cent with the majority in the coastal province, where most of the country’s oil reserves are located. Bahrain, too, has a large Shia population. In such a scenario, tensions between Sunnis and Shias are likely to accentuate not only in Iraq but all over the region, more so in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Saudi officials have warned that if “atrocities” against Sunnis in Iraq are not halted, it may consider some form of intervention in that country. Nothing could be more disastrous for it would draw in Iran in what could turn into a region-wide sectarian confrontation.

Two developments are discernible. One, that the US domination of the region is weakening and that Washington will henceforth have to depend on diplomacy rather than on the military to maintain its interests. Secondly, it will be years, possibly decades, before Iraq recovers any semblance of the “order” that prevailed in the country during the Saddam years.

The country could split up into three independent states representing the three communities living in them, a dangerous precedent that holds frightening prospects for its neighbours all of whom are equally artificial entities with discontented minorities. Even if this break-up is avoided, the country could become a loose-knit federation, with three powerful semi-independent states within a weak and ineffective federal government with little ability or capacity to be counted as a regional power.

What then is the solution? There is none that is pain-free or even assured of success. The US invasion has opened a Pandora’s box with little regard or understanding of the demons within it. Before looking for solutions, the Bush administration must recognise publicly and privately its folly and acknowledge the need for a fundamental change. The Iraq Study Group’s report is a convenient tool for doing so as it contains sound recommendations which need to be examined dispassionately without fear of upsetting the neo-cons who have already caused immense harm to the US and the world.

Then, the US should focus on evolving a regional forum of neighbouring states, the major powers and non-Arab Muslim states, on lines similar to that adopted for the Bonn process on Afghanistan. This would mean bringing in Syria and Iran and recognising the role that these two can and should play. Syrian cooperation could have a positive influence on the situation in both Iraq and Lebanon. Approaching Iran may appear more problematic, but is achievable if Iran is assured that the US has abandoned its goal of a regime change. Already, it has gained tremendously as American policies have resulted in the ouster of the two regimes inimical to it: the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baath in Iraq.

Does Pakistan have a role in all this? Given the current mess in Iraq a policy of non-involvement may appear the preferred course. This would, however, be immoral. Given our own mix of Shias and Sunnis and an acceptable track record of sectarian harmony, it is incumbent on Pakistan to make a sincere attempt to use its influence, however weak, to promote a regional solution in consultation with friends and allies such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. We cannot remain unaffected bystanders as Iraq’s disintegrates.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Nepal’s peaceful revolution

THERE were no guillotines, no storming of Bastilles and no Madame Therese Defarge to knit the names of oppressors in the scroll she wove throughout the day. Revolution in Nepal, unlike the one in France, was peaceful. None from among the oppressors was even touched.

Eight months later, when I ambled through the streets of Kathmandu, I tried to look for the ravages of revolution. There were none. The city was normal and the shops well-stocked. Both King Gyanendra and the kingship, once held sacred, had been thrown into the dustbin of history without any violence.

When more than a million people marched on Nepal’s capital last April from different parts of the country, they demonstrated their determination against a despotic ruler — not a person, however cruel. They could have removed him physically from his palace and destroyed his estate spreading over half of the city’s centre. But they only wanted the king to step down.

The blood which was spilled was that of 25 people from the throng. The security forces, arrayed like a battlefield formation, had shot them down. How many more innocents could they kill? They had no heart in it and reported to the king, their commander-in-chief, that the situation was “beyond control”. Only then did he surrender his powers to leaders in the Nepali Congress, the largest political party. Indeed, it was a triumph of the people, the teeming millions, poor and marginalised, whom the outside world had written off. People retrieved their freedom and restored power to the elected parliament which the king had dissolved. The change was no less significant than the end of the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent in 1947.

There was dignity in the people’s revolt, something that evoked awe, democratic and disciplined as it was. Yet there was a message of defiance to the tyranny of one man and his collaborators. Nepal had witnessed something similar in 1990 when a people’s movement had overthrown the panchayat system of absolute monarchy. The revolution made the Nepalese transcend the barriers of caste and clime, span the distance between rural and urban, the Terai region and the hilly tracts.

Diverse communities rose like one person. This has its plus and minus points — unity had come about but there was a rise in expectations. However, what strikes one is the patience with which people waited for the outcome of talks between the two contesting sides, the Nepali Congress, along with its leftist allies, and the Maoists, the communist party of Nepal commanding the People’s Liberation Army. With bated breath, the people saw the finalisation of the interim constitution in November. A month later, they witnessed the removal of King Gyanendra as the head of the state. Both sides sorted out their differences by making the prime minister the head of state.

Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala does not apparently like the arrangement because he said in a statement that the prime minister had become too powerful and there was danger that he could act as a dictator. The interim constitution has kept intact the institution of monarchy and it will be voted upon on the opening day of the constituent assembly that is yet to be elected.

However, the monarch is still revered, particularly in the villages. One estimate is that at least 50 per cent of the Nepalese want the institution of monarchy to stay in some shape because they regard the king as the incarnation of god. The Royal Nepal Army is tilted towards the king. It has retained the word “royal” although Nepal Airlines has dropped it. Even after the revolution, the interim coalition government sent a letter to King Gyanendra on his birthday although it did away with the ceremony of ministers going in a delegation to greet him.

The Koirala government and the Maoists are concentrating on the surrender of arms. The modus operandi has been settled: the Maoists will lock up their arms in containers provided by India and the UN will supervise the whole exercise and guard the container, although the Maoists will keep the keys.

The point which is bothering most Nepalese is whether the Maoists will surrender all their arms. The suspicion is that they will stack some elsewhere since there is no inventory. This has divided society not on a pro- or anti-king basis but on that of pro-Nepali Congress and pro-Maoist.

The former claims to protect democracy, the latter the people’s rights. Still, the fact remains that the Maoists who have conducted an armed struggle for 10 years have bid goodbye to arms. When I asked top Maoist leaders whether they would return to violence if the parliamentary system did not work, their reply was that their faith in peaceful methods was irrevocable.

If this is so, I am unable to understand Maoist attacks on far-flung police posts which are being re-established after their destruction during the insurgency. Instances of extortions or “donations” are galore. I do not think that the cadres are out of the control of the Maoist leadership. I believe that such assertions of authority or its misuse may go on until the Maoists join the interim government, something which should have happened by now. The surrender of arms may pave the way. The arduous task — finding resources for providing basic amenities to the people and enforcing law and order — will begin only when the Maoists join the government. They took to arms because the system could not deliver.

The same question will stare them in the face after the parliamentary system is in place. The monarchy, the Maoists’ methods and parliamentary ways or, for that matter, socialism and communism, are the means to an end, not the end in themselves. How much good will they do for the people is the criterion. If they are sacrificed for what is considered good for the country, would the objective be right?

Civil society, that should provide the answers, feels that it has not got its due. I concede that the intellectuals in Nepal are better and more committed than the ones in India. But the latter have an open society. Tall national leaders gave them a head-start and recognised their importance. The Nepalese had to work with the king who, however benevolent, was the king. But Nepal is more homogeneous after the April revolution than ever before. There is freedom in the air. With the Maoists adopting democratic methods and Koirala and his allies keeping their side of the bargain, there is no reason why peace and prosperity should elude Nepal.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

Global warming

CONSIDER the humble polar bear: Ursus maritimus to the scientists who admire it for its intelligence. Now consider President Bush, who might be classified as Executum obstreperum by the thousands of scientists who say his administration fails to appreciate the gravity of global warming. Is it possible that the polar bear can do what the scientists cannot?

What the polar bear could do, essentially, is force the administration to take steps to curb global warming. With its proposal, announced last week, to list polar bears as a threatened species, the US Fish and Wildlife Service for the first time acknowledged that global warming is the driving force behind an animal’s potential extinction.

If the polar bear is listed as endangered, then the US government would be bound by law to protect it — and protecting it may require regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

In the polar bear, the administration may have met its match. This isn’t just any animal — it is a creature at once majestic and cuddly, the star attraction at countless zoos and featured in so many TV commercials it practically qualifies for a SAG card.

If that’s not enough, the same type of habitat loss threatening the bears’ survival also endangers the penguin, which had a better year at the box office than all but a few humans.

Less popular is the administration’s stance on global warming. Bush has acknowledged the phenomenon, but he’s reluctant to require industry to cut greenhouse gas emissions. If the polar bear is listed as an endangered species, would the government have to crack down on the carbon emissions that are threatening its existence?

Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne passed the buck on that question, saying such regulations fall to other departments. That’s arguable; Fish and Wildlife is the lead agency charged with protecting species from the effects of pollution. If nothing else, a listing for the polar bear would expose Fish and Wildlife to lawsuits from environmentalists similar to the one against the Environmental Protection Agency that is now before the Supreme Court; a dozen states, including California, say the agency is ignoring its duty to protect public health by not regulating greenhouse gases.

—Los Angeles Times