GENERAL Musharraf has said before, and repeated it the other day, that neither Ms Bhutto nor Mr Sharif would be allowed to participate in the forthcoming election. Mr Sharif, he says, had made a deal to stay away from the country for ten years, and he must abide by it.

He argues that Ms Bhutto is a convicted felon, and additional criminal cases are pending against her. If she is indiscreet enough to return to Pakistan, she will go to jail. Moreover, because of the court verdicts against her, she would not be qualified to contest an election. He has thus blasted away the speculation about a rapprochement between him and her.

Is he being so tough because of an unwavering conviction that those who have violated the law must be punished? Not likely, considering that he harbours several former lawbreakers as ministers in his government. The greater likelihood in one case is that he simply despises the man (Mr Sharif).

It is well known that he and Mr Sharif did not get along well during the latter’s second term as prime minister. Even if the allegation that he attempted to interfere with the general’s flight back home from Colombo is not entirely true, there can be no doubt that he attempted to dismiss General Musharraf unceremoniously. Mr Sharif was convicted of a grave crime, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. At the Saudi government’s behest, the general released him on the understanding that he would remove himself from the country for 10 years. But instead of spending his years of exile and his expected retirement from politics meekly, Mr Sharif has of late been vitriolic in his denunciations of the general.

Nawaz Sharif has always been deferential toward religious orthodoxy, does not answer the general’s description of an “enlightened moderate,” and does not therefore qualify as a potential ally. Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and company in the “king’s party” have no desire to see him return and attempt to disrupt their ranks. That being the case, what is Musharraf to do? Unless Mr Sharif is politically naive, his hard-hitting posture suggests that he has read the situation correctly and does not really expect to return and contest the election in 2007.

Many of those devoted to the country’s political stability would vote for leaving the past alone and letting Ms Bhutto and the Sharifs return home and participate in politics. The case for leaving them unmolested goes somewhat like this: even if they have acted wrongfully in the past, why pick on them when so many other lawbreakers are prospering under the present regime? Those who argue in this vein are not saying that two wrongs will make one right. They are, I think, saying that we confront a situation in which we have to opt for the lesser evil. What exactly is the situation?

Partisans of Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif maintain that these two persons are the highest-ranking leaders in the two “mainstream” parties in the country, and that their participation in the election will enable their respective followers to do much better than they might otherwise do. Their exclusion will deprive their parties of their normally expected gains and would thus, by itself, amount to pre-poll rigging. The present ruling party may then come out winning without having to do much rigging on polling day.

How does this reasoning sound? In my view, it is not compelling. Benazir Bhutto was present on the scene, campaigning as best as she could, during the elections of 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997. In 1988 and 1993 her party won a plurality, but not the majority, of seats in the National Assembly, and she could form the government only with the help of other groups. It did not win even a plurality in 1990 and it did very poorly in 1997. It got virtually wiped out in Punjab in that election. She was not present in the country in 2002 and did not participate in the election campaign of that year. Yet, in spite of the allegedly massive rigging in that election, the PPP won a plurality in the Sindh assembly and appeared to have emerged as the largest single party in the National Assembly.

The record would seem to show that her physical presence in Pakistan does not make any significant difference to her party’s electoral performance and fortunes. She participated indirectly in the 2002 election, settling the award of party “tickets” and guiding its campaign strategy from her locations in Dubai and London. She communicated with her lieutenants in Pakistan on the telephone, by fax and email, and in meetings she called wherever she happened to be at the time. It may have been expensive and inconvenient for these party men and women to travel abroad and meet with her, but none of them has been complaining. This arrangement would appear to have worked reasonably well, and produced satisfactory results in 2002, and it may work well again in 2007.

Pakistan is just about the only country in the world whose three major political parties are managed by leaders who are located abroad. The MQM seems to suffer no disability from the fact that its chief, Mr Altaf Hussain, is a British citizen who lives in London and has been operating from his offices there for quite a number of years. His following among the Urdu-speaking Pakistanis remains as substantial and dedicated to him as ever. He addresses them on the telephone and thousands of them gather to hear his lengthy orations. This is a peculiar situation. But, then, Pakistanis are an innovative people, and many of our other situations are just as weird. We have to make do with what we have.

Mr Sharif’s position is not quite the same as that of Benazir Bhutto or Altaf Hussain. In his days of glory he was the head of an assemblage that has been known as the “king’s party” since shortly after its inception. The party’s constitution was amended in 1950 to enable its president to hold office in government. As a result, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan replaced Chaudhry Khaliq-uz-Zaman as the PML president.

Since then the party has dumped its president when he ceased to be the prime minister and adopted his successor as its president. It eased Khwaja Nazimuddin out after his dismissal as prime minister and took Mohammmad Ali Bogra, the new prime minister, who had no political following anywhere in the country.

A small faction within the organisation did on occasion set up its own separate house out of loyalty to a particular leader, but the larger part went with the “king.” This larger faction has relied upon him, not on mass support, for gaining political power. The more influential members of the party, as it existed before Musharraf’s coup, now belong to PML (Q).

Given the party’s long tradition, it is extremely problematic that Mr Nawaz Sharif’s presence in Pakistan in 2007 will enable his faction to regain its former dominance. He was immensely wealthy, which he still is, but his talents as a politician and as head of government used to be placed somewhere between mediocre and low. Solitude, reflection, and introspection during his years in Saudi Arabia may have given him greater maturity and sophistication. But that will not bring the defectors from his party back to his faction.

He will have money to spread around, but so do the Chaudhrys of Gujrat. He is not an orator, and none even among his partisans has ever claimed that he has charisma capable of drawing the masses to his side. He cannot whip up Punjabi chauvinism in 2007, as he did against Ms Bhutto’s government in 1989, because that is no longer a viable option. On balance I am inclined to think that his participation in the election campaign will not do a whole lot for his faction.

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif have been declaring their intention to return to Pakistan after the election schedule has been announced. If the elections are held after the present assemblies complete their term, they have to be held within 60 days of that event. The election schedule will probably be announced no sooner than a couple of months before their term expires. That does not give Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif much time to repair the breaches in their party organisations and mount effective election campaigns. Thus, their return to the country sometime in the summer of 2007, even if it were somehow to materialise, would not be of much avail.

If individual leaders are larger in stature than the parties they head, the latter are not likely to remain viable after they are gone, which they will be sooner or later. The parties may languish and fade away even when their original energisers are still around. The PPP factions, such as the Patriots and Shaheed Bhutto (presumably led by Murtaza Bhutto’s widow and the venerable but now frail Dr Mubashir Hasan) have no future. In my reckoning the prospects of PML-N are also problematic. But that need not be the case with the PPP. It has a fairly firm base and quite a few sensible and eloquent persons within its ranks.

Amin Fahim seems to be doing well and so are Aitzaz Ahsan, Sherry Rahman, and several others. The party has a viable organisation and a bunch of dedicated cadres on the ground. It has a distinctive social outlook. There is no reason why it cannot continue to function as an influential agent in Pakistani politics. But if it is to ensure its longevity, then somewhere along the line, it will have to learn to do without Benazir Bhutto who, even though we wish her well, has to be vulnerable to the normal human frailties.

In conclusion it may be said that the better part of wisdom for both the PPP and PML-N would be to prepare for the 2007 election, assuming that their chiefs will not be present on the scene to campaign for them.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, US. e-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net

AFTER 35 years, the surrender at Dhaka and the emergence of Bangladesh is a forgotten chapter in Pakistan’s history. But a footnote to that great tragedy continues to fester. Some 200,000 people living there still insist that they are the citizens of Pakistan and hoist the Pakistani flag in Dhaka’s Mohammadpur slum on August 14 every year.

Most of the present denizens (families of seven or more huddled in one shack) of Mohammadpur and smaller slums in Rangpur, Narainanj, Saidpur, and Mirpur were born after East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Their hope to make it to Pakistan one day may be fading but refuses to die. Their fate has long ceased to be of concern to the government of Pakistan. Nor does their plight strikes a chord of sympathy even among their ethnic kin in Pakistan.

In meetings, TV discussions and newspaper articles the loss of East Pakistan is regularly mourned and is the subject of much debate and analysis. But it was left to lawyer Aziz Munshi to speak for the “legal and constitutional right of the stranded Pakistanis” to come to their country — for they did not leave the country, the country had left them.

How one wishes that Mr Munshi had persuaded Gen Ziaul Haq, Nawaz Sharif and then Gen Pervez Musharraf (he was attorney-general in the governments of all three) to fulfil their constitutional responsibility. Now what Mr Munshi has to say carries no more weight than the opinion of an individual. The state’s legal responsibility may have abated with the passage of time and the presence of a new generation — but not its moral responsibility which is more binding, universal and eternal.

The humanitarian aspect of the issue, ironically, was emphasised at the same meeting by H.N. Akhtar and S.S. Qasim (one a bureaucrat, the other a soldier) who had followed cold rules all their lives. The “Biharis,” they argued, had the right to return for they had fought to the last to save Pakistan.

Sadly, the demand for their repatriation finds place neither in the manifestoes of political parties nor in the rhetoric of their leaders for today it would not get them votes. The indifference of the religious groups to whom the bonds of faith are stronger than race or culture is even more marked. Not only have they made no effort on this issue, they have frustrated the efforts of those who felt concerned.

A plan for repatriation was made and financial commitments for it were secured by a public-spirited life peer of Britain, Lord David Hedley Ennals. Mr Muzafar Husain, East Pakistan’s last chief secretary, who was a witness to the sacrifices of the stranded people was appointed by the government of Pakistan to support Lord Ennals’ efforts.

While Lord Ennals’ plan was still in the making, ethnic tensions arose in Karachi which was expected to be the most likely destination of the repatriated “Biharis” as it had been for a much larger number of them who came by whatever route and in whatever manner they could. As the government dithered, Lord Ennals walked away in disgust and the donors he had lined up, too, backed out. In the course of time, the repatriation of the “Biharis” also got linked with the presence of a much larger number of Bengalis in Karachi most of whom were unwilling to go. It was difficult to locate and deport them.

Some years after Lord Ennals’ departure, the Jeddah-based Rabita Alam-i-Islami stepped in to take up his unfinished mission. Rabita started on a promising note but made little headway as time went by. Hopes were raised once again in 1999 when Dr Abdullah Omar Nasif, chairman of the Saudi consultative assembly and a former secretary-general of Rabita, promised to take the issue back to a reconstituted and more assertive council of Rabita. It has not been heard of since.

Rabita’s plan envisaged rehabilitation of the returning people in a number of selected locations in Punjab. As this plan faltered, Dr Nasif blamed the excessive preoccupation of successive governments with their own politics of survival. In reviving its plan the Rabita, it seems, was prompted by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain who was then interior minister in Nawaz Sharif’s cabinet. He undertook to select and acquire 34 sites in various Punjab districts and also helped raise funds.

He kept renewing his pledge but it remains a guess whether this time round the blame lay on Rabita or again on the government concerned about its own survival. Nothing happened in material terms. In more recent times Chaudhry Shujaat, forgetting his pledge to the “Biharis”, has shown more interest in bringing over the mortal remains of Chaudhry Rehmat Ali, a man who denounced Jinnah and his Pakistan.

During the time when it was in power in the NWFP, Wali Khan’s NAP (National Awami Party, later renamed ANP) offered to receive and settle the whole stranded lot in that province. For the NWFP government it would have been an easy task for, after all, it had played host for a generation to a much larger number of refugees fleeing from war-torn Afghanistan. It seems it was the centre that did not take up the offer for the ANP is known to be much less given to hyperbole than other parties.

During General Musharraf’s seven years in power, there has not been even a passing mention of the return and rehabilitation of the stranded people though Chaudhry Shujaat is the most influential figure of the regime and has also been prime minister for a while. He is now much better placed to fulfil the pledge he made in March 1999. Gen Musharraf too should be sympathetic — or so the Mohammadpur slum dwellers expect.

That said, there is little hope for any action to ensue as repatriation is no longer a live issue for this government. All that can be expected of it is to persuade the government of Bangladesh to accept the willing among the stranded as its citizens. After all if Pakistan doesn’t want them where else can they go?

The efforts aimed at repatriation or acquiring citizenship should not be given up altogether. Some humanitarian organisations in Pakistan and Bangladesh could jointly accomplish what the two governments couldn’t or did not want to. The world community would certainly help. Humanitarian winds are blowing strong across the world. Just look at the donations for the Asian tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake. More money has been pledged than the receiving countries can spend.

A comforting feature of the otherwise troublesome repatriation problem is that it would bring to Pakistan skilled artisans and hardy workers. Two generations of them have survived in a degrading hostile environment under a callous government amidst hopes that were raised only to be dashed.

Though the people coming from Bangladesh would not be a burden but an asset, considering the precarious ethnic balance of Sindh, it would be wise and safe to settle them in Punjab and the NWFP where skilled workers and craftsmen are always in short supply. Legal, political and economic considerations apart, it remains Pakistan’s moral responsibility not to let the second generation live and die in limbo.