WITH 1971 receding further into the past, our hindsight can now detect the previously hidden aspects and implications. Hitherto, we mourned the loss of East Pakistan as a one-time historical tragedy, but are now rediscovering it as the first splinter of continuous erosion.

This finding may sound sacrilegious. But it demands an objective assessment of our 59-year history, which primarily is the story of a long war between the democratic and undemocratic forces in the country. East Pakistan was the first casualty in this war, which continues to rage to this day between the same adversaries, with the same determination and with the same destructive possibilities. Let us dispassionately analyse the sequence.

1971 marked the end of the first clandestine phase in this long war, which started only eleven months after Pakistan came into being, when the vacuum created by the death of the Quaid-i-Azam converted Pakistan’s soil into a playing field of undemocratic forces. Two groups could be recognised fairly soon.

The first included the privileged slaves of the British rulers (pre-independence district level feudal politicians) who were suddenly elevated to the level of their ex-masters and occupied the Constituent Assembly. To cling to this highrise view they began to wilfully delay, even thwart, the framing of the constitution. Consequently, the first assembly, in its seven-year existence before its dissolution in 1954, held only 15 sessions for 116 days with an average sessional strength of 37 to 56 members.

The second group germinated in July 1949, (barely 10 months after the death of the Quaid) when Brigadier Akbar Khan (later major general) initiated a plan to overthrow the “corrupt and inefficient” civilian government. It was delayed due to his year-long absence for a training course in the UK. On return, promotion and appointment as the chief of general staff (CGS) under the new commander-in-chief, General Ayub Khan, he decided in the final meeting at his house on Feb 23, 1951, to arrest Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan during his visit to Rawalpindi on March 3. The conspiracy, however, failed due to leakage of the plan resulting in arrests, trial and convictions.

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in the same year (October 1951, the mystery remains unsolved till today) and the two undemocratic groups soon joined hands to create an invisible feudal-army axis. It quietly surfaced in 1954, when Gen Ayub Khan, joined the national cabinet in uniform as the defence minister and the commander-in-chief.

Since the vocal majority province of East Pakistan raised a democratic demand for an equitable share in national governance, the undemocratic axis decided to get rid of this constant irritant and potential threat to its autocratic hold. This was followed by a strategy to ignore the patriots in that wing and encourage the separatists. The ensuing civil war sucked in India and the final jettisoning of the people-oriented majority wing was achieved through a mock war and quick surrender to India. Thus, the demise of East Pakistan was a defeat for the nation, but a victory for these undemocratic forces.

To consolidate their victory over a defeated nation Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report was buried for 27 years and the culprits identified in this report were generously rewarded. Out of the two components of the axis, Z.A. Bhutto became the prime minister and General Yahya Khan, after a comfortable and protected life, was buried with full military honours.

With East Pakistan gone, the undemocratic elements attained an unchallenged hold over the residual Pakistan. The hitherto undercover war became an open military operation. In addition to the gun, Gen Ziaul Haq picked up a very harsh stick (the hanging of Bhutto, public flogging of thousands of civilians and encouragement of divisive sectarianism) and a very sweet carrot (taking the equally undemocratic mullah on board, free flow of political bribes, job quotas, and granting freedom to loyalists to loot and plunder national resources). The dual axis was thus transformed into a crafty system of a self-serving triple alliance of mullah-military-wadera collusion. In the post-Zia period, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf dexterously used these weapons of offence against the retreating democracy.

After 1971, the system began to distort, even demolish all institutions of the state and civil society, and began to perpetuate itself. Democracy, therefore, suffered many more defeats through two army coups, fake referendums, rigged elections, defections, horse-trading, political bribes, a divided judiciary and the storming of Supreme Court, the subordination of the judiciary to the civil and military executive authorities, dismissal, exiles, conditional installation of elected prime ministers, plunder of public funds etc. In 2006, the badly battered democracy is demoralised, disheartened and frightened. Civil society is in a state of coma.

The foregoing account clearly establishes the qualitative kinship between 1971 and 2006. These are identical milestones of the same journey and show the distance covered in a direction opposite to Jinnah’s democracy. Having personally seen the civil war and the fall of Dhaka, I can count some of the matching features as under.

My most painful memories of East Pakistan in 1971 are the tearful complaints of pro-Pakistan Bengalis that the army wanted to “do it alone” and was not involving them in saving the country. Contrary to the planted myth (“all Bengalis were hostile”) such patriots were in a sizable majority, but they felt defeated for being left out. They should get better appreciation now because the entire Pakistani nation in 2006 suffers from the same “outsider syndrome.”

No one knows why, what and how things are shaping in Balochistan, Waziristan and elsewhere. Any type of access is completely denied to arbitrators, volunteers, social workers,journalists or fact-finders. A few self-styled wizards insist on handling things in the “supreme national interest” with the whole nation guessing its future in anguish. This syndrome is now apparent everywhere, even in financial scams, inflation, dubious, stock exchange transactions, governance and other areas.

While the world accuses Pakistan of being a failed state, with think-tanks of “friendly” countries predicting the dates of Pakistan’s demise, the triple alliance of rulers continues to suppress and undermine our human resource through anti-people policies and devious devices, instead of developing and harnessing it to face the perceived dangers. I am reminded of the last days of East Pakistan where vast human and material resources remained idle even when the political horizon was overwhelmed by storms. By day I live in 2006, but by night I recall 1971.

The mistake in 1948 to impose Urdu (the language of 3.3 per cent population) on 56 per cent majority wing in total disregard of local sensitivities was genuinely rectified in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions, but the political system failed to positively consolidate the rectification. The nation’s shock absorbing capacity was completely destroyed by continued suppression and irrelevance of civil society. The fissures created by the language controversy, therefore, continued to grow larger to the point of complete rupture in 1971.

Since the nation remained a hostage to undemocratic forces even after 1971 the system has continued to be less and less integration-friendly. All the skills of the rulers and the state apparatus are focused on dividing the political parties, provinces, sects, and groups. With the military barracks as the decision-maker, civil society as an outcast, and rulers estranged from the ruled, our nation today cannot pretend to have any shock-absorbers against internal or external jolts.

The governing set-up and the mindset of the rulers in 1971 and 2006 are exactly the same. In both regimes, military dictators, occupying the driving seat in a cartload of dumb legislatures, captive judicial systems and harassed executives, regulated the speed with the jugglery of identical “LFOs.” Their uniformed fraternity remains bent on retaining power regardless of the consequences. Pakistanis disappear today as did East Pakistanis in 1971. No wonder, the people are equally bewildered, disgusted, demoralised, and helpless to the extent of being insensitive, in spite of being the owners of this country.

To conclude, there is only one moral lesson of the 59-year long war. We should not forget that the most lethal weapon of assault was an engineered grouse of exploitation of one region by the other. Today, the same complaint is as loud and clear as it was in 1971. We see the same accusing fingers, and the same lack of communication among the people of the different regions. Thus separated, it is very easy to convert a deliberate rumour into spiralling incrimination and invective.

The hidden truth, however, is that the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 was not due to the exploitation of one wing by the other, but the first manifestation of exploitation of both wings by an anti-democracy system. Currently, the collective exploitation of four provinces by the same system (much more crafty and wily than before) is continuing with the same skill and vigour as before. East Pakistan was the first victim of this foul play. If the people do not come forward to get rid of this system, other federating units can meet the same fate.

mmufti@apollo.net.pk

THE Asian Development Bank has agreed to lend $600 million to Pakistan for the enhancement of private sector participation in infrastructure development. Assuming large private investments in housing, manufacturing and agriculture, the ADB wants to extend support for the provision of power, transport and drinking water.

It is inferred that the capacity of the public sector is limited and, therefore, the need for private investment is urgent, given the government’s ambitious growth targets. Sources say that Pakistan expects to attract private investment to the tune of $81 billion.

It has become a routine for successive regimes to grab any offer of credit by a donor agency without thoroughly examining the long- and short-term impact of such a loan. This instance is no different. Without looking into the background of ADB’s lending in the past, the new arrangement is being finalised by the relevant government departments.

A sizable number of ADB-funded and supervised projects have generated disappointing outcomes in the past. Until 2002, Pakistan received funding support for 217 development projects in various sectors as per the ADB’s own records. Although some, such as the South Rohri Fresh Groundwater Irrigation Project and the Balochistan Fisheries Development Project, have been successful, as many as one-third have ended up in dismal failure. Examples of the latter variety include the Faisalabad Water Supply and Sewerage Project and the Karachi Urban Development Project.

Pakistan owes $6.5 billion to the ADB — a big chunk of its total external debt — making it important for decision-makers to assess the need and usefulness of all the loan contracts under consideration. It will not be out of place to mention that the overall track record of ADB lending has been fairly dubious in nature.

ADB lending is driven by supply, without a direct link to the prevailing needs in the respective sectors. The potential benefit to the direct and indirect beneficiaries is seldom accounted for. In 1998, ADB operators pushed the management of the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board to sign a contract for the construction of a sewerage treatment plant in Korangi. ADB was to provide $70 million which constituted around 70 per cent of the total cost. The project was designed to rely upon large-scale trunk sewers for the required amount of sewage. As these sewers did not exist, it was obvious that further funding would be needed to construct these components, thus multiplying the cost several fold.

It was also observed that ADB and other involved agencies kept the whole process a closed-door affair. No consultation was carried out with the related communities and stakeholders. A group of public-spirited professionals prepared an alternative proposal and presented it to the then Sindh governor to show that the anticipated output could be generated without the foreign loan component at one-tenth of the cost. Good sense prevailed and the project was set aside. On the other hand, millions of dollars were wasted in the Baldia Sanitation Project and Solid Waste Management Project for the city.

A fundamental point of concern in ADB-funded projects is the astronomically high cost of technical assistance. Whereas no exact formula exists to interpret this aspect, this component can vary from one-fourth to more than one-third of the total loan overlay. In usual cases, this element is found to be several times higher than prevailing local rates. This money in fact finds its way to the country of the consultant, making the recipient nation poorer.

For instance, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, international consultants for an environmental management project received a salary of $12,000 per month whereas the average per capita earning in the country was not over $200. In the recently announced study on KWSB privatisation, a total of $300,000 is likely to be spent on jobs that can be done for one-third this amount.

Independent assessments also question the quality of technical assistance that is extended to projects in developing countries. Some of the technical personnel have little or no background of working with culturally and linguistically diversified elements. Others do not possess the appropriate competence and background. Many are not able to transform technical options to suit existing realities.

A point of concern regarding donor support in general and ADB assistance in particular is the insistence on private sector participation strategies. Past experience shows that this approach is not without an ulterior motive. There are many developmental and sectoral areas where the capacity of the local private sector is non-existent. In such instances, the plan is to create conditions that would allow international firms, mostly from developed countries, to be given projects and developmental initiatives at rates and terms of their choice.

Not only does this mean loss of job opportunities for the local population, the operation and maintenance of such initiatives become a liability. The drinking water sector is a case in point where giant multinationals are hell-bent upon entrenching themselves in the country. The potential of local entrepreneurs has seldom been considered in this respect. As a result, the sustainability of such enterprises becomes open to question.

Choice of development approach and priorities is heavily influenced by donor preferences. One finds that multilateral donors such as ADB prefer to support short-term project-based inputs in identified sectors. They want to convert development into business, trading and service opportunities. The ones most affected are communities who do not possess the financial and administrative strength to counter these moves. Developmental decisions and projects drastically affect their lives, at times jeopardising the survival of communities.

The community of waste pickers and recyclers in Karachi is an example. Successive studies and projects by ADB-supported consortia have advised the takeover of the solid waste management sector by high profile foreign private sector firms with international experience. Such entrepreneurs devise strategies to dispose of the waste without taking into consideration the future survival of informal recyclers. In other words, each and every recommendation suggested by donor-funded consultancy assignments aim to benefit the large businesses. Regrettably, the government functionaries also endorse such approaches without examining the net benefits or otherwise to the local people.

In development, capital is only one of the necessary ingredients. A rational approach translated into a workable plan, manageable projects to achieve the prescriptions in the plan, public consultation to give public support (or otherwise) to the planned projects, capable human resource and corresponding material resources are some of the other aspects needed for development to take off.

In addition, the existence of a visible need for development input is vital. There is no denying the fact that the areas identified for support by ADB have amply demonstrated the need for development input. However, other pre-conditions have not been met. For instance, in the urban transportation sector, studies have very clearly highlighted the need and feedback of stakeholder groups. Masses wish to have access to an affordable and efficient public transport. The inputs that one finds in the sector do not correspond to this fundamental aspiration. Instead of responding to this need, one finds flyovers, car loans schemes, highways, motorways and similar projects being announced and executed, many of which have donor support also available to them.

Pakistan is already a heavily indebted country. A sizable proportion of national income is spent on debt servicing, particularly hard-earned foreign exchange earnings. Decision-makers must think twice before inking any new loan contract. Domestic resources and options must be explored in the first place. By revising the consultancy and contracting procedures, the planning and project implementation overheads can be greatly reduced.

Similarly, corruption is evident in development allocation. Adherence to strict financial and operational controls would be useful in obtaining the best value for money. And finally, feedback from the stakeholders must be obtained as a norm. The government should constitute standing committees of parliamentarians/members of provincial assembly/local government to review these crucial decisions. This would be instrumental in transforming representative democracy into participatory democracy.