Forensic report: does it shed light?
By Shahid Kardar
THE forensic investigators have submitted a report that provides a sophisticated bailout of not just large brokers but also absolves almost everyone of any misdeed that might have contributed to the stock market crash of March 2005. While failing to dwell on the reasons that led to the crash it seems to suggest that such outcomes are part of the course and that we should all learn to live with the recurrence of such events since risks and rewards in inherently risky securities markets are part of the game.
This rejoinder will argue that a report is incomplete and its conclusions flawed in places. The macro data reviewed by the Task Force is regarded by the investigators as not providing sufficient evidence to draw any conclusions on the occurrence of wash trades — for reasons ranging from the lack of a unique identity code for each investor and the existence of benami and group accounts to the presence of dhobi brokers and the inconsistent and often incomplete nature of trading records, (the Task Force had itself acknowledged and stated clearly that the anonymous nature of these transactions was a factor that had clouded tracks of potential cases of market abuse).
It is quite amazing that the forensic investigators used the same aggregate data to absolve all brokers of any wrongdoing whatsoever! If the claim is that the available evidence could not support the Task Force’s suspicions (since no specific allegations were made in the report of the Task Force on this account), one cannot argue that the same “inadequate” data proves that all brokers were innocent, despite their own confession that they were “not able to analyse the type of trading related data that is normally generated”.
In other words, if the macro data could not provide an affirmative answer to the Task Force’s questions, it could not also logically rebut the allegations (even if they had been made) levelled by the Task Force. The investigation of such data should have been equally inconclusive. Therefore, the categorical statement of the investigators certifying the purity of the brokers raises doubts not only about the quality of the conclusions of the forensic report in this area, but also leaves one guessing as to why, on the basis of data of “dubious” quality, the investigators needed to go out of their way to issue a clean sheet to those regarded by the public at large as the main suspects. In the opinion of this writer, the prime responsibility of the investigators should have been to examine the underlying micro data (supposedly their core competence), the accounts of brokers and those of their clients and some transactions, and provided an explanation of what happened in the fateful month of March 2005. If the investigators were unable to lay their hands on such data, for whatever reason, they should have said so and moved on.
The investigators assert that one of the factors that caused the crash was not the withdrawal of badla but the policy of the SECP to phase it out for some scrips, and that badla was not withdrawn as a result of voluntary action of any influential broker. This conclusion flies in the face of representations made to the Task Force by a host of market players. Respondent after respondent reported that badla withdrawal was a key factor precipitating the crash of March 2005, — an outcome also supported by macro-level data.
Some badla providers explained that they stopped financing because they began to worry about the sustainability of the rise in the market and the ability of badla borrowers to repay their loans. Nowhere did the Task Force report contend that it was just brokers who were withdrawing badla; the report accepted that brokers could have been withdrawing funds on behalf of their clients.
In fact, the mutual funds withdrawing badla had defended their action on the rational plea that they had no responsibility to the investors, their prime responsibility being to protect and augment the interests of their unit holders. What the Task Force had highlighted was that some badla providers had sold in the March futures, contracts at prices higher than in the ready market from which they were withdrawing badla.
Also, contrary to the contention of the forensic investigators, it was not argued anywhere in the report, except in the case of futures contracts, that there was collective manipulation and wrongdoing in this area. In fact, the Task Force had proposed a detailed forensic investigation to ascertain facts and determine if manipulation had taken place.
In their zeal to discredit the Task Force and target its report by claiming that they did “not find sufficient evidence to support the paramount scheme of manipulation in the manner put forth by the Task Force”, the forensic investigators put in extraordinary effort to reading between the lines of the Task Force report and left themselves with precious little time to read what was actually said in plain words.
The report of the Task Force never suggested that brokers conspired collectively to use manipulative practices through wash trades nor did it conclude that they colluded to systematically restrict COT availability. The Task Force’s categorical and specific charges are with respect to manipulation by some brokers (in collusion with KSE management) in the futures contracts when “some of the large brokers began efforts to design bailout plans for potential default, possibly aimed at protecting their own interests”. It refers to the extended COT session conducted on March 25, to benefit themselves, in complete violation of normal trading rules, when futures positions were treated as if they were ready market transactions.
This allegation is grounded in fact and quoted at length in the report of the Task Force. The report tracks the return to the scene of the badla providers to support the same scrips for which they had withdrawn badla during the period March 8 to 14. The Task Force report challenged the assertion of the badla providers that they had stepped in to save the market, arguing that the latter were aware of the adequate deposits of margins with the KSE and that the return of the badla providers was likely to have been to protect their interests. They also raised the interest rate on this badla from 18 per cent to 24 per cent, a strange way of saving the market!
Similarly, the report did not say that brokers “sold shares that they did not actually own” and purchased them in the ready market at highly discounted prices. It simply said that it could have happened and that this required a more detailed broker-level examination. Even here the investigators find themselves on a weak wicket. If, because of group accounts, the possibility of “blank sales” having taken place-could neither be confirmed nor disproved, then the forensic investigators could not challenge the suspicions of the Task Force.
It is interesting that while agreeing with the Task Force that there could have been manipulation in the futures market on the matter of the extended COT session on March 25, the description of which occupies a fair amount of space in the report of the Task Force, the forensic report has essentially chosen to gloss over the relevance of this action of the brokers. One wonders why?
It is also intriguing that the investigators at no stage considered it necessary to speak to the Task Force members. They never met the latter before commencement of their assignment or even during the investigation to discuss their findings and how their conclusions differed with some of the concerns raised by the Task Force.
Finally, considering the positive image that they present of Pakistan’s capital market and the touching faith that the investigators seem to have in the integrity and pristine practices of the large brokers, would it be too much to ask them to put their own money on the line by investing in Pakistan’s stock market a part of their earnings they were paid for this assignment?
The writer is a former finance minister of Punjab.

