Nicaragua: back to the future?
By Mahir Ali
A PROMINENTLY moustachioed figure from the past has been haunting United States officials of late. No, I don’t mean Saddam Hussein, who was sentenced to death last Sunday in what is predictably (and unconvincingly) being hailed in certain quarters as yet another turning point for occupied Iraq. Sadly, the verdict is no more likely than any of the previous watersheds to put an end to the bloodletting in that benighted land.
Would a demonstrably fair trial have made any difference? Probably not. Not at this stage. Perhaps a more pertinent question would be: could a fair trial have been conducted in a country under foreign occupation? Not many people would deny that Saddam has a great deal of blood on his hands, and even those of us who view the death penalty as a state-sanctioned act of barbarism, would agree that he shouldn’t have been allowed to get away scot-free. But it isn’t easy to see how the interests of justice will be served if the ex-dictator goes to the gallows, while those responsible, directly or otherwise, for an estimated 655,000 Iraqi deaths in the years since Saddam was toppled incur no penalty.
In the case of Iraq, it is beginning to be widely accepted that the past is another country. For a decade and a half, the US has been keen to believe the same about another nation that experienced Washington-sponsored regime change, albeit via a different form of terrorism.
Nicaragua had a long history of military rule, authoritarianism and frequent intervention when the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) assumed power in 1979 following a popular insurrection. The liberation front took its name from Augusto Cesar Sandino, a nationalist rebel leader who had vociferously opposed the presence of US Marines on Nicaraguan soil in the early 20th century.
He was assassinated in 1934 by the National Guard under the command of General Anastasio Somoza Garcia, who staged a coup shortly afterwards. Thenceforth, the Somoza family was never more than a stone’s throw from the highest office in the land: the last of the Somozas fled only in the shadow of the Sandinista triumph.
The socialist agenda of the Sandinistas helped to conjure up a favourite American bugbear, the risk of “another Cuba”, only six years after a similar “threat” had been repelled in Chile. In the latter case, the fact that Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity government had been democratically elected was wilfully ignored: the Nixon-Kissinger strategy was to “make the economy scream”. But that did not suffice, and the time-honoured device of a military coup had to be deployed to draw a line under the Chilean dream of an equitable economic order. An uncommonly heavy dose of neo-liberal economics followed, under the aegis of the exceptionally brutal Pinochet junta. Unlike Saddam, Pinochet has thus far succeeded in evading a trial.
Nicaragua faced a somewhat different strategy of subversion: infiltration by CIA-trained mercenaries, known as the Contras, whose brief was to target not just Sandinistas, but anyone who was supporting the revolution, be they peasants, teachers or priests. This was terrorism, pure and simple. And Ronald Reagan declared the Contras to be the moral equivalent of his nation’s founding fathers.
In response, the Sandinistas adopted an unusual tactic: they held elections, which were deemed to be fair by most international observers. The FSLN’s presidential candidate, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, won a handsome majority in 1984. Which inevitably led Washington to declare the vote unacceptable. When the US Congress decreed that the Contras, whose terrorist outrages were making headlines across the world, could no longer be funded, the Reagan White House opted for surreptitious means that involved the sale of weaponry, via Israel, to Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran, and the despatch of funds to the Contras with Saudi assistance.
The illegality of the convoluted process did little serious damage to the Reagan administration, although the man in charge of the operation, Colonel Oliver North, was eventually incarcerated for his troubles. The war of attrition caused an estimated 50,000 estimated fatalities. A large proportion of the dead consisted of innocent villagers who had been directly targeted rather than caught in the crossfire.
When the Sandinista government hauled the US before the World Court on the charge of mining Nicaraguan harbours, an adverse verdict failed to deter Washington from its course of action. By the time the next Nicaraguan elections rolled around in 1990, the US made it painfully clear that in the event of another victory for Ortega, the Contra conflict would indefinitely be prolonged. This democracy at gunpoint succeeded in producing desirable results from the American point of view: Ortega lost to the conservative candidate, Violeta Chamorro, and the Sandinistas handed over power without a fuss.
Nicaragua subsequently faded from international headlines, and it wasn’t particularly easy to ascertain whether the promised peace and prosperity followed once the nation had been plucked out of the Soviet orbit of influence (a scheme of things in which it had always been on the periphery). Not surprisingly, it turns out that after 16 years of neo-liberal economics, Nicaragua is the second poorest country in the western hemisphere. Up to 80 per cent of its population of 5.5 million lives on less than $2 a day. There was some economic growth in the 1990s, but it failed to trickle down. The levels of healthcare and education — areas in which the Sandinistas had taken encouraging initiatives — are abysmal. Unemployment is high and power breakdowns are a daily occurrence.
Given these conditions, perhaps the State Department in Washington ought not to have been particularly surprised when it emerged that Ortega stood a reasonable chance of winning this year’s presidential ballot. Actually, his strength in opinion polls was not a direct consequence of Nicaragua’s economic plight, which has been pretty poor all along; he was boosted by the inability of the conservative side of politics to agree on a single candidate.
The seriousness of the divide was demonstrated by the fact that even ageing Cold Warriors in the US found it difficult to choose between Eduardo Montealegre and Jose Rizo. The State Department and its man in Managua, US ambassador Paul Trivelli, have been backing Montealegre, whose credibility can be measured by the fact that he has accused Ortega of being friends with Osama bin Laden. But when Oliver North visited Nicaragua a couple of weeks ago, he wasn’t just returning to the scene of his crime: the trip was intended to bolster the fortunes of Rizo, who was also the preferred candidate of the more ideologically motivated ex-Contras.
At the same time, Ortega’s running mate, Jaime Morales, is himself a former Contra leader — albeit one who now believes he was used by Washington for its own ends. Hardcore Ortega partisans believe that he would strive to deliver what the Contra intervention prevented el Comandante and his comrades from achieving in the 1980s. However, some ex-supporters have been put off by his dubious political alliances, allegations of corruption and child abuse (which may or may not have been part of a smear campaign), and his backing for the Catholic Church’s successful attempt to ban abortion. Breakaway Sandinistas also put up a candidate in Sunday’s election, but without seriously eroding Ortega’s vote bank.
Back in the 1980s, the youthful Ortega was a symbol of hope for millions of Latin Americans, as well as a focus for US hatred. At 60 he’s mellower and chubbier than before. The military fatigues of yore are long gone. He talks more about God than Marx, and his public rallies have featured echoes of Lennon rather than Lenin, a Spanish version of the ex-Beatle’s ‘Give Peace a Chance’ having been adopted as the Ortega campaign’s theme song. The moment of militancy has passed, he suggests, and his revolutionary zeal is now restricted to peaceful means. He doesn’t object to free trade with the US, but says he is determined to curb the excesses of “savage capitalism”.
Below his receding hairline Ortega still sports his iconic moustache, and that, notwithstanding all his professions of moderation, sufficed for the US to interfere in the Nicaraguan electoral process via a plethora of dire warnings and unconscionable threats, often couched in the viciously uncompromising language that characterises the Bush administration yet is also reminiscent of the Reagan era. Not only will aid and assistance cease in the event of an Ortega victory, but there are moves afoot to seal off the remittances from relatives working in the US and elsewhere that serve as a vital lifeline for substantial numbers of Nicaraguans.
The cautionary bullying appears not to have worked, just as an early endorsement from Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez appears to have done no harm. Ortega needed at least 35 per cent of the vote and a five per cent lead over his nearest rival to win in the first round of balloting. Most analysts agreed that he wouldn’t stand much of a chance if the contest went to a second round. Preliminary results showed him leading the pack with 40 per cent, nearly eight points ahead of Montealegre.
Ortega’s extraordinary comeback won’t mean much if he is unable to meaningfully improve socio-economic conditions for the majority of his compatriots. On the other hand, if his best efforts are thwarted once more by the ideologically motivated machinations of an imperialist-minded neighbour, it will be another black mark against the most powerful rogue nation of all, which all too frequently favours the noose as an instrument of vengeance.
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