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| October 29, 2006 | Sunday | Shawwal 5, 1427 |
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A dominant figure
The Mohali debacle
North Korea: stirring the hornet’s nest
Now telenovela
NORTH Korea is a small hermetic state born out of the Korean war of 1950s. In many ways it is unique and unusual. It has a Stalinist-era type of dictatorship and one of the very few countries in the world that has kept itself out of the globalisation process.
EVEN though Mullah Omar has rejected Mr Hamid Karzai’s offer of talks with the Taliban, the very fact that the Afghan president has realised the need for a political solution to the on-going conflict with the militants shows obstinacy giving way to pragmatism. Talking to reporters in Kabul on Friday, Mr Karzai said he was prepared to talk to Mullah Omar for the sake of peace in Afghanistan provided the guerilla leader freed himself of “foreign slavery”. Ignoring for a moment the implications of Mr Karzai’s reference to Mullah Omar’s “foreign slavery”, what needs to be noted is the light of wisdom that seems to be dawning on the beleaguered Afghan president after half a decade of bloodshed and reliance solely on force for solving what is in great measure a political problem. That the Taliban themselves have left no stone unturned to destroy Afghanistan and bring misery to its people goes without saying. They have done this both when they were in power and now that they are out in the cold and waging a war that has led to countless civilian deaths and widespread destruction in Afghanistan, especially in the Kandahar region, which is the Taliban’s stronghold.
An Afghan national, born in the village of Nauda in the Kandahar province, Mullah Omar, in the words of President Pervez Musharraf, is “caught in a time warp, detached from reality”. On Saturday, he rejected Mr Karzai’s talks offer, saying there would be no talks with the Afghan head of state unless he freed himself “from the slavery of foreign infidels”. Mullah Omar carries a prize on his head, and it is not clear how Mr Karzai will talk to a wanted man. But these are what can be called the modalities of talks, and can be taken care of. The problem, however, is as much with President Karzai as with Mullah Omar
The reason why Mullah Omar has rejected the Karzai offer is obvious: the Afghan president lacks a true power base. Himself a Pakhtoon, he looks to foreign troops to give peace to his country. The presence of foreign troops only evokes intense feelings of nationalism among the Afghans. That is why no foreign army has ever left Afghanistan with its honour intact, as the British and the Russians know only too well. Besides, America, hopelessly bogged down in Iraq, is keen to lighten its Afghan encumbrances and wants Nato to play a greater role there, while most Nato governments have no intention of getting their boys killed for bolstering Mr Karzai’s fragile government. If Mr Karzai wants peace in Afghanistan he should deal with the militants himself and seek the active cooperation of non-Taliban Pakhtoons for putting an end to violence. He should put his own house in order, take measures to end the bloodbath by political means and start the process of reconstruction in earnest so as to better the lives of the Afghan people, who have been pauperised by 27 years of continuous warfare.
GHULAM Ishaq Khan, who died in his hometown Peshawar on Friday at the ripe old age of 91, was closely associated with the economic and political history of Pakistan almost ever since the country’s foundation. His training as a bureaucrat ensured that he would bring a certain encrusted conservatism to bear on political developments and he perhaps made no secret of his distaste for politicians, whom he believed to be inconstant. But, on the whole, Mr Ishaq Khan’s career as a bureaucrat and policymaker was far less controversial than the character it assumed after he was catapulted to the presidency following Gen Ziaul Haq’s sudden death. Unfortunately, he then came to symbolise all that is wrong with our political system and state management at the top.
Instead of seeking to dilute some of the harsher features incorporated into the Constitution by Ziaul Haq, Mr Ishaq Khan fell easily into the pattern established by earlier authoritarian rulers, acting in concert with the military to interfere with civilian governments and trying to impose the establishment’s point of view on them. Because of this he strengthened the hold of the military and civilian bureaucracy on governance and added to the problems already troubling Pakistan. His dismissal of two elected governments on almost identical charges of corruption and misuse of power is something that will not be easily forgotten: his action was motivated by the military and he obviously fully endorsed it, otherwise he would have resigned.
Mr Ishaq Khan’s relationship with Ms Benazir Bhutto was particularly based on mistrust, although it was Mr Nawaz Sharif who finally made the dominant figure from the Frontier quit the presidency. The “Go, Baba, go” cry was heard in parliament during his presidency. However, for all his political faults, his career was never tarnished by allegations of personal wrongdoing and he was known as a civil servant of personal integrity, which itself must be seen as a rare and endearing quality in our sullied context. But it would be difficult for him to escape the charges of misuse of office and abuse of power or of overlooking the risqué side of some of his close associates.
WAKE-UP calls don’t come much louder than this. The usual apologists would do well at this stage to look beyond the Mohali pitch and the terrors that seam and bounce hold for Pakistani batsmen. Our failure to cope with the moving ball is an age-old defect born of the limited technical skills needed to prosper on flat domestic tracks. More striking was the complete absence of spine in Pakistan’s performance against South Africa. Fighting back when cornered and refusing to surrender had come to be touted as a hallmark of Inzamamul Haq’s team. And there we have the problem in a nutshell: there was no Inzamam in the side that took the field in Mohali. Under the same conditions, a side not so much led but held together by the glue that is Inzamam may have made a better fist of it. Pakistan could still have lost but there is dishonour only in capitulation, not defeat. Inzamam may lack initiative but the team fights for him.
Given the build-up, the team’s early exit from the Champions Trophy is less surprising than the fact that it managed to win a match. The captaincy fiasco, followed by the doping scandal, was not the ideal preparation for a major competition. Some ill-timed comments by the new PCB chief did not help either. His observations were not without merit but they should have been reserved for more tranquil times. Mr Nasim Ashraf is clearly eager to show who’s the boss, but the reality is that he will always be better known for his political connections than links to cricket. The sooner the PCB reverts to a system of elected officials, the brighter will be the future of Pakistan cricket. More important in the immediate context, the whispering campaign against Inzamam must end. Younis Khan’s time will come. The need now is to rebuild and Inzamam, as a batsman and a leader, is central to those plans.
Apart from China and Russia, it hardly can count on any sympathisers and perceives the United States as its foremost enemy. No wonder then that North Korea whose nuclear programme had been a major global concern conducted a nuclear test it sent shock waves around the world.
Interestingly, no one is certain as yet how successful the test was and how much of progress Pyongyang has made in developing a functional nuclear weapon. Nonetheless, its nuclear weapon test has placed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the regime supporting it under unprecedented stress.
Ever since the Cold War, the United States has maintained its nuclear hegemony in East Asia and North Korea’s emerging nuclear challenge could now puncture this balloon. Moreover, a nuclear-armed North Korea could trigger a chain reaction. Japan, feeling that the US extended deterrence is not sufficient to protect its security, could decide to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Already it has a highly advanced civil nuclear energy programme and sits on tons of weapons grade plutonium sufficient for making nearly five thousand bombs.
This move in turn could heighten tensions between Japan and China, as relations between them are already strained on the issue of Yasukuni shrine and Japan’s security alignment with the US which it perceives to be directed against its strategic interests. China, which is somewhat uneasy about the Indo-US nuclear deal could then take counter measures against Japan’s nuclearisation and India’s expanding nuclear arsenal. India may use China’s build-up for enhancing its own nuclear capability, which could set off an arms race in the region with a negative fall out on Pakistan.
Japan’s nuclearisation could also draw South Korea closer to China and may result in some form of strategic division of North-East Asia, with the US and Japan on the other side. A multipolar nuclear world would be far more dangerous and complex that would require major readjustments in defence and nuclear policies and doctrines of major powers.
Another negative facet of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme is that it is the first state, which after signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty decided to withdraw from it in 2003, and subsequently acquired a nuclear capability. This could give ideas to other potential proliferators.
The immediate fallout of North Korean nuclear test on Pakistan was that the episode of Dr. A.Q. Khan once again surfaced. Pakistan’s detractors reminded the world that Dr. A.Q. Khan provided North Korea with uranium-enrichment technology in spite of the fact that its nuclear detonation was plutonium-based. Nonetheless, Pakistan has to share the blame that this delinquent act did make a contribution to enhancing North Korea’s overall nuclear capability. Although, Pakistan’s subsequent cooperation with the IAEA, the United States and the international community on the prevention of illicit nuclear capability, and the adoption of administrative and legislative measures for prevention of the spread of nuclear capability has helped in minimizing the damage.
The Bush administration faces a great dilemma in tackling North Korea, as its highly aggressive policy is going nowhere. It considers DPRK a paranoia and an irresponsible state, has labelled it as one among the three “axis of evil” countries and is avoiding any direct diplomatic involvement with it and relies on Six Party Talks to achieve its denuclearisation objective. On the other hand, America has no coercive military capacity to impose its will either, the reason being that a successful military strikes against North Korea would require complete information of all its nuclear weapons and related facilities and the ability to destroy them.
There is still some missing information about North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The main reason for hesitation in taking military action against North Korea is the fear that it would retaliate with its massive artillery fire, missiles and a conventional or even a nuclear bomb on South Korea and the US forces stationed there. North Korea has more than a million-strong army and sees itself in a good bargaining position with the US. With American forces tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan and stretched thin worldwide, it would not like to open a new front. Besides, any military attack on North Korea will be unacceptable to China, Russia, and South Korea and complicate relations with regional countries.
Washington has therefore relied heavily on a diplomatic solution. It has sought Chinese (and Russian) assistance for getting the United Nations Security Council resolution passed imposing strict sanctions on North Korea. To what extent the sanctions would compel North Korea to change course will have to be seen.
According to perceptive observers, North Korea is using the nuclear card to force the US to deal directly with it on security and “regime change” issues. Ironically, both countries seem to be using the “compellence strategy” to achieve their political and strategic objectives, which so far has not worked. To break the standoff, the US may have to undertake direct negotiations after giving a certain time lag for hostilities to subside.
The greatest challenge is to bring North Korea within the fold of a regional system of nuclear none proliferation, consistent with NPT — IAEA system. No doubt, it would be a difficult undertaking, but with Chinese and Russian support and security guarantees by the US, it may be attainable. China has considerable leverage that it can exercise in bringing Pyongyang back from the brink.
But China has its limitations too in dealing with North Korea. It considers North Korea to be its strategic partner and a useful buffer against Taiwan and an ally against Japan that it would not like to lose. However, in due course, a more conciliatory approach by all regional powers may make DPRK realise that there are far greater advantages in economic development than pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. Economic progress could lead to openness, abandonment of the nuclear programme and rapprochement with South Korea.
On a larger canvass the concept of nuclear deterrence may have served during the Cold War to balance the enormous destructive power possessed by the US and the former Soviet Union, but in today’s altered global security paradigm nuclear weapons are becoming a great hindrance to peace and security. The five recognised nuclear powers have to realise that only by meeting their obligations of disarmament, can global stability be achieved. It is difficult to punish proliferators when the nuclear five of the NPT, are themselves not complying with treaty obligations under Article 6 as viewed by the non-nuclear weapons states.
What is worrisome and a paradox is that Russia and the US, despite their transformed friendly relationship and cooperation in nuclear threat reduction programmes have brought about no change in the Cold War postures. With ever increasing nuclear weapons states, nuclear disarmament should be given the highest priority. If equal emphasis is accorded to progress on nuclear disarmament and curbing proliferation, the world can be made more peaceful and secure.
The writer is a retired lt-general.
UNDERNEATH the intellectual surface of Victorian fiction still studied today runs a more powerful current. Obscure though they may be now, when compared with George Elliot or Thomas Hardy, in their day authors such as Mary Elizabeth Braddon and Mrs Henry Wood (the pen name of Ellen Price) were huge bestsellers of popular melodramatic fiction.
It is this vein that the BBC is tapping with the announcement it is developing a telenovela — the long-running television genre that commands huge audiences across Latin America. The BBC’s decision follows the US broadcaster ABC, which is now airing its first mainstream telenovela, adapted from a smash-hit Colombian series.
Fast paced and nail-biting, in a typical telenovela a bosom never goes unheaved, and any confrontation either ends in tears or a slap in the face, or both. Unlike soap operas, which are open-ended and tend to the quotidian, telenovelas have defined plots, traditionally involving a pair of star-crossed lovers, although different countries each have their own style: Colombia’s telenovelas tend to be funnier and more quirky, while Argentina is currently glued to Montecristo, a heavyweight series set during the country’s years of military dictatorship.
All of which would be recognised by Mrs Henry Woods as author of East Lynne, a novel studded with torrid affairs, false identities and political murder. Since Britain’s appetite for melodrama is undiminished, the telenovela is a Latin import that could run and run.
—The Guardian, London