ISLAMABAD: On this day seven years ago, General Pervez Musharraf presented himself as a “reluctant coup-maker”. He claimed he never intended to seize power, that circumstances forced his troops to overthrow an elected government. Soon he fine-tuned his argument, describing the October 12, 1999, takeover as a “counter-coup” that followed the “real coup” staged by prime minister Nawaz Sharif when he tried to dislodge Gen Musharraf as the chief of army staff.
Even if that were to be believed, seven years on there is little sign of the military ruler making way for complete and unfettered civilian rule in the country. In fact, President General Musharraf would like the world to believe that the political system he has introduced is better than what he calls the “sham democracy” of the past. Also he views himself as a visionary, if not a messiah, who holds the panacea for most of the ills afflicting Pakistan, be they political, economic or social. And the underlining suggestion is that he may continue to be the country’s president and army chief for a long time to come.
Still, the question of him being indispensable to the political system remains a matter of intense debate. An increasing number of critics, including some former members of his original team, would like to believe otherwise. But it is also true that his obdurate survival against heavy odds is the product of a peculiar combination of hard work and political manipulation, dramatic changes in the geopolitical environment and, of course, a great deal of luck.
The circumstances in which the army seized power on October 12, 1999, were also quite bizarre. Under a well-conceived plan, Nawaz Sharif sacked Gen Musharraf when he was airborne, returning to Karachi from an official visit to Sri Lanka. Mr Sharif’s personally appointed ISI chief, Lt-Gen Mohammad Ziauddin Butt, was perhaps so excited about the prospect of becoming the COAS that he failed to inform his boss that the number the troops under his command was, in a word, zero.
On the other side, senior commanders like Lt-Gen Mehmood Ahmad and Lt-Gen Abdul Aziz Khan already had a plan to seize power whenever the need was felt to overthrow an elected government. Given Pakistan’s chequered political history, and the military’s dominant role in civilian affairs, what followed in the few hours after Gen Musharraf’s replacement was announced on state-run television was understandable though unfortunate. The military had struck for the fourth time to safeguard its own honour.
But could the move be justified? As was the case in military interventions of the past, the honourable Supreme Court did just that by providing Gen Musharraf with the ‘legitimacy’ he badly needed.
All this did not happen overnight. Prior to the events of Oct 12, there were clear signs of a tense power struggle in Islamabad. Critics say that with the passage of time, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif became bent on using his parliamentary majority to make all other institutions subservient to his personal authority. The way the country’s chief justice had been made to step down by splitting the judiciary was unprecedented. Equally crude was the manner in which President Farooq Leghari and the army chief at the time, Gen Jehangir Karamat, were cornered into resigning. But if Mr Sharif thought that his handpicked army chief would dance to his tune, like the new president, Rafiq Tarar, he soon realised that the opposite was true.
Within a few months, Gen Musharraf had started sending direct and indirect messages that any attempt to dislodge him would be tantamount to insulting the military. What followed is now another dark chapter in Pakistan’s political history. Looking back, President General Musharraf is now convinced that without his intervention it may not have been possible to revive the faltering economy, check the rise of religious militancy, or reform the country’s political and social order.
Gen Musharraf’s decisions or presidential style may not be to everyone’s taste, but there can be no denying his impact on the country as well as its relations with the rest of the world. The economy is doing well (even if post-9/11 issues remain the major impetus), the dialogue with India (though still a victim of mistrust) offers new hope for peace, and the dumping of the Taliban (even if it was external pressure that swung the vote) has put the brakes on the intelligence establishment’s earlier policy of encouraging Islamic militancy within and outside the country.
Interestingly these are ongoing projects, which suggests that stepping down is not on Gen Musharraf’s mind as we speak. Nor, at this stage, are the United States and other western powers willing to risk a replacement. This gives him leverage to deal with domestic political affairs rather ruthlessly.
There are many who believe Gen Musharraf has nowhere to go even if he wanted to leave. “There is no exit for a military ruler,” says security analyst Dr Ayesha Siddiqua. “Look around the world, particularly the Latin American countries, where no military ruler has relinquished power on his own.” She believes that like any leader who is not accountable to anyone, Gen Musharraf’s prolonged stay in power may make him commit bigger mistakes but that may not be reason enough for him to consider stepping down.
Imran Khan of the Tehrik-i-Insaf supported Gen Musharraf for more than two years, a move he now regrets. Gen Musharraf came to power with an element of sincerity, he points out, but then started surrounding himself with “mega crooks”. Imran Khan says he later “realised that the general has no vision. His vision is that whatever is good for him is good for the country.” Imran Khan is convinced that once all groups band together and resign from parliament — a signal for the people to take to the streets — it will be impossible for the general to stay in power. As to when that may happen, he has no answer.
Little surprise then that Mushahid Hussain, who spent more than a year in detention after the 1999 coup but is now part of the governing Pakistan Muslim League, remains singularly unruffled. He believes that the issue of Gen Musharraf being the stumbling block in the road to unfettered democratic rule can be resolved if he gets himself elected as head of state in accordance with the Constitution. The secretary-general of the party that Musharraf so proudly says was his own creation sees the president as a “maverick” in the Pakistani establishment, an “unconventional” military leader who says or does what he thinks or feels is right. “Khulla dhulla banda hai (he is a free-spirited man),” he says of Gen Musharraf.
Maverick he certainly is. And in some ways this trait is proving to be his biggest problem. Because of his mixed, even contradictory, policy decisions on crucial issues, people are yet to discover the real Pervez Musharraf. For instance, he initially backed the idea of an international campaign in support of the Taliban government (on the grounds that it was representative of ethnic Pashtuns) and later abandoned the regime. Similarly, it is difficult to make out if the man who ordered the Kargil operation is the real Gen Musharraf or the one who is now the biggest advocate of peace with India.
On the domestic front, he hates Benazir Bhutto for being ‘corrupt’ but makes his peace with so many whose bulging files are gathering dust in the National Accountability Bureau. He is not willing to talk to Nawaz Sharif because his government was ‘corrupt and inefficient’ but is prepared to accept anyone who defects and joins the ruling regime. He orders a major military offensive against pro-Taliban tribal militants in Waziristan but ends up signing peace deals with the very same people. And he says and believes in creating an atmosphere of enlightenment and moderation but often finds himself helpless in the face of resistance, not only from religious parties but also the more conservative elements within his ‘own’ PML.
Amidst this confusion or lack of direction, President Musharraf’s eighth year in power may prove to be the most crucial for political stability in the country. The old game of making and breaking alliances in the run-up to the 2007 polls has already begun and Gen Musharraf’s personality is central to the big question mark hanging over future politics. Should the general’s uniform be the rallying cry of the 2007 contest, with all opposition groups joining hands to take on his supporters? Or should the fight be fought from a more ideological platform, with relatively liberal groups striking a deal with the general to take on the religious right?
For someone like Mushahid Hussain, Gen Musharraf’s military office is irrelevant. “The issue is not if he is in khaki or mufti,” he says. “It is that of a mindset.”
According to him, Gen Musharraf doesn’t have a feudal mindset, unlike most politicians, and has the flexibility, tolerance and moderation needed to govern. For Dr Ayesha Siddiqua, Pakistan has become a kind of predatory state where “the leadership is driven by short-term gains and not long-term objectives”.
Barring any dramatic change, General Musharraf seems set to become the first military ruler to hold a second general election during his rule. Equally unfortunate for Pakistani politics, his may be the figure that continues to map the future course of the country.
