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| October 09, 2006 | Monday | Ramazan 15, 1427 |
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‘Ghost’ schools galore
Dengue fever in Karachi
Rethinking Afghan policy
IF there is anything which epitomises all the shortcomings of our foreign policy, it is our Afghanistan policy which we have implemented with consistent short-sightedness since 1992 after the fall of the Soviet-installed Najibullah regime in Kabul.
THERE is a long way to go before Pakistan can say that last month’s deal with the tribal heads of North Waziristan is paying dividends. Since the agreement was signed on Sept 5, peace has been holding, and there has been no major incident that could be construed as a violation of the deal. On Thursday, President Musharraf presided over a meeting dealing with the issue, reportedly expressed satisfaction over the progress of the implementation of the agreement and emphasised the need for the government to carry out its part of the bargain diligently. From the point of view of the war on terror, two clauses of the agreement — signed on behalf of the Taliban by seven militants who are members of the Taliban Shura — are of vital importance. One makes it clear that there will be “no cross-border movement for militant activity in neighbouring Afghanistan”. The other clause stipulates that all foreign militants will leave the area, and those unable to do so will abide by the law of the land. It remains to be seen whether the militants and their tribal hosts will adhere to these two vital clauses.
Since its signing last month, the agreement has caused misgivings not only in Kabul but in some western capitals, too. While the president’s recent visit to the US and his meetings with President George Bush have addressed American concerns on this score, the government in Kabul still has reservations about the deal. It is now reported that Nato commanders in Afghanistan have called upon President Hamid Karzai to be “tough” with Islamabad. The report looks odd, because the president has had satisfactory meetings with the political leadership of the countries whose generals now are said to be unhappy with Islamabad over its purported support for the Taliban. One can understand the Nato generals’ frustration, for they are badly bogged down in Afghanistan. In spite of all the high-tech military apparatus at their disposal, they have failed to pacify the country, especially the south-eastern part bordering Pakistan. The reason is that the government in Kabul has taken no political initiative of the kind Pakistan has, and the Nato troops have merely involved themselves in a costly wild goose chase.
What the Nato commanders should note is that because of the inept policies being pursued by the Karzai government, an average of 3,000 Afghan refugees are entering Pakistan daily. Having suffered the consequences of playing host to four million Afghans, the Pakistani people are no more in a mood to accept a new wave of Afghans fleeing war and poverty in their country. While every now and then he speaks of the Taliban’s forays into Afghanistan, does President Karzai realise that he owes some duty to his people to provide them with a degree of peace, security and means of livelihood? Islamabad’s deal with the tribal heads was justified because it realised after suffering hundreds of casualties over the last two years that there can be no military solution to the problem. The British and the Russians learnt this long ago. It is time the Nato generals read some chapters of the history of foreign political and military involvement in Afghanistan. Instead of asking Mr Karzai to be tough with Pakistan, they should ask him to take some political initiatives and launch long overdue reforms, like controlling poppy cultivation and getting tough with the drug mafia in his country.
PAKISTAN’S first National Education Census gives some shocking details about the state of schools in Pakistan. The most disturbing revelation is that 12,737 educational institutions out of a total of 164,579 public sector schools in the country are “non-functional”, a euphemism for ghost schools. This means that nearly 7.7 per cent of schools exist on paper only. The report says that another 4,126 schools refused to give data to the surveyors, but it is not said whether they were government or private schools. Needless to say, this points to a very disquieting situation for several reasons. First, it indicates the high level of corruption rampant in the government’s education sector. Every non-existent school that exists only in the education department’s records is siphoning off funds from the education budget to fill some unscrupulous people’s coffers, while the institutions that are functioning are being deprived of funds they are badly in need of. Secondly, this state of affairs adversely affects the planning of the policymakers because many areas suffer on account of the absence of a school when on paper one is supposed to exist there. Thirdly, in view of the fact that this problem is not a new one and has plagued our education system for a long time, it is indicative of the higher authorities’ inability or unwillingness to check this problem. It is well known that corruption, where it exists, runs from top downwards. That is why the simple act of supervision and monitoring of schools appears to have become an impossible task for the officials of the education department.
The federal education minister, who released the data of the education census to the press, did not suggest any line of action the government planned to adopt in response to the findings of the survey. True, education falls in the provincial domain. Islamabad only sets the broad guidelines. But this is a matter of grave concern because Pakistan is very backward in terms of the rate of literacy and the level of education of the people. The funds allocated to this sector are nothing to boast of either. It is, therefore, time the federal education ministry in conjunction with the provinces began to tackle the problem and made sure that corruption is rooted out, otherwise it will destroy education in Pakistan.
CONTRARY to what government officials might say, the situation relating to the spread of dengue fever in Karachi is alarming. Fourteen people have died so far over the past four months and several others — more than 300, according to reports — showed signs and symptoms of the mosquito-borne infection over the same period. These figures might not be considered frightening when compared with the rising number of dengue cases being reported from different parts of India, but what is of concern is how ill-prepared the authorities are to cope with a potential epidemic. Stagnant pools of water after the recent rains are still there: they form an ideal breeding ground for mosquitoes. The ability of doctors in the city to diagnose the disease is also poor. There has been at least one recent case where haemorrhagic fever — an indication of dengue fever complications — was not detected or treated accordingly, leading to the death of a young patient.
The civic and health authorities have shown themselves to be so inept in dealing with the situation that it is not practical to expect them to take steps, such as large-scale and effective fumigation throughout the city and its environs, to eliminate mosquitoes and their breeding places. Mosquitoes can also breed in homes, which makes it necessary to disseminate essential information about the infection and its prevention, such as the use of mosquito netting and repellent. Dengue fever is largely self-limiting but complications can cause fatalities, and testing and medical diagnosis are necessary where symptoms appear. Complicated cases of dengue fever require blood transfusions and as such the patients and their families must insist on previously unused and sterilised medical equipment for the process.
This policy has passed through several phases, each phase marked by its own set of failures leading to negative consequences for Pakistan.
It is true that Pakistan-Afghanistan relations at the government level were bedevilled by the Durand Line issue from the very beginning and Afghanistan was the only country to object to Pakistan’s admission into the UN after its independence. But there was always a reservoir of goodwill among the Afghan people for Pakistan and its people because of strong brotherly ties. During the 1965 Pakistan-India war, the Afghan government adopted a neutral position but the public sentiments were in support of Pakistan. The Afghan people remained supportive of Pakistan during the 1971 East Pakistan crisis.
By the beginning of 1978, there were definite signs of improvement in relations between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and considerable progress was achieved towards the settlement of the boundary issue between the two countries on the basis of the Durand Line. The process, however, was interrupted by the overthrow of President Daud.
It was hoped that the solidarity shown by the people and the government of Pakistan for their Afghan brethren in their struggle against the Soviet occupation would put an end to Kabul’s irredentist claims against Pakistan and usher in a new era of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation once Afghanistan regained its freedom. Unfortunately, that promise has not yet been realised thanks in large part to Islamabad’s Afghanistan policy.
Pakistan’s policymakers failed to recognise in the actual conduct of the Afghanistan policy that the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992 had changed the character of the fighting in Afghanistan. From a war of national liberation it went on to become a civil war which continues till today. Whereas Pakistan was perfectly justified in supporting the Afghan people in the jihad against the Soviet occupation, Islamabad’s role in the post-Najibullah era had to be a different one. In short, Pakistan on legal grounds had no justification to support one Afghan side or the other in the civil war which ensued. Unfortunately, this is precisely what it did.
Pakistan made a good beginning in arranging a meeting of the Afghan Mujahideen leaders which resulted in the signing of the Peshawar accord when the Najibullah government fell. However, problems started when Burhanuddin Rabbani, who became the president of Afghanistan after Sibghatullah Mujaddadi’s brief tenure as president came to an end, refused to abide by the terms of the Peshawar, and the later the Islamabad, accords in an attempt to prolong his rule.
The situation soon aggravated in the form of open warfare between Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was the real force behind Rabbani and Gulbadin Hekmatyar. It is no secret now that Pakistan’s sympathies and support at that time were with Hekmatyar who laid Kabul to waste in an unsuccessful attempt to defeat Ahmad Shah Massoud. Thus began a series of blunders by Islamabad.
Later, Pakistan in its quest for a friendly Afghanistan became involved on the side of the Taliban that emerged as a force to reckon with in areas around Kandahar in 1994 and soon established their sway in large areas of Afghanistan capturing Herat and Jalalabad in the process and entering Kabul in September 1996. The pro-Taliban lobby in the Pakistan security establishment and the foreign ministry took advantage of the Taliban’s short-lived capture of Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997 to recognise the Taliban regime. Despite Pakistan’s best efforts, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the only other countries to recognise the Taliban regime until its downfall in the aftermath of 9/11.
Pakistan’s support to the Taliban regime identified it with its retrogressive rule thus tarnishing its international image. It isolated Pakistan at the regional and international levels as the Rabbani regime continued to occupy the seat of Afghanistan both in the ECO and the UN. Since the Taliban were overwhelmingly Pakhtoons, Pakistan’s support to them alienated the non-Pakhtoon in Afghanistan who, according to some estimates, constitute more than 50 per cent of the Afghan population.
Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy damaged its relations with Iran and pushed it deeper into the Russian and the Indian embrace as all the three countries were supporting the Northern Alliance. It alienated many of the Central Asian Republics which alleged that the Taliban were destabilising their governments. Interestingly, one of the arguments advanced at that time in support of Islamabad’s pro-Taliban policy was that it would help strengthen relations with the Central Asian Republics.
Even China, with whom Pakistan has a vital strategic relationship, had misgivings about this pro-Taliban policy as it had suspicions that the Taliban were in league with separatist elements in Xinjiang. Above all, Pakistan’s support to the Taliban regime promoted extremism and the Kalashnikov culture. Thus, the pro-Taliban policy, taking into account its international, regional and internal dimensions, was unsustainable.
But nothing would make Pakistan reconsider its pro-Taliban policy which it continued to pursue in a single-minded fashion oblivious to its immediate and long-term negative consequences for the country. The military establishment, which was in the driving seat as far as the policy was concerned, refused to heed wiser counsel and turned down various proposals which would have imparted greater balance to Islamabad’s Afghanistan policy. It was a measure of the militarisation of Pakistan’s foreign policy and the inability of its policymakers to look beyond their noses that Islamabad was issuing pro-Taliban statements until 9/11 forced a U-turn on it.
Now the pendulum has swung to the other extreme. There was a time when Pakistan persisted in its support for the Taliban despite the international odium that such a policy provoked. Now, following the famous U-turn forced by the Americans, Pakistan hardly sees anything worthwhile in them.
The net result of the flip flops in our Afghanistan policy pursued for more than a decade is that instead of a friendly Afghanistan which was our objective, we have managed to have a hostile neighbour. Our relations with Kabul are now marked by suspicions rather than mutual trust. If there was any doubt in this regard, it was removed by the exchange of angry comments between Presidents Musharraf and Karzai during their recent visit to the US.
The pro-Taliban policy prior to 9/11 alienated non-Pakhtoon communities in Afghanistan. The policy to ditch the Taliban in the aftermath of 9/11 has alienated the Pakhtoons. The reality is that now one would need a fine toothcomb to find a friend of Pakistan in Afghanistan. If this is not a policy failure of historic proportions, one wonders what is.
As for the future, the central element of our Afghanistan policy should be to refrain scrupulously from any interference in the internal affairs of that country which continues to suffer from civil war. This should be ensured through appropriate agreements with tribesmen on the lines of the recent accord in North Waziristan and patrols by Pakistani forces along the border with Afghanistan. All possible measures should also be adopted to prevent political and non-political elements in Pakistan from fishing in the troubled Afghan waters.
These steps would require a level playing field for the moderate and progressive political parties in Pakistan. Continued restrictions on them and their leaders will allow the extremist religious parties to fill the vacuum as they have done so far under the present political-military dispensation in the country. It is imperative that the policies of moderation and enlightenment that our rulers preach are practised in a demonstrable fashion in domestic politics if we wish to overcome extremism and Talibanisation.
Only a democratically elected government enjoying popular support will have the courage and strength to conduct an Afghan policy in the country’s best national interest instead of succumbing to external pressures as happened after 9/11. In short, the success of our Afghanistan policy is closely linked with the revival of a full-fledged democratic system in Pakistan and the withdrawal of the army from involvement in politics.
The danger, however, is that even Pakistan’s best efforts may not prevent pro-Taliban elements in our tribal areas from crossing over into Afghanistan because of their links with the tribes across the border unless the Taliban in Afghanistan are politically engaged. The Karzai government and its foreign friends must understand that the Taliban being a political movement cannot be defeated through military means alone.
In short, engagement with the Taliban within the framework of an inclusive political system may provide a long-term solution to Afghanistan’s travails and hasten the final departure of the foreign forces. Such a process may also have the welcome effect of moderating the Taliban’s retrogressive tendencies.
The need of the hour is for a new international conference to bring about necessary changes in the political dispensation in Afghanistan to make it more inclusive as a sequel to the Bonn process. Modernity cannot be imposed on Afghanistan under the barrel of the gun. The reform of the Afghan society will at best be a slow process propelled by education and economic development rather than by attempts on the part of western countries, which are responsible to a large extent for the current mayhem in Afghanistan, to perform socio-political surgery.
The writer is a former ambassador. Email: javid_husain@yahoo.com