Blessings of judicial activism
By Sajjad Ali Shah
BEFORE partition, the judicial system in the subcontinent was provided by the British government that did not interfere with the personal laws of its subjects. Muslims were governed by their laws of inheritance, matrimonial affairs, custody of children, pre-emption in purchase and sale of land, etc, as rooted in their religion. Likewise, Hindus, Parsis and Christians were governed by their own personal laws.
The British gave us a system of courts, procedural laws and some substantive laws in codified form. For their own use, they have codified laws made by parliament in Britain and rigidly followed conventions and precedent judgments. The British are conservative by nature, but whenever their laws are silent and provide no remedy in a particular set of circumstances, they invoke equity, which means the use of good conscience and principles of natural justice and fair play.
This has become prominent as a different branch of law and they have separate courts of equity. In fact, equity lays down the foundations of judicial activism so that courts do not feel helpless if the law does not allow remedy for any particular reason and can find a way out in order to give remedy to the aggrieved party.
When the British left in 1947, the emerging countries of India and Pakistan were allowed to follow the British legal order in the shape of the Government of India Act 1935 to be read with the Indian Independence Act 1947 until both countries drafted their own constitutions. Pakistan made its first constitution in 1956. Until then, it was governed by the old British legal order.
The first case in court that demonstrated judicial activism was that of Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan (PLD 1955 Sindh 96). The Chief Court of Sindh interpreted the words “assent” and “dominion” in a broader and more liberal manner and used judicial activism. It gave a landmark judgment to the effect that the governor-general had no power to dismiss the constituent assembly, which was duty-bound to prepare a constitution for the country.
The Federal Court set aside the decision of the Chief Court and upheld the order of the governor-general. It is said that the draft of the constitution was ready to be announced on December 25, 1954, but the governor general dismissed that assembly on October 24, 1954, to avoid the curtailment of his powers of dismissing the government of the elected prime-minister. The Federal Court held that a writ jurisdiction was not available as the relevant law did not receive the assent of the governor-general.
In consequence of the judgment of the Federal Court, 35 constitutional acts and many decisions under writ jurisdiction became invalid for want of assent of the governor-general. There was total confusion and chaos and the governor-general issued an ordinance with retrospective effect to rectify the mistake. The federal court held in Usif Patel’s case (PLD 1955 FC 387) that the governor-general was not empowered to issue an ordinance for constitutional matters in the absence of the constituent assembly.
The governor-general then made special reference to the Federal Court for guidance (PLD 1955 FC 435). The Federal Court allowed retrospective validation of invalid acts to be approved by a new constituent assembly directed to be elected. This judgment gave rise to the doctrine of state necessity, which is also called the law of necessity, later used by the courts to justify martial laws and the dismissal of constitutions.
Coming back to the topic of judicial activism, the next important case in line is that of Asma Jilani (PLD 1972 SC 139). In this case, the second martial law of General Yahya Khan in 1969 was challenged.
On behalf of the military government, the law of necessity was pleaded but the Supreme Court rejected the plea and held that the commander of the armed forces was bound by oath to defend the constitution and had no power to dismiss the same as the constitution was the fundamental law of the country. General Yahya Khan was also declared a usurper.
In this martial law, we lost East Pakistan which became Bangladesh. The judgment in Asma Jilani’s case is very bold with full manifestation of
judicial activism as the doctrine of necessity was rejected
and the door of martial law was shut.
After the separation of the eastern wing, the remaining four provinces adopted the name of Pakistan and prepared the new Constitution of 1973 with Article 6 inserted in it to prevent the army from dismissing the Constitution and imposing martial law. All this was in vain.
The Constitution was suspended on July 5, 1977, and General Ziaul Haq imposed martial law, which was challenged in the Supreme Court by Begum Nusrat Bhutto (PLD 1977 SC 657). The Supreme Court did not follow the rule laid down in the Asma Jilani case and held that the facts in Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s case were distinguishable as the Constitution had not been dismissed but only suspended and the intention was to restore it.
The suspension of the Constitution and the imposition of martial law were justified on grounds of state necessity and treated as a deviation from the Constitution. General Ziaul Haq restored the Constitution in 1985 after eight years with validation of martial law and laws made by the army chief, which were approved by parliament.
Instead of promoting judicial activism, the judgment in Nusrat Bhutto’s case protected the suspension of the Constitution and the martial law of General Ziaul Haq on the basis of the doctrine of necessity. This was followed again by the Supreme Court in the case of Zafar Ali Shah (PLD 2002 SC 869) in which the suspension of the Constitution and the imposition of martial law by General Pervez Musharraf of October 12, 1999, was challenged.
In both cases, the point that the suspension of the Constitution is subversion, as mentioned in Article 6, and is punishable as treason was not taken up for discussion, hence this moot point remains unanswered.
Validation of martial law by the courts and its subsequent approval by parliament, elected under the umbrella of martial law, changed the basic structure of the Constitution and reversed the progress of democracy. Pakistan was achieved after sacrifices of life and property so that Muslims could live in a homeland under the rule of democracy and have a government of the people, by the people and for the people. Unfortunately we have not been able to save the Constitution from onslaughts undermining democracy.
Democracy can flourish only when all the institutions mentioned in the Constitution perform their roles as defined. There should not be overlapping or overstepping. Every institution must function within its own jurisdiction and limits. The judiciary has a very important role to perform in supervising the correct implementation of the Constitution and not allowing other institutions to overstep their authority. Judicial activism is helpful to the courts to assert their powers and jurisdiction and to do justice strictly according to the law.
The basic principle of judicial activism is rooted in Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, which was given to us by the British in 1908, and which empowered civil courts to try suits of a civil nature, except those where which their jurisdiction was expressly or impliedly barred. This means that the court has to be satisfied that it has no jurisdiction under the law. This provision of law lets the court be assertive in matters of jurisdiction unless it is barred expressly or impliedly. It is to be read in conjunction with the principles of equity.
Part seven of the Constitution pertains to judicature and courts. It provides for the establishment of a Supreme Court of Pakistan, a high court for each province and such other courts as may be established by law. No court shall have any jurisdiction except that conferred by the Constitution or law. The Supreme Court has original, appellate and advisory jurisdiction, and jurisdiction to transfer any case or appeal from one high court to the other. The high court has a very wide jurisdiction including the power to issue writs against the orders of government or local authority, challenged as being passed without lawful authority or in excess of such authority.
The high court can also be moved for the enforcement of fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution. This jurisdiction can be exercised by the Supreme Court concurrently if it involves the question of public interest and no other remedy is available under the law. Public interest litigation is a new branch of law which has given a new dimension to judicial activism. The Supreme Court being the apex court in the country has the power to do complete justice in any matter pending before it, and if any procedural law comes in the way, the same can be waived in favour of doing justice and providing relief to the affected persons.
The Supreme Court can take suo motu notice or can act on a news item in the print or electronic media in matters of public importance, where fundamental rights are infringed collectively. Judicial activism is a very good thing for the poor and oppressed whose grievances cannot be redressed and for whom procedural wrangles and financial burdens come in the way of justice.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan has acted positively and intervened in many cases in order to do complete justice. Recent examples of these are kite-flying, valimas, sale of Pak Steel, and in the past, sectarian and extra-judicial killings. Wherever injustice is done the courts can demonstrate their spirit of judicial activism and step in to do justice and rectify the wrong done to the people advertently or inadvertently.
The writer is a former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.


