A POINT raised in the National Assembly the other day by a member belonging to the ruling coalition was summarily dismissed by the House and has since been relegated to the status of a non-issue. But it is an important question that needs an airing, if only because of its political exploitation by vested interests down the years and the implications for the future if it is left unresolved.

The member, Mr M.P. Bhandara, had moved a bill seeking to delete clauses from two sections of the Constitution that refer to the “Pakistan ideology”. The clauses lay down that anyone who has been disrespectful of the integrity and ideology of Pakistan or who, after the establishment of Pakistan, worked against the integrity of the country or opposed the ideology of Pakistan shall be disqualified from being a member of parliament. Mr Bhandara argued that the term “ideology of Pakistan” was not clearly defined and either it should be so defined or it should be deleted from the Constitution.

In a letter to the editor published in this newspaper on Sunday, the MNA has further clarified: “I am all for the ‘ideology of Pakistan’, but I have a right to know what it is. And if it cannot be defined by parliament, then there is little justification for its retention in Articles 62 and 63.”

What indeed is the ideology of Pakistan? This needs to be discussed particularly in view of the inroads now being made by our clerics to seek to extend their control even over matters temporal — witness the veto the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal wants over the protection of women’s rights bill. The clerics have a simple explanation for what the Pakistan ideology means: it means that Pakistan is based on the Islamic ideology and it is their interpretation of Islam that should hold the field. Which interpretation of Islam they mean is not made clear: we have sectarian differences within our own fold and have fought and killed for what we believe to be our version of Islam.

This view, that ideology means Islam and thus needs no clarification, is apparently supported by the Chaudhris and others of their ilk within the ruling Muslim League whose conservative politics is as perplexing as that of the maulvis and who seem to be working at cross-purposes with the enlightened moderation of their leader. They don’t want their political bailiwick in Punjab rocked by Mansoora. This is seen graphically in the reactionary compromises being sought by them over the women’s protection bill, bypassing the consensus reached in the National Assembly’s select committee. Senior advocate and writer on legal issues Afzal Haider has pertinently pointed out that “if you can go back in time, you will realise that the Federal Shariat Court was established on the clerics’ demand which gave them a place on the judiciary (interview with Books and Authors, September 17).”

When uncomfortable questions are raised about the ideology of Pakistan and what precisely it means, you can be referred to the Pakistan or Lahore resolution of 1940. This short document, while rejecting the scheme of federation embodied in the Government of India Act 1935 (many of whose provisions, incidentally, continue to govern our constitutional life today) as totally unsuited to, and unworkable in, the peculiar conditions of this country, says no constitutional plan would be workable in the country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following principles — “that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that in the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent States (subsequently amended to “state”) in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”

The resolution also seeks effective and mandatory safeguards for Muslims where they are in a minority as well as for minorities in the regions that will constitute independent Muslim states. But the words “ideology of Pakistan” find no mention anywhere in the resolution. If the assertion of the rights of Muslims to have their own state or states in the regions where they were in a majority is what is meant by the “ideology of Pakistan”, then where does religion figure in this except as denoting the political rights of the Muslim majority provinces?

There is a strong belief that it was the Indian Congress’s rejection of any safeguards for the Muslims after independence and its refusal to commit itself to any special measures designed to bring Muslims on a par with the majority in terms of education and economic development that finally led to the parting of ways. It should also be remembered that the Communist Party of India had supported the demand for Pakistan on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination.

Therefore, self-determination and the securing of Muslim economic and political rights in Muslim majority areas and recognition of their requirement for special attention where they were dominated by the Hindus can also be interpreted as defining “the ideology of Pakistan.

It is another matter that old communists in Pakistan, as well as so many liberals and democrats, now see the events leading up to 1947 through a fog of mass migrations and bloodshed and the replacement of the Hindu exploiting classes by a class of Muslim banias that are far worse in their looting and grabbing. They feel embittered at what their idea of Pakistan and their backing of it have turned out to mean in practical life.

In the context of the ideology argument, reference is also made by some to the 1946 Muslim League legislators’ convention in Delhi, where the message between the lines was that Hindus and Muslims were two nations and could not live together. It was in this session that the word “states” of the Lahore Resolution formally became “state”, although Mr Jinnah had earlier reportedly clarified the point in a letter to Gandhi on September 17, 1944.

A resolution adopted by the Muslim League legislators said, inter alia, that the “different historical backgrounds, traditions, cultures, social and economic orders of the Hindus and Muslims have made impossible the evolution of a single Indian nation inspired by common aspirations and ideals” and that “after centuries they still remain two distinct major nations”. But in this resolution too you find no mention of the phrase “ideology of Pakistan”, although posthumously we have seen in this an indication that the two-nation theory, of Muslims and Hindus being separate nations, was meant to be our ideology.

We have a Nazaria-i-Pakistan Foundation based in Lahore and working since early 1999. Its website, full of the most trite observations about the creation of Pakistan, also provides no satisfactory clue about the ideology of Pakistan, but seems also to suggest that the two-nation theory defines the ideology of Pakistan. It says that “Nazaria-i-Pakistan is in fact another name for our Islamic spirit and character ... the Quaid-i-Azam dismissed the wishes of the Hindus and the British colonialists for a joint Hindu-Muslim nationhood as a pipe dream. With single-minded devotion he sought against this menace and succeeded in getting the idea of a separate Muslim identity recognised. In the 28th annual session of the Muslim League in 1941 in Madras, (the) Quaid-i-Azam formally declared this objective as the ideology of the Muslim League. It is this very ideology which is known today as ‘Nazaria-i-Pakistan’.”

Perhaps the foundation can now attempt to explain how in 1971 one Muslim nation became two Muslim nations and comment on the point raised by Mr Bhandara. In fact, a debate on the implications of the loss of East Pakistan for the two-nation theory may actually help clarify the contradictions that bewilder us on this score and reinforce the concept of the ideology of Pakistan for the benefit of many. The concept has gone through many interpretations, and even Urdu was once seen to be part of the Pakistan ideology. No one has enlightened us as to whether military rule is also the warp and woof of our ideology.

Religion was invoked to mobilise the Muslim masses by our founding fathers, but the Quaid’s August 11 speech is a clear enunciation of his idea of Pakistan as a liberal democracy. It is important not to remain trapped in articulations of the past enunciated in the heat of the pre-1947 battle but to decide, here and now, what we mean by the ideology of Pakistan and what we want Pakistan to be.

This is something that we have to decide for ourselves without reference to the past, and the cobwebs and contradictions that have remained unaddressed need to be openly tackled.

THE accord signed at Miramshah on September 5, could have been achieved much earlier and without the enormous loss of life, property and the bad blood generated by the military operation against foreign militants.

What has been agreed to now meets the demand of the parties to the conflict. The agreement did not take place before because of the lack of goodwill and understanding and meddling by ignorant and unconcerned agencies and persons.

When General Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai was appointed as the governor of the Frontier Province in May this year, I, along with many others, had welcomed his appointment because he was considered “the right man for the right job”. My optimism was based on his past record as corps commander in Peshawar where, backed by his solid tribal background, he had developed an excellent rapport with the tribesmen. However in a previous article in this paper, I had expressed my apprehensions that if the new governor was not given a free hand, and if meddling by Islamabad continued, he would not succeed despite his excellent credentials. But it seems that the hostile parties have come to an amicable settlement through the time-tested mechanism of an inter-tribal jirga.

Before assessing the impact of the agreement on the current situation, it is pertinent to examine the various clauses of the agreement. The accord consists of a total of 16 clauses and four sub-clauses.

From the government side, the political agent who signed the agreement gave a commitment that the persons arrested during the last two years would be released and all their privileges restored. The government would strive to solve all differences not through the use of force but according to tribal tradition. All new checkposts would be abolished and the remaining ones manned by tribal forces and not by the military. Adequate compensation would be paid to the tribesmen for loss of life and property. The military would be withdrawn and confined to its forts and bases while all confiscated vehicles, weapons and other assets would be returned to their lawful owners. Under the agreement, the ban on the carrying of weapons would be lifted although tribesmen would not be allowed to display heavy arms.

The terms accepted by the militants include a commitment not to attack law enforcement agencies, government installations or military men. No parallel administration would be established and the writ of the government would be accepted and honoured. Nobody would be allowed to launch any attack across the border into Afghanistan from Pakistani territory. However, there would be no ban on tribesmen to carry on their usual trade and business with Afghanistan and they would be free to meet their relatives across the border.

The tribesmen would desist from interfering in districts adjoining North Waziristan. All non-Pakistanis would leave North Waziristan. Those who were not in a position to do so for some valid reason would be required to live peacefully and respect the existing laws and the terms of the agreement. All governments assets, vehicles, wireless sets, etc would be returned to government agencies.

By and large, the agreement is balanced as it meets the demands of both parties. However, much will depend on its faithful implementation. Although a 10-member committee consisting of government representatives, local elders and ulema has been constituted to oversee the implementation of the agreement, much will depend on the goodwill and determination of the parties. In this regard, restoring the authority and prestige of the political agent is a welcome development.

While welcoming the accord, one should not lose sight of some of the hurdles and imponderables. For instance, how will the government deal with the very sensitive issue of growing religiosity in the area? This is being spearheaded by students of local madressahs who call themselves Mujahideen or Taliban, and who are bent upon introducing shariah laws in the region. This mindset also provides the impetus for jihad against those perceived to be aggressors and infidels in Afghanistan.

The government’s task has also been complicated by the fact that over a period of time the maliks and elders, who were solid pillars of the tribal system, have become almost irrelevant. The leadership is now in the hands of hot-blooded youth who do not accept any authority. The attitude of those whose dear ones have been killed in skirmishes with the army has also to be considered in the implementation of the agreement.

I am particularly referring to followers and kin of stalwarts like Commander Nek Muhammad, Commander Abdullah Masud, journalist Hayatullah Khan and scores of influential maliks, religious leaders and notables who have been victims of the army action. As their representatives are not a party to the agreement, they have the potential to scuttle it.

Equally important would be the reaction of other tribes and sub-tribes as the agreement has been signed only with the Utmanzai tribe. Also as the agreement only covers the tribes of North Waziristan, how will the government deal with the situation in South Waziristan where the insurgency was just as intense if not more. The agreement is totally silent on this important issue. And lastly, it is the attitude of the Americans and the Afghans which could prove a determining factor in its implementation, unless the government of Pakistan takes a resolute stand.

The Americans, who were responsible for sabotaging earlier agreements (e.g. the Shakai agreement of 2004) have already started making holes in the agreement. For instance, one of their spokesmen hinted at the possibility of Osama bin Laden being given sanctuary in Waziristan as a result of the agreement. Another spokesperson while cautiously welcoming the agreement said that Washington would like to see Pakistan in full control of the territory thus hinting that government control would be loosened as a result of the agreement. If the insurgency continues or increases, Kabul will blame Pakistan and the agreement and we will be back to square one.

All said and done, the agreement signed at Miramshah on September 5 in the presence of hundreds of tribal elders, ulema and notables, is the best under the circumstances. At least it gives the parties some breathing space to ponder over their past conduct and chalk out a course of action which will usher in an era of lasting peace and order in the region.

The writer is a former ambassador.