What ails our foreign policy
By Javid Husain
PAKISTAN’S foreign policy currently suffers from problems of substance and image, a combination that has made the country vulnerable to the challenges of the 21st century. The nation faces the risk of grievous losses unless there is a radical transformation in foreign policy. That would not be possible without making fundamental changes to the way this country is governed.
Let us first deal with the image problem. The lead article on Pakistan in a recent issue of the weekly Economist had the following to say: “Terrorism has many sources and claimed justifications, but if it can be said to have a centre, it lies in the training camps, madressahs and battlefields of northern Pakistan and southeastern Afghanistan... perhaps the most damning criticism of General Musharraf is that he continues to do grave damage to the long-term political health of Pakistan.”
If one reads the comments appearing in the rest of the western media or coming from western opinion makers, it seems that the general perception of Pakistan is that of a politically unstable and economically impoverished country that is providing a breeding ground for extremism and terrorism despite its government’s avowed policy of condemning and combating terrorism in any form.
To give another example, Pakistan has been demoted to ninth position in the list of failed or failing states by the American journal Foreign Policy this year as against the 34th position it occupied last year. Lest it should be understood as a new development, the assessment of the US National Intelligence Council in its report entitled “Global Trends 2015”, issued in December 2000, was that by 2015, “Pakistan will be more fractious, isolated, and dependent on financial assistance.”
As for the corruption problem, Transparency International’s report for 2004 placed Pakistan at the 129th position with the most corrupt country being ranked at 145. The TI report for 2005 moved Pakistan down to 144 with the most corrupt country ranked at the 158th position. India, on the other hand, was ranked at the 88th position.
There should not be any doubt, therefore, that we are faced with a serious image problem abroad. To the extent the image problem is merely one of adverse perceptions by foreign observers, it should be relatively easier to fix it through external publicity, provided the government is prepared to allocate the necessary resources and adopt the right strategy for the purpose.
But if our image problem is based on realities, changes in conditions within the country and in policies would have to accompany the publicity effort abroad to rectify the situation.
Unfortunately, Pakistan’s tarnished image abroad is based mostly, though not exclusively, on domestic realities and the way foreign affairs are handled. Therefore, Pakistan’s image abroad cannot be improved without radical and substantial changes in the way the country is governed.
In short, if we wish to project the image of a moderate, progressive and enlightened democratic country, we would have to establish a full-fledged democratic system based on the primacy of representative institutions, rule of law, withdrawal of the armed forces from politics, independence of the judiciary, and the strengthening of various institutions of state besides following enlightened policies. However, enlightenment must be defined in terms of the promotion of the spirit of enquiry and the quest for knowledge rather than a blind and slavish pursuit of western behaviour patterns which are at variance with our cultural traditions.
Even in the context of the substance of the matter, our foreign policy historically speaking would fail the test of soundness in conception and formulation. The first and foremost test of a sound foreign policy is that its demands should be within the reach of the national resources consistent with national security and economic progress and well-being.
Unfortunately, from the very beginning Pakistan pursued a foreign policy which placed unsustainable strains on national resources as it entailed over-spending on the military at the cost of economic progress and welfare.
This was in contravention of the lessons of modern history according to which the rise of nations has been accompanied by the build-up of their economic strength followed by the strengthening of their military capabilities. We put the cart before the horse and built a top-heavy military super-structure on weak economic foundations.
The net result is that other countries like South Korea and Malaysia, which were more or less at the same stage of development in the 1960s as Pakistan was, have pulled far ahead with per capita incomes of $20,400 and $5,000 respectively as against $847 for Pakistan. As for economic welfare, roughly one-third of Pakistan’s population lives below the poverty line.
The undue emphasis on the military dimension of Pakistan’s foreign policy by over-straining a fragile resource base had the effect of increasing Islamabad’s reliance on the US to obtain the military wherewithal to face the Indian threat and economic assistance to make up the shortfall in domestic resources for the development of the country. This dependence inevitably limited Islamabad’s manoeuvrability in the handling of foreign affairs making it generally subservient to US dictates.
It is important that the foreign policy of a country adequately take into account the salient features of the global and regional environment. This is especially true of small and medium-size countries whose capability to influence or modify the global environment is limited. Pakistan’s history is again full of examples in which foreign policy has been out of step with global and regional realities. The pro-Taliban policy from 1995 to 2001 is a prime example of this shortcoming.
Foreign policy must also be dynamic in character. A dynamic foreign policy anticipates the emerging trends in regional and international affairs, and takes steps to avoid the pitfalls while exploiting opportunities.
Failing this test, foreign policy becomes reactive rather than pro-active in which the policymakers are constantly surprised by new developments and caught in a perennial race to catch up with changes in the regional and international environment. Pakistan’s Kashmir policy pursued since the 1990 reflects the absence of this dynamic element in foreign policy. The same was true of the pro-Taliban policy pursued from 1995 to 2001.
Foreign policy ideally should be part of a grand national strategy in which the political, economic, military and diplomatic dimensions of policy are well-integrated. Unfortunately, the reverse has been the case during most of our history in which the left hand of the government did not know what the right was doing, leading, in some cases, to disastrous results.
Another drawback of our foreign policy is that it has normally been guided by short-term considerations and has lacked long-term strategy and vision. In other words, the practitioners of our foreign policy have usually been pre-occupied with day-to-day adjustments in response to changing circumstances without any sense of long-term direction. Pakistan’s inability to look beyond the horizon or beyond what is current has robbed its foreign policy of the qualities of consistency and stability, resulting in a series of flip-flops as exemplified by our India and Afghan policies.
Several factors are responsible for this phenomenon. The ministry of foreign affairs has traditionally ignored the long-term policy planning aspect of its functions both in terms of priorities and the allocation of manpower and resources. Consequently, its leadership does not have the benefit of long-term analysis and thinking to assist it in policy formulation.
The quality of leadership in the country lacks the will and ability to plan ahead. This is also to blame for this weakness in foreign policy. Pakistan’s leaders by and large have been unable to provide a long-term vision to inspire and guide the nation and the officials working under them. They have been more concerned with the immediate issues of the day and quick results flowing from short-term and arbitrary approaches rather than grappling with the likely problems in the years and the decades to come when they would not be at the helm of affairs.
Further, the domination of the security agencies in the foreign policy establishment has prevented the foreign office from playing its due role in the formulation of foreign policy, especially during the past two decades, thereby, allowing non-professionals, who are incapable of understanding the nuances and the fine points of foreign policy or the emerging global trends, to take charge of policymaking. This has led to chaotic results.
In subsequent articles, I intend to analyse in greater detail the country’s India and Afghanistan policies in the light of the points made above.
The writer is a former ambassador.
E-mail: javid_husain@yahoo.com


