LAST Saturday, the world observed the fifth anniversary of 9/11. Five years may be too short a time for a totally dispassionate examination of this tragedy. Still, one can safely reach certain conclusions.

The first is that the 9/11 calamity has had the most far-reaching impact on the US itself. The political leadership there as well as the common man continues to view the world through the prism of 9/11. Both individually and collectively, Americans see it as an event that has transformed the world, radically and unfavourably for them.

It would be a mistake to view the event only in terms of the destruction of valuable property and the loss of some 3,000 human lives. These were, of course, grievous. But the physical loss and pain suffered that day cannot equal the injury inflicted on the psyche of a people born free and raised in security. Until that point in time, the Americans had considered their country a fortress that no enemy could breach. But suddenly, the citizens felt exposed and vulnerable. It was this feeling that accounted, more than anything else, for the readiness of ordinary Americans to rally round President Bush and give him a carte blanche to do anything, anywhere and at any time, if the action was aimed at making America strong and secure.

The impact of 9/11 was immediate and profound, especially for President Bush, who had come to power determined to avoid foreign entanglements on the plea that America could not be the world’s policeman. But 9/11 was such a cataclysmic event that he changed this thinking. His close associates, especially those espousing neo-conservative views, were able to convince the president of the need to abandon the laid-back policies of the Clinton administration that they held responsible for emboldening anti-American elements to coalesce the world over.

Thereafter, Bush made it clear that the US would follow policies that were meant to protect and promote American interests and in any manner it found fit, because a strong and powerful America was good for democracy and world peace. If this could be achieved in concert with other countries and through the UN, that would be the preferred course. But the hesitancy of other capitals and the inability of the UN would not be permitted to inhibit the US from pursuing its national interests.

It was this philosophy of unilateralism that became the bedrock on which subsequent US proposals and initiatives, such as the ouster of the Taliban, the invasion of Iraq, the isolation of Arafat and the ostracisation of the elected Hamas government, were justified. With this policy, President Bush’s popularity at home soared and he was reelected with ease. The Democratic Party was left with no option but to offer its grudging support to the president as he went about “slaying dragons abroad”.

But this policy set the US on the road to aggressive unilateralism, that lacked international support and therefore the legality and legitimacy that knits together strong coalitions. Whereas on 9/11, America enjoyed the world’s sympathy and support, the goodwill was soon frittered away. Washington came to be perceived “as a bully”, that was determined to trash international treaties and conventions; in fact, break all the rules of the game in pursuit of its ambition to dominate the world. Many major powers, such as Russia and China, which had joined the US in the global war on terror, soon became disenchanted when they perceived the contempt with which the US was pursuing its narrow, ill-considered national objectives, without regard to the interests or even the sentiments of other states. The war on terror thus came to be identified more with America’s unilateral agenda and less with countering the global menace.

Another important, but less recognised, fallout of 9/11, has been its impact on American domestic politics. The Bush administration galvanised the entire country, especially the conservative forces, in such a manner that it was able to rout the Democrats in subsequent presidential and congressional elections, achieving a stranglehold on the executive branch and the ability to influence the legislative and judicial agendas as well. Churches espousing conservative ideologies are larger, richer and more influential today, than at any time in the past. They have also become active players on domestic issues and liberals are viewed increasingly as dangerous and even unpatriotic.

Thanks to its control over both Houses of Congress, the Bush administration also succeeded in introducing legislation that has changed the character of the country. Its strong adherence to the rule of law, respect for individual rights and other long held conventions traditionally respected by the American legal system, have been either violated or ignored. The administration has gone about engaging in detaining people, having illegal interrogation camps and carrying out unauthorised wiretapping, both at home and abroad. The result is that many well-meaning Americans are genuinely worried that their country may be turning into a police state.

The American Civil Liberties Union has criticised the administration for taking refuge behind the plea that America faces an amorphous, unidentifiable, unconventional enemy, and therefore it cannot afford to be handicapped by considerations of civil liberties and human rights. In other words, the “fear factor” is so overwhelming that the administration can convince large numbers to agree to their rights being suspended or abridged, on the plea that the country must be made more secure.

It is, however, in the field of foreign policy that the impact of 9/11 has been most remarkable. In the days immediately after the tragedy, the Bush administration decided to invade Afghanistan with the express purpose of ousting the Taliban government and destroying Al Qaeda; an action that enjoyed the overwhelming support of the world community, which had already come to abhor the Taliban regime on account of its highly reactionary policies.

Since then, thousands of American and allied troops have been engaged in unremitting clashes with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, neither of which appear to have lost the appetite for combat. In fact, there is renewed Taliban activity, leading many to the conclusion that the group may actually be on the road to revival.

The administration then made the grave mistake of orchestrating the invasion of Iraq, with scant international support and without the approval of the UN. It mistook the world’s support for its war on terror as a licence to proceed on a course of action that was devoid of both legality and legitimacy, on the flimsiest of excuses, all of which were later proven to be without foundation. In the process, the US lost its credibility, and more importantly, it created a “breeding ground for terrorism”, as many credible political observers had warned. At the same time, the transfer of American resources to Iraq has diluted its commitment to Afghanistan, which should have continued to occupy centre-stage in America’s global war on terror.

There can, however, be no complete assessment of 9/11, without an examination of its impact on Pakistan which was the first to come under harsh American scrutiny, viewed as it was as the Taliban’s most ardent supporter. It was not easy for Pakistan to agree to the US demand that the Taliban be abandoned and that the US be assisted it in its operations against Kabul, but it did. This evoked considerable criticism in the country, with the government being accused of performing a U-turn, but given the mood of the US and even of other major powers, Pakistan had no other option.

Any criticism should be directed more at the manner in which Pakistan negotiated the change, rather than the change itself. There may be some merit in the view that we panicked and did not show the right degree of resolve. The reality, however, is that with an internationally ostracised government at home and the country subject to virtually every sanction that the Americans have on their statute book, the room for manoeuvre was limited and Pakistan had little “wiggle room” available to it. The government claims that we have benefited greatly from this policy. True, we are once again a close ally of the US and its major partner in the global war on terror. This has raised Pakistan’s profile globally and enhanced its international importance and credibility. Moreover, Islamabad has also been the recipient of American largesse that includes advanced weapon systems. But the relationship continues to be based, as in the past, on a single-item agenda, this time the global war on terror.

Concerted efforts are needed to broaden the scope of ties by establishing relationships with institutions rather than individuals. More needs to be done to encourage the US to open up its markets to Pakistani exports and to take greater interest in investment opportunities here. More worryingly, there are large numbers of Pakistanis who feel a tremendous sense of foreboding over the manner in which the Bush administration has downgraded issues of democracy and human rights in its agenda with Pakistan.

One wishes that the US had been more forceful in its advocacy of democracy for this country and not sacrificed these noble principles on the altar of short-term, ephemeral advantages. The US makes this mistake often, but to have done this in Pakistan, which was established through the principles of democracy and dialogue, is a colossal error that both will rue one day.

The most disturbing fallout of all this has been the growing “divide” between the world of Islam and the West. While large numbers in America and Europe have come to view Islam with deep suspicion, many Muslims fear that the West has embarked on a new “crusade”, with no less fervour and resolve than that shown by European monarchs in their response to Pope Urban II’s call in 1095, to join hands in rescuing the Holy Land from the Muslims.

Combating terrorists is perfectly legitimate and most sensible Muslims would never countenance acts of violence, for it goes against both the law and spirit of Islam. Yet an attitude of hostility in the actions and pronouncements of western leaders and opinion-makers is creating a major crisis in relations among the adherents of major faiths. Some of this may be unintended, but remarks such as Bush’s reference to a “crusade “ and recently to terrorists being Islamic fascists are unnecessarily provocative and have generated a deep mistrust of and hostility towards Muslims, making it difficult for those who advocate moderation and dialogue with the West, to retain credibility among their own people.

Surely, no one in their senses would want to fan extremism and intolerance, which would only be widening the gulf between Islam and the West. But the West must recognise that military action alone will not eradicate terrorism. What is required is a comprehensive strategy that includes a serious and sincere effort to address political disputes and socio-economic issues. The West must also abandon its fascination with authoritarian regimes, which can never promote genuine dialogue and reconciliation either at home or abroad.

The writer is a former ambassador.

I DO not know why after every bomb blast, whether in Mumbai in a Hindu locality or in Malegaon outside a mosque or elsewhere, we, particularly the media, resoundingly say that there was no communal riot. One leader after another repeats in more or less the same words that the terrorists have failed in their nefarious purpose to disrupt Hindu-Muslim unity.

So far, the refrain has been that the terrorists have no religion. But after the Malegaon blasts, most Urdu newspapers have said that the bomb blasts were the handiwork of Hindu fundamentalists. Probably so, but, if in the past, the comment has been that terrorists have no religion, why change that stand now? It does reflect anger but smacks of parochialism.

If the blasts are engineered by particular communities, it is bad enough. But the worst is the message it conveys: that Hindu-Muslim unity is superficial. Leaving aside the elite, when the two communities live in their own localities they have practically no social contact and very limited economic dealings, so why should we feel that the blasts were meant to destroy unity? The absence of conflict is not unity. We are confusing it with co-existence.

The fact is that even after 59 years of independence, we have not been able to establish a secular polity which we thought we would after getting rid of the British rulers and parting company with those who wanted to establish a separate, religious polity. Our freedom struggle projected pluralism as its ethos. Where did we go wrong? This was the question I raised in my maiden speech in the Rajya Sabha in 1997. I still have no firm answer.

Either the seeds of separatism have been sown so deep that we have not been able to uproot them or we have left things as they were because we did not care. Our main interest was independence and once we got it we were hardly bothered about establishing a secular society. True, we have adopted a constitution which has given all communities equality before the law. But to make this meaningful, we have done little in the field of education and employment. The effort to blot out old prejudices or rectify communal thinking has seldom gone beyond paper. We have stayed more as Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs than Indians.

Our approach has been sectional and has remained the same way in one form or another. There have always been terrorists in our midst. Otherwise, how do we explain the Gujarat pogrom, the 1984 killings of Sikhs or even the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948? We have not imbibed the secular spirit which a secular society demands. That is the reason why most of us do not rise against blatant acts of communalism and a few even give shelter to terrorists, foreign or Indian. We are barking up the wrong tree.

Take for example Vande Mataram. It is a song which has stirred national feelings for years. To use it for political purpose is fatal. Union Minister Arjun Singh, a top Congress leader, was the first to throw the brick, making the singing of the song compulsory at government-aided schools on September 7 to celebrate the centenary of Vande Mataram. Congress president Sonia Gandhi would have done the country proud if she had said that she was not compelled to sing it. True, she did not sing but the party’s explanation was that the date of September 7 was historically wrong for the centenary year. The message that a person does not become less patriot if he does not sing the song went awry.

The BJP, which has no other programme except to communalise every facet of India, feels happy that it has embarrassed the Congress. This may well be true but by communalising the issue, the BJP has pulled down the Vande Mataram from its high national pedestal. The question is not whether the Congress has lost or the BJP has won. The question is whether the Indian nation has won. It has not. The BJP may have scored a point but it is at the expense of Vande Mataram.

I was amused to read the comment by the Muslim Personal Law Board and some Islamic organisations. They do not have to teach the nation that Islam does not worship anything other than Allah. After living together for centuries, all Indians know that. Yet nearly 70 years ago, a committee comprising Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Subhas Chandra Bose decided in favour of singing Vande Mataram’s first two stanzas. Why didn’t these organisations leave the matter at that? They made it into a religious issue and played into the hands of the BJP.

I think that former Union Minister Arif Mohammad Khan wrote a commendable article in support of Vande Mataram and stood by the side of former Prime Minister Inder Gujral in public to sing the song. But some “custodians of Islam” have run him down and compared him with the late Union Minister M.C. Chagla, a Muslim who joined politics late like Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The mullahs and their ilk used to call Abul Kalam Azad a show boy of the Hindus before partition because he was the leader of the Congress that was paraded as a Hindu organisation then. They have their pet horse of fundamentalism to ride though they go on swearing by secularism to hide their true colours.

A society does not become secular by enunciating that it is secular. It requires commitment to the principle of tolerance and accommodation. Above all, it needs conviction that one’s religion is not superior to that of others. All people, belonging to different religions, realise that their separate entities merge into one — that of India. See America where there is only one civil code, and no personal law of any community.

What is disconcerting is that the Congress is politicising issues and institutions while the BJP is communalising them. Both parties have only elections and power in view and they don’t care about the country. The BJP never had any secular traditions. The Congress has. But the latter’s behaviour reflects a bent of mind which is not trying to learn how to rescue society from parochialism but how to down the BJP.

The delay in judgments has worsened the situation. For example, a special court has taken 13 years to convict the first set of guilty in the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts. The supreme court has not yet taken up the case praying for the rejection of the Action Taken Report that called the Srikrishna Commission report on the 1993 blasts “biased and anti-Hindu.” When there is no odium of guilt in a community which kills people of the other community, every verdict gets lost in recrimination. A secular society should be made of sterner stuff.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

HIS disposal has occurred in a most unfortunate manner. Nevertheless, the reaction of most of our columnists and news commentators has been excessively emotional. The only balanced evaluation of the Nawab has been presented by Mr Ardeshir Cowasjee in this paper.

Whatever qualities of manhood the Nawab possessed, he was no champion of the Baloch people. He was above all else an absolute ruler. He was handsome, brave, articulate and headstrong, but his strongest motive was self-interest. Since he was sitting on Pakistan’s most valuable energy source, all governments tended to oblige him as far as possible. As a matter of fact, he was appointed by the first PPP government to suppress the other two prominent sardars, Marri and Mengal. The whole thing ended in a stalemate.

It seems that the PPL upset the Nawab recently by not acquiescing in his demands. His intransigence took over and he started creating trouble. The last straw appears to have been the rocket attack on General Musharraf, helicopter at Kohlu; after that things escalated rather rapidly until it became a fullfledged rebellion of the Nawab against the government. Since neither party were in a mood to compromise, the end result was in some ways inevitable.

The Nawab was certainly a very brave man. It reminds one of the ruler of Rohilkhand, in the late 18th century, who rode out at the age of 70 to fight the British. He was killed, his army defeated and his state promptly annexed by Warren Hastings. He was undoubtedly a brave man, but for the rest....

The inept handling of what really happened made matters worse. After all, quite a few officers were also killed when the cave collapsed. Someone had obviously bungled.

Thereafter, it seems that the government decided to take a leaf out of the annals of empire. The precedent was set by the British when they suppressed the Hur rebellion in Sindh and captured the Pir of Pagara. They hanged him and then threw his coffin into the Arabian sea so that his mausoleum would not become a shrine for people who wanted to end British rule violently.

The suspicion that the Nawab’s body was not in the padlocked coffin interred in Dera Bugti is not an unreasonable suspicion.

The fact is that Balochistan has been exploited for the last fifty years. Their anger is legitimate. We kept things ticking over by accommodating the demands of Nawab Bugti without bothering about Mengal and Marri or the people of Balochistan.

It is a difficult problem: the sardars do not want their absolute rule over their tribes to be diluted. How then are the people of Balochistan to be helped? Will the sardars want the people to be provided with social services, such as health, education etc or even such things as electricity and gas? How can this be done unless the area is opened up to provide the necessary infrastructure?

They are also upset as the population has already been diluted by Pashtuns. Because of military action in the tribal areas the Pashtuns have taken this opportunity to unite with the Baloch in a (token) protest, but the unity is probably superficial.

The further concern of the Baloch is that, with the development of Gwadar, they would be overwhelmed by Punjabis — a not entirely imaginary fear. These are political issues and by now it should be clear that an attempt at a purely military solution, apart from being highly undesirable, is simply not possible. It would certainly lead to a prolonged period of disruption.

The Baloch are a proud people, but intransigence on either side will not lead to a political solution. If the sardars refuse to talk to the government and keep claiming that they are not a part of Pakistan, it will not be accepted.

On the other hand, the government’s refusal to talk to them and talk things over will only complicate the issue, resulting in unnecessary violence and mayhem.

However, to take an extreme view and confuse it with the East Pakistan situation only indicates a certain superficiality of observation. What happened there had entirely different origins. East Pakistan demanded that the per capita income there should be brought at part with that of West Pakistan — a not entirely unreasonable demand.

After 1968 it was quite clear to anybody understanding numbers that the resource flow from West to East Pakistan was picking up.

We did not like this. However, the Awami League had offered a way out with Six Points which could have been a starting point for negotiations. Instead of negotiating seriously, the then government decided to teach these ‘ghaddars’ a lesson and convert East Pakistan into a colony. It seemed blind to the fact that the majority of the population, whatever else they many be, can’t be ‘ghaddars’. All sorts of objections were raised against negotiation, arguing that we could not implement the Six Points in all the provinces in West Pakistan, as if it was one of the demands of the Awami League, or that we would have to divide the assets which, in any case, would be necessary — but, nevertheless, negotiable.

One thought Brig. A.R.Siddiqui would tell us, in his book, as to why we refused to negotiate. Did we think that military action would be a decisive solution? He has also not enlightened us as to why the army thought that India would not enter the fray. Was the high command so dense as not to realise this? The operation was doomed to failure.

Balochistan is entirely a different matter altogether. RAW can have a bit of fun in causing trouble but not much else. Nevertheless, it doesn’t mean that we should repeat what we did in East Pakistan. Let alone internationally, it wouldn’t even wash with the people in Pakistan. Mr I.A. Rehman of Human Rights Commission has already asked Punjab to be reasonable.

Most people do not realise that because things have been allowed to drift for the last so many years, it is going to be a difficult exercise. How to find a balance which will pacify the sardars or at least put them on the defensive end, at the same time allow the government to do something for the people of Balochistan. A big problem is the provincial government. While all governments are a bit corrupt, the provincial government of Balochistan is said to be the worst.