PUNJAB is once again on trial. Is this key unit of the Pakistan federation capable of putting its past aside and taking the lead in defending the federal polity? On a satisfactory answer will depend the state’s ability to fulfil its most basic obligations to the citizens, namely, maintenance of an order that can offer all sections of the population guarantees of freedom, equality and prosperity.

A preliminary objection to the query — why is it being raised and that too at the present moment? — can easily be met. Balochistan is ablaze and where fires are not visible the loud voices of resentment and resistance can hardly be mistaken. The killing of Akbar Bugti has merely opened the floodgates of discontent that had been gathering for decades.

No elaboration of the circumstances of Bugti’s liquidation, no white papers on his “acts of terrorism”, and no post-mortem media trial of the late Baloch sardar can sustain the delusion that the crisis in Balochistan is limited to the Bugti affair. True, this case will have to be decided in accordance with the dictates of justice. But the real issue is the need to satisfy the political, economic and cultural aspirations of the long-wronged people of Balochistan.

What Balochistan has been asking for is no more that what it is entitled to as a full unit of the federation: its right to its resources, and its right to protest against arbitrary encroachments on these resources. Above all, it wants to be heard and not to be shot at every time it cries for justice. Fears that Bugti may not be the last nationalist to pay with life for his “audacity” and reports that some young radicals have already been put on the hit list add to the urgency of damage control measures. The sooner the process begins the better it will be. Delay will make matters worse; it could even push the wounded Baloch to the point of no return.

The most basic reality, the country’s entire population, especially in Punjab, must bear in mind is that force alone cannot provide a fair resolution of the Balochistan crisis the state has quite rashly blundered into. There is little doubt that the Baloch are two few (in Balochistan), too scattered and too poorly equipped to resist for long the state’s vastly superior firepower and numerical strength — at least in open plains.

Some other relevant factors may not appear to be in their favour at present. There is some substance in the oft-quoted bit of vainglorious boast that Balochistan is not East Bengal. The state may also not fail to find some quislings within Balochistan who will be glad to play the role of hatchet-men. Of course, for a heavy price to be paid by the people, including the Baloch themselves. Such people can be found in Balochistan as easily as they have been collected in other parts of the country.

But, for one thing, no one can predict the configuration of forces in the region a few years hence. Even a few months hence. For another, force can at best quell the violent manifestations of a political issue, it cannot ensure the kind of peace all societies need not only for progress but also for civilized existence.

Force can only smother hearts, it cannot win them. No self-respecting Pakistani should welcome the prospect of having to tell the world month after month, year after year, “Please do not worry about Balochistan; we can deal with the primitive people living in that part of the country”.

Neither Balochistan’s wail nor its youth’s spirit of defiance alone will be sufficient to secure renunciation of use of force. That will be possible only if Punjab realises its duty to prevent armed expeditions into the Baloch heartland. Punjab must tell the powers that be that any state that uses armed forces against its own people, whatever the provocation, is guilty of violating international humanitarian law. More than that, it will be guilty of violating its compact with the people from which all modern states derive legitimacy.

Till some years ago one might not have been bold enough to appeal to Punjab’s mind and its conscience. There were times when both seemed to have been put behind padlocks as ugly and as repulsive to normal eyes as the one on Bugti’s coffin. But there are some welcome straws in the wind. Punjab has not unanimously backed the bludgeoning of the Balochistan people; many voices have been raised in protest, and many more have counselled prudence.

There is hope that Punjab may be able to see the urgency of calling for a halt to all armed operations in Balochistan. It will not be a favour to Balochistan as much as it will be to Pakistan and to Punjab itself. No community can be at peace with itself if it condones (to say nothing of supporting) suppression of a people bound to it by many sacred ties.

Once recourse to violence has ended, Punjab must try to understand and resolve its historical disagreement with the people of the other federating units. The latter believe recognition of their historically-formed cultural and linguistic identities can be accommodated within the concept of Pakistani nationhood. They therefore reject integration with any other identity and suppression both. Punjab however has had serious problems with reconciling itself to the reality of Pakistan being a multinational state. Till 1971 it was possible to see the logic, howsoever convoluted, in such a tenuous stand as this — the interest of Punjab’s ruling elite drove it to look for any means for negating a bigger federal unit’s entitlement to occupy the state’s driving seat. But there is no reason after 1971 for Punjab to stick to its muddled thinking on the national question, unless it is argued that denial of diversity and demands of pluralism can often take roots in the psyche of a people with all the attributes of belief.

That some people outside Punjab, not only in Balochistan and Sindh but also in the Frontier and former East Bengal too denied diversity does not alter the argument that Punjab has been the main force opposed to the resolution of the national question. In order to oppose the expression and assertion of their identities by the Baloch, the Sindhi and the Pakhtun, the Punjabi has been bamboozled by the self-appointed custodians of his interest into denying the lure of his own identity.

However, even if Punjab wishes for any reason to live without an identity distinctively its own for any length of time, this cannot be a valid reason for expecting the Baloch, the Sindhi and the Pakhtun, or the Seraiki for that matter, to follow suit. Pakistan will be much stronger and more beautiful a country if all units are accorded recognition of their multiple identities.

If must however be said in fairness to the Punjabis that they are not the first or the only ones to deny the existence of diverse ethno-linguistic, cultural communities within the Islamic fold. The revolt of Iraq against Hijaz was never understood nor was the Berbers’ revolt against the Omayyads. In recent times Mohammad Ali’s bid for autonomy from the Caliph in Istanbul was not approved and the Arab revolt against the Ottomans, though instigated against the interest of both, was roundly denounced by the most vocal advocates of the Ummah, especially in South Asia.

Many in this part of the world bad, probably still have, difficulty in appreciating Nasser’s decision to assert his Arab and African identities along with his identity as a Muslim. For a long time in Pakistan anyone who spoke of multiple identities was condemned for fuelling fissiparous tendencies (‘markaz-gurez jhruh, janat’) to the satisfaction of official speech writers.

A debate on this subject has been made unavoidable by the recent events in Balochistan, as had happened during 1948-71 when East Bengal was asking for its rights. The crux of the matter is that the theocratic ideology formally foisted upon Pakistan by Gen. Ziaul Haq offers no scope for the flowering of a genuinely federal plan. Religion is being used, without authority and without sanction, to obliterate the various communities’ legitimate ethno-linguistic, cultural and territorial loyalties.

It is precisely for accommodating such entities that federations have been founded and quite a few unitary states have in recent years had to opt for federal arrangement. A theocracy is innately incompatible with federalism while Pakistan was always visualized as a federation. Call the forced marriage between these irreconcilable concepts a political folly or a suicidal mindset, or whatever expression one may fancy, the essential fact Punjab must grasp is that it will be impossible to solve the Balochistan crisis, or any similar crisis that may erupt in future, without discarding the theocratic distortions introduced in the original vision of Pakistan.

Equally manifest is a federation’s incompatibility with any form of authoritarianism. All authoritarian regimes are promoters of a ‘strong centre’, to recall F.M Ayub’s favourite cliche, and they can appreciate neither the demands of autonomy by federating units nor the imperatives of devolution of power to local communities.

Thus, the only path towards a just resolution of the Balochistan crisis lies in Pakistan’s abandonment of both theocratic and authoritarian state models. And this cannot happen unless Punjab seizes the latest opportunity to discover its role as the builder and defender of a democratic, non-theocratic federation. Let no more blood be shed in Balochistan because that will put matters beyond the powers of Punjab even.

THIS is not the first time that the expansionist Israel unleashed what, doubtless, is a genocidal war: One thousand three hundred fatalities, mostly civilians, about a million in habitants of the South Lebanon driven northward on threat of the invading forces that dropped leaflets and bombs from the air.

One thousand and seven hundred alone evacuated by the US at the beginning of the war — all this pointing to a war not against any army but against the whole population in an attempt to stamp out the national resistance spearheaded by the Hezbollah guerrillas.

The Red Cross, Oxfam and Human Rights Watch have detected traces of chemical weapons from the wounds of the victims, alive or dead. Clearly, the indiscriminate use of prohibited weapons constitutes horrendous war crime, the perpetrators of which should stand trial like the Nazi persecutors at Nuremberg some fifty years ago. In the on-going war, homes, hospitals, schools, refugee shelters of Qana have been targeted by the Israeli warplanes supplied by the US.

While there is a worldwide outcry against the dastardly crime of the Israeli aggressors, and desperate calls by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, the French, Russians and Chinese for an immediate cease-fire, George Bush and Condoleezza Rice have been stalling it on flimsy pretexts just to give Israel time to occupy the Lebanese territory up to and even beyond the Litani river.

When the Israeli forces failed to achieve this target thanks to the popular resistance by Hezbollah, which not only repulsed the invading troops from Bint Jebl but destroyed their battleship, SAARS equipped with harpoon missiles and battle tanks, the Bush administration stepped up the supply of war material to Israeli troops by airlift from the US via British airfield amid strident protests from the local community. This aid to Israeli invasion of the Lebanon compromises George Bush’s so-called New Middle East Plan which is seen as Bantustan reminiscent of the apartheid era.

In the New Middle East, the US, because of its oil interest, would be the dominant power while Israel the junior hegemon. As a first step towards the furtherance of this neo-colonialist strategy, the popular resistance in the occupied West Bank and Gaza and in Lebanon must be eliminated. Hence, Israel’s two-pronged attack on Hamas and Hezbollah. In the second phase, the Bush administration would take on Iran and Syria already indicted for sponsoring terrorism in Lebanon and for trying to make the dreaded Islamic Bomb.

But it is easy to conceive and not so easy to deliver. For the Hezbollah has halted the Israeli juggernaut and made deep dents into its armour, giving Tel Aviv a foretaste of war against a determined population. That in both Gaza and Lebanon Israeli operations, launched ostensibly to secure the release of its abducted soldiers, two by Hezbollah on July 12 and one by Hamas militants, the Israeli army did not pause to ponder that their indiscriminate bombing of suspected sites, might have killed the hostages along with their captors.

If Israel were really interested in the safety and release of its hostages, instead of launching a full-scale invasion of Gaza and Lebanon, it should have chosen the path of negotiations as it did in 2004 by exchanging 100 Lebanese prisoners for an abducted Israeli colonel. In fact, this time the Israeli agenda was to capture South Lebanon and stamp out the popular resistance there and the occupied West Bank and Gaza. In the execution of this plan, Ehud Olmert enjoyed the blessings of George Bush. But that was not to be.

The Hezb counterattack not only destroyed many Israeli tanks, artillery, warplanes, battleships and troops but also hit Haifa and northern Israel forcing it to evacuate its 15,000 citizens living in the border region. This loss of men, material and morale of Israeli army was too much for the Jewish state to bear, for the saner elements in that country criticized the conduct of the war and questioned its wisdom. The Israeli chief of the army staff ordered further reinforcement of the expeditionary force, bringing their total number to 30,000 troops in Lebanon but all this to no avail.

As the war dragged on for 34 days, the pressure of the world opinion for an immediate ceasefire mounting with each passing day, it became impossible for George Bush to resist it any more. This gave France a chance to take the lead in preparing a comprehensive draft resolution aimed at immediate halt to fighting followed by the Israeli troop’s withdrawal and the deployment of a French-led 15,000 international force to augment the skeletal 1990 UNIFIL contingent. In addition, another 15,000 Lebanese troops would also be deployed along the Lebanon-Israeli border while Hezbollah would be disarmed though no time-table has been set for that, meaning this would be resolved in the context of a wider settlement some time in the future.

Hezbollah accepted the resolution despite its reservation about the question of its disarmament. Israel and, of course, the US insist on the dismantling of Hezbollah as provided by the Council Resolution 1559 last year. But they forgot that the resolution also calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. It was in compliance with this resolution that 30,000 Syrian troops stationed in the Bekka valley were pulled back by Damascus. Now it is Israeli’s turn to withdraw its occupying forces from the Lebanese territory, including the Sheebaa Farm.

One notable feature of the Security Council resolution 1701 is its stress on the settlement of the disputed Shebaa Farm occupied by Israel during its June 6, 1967 war. The question is whether a state can capture and annex another state’s territory. Israel also occupied the Golan Heights, the Syrian territory, in the June ‘67 war and annexed it despite the Security Council resolution 497 directing the it to rescind the annexation. Similarly, a number of Council resolutions — 252, 267, 298, 476 and 478- directing Israel to cancel the annexation of Eastern Jerusalem was defied by it.

Though Israel reluctantly accepted the resolution on August 13, it might violate it whenever it sees a chance for it. This has been the consistent record of the Israel. It seized the Port Umm Rush Rush in 1949 after a cease-fire that brought about cessation of hostilities in the first Arab-Israeli war. The Port was allocated to the proposed Palestinian state by the UN Partition Plan but Israel annexed it and named it Eilat which it still occupies. On October 22, 1973 Israeli army crossed the Suez Canal to encircle the Egyptian army units in flagrant violation of the cease-fire.

Again, this time round, Israel launched a fierce raid on August 19 as its commandos clothed in the Lebanese army fatigues made incursions under air cover about 30 kilometres east of Balbek. The Lebanese government protested against this violation. If the fragile truce has to hold, the Security Council must take action to prevent its recurrence lest fighting flares up.

It is about time that the UN Chief, Kofi Annan, who in his council speech on August 11 promised to implement all, and not just a few, UN resolutions to settle the whole Middle East problem, took firm action to restore the credibility of the world body.

The Lebanon war has lessons for all the contenders in the region: Israel cannot maintain its occupation of the Arab lands it occupied in the June 1967 war. It will have to vacate them all. At the same time, the Arabs have to accept the existence of Israel within its pre- June ‘67 borders and give up all talk of wiping it out. The US should withdraw its occupying forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and make place for international peace forces in these countries followed by assumption by the UN of a mandate to facilitate the formation of representative governments after internationally-conducted elections on and the establishment of a participatory federal democratic systems there. Any attempt to impose the hegemony of a foreign power in that region would meet with popular resistance.

The Lebanon war has changed the realities on the ground, impacting the international environment as manifested in the declaration of the Central American state, Costa Rica, to shift its embassy from the occupied East Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, meaning it no longer recognises the Holy City as Israeli capital because its annexation by Israel is in contravention of the Security Council resolutions mentioned earlier. This is the correct legal position. Another Latin American state, Venezuela, withdrew its ambassador from Israel because of its naked aggression against Lebanon.

Israeli aggression has estranged certain pro- West Arab and Muslim states which were considering the establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel if and when it withdraws from all the Arab territories it occupied in the June 6, 1967, war.

THIS time there are no excuses. Every scrap of intelligence warned the government not to fight a war against insurgency in south Afghanistan. Ask the CIA, MI6, the former service chiefs Lord Inge and Lord Guthrie, and Nato allies who thought the then defence secretary, John Reid, was mad.

Ask the Americans, who were losing more men than in Iraq and were wisely withdrawing. Read the reports published throughout 2004/5 that the Taliban were back in strength. These were veteran guerrillas, well armed, who could count on the tacit support of tens of thousands of tribal militias. What made Tony Blair think he could beat them with just 4,000 soldiers? The Soviets lost with 120,000.

This expedition ranks among the stupidest in recent British history — and there is serious competition. It was undertaken under the aegis of Nato, designed for a different purpose and notorious for incoherent decision. This meant British forces would not be masters of their fate but at the mercy of a caravanserai of some 36 nations in Kabul, most with no intention of getting hurt.

When I met the effervescent Lieutenant General David Richards, currently head of Nato operations, in June, I shared the view of all who visit British troops on the ground. I was impressed by their morale and technical competence. But such visits (which rarely stray off base) risk buying into the dangerous assumption that military competence can compensate for political folly. These British soldiers are not fighting “against terrorism” or dying “for democracy”. They are dying because the Americans wanted out and George Robertson, the political head of Nato, craved a purpose in life. (The same Robertson, as defence secretary, protected the Eurofighter, aircraft carrier and Trident budgets at the expense of less glamorous kit now desperately needed in Helmand.)

What baffled me was Richards’s naivete about the Taliban, on whom there was already a copious and alarming literature. He was full of “Malayan inkspot strategies”, winning “hearts and minds” and not fighting the American way, such as bombing and strafing civilians. Richards said he had enough troops to do the job and was gung ho. I left his office in a daze. Was this how the British set off to the Dardenelles?

None of the objectives set by Reid in January was achievable. Commons bombast about gallant troops driving the “remnants of the Taliban ... into their last bastions”, eradicating poppies and building schools, clinics and democracy, was drivel. So was Reid’s talk of the “fundamental difference” between US counter-terrorism and British reconstruction. Semantics about rules of engagement and “not firing a shot” was equally hollow; in Helmand the British are consuming ammunition faster than at any time since the second world war.

British ministers involved in this war are way beyond their pay grade. Asked by Lord Astor last year about the troop balance between Iraq and Afghanistan, the defence minister Lord Drayson (recreation: sword-fencing) replied dismissively: “My lords, I am sure that noble lords will want to join me in congratulating the noble lord on his birthday.” The aid minister, Hilary Benn, denies that British troops are waging war, “but supporting a process of reconstruction”. Kim Howells of the Foreign Office wants to “defeat the drugs trade” and plans to waste #270m doing so. Armchair generals are bad enough, but armchair ministers are a menace.

Within three months of their full deployment, British troops have reportedly had to abandon the “platoon house” strategy of securing bases in isolated towns and villages. They were being pulverised by Taliban mortars. The publicity attached to the Nimrod disaster at the weekend was excessive. Any plane can crash. Death tallies, on both sides, are merely a sign of failure. To have to kill 200 young Afghans to secure a village for a day indicates that hearts-and-minds is not working. This is classic Vietnam syndrome, the military fantasy that war is a setpiece battle against a finite enemy (in this case “1,000 terrorists”). It implies that when 1,000 are dead, you have won.

The Afghans beat the Soviets in the 1980s by generating exactly the spirit of nationalist insurgency now fuelled by the brutality of the Nato occupation, especially its casual use of air power. When the Taliban seized control in 1994, they offered the country a sort of order, and even prosperity, based on opium. There is no doubt that they will return, at least to the south. Kabul cannot stop them. Nato certainly cannot. For Blair and Reid, architects of the current deployment, to lump the Taliban in with Al Qaeda, 9/11 and the Sunnis in Iraq is an invitation to false strategy. British troops in their #1bn camp in Helmand are as trapped politically as they are militarily. The government is in denial.

Finding a way out of this morass is near impossible. British policy is in hock to Blair’s Nato machismo, and early withdrawal is hard to imagine. Since British troops cannot conceivably “defeat” the Taliban, sending reinforcements will merely add to the latter’s target list. The present retreat from hearts-and-minds to search-and-destroy may be important for troop morale, but it is the same failed policy adopted by the Americans in Iraq’s Sunni triangle. And the Taliban make Iraqis look amateur. They fight as units, are better equipped and have rich allies over every border.

Karzai, besieged in Kabul, knows one thing. He must do a deal with the Taliban as he has with the northern and western warlords. His spring appointment of gangsters and drug-runners as police chiefs and commanders may have appalled his foreign paymasters. But Karzai has only one way to survive outside his capital: buying support from those who can repay with security. In the south that is commanders in league with the Taliban, even if it means Mullah Omar returning to Kandahar. The British could then argue that they have roughly honoured the pledge to achieve security. Either way there is no alternative to negotiation.

This is not a war that can be won on the battlefield. A prolonged campaign of attrition, as proposed by Des Browne, Reid’s successor, would demand a terrible cost in lives and money. The Taliban can fight for ever. It is no good politicians in London shouting: “We cannot afford to fail in Afghanistan.” Such chest-beating at the expense of other people’s lives should be actionable. Blair and his colleagues have willed on the army a war they knew it cannot win. The least they owe it is an exit strategy. —Dawn/Guardian Service