The sky is the limit
By M.P. Bhandara
“IF autonomy is the solution to the Kashmir problem, then the sky is the limit” — this declaration (or words to this effect) was made by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao of India, in the early ‘90s. President General Musharraf in recent interviews with the Indian TV journalist, Karan Thapar, and the scholarly journalist, A.G. Noorani, (Frontline) has been testing the limits of the Indian sky.
The history of direct negotiations with India on any serious issue is bad. Prime Minister Nehru reneged on solemn commitments to implement the UN sanctioned plebiscite in Kashmir. The reason: Pakistan did not withdraw its forces from Azad Kashmir as required under the UN resolutions (when later it disagreed to withdraw, India backed out). The 1954 Pakistan-US Defence pact was then cited as a reason for the final renege on the UN resolutions. India said that the pact had caused an “imbalance” in the subcontinent: when India itself acquired US arms during its China war in 1962, was not the “imbalance” removed? No, said India.
Much the same thing happened in the Siachen negotiations. An “agreement” between senior officials was hammered out in Islamabad at the fifth round of marathon meetings in June 1989. The joint declaration of June 17, 1989 by the foreign secretaries read as under:
“There was an agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on redeployment of forces to reduce the chances of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform with the Simla Agreement and to ensure durable peace in the Siachen area. The army authorities of both sides will determine these positions.”
At the concluding press conference, Foreign Secretary Humayun Khan spoke of a joint commitment to relocate “forces to positions occupied at the time of the Simla Agreement”. Foreign Secretary S.K. Singh of India replied, “I would like to thank the Foreign Secretary, Dr. Humayun Khan, and endorse everything he has said.”
The very next day the Indian foreign office repudiated the “agreement”
Much the same happened in Agra in July 2001. A joint declaration was worked out between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf. The chairs were even positioned for the signing ceremony. India reneged minutes before the signing.
I quote below excerpts from the interview that President Musharraf gave to Mr. A.G. Noorani on August 1, this year. Said President Musharraf: “...The other thing I want to bring out is that when I had two sessions with Prime Minister Vajpayee, a one-on-one meetings, and we decided on the framework, when we broke for lunch, a script comes in front of him, and he totally negates what we had just been discussing inside for hours....”
The President adds: “The issue of what the reality was I really don’t know. The reason they had given was that the cabinet had not approved. I said, “Which cabinet? I don’t see any cabinet here. Had the cabinet met?”
One suspects that if and when serious discussions commence in Havana or New York, one may find the Indian position on Kashmir autonomy pretty vague or riddled with holes. There is, however, one saving grace and that is Prime Minister Manmohan Singh — a happy departure from the usual run of Indian politicians — a man of intellectual and moral integrity, a person whose word can be relied upon.
The autonomy proposals rest on two pillars: phased withdrawal of the militaries from their respective Kashmir parts, and self-governance on both sides — self-governance in its fullest meaning and spirit. Pakistan’s autonomy proposals on Kashmir contemplate no change in the state’s legal status, population or territorial exchange. Prima facie this appears to be the only rational solution to this vexed problem.
Mutual troop withdrawals from the autonomous area is the core requirement. The trickier part is to define the scope, content and depth of self-governance. An autonomy drawn up on the model of the South Tyrol agreement between Austria, Italy and the South Tyrol people provides quasi-independence short of sovereignty. Just as Italian sovereignty of South Tyrol is of considerable importance, so is the intention that the Line of Control becomes irrelevant. This solution is perhaps the only solution for all three parties involved in this vexed dispute. President Musharraf has gone the extra mile to say on record that an acceptable autonomy agreement can lead to a peace treaty with India, and the mutual withdrawal of the Kashmir case from the United Nations.
For now how should both sides proceed? It is important that India and Pakistan be guided by the opinions of the Kashmiris. The Kashmiri leaders on both sides are well known. However, for the success of the inter-Kashmir dialogue, it is essential that the Hizbul Mujahideen leader, the main fighting group in the valley, is invited to the dialogue. This would suggest that the intra-dialogue takes place outside the subcontinent. Maldives as a conference location might be acceptable to all.
Given below are some of the issues on which Kashmiri ‘advice’ to India and Pakistan would be crucial to evolving a consensus on autonomy.
Should Laddakh, Northern Regions and possibly Jammu be part of the autonomy process?
How and in what phases should the militaries be withdrawn — firstly to garrisons and later out of the autonomous area?
Should article 370 of the Indian constitution be considered as a base for Autonomy? If so, what changes, if any, are required to ensure its applicability to the respective Kashmiri sides?
In regard to disputes arising between an autonomous region and India or Pakistan, what mechanism will decide the issue? The Rann of Katchh tribunal is an example. The South Tyrol agreement was clinched when both Austria and Italy agreed to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, if a dispute arose. None has.
What institutional arrangements should be made between the autonomous zones to provide freedom of travel and trade to Kashmiris?
What institutional arrangements are required to combat terrorism?
Will respective election commissions be supreme in their jurisdictions or should there be a joint commission?
In respect of appeals arising from decisions made by the respective High Courts, is there scope for a Kashmir supreme court covering for the autonomous area?
These are not easy questions to answer. The ‘advice’ of the inter-Kashmiri dialogue is not binding on Pakistan or India — but it is binding on the two countries to play a mentor role as opposed to an adversarial one to heal the fractures of the inter-Kashmir divisions. Human Rights organizations in both counties too have a role to play in ensuring that terrorism does not muddy the process.
India and Pakistan need to convince each other that they are not sponsors of terrorism and liberation armies. There should be joint investigations, with full access to intelligence, where one suspects the other. A good starting confidence building measure would be a joint investigation, with the assistance of Interpol, of the Mumbai blasts.
The writer is an MNA. murbr@isb.paknet.com.pk

