Fiduciary duties in privatisation
By Syed Mohibullah Shah
THE widespread support for the Supreme Court decision on privatisation of the Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM) reflects the deep anxiety, even among supporters of privatisation, about the manner in which state-owned assets were being sold.
Although Pakistan is a common law country like the US and the UK where corporate and securities issues are driven by case law, this is the first time in over 150 privatisations that the Supreme Court has judicially reviewed such a transaction.
It turns out from the Supreme Court judgment that our statute-driven privatisation has several flaws and its practice has been riddled with violations of laws, rules and fiduciary obligations. Pakistan’s corporations work under the fiduciary model of governance where the interests of shareholders (i.e. the people in state-owned enterprises) are represented on the board.
In such a model, judicial review, by courts — although ex post facto — provide an important remedy for corporate ailments. The absence of such a remedy had been a major cause of anxiety among people over certain privatisation cases and the court verdict, therefore, comes as a relief.
Because privatisation involves the sale of assets along with control over the corporation, it is an extraordinary event in the life of a corporation. It is the last chance for shareholders to realise control premium since henceforth they would have no ability to control the policies and working of the corporation which would now be managed according to the interests of the controlling shareholder.
That is why corporate law in developed countries like the US and the UK places the conduct of dealing parties under “enhanced scrutiny” from the moment the decision to sell corporate assets is taken so that negative practices like self-dealing, violation of laws and fiduciary obligations are not adopted and shareholders are deprived of full benefits from this last chance.
The Supreme Court has highlighted this concern while referring to a World Bank report that “The government... has a fiduciary responsibility to its citizens when it privatises an asset.” The Bank is actually advising that the same parameters for privatisation be followed in Pakistan in the sale of corporate assets as in other common law countries like the US and UK.
American corporate laws hold increasing sway over M&A (mergers and acquisitions) activities in European and Asian countries including Pakistan since the US is often the largest investor in these countries.
Within the US, the predominant corporate law that is also most friendly towards the management/ authorities is the Delaware general corporate law of the state of Delaware. That is why over 40 per cent of the companies listed on the NYSE and over 80 per cent of Fortune 500 corporations are all Delaware-registered corporations.
Yet, even Delaware corporate law imposes high standards of conduct upon the management and all parties dealing with the sale of corporate assets. In the US, while the black letter law of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty has long been established, enhanced scrutiny standards have been adopted in M&A transactions, through three landmark judgments by the Delaware supreme court in the Unocal, Van Gorkom and Revlon corporations cases.
Any doubts about conflict of interest situations were also dispelled in favour of securing the best price in sale transactions against any contractual obligations that reduced that price in another important judgment by the court of chancery of Delaware in Ace v. Capital Re Corporation (1999). The verdict held that “the public policy of ensuring directors’ care and loyalty in significant corporate events such as mergers outweighs the protection of the acquirer’s contractual rights.”
Therefore, in declaring the sale of PSM “void and of no legal effect” in view of acts of “omission and commission” that adversely affected shareholders (people) from receiving the best price, the Supreme Court judgment upheld the high standards of fiduciary duties towards the people that are also respected in other common law jurisdictions.
Leaving aside the important question of the Council of Common Interests’ approval, the privatisation of PSM was also vitiated by violations of mandatory provisions of law and rules and non-compliance with fiduciary duties, specially those relating to three principal areas of privatisation: (a) prequalification of bidders, (b) valuation of the assets and (c) a level playing field i.e. not changing the terms of the deal to benefit one party.
Its social policy merits apart, Privatisation Ordinance 2000 sets debt retirement as the essential objective of privatisation in Pakistan.
This imposes a legal obligation on the players to secure the highest price for the enterprise — similar to what American corporate law calls Revlon duty i.e. not to be affected by any factor other than securing the highest price in sale transaction. Yet, as the judgment notes, several billions worth of “the incentives/ concessions were not advertised but extended to successful bidders.”
We know that precision is not possible in valuation models and reliance on a single model is inadvisable. The valuation and marketing strategies adopted in privatisation have also been dented by the recent sale of 81 per cent of the shares of Union Bank (with 65 branches) for $431 million (equal to Rs25.8 billion) whereas 51 per cent shares of Habib Bank (with 1,425 branches in Pakistan and 48 abroad) were privatised in 2003 for Rs22.5 billion.
Normally the courts are not supposed to substitute their opinion in the conduct of business operations — the Business Judgment Rule (BJR) — or “in the policymaking domain of the executive”. But as the Supreme Court has noted “if the decision of the authority betrays total disregard of the rules and the relevant material, then the said decision fails the test of reasonableness laid down by the constitutional court for the exercise of the power of judicial review.”
The principal actors upon whom fiduciary duties devolve to meet these standards would include the board of directors of PSM, the Privatisation Commission, the Cabinet Committee on Privatisation (CCOP) as also valuers and their financial, legal, accounting and technical advisors whose discharge of fiduciary duties are reflected in the judgment. They were all under ‘Revlon duty’ to secure the highest price for the asset being privatised.
It is troubling that although privatisations have been going on for 15 years, these omissions and commissions were not noticed internally and it took the Supreme Court to do the needful.
It is also troubling that while approving previous and some additional privatisations, the CCI did not address the flaws pointed out in the judgment and plugged these out of the system before proceeding with further privatisation. It would be relevant here to refer to para 82 of the judgment which says, “Apart from the illegality noted above viz complete violation of Rule 4 this unexplained haste casts reasonable doubt on the transparency of the whole exercise.”
This decision will cause no obstacle to investment flows in Pakistan as some learned advocates argued before the court. The US is the largest investor abroad as well as the biggest destination of foreign investment flows and every serious investor is — or should be — familiar with the aforementioned and well-established practices of American corporate law. If anything, this judgment will help raise the quality of corporate law practice in Pakistan and set standards that are also respected and followed in other common law jurisdictions like the US and UK.
There is yet another reason why this decision is welcome. It has now set the standard of enhanced scrutiny for the sale of public assets and underlined the need for reviewing these judicially to see whether fiduciary duties have been duly fulfilled in privatisation transactions or if the disease that the court discovered in the PSM privatisation pervades the sale of other national assets as well.
E-mail: smshah@alum.mit.edu

