THE recent voting in the US House and Senate foreign affairs committees in favour of the administration’s legislation to waive the provisions of the US Atomic Energy Act, represents a major success for the US in its oft-expressed desire to strengthen ties with India. Ever since the US commitment (finalised in March 2006) to provide India with civilian nuclear technology was made during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington in July 2005, the intentions of the two governments have been quite clear.

It was recognised that notwithstanding initial opposition from the non-proliferation lobby, the administration would succeed in getting congressional approval for the deal.

Most analysts emphasised that the US-India arrangement signalled the two countries’ willingness to promote each other’s interests. They pointed out that while Pakistan could not expect similar concessions from the US, it was nevertheless essential for Islamabad to stress the adverse impact of this deal for Pakistan and the region as a whole.

Regrettably, we failed to do so for many months. The Bush administration, on the other hand, attached such high priority to this agreement, that it galvanised not only its supporters within Congress but even urged leaders of major business houses and pro-Indian scholars and journalists to pitch in. The Indian community in the US was a major player and used its influence to convince those legislators who appeared hostile or even indifferent to the nuclear deal.

The overwhelming vote in the committees ensures trouble-free approval for the agreement at all levels. The vote is all the more remarkable as the US Congressional Research Service in its report had pointed to flaws in the US-India deal, especially with regard to its failure to address the future of fast-breeder reactors. Some of these fast breeder reactors are likely to be dedicated to India’s military programme. Non-proliferation experts have also pointed out that the US-India deal does not cover India’s nuclear research facilities.

The administration has responded by pointing to certain built-in safeguards in the US-India nuclear deal. A few of these are noteworthy. The bills approved by the House and the Senate retained Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, that allows for termination of nuclear cooperation with India if it conducts nuclear tests or if the agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the US are violated.

The Indians have also reportedly assured the US that they would be willing to consider concluding the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). The administration has also informed Congress that it will insist that India place its civilian reactors under IAEA safeguards before the 123 agreement. While these are reassuring provisions, the fact remains that they do not guarantee a genuine control over and containment of India’s nuclear arsenal. This is evident from the administration’s refusal to entertain Senator Russ Feingold’s amendment proposing that the administration certify that India would not divert its fuel for its weapons programme.

Admittedly, some Indians remain opposed to the deal. For example, Professor Brahma Chellaney of the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi has said that by agreeing to place 35 of its nuclear sites under international inspections of a type applicable only to non-nuclear states, India has agreed to a discriminatory policy. He has also dismissed the Indian government’s contention that the US nuclear deal would help India meet its massive energy demands and has advised New Delhi “to secure coal and renewable energy technologies and to exploit its huge coal and hydro-electric reserves”.

There may be some merit in these arguments, but for Pakistan and the region, these objections amount to mere nit-picking, while camouflaging the tremendous advantages that this deal brings to India and the US. It is especially important that the US-India deal be seen not merely in terms of what it does or does not give India, but in a larger context. Not to appreciate the strategic nature of the Indo-US deal would be a grave failure on our part.

Apart from its economic benefits, both countries consider this deal as a concrete manifestation of their common desire to forge a relationship of truly strategic dimensions in which they will not only cooperate to promote their mutual interests, but where possible, the interest of the other party as well. It is in view of this that some of the concerns expressed by credible political observers is worthy of repetition.

A legitimate question raised was why the Bush administration had chosen to “trash” US laws and to diminish America’s international standing by offering to lobby with other major powers, including members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to take measures that would seriously compromise the provisions of a large number of international understandings, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

It could not be the mere economic prospect of selling civilian nuclear-related technology and consumer goods to India’s 300 million strong middle class. Some observers have asked why the Manmohan Singh government should have decided to abandon the cherished Indian policy of non-alignment and, more importantly, of keeping all its options open.

Policy pronouncements made in both capitals make it clear that the two countries are playing for high stakes. For the US, it is clear that cooperation in civilian nuclear technology will provide the opening that Washington has long sought, in its desire to build a strategic relationship with India, which is perceived as a growing economic and military power. Yet, Bush’s offer to erode and possibly scrap international non-proliferation agreements by opting in favour of an ad hoc, case-by-case approach, that rewards certain countries, while punishing others, is seen as having a much broader aim, one that has never been spelled out by either Washington or New Delhi, but which has been made adequately clear by those close to the centres of power in both capitals.

As Joseph Cirincione, head of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment, said: “The crux of this announcement is what it tells us about the US grand strategy, and that behind whatever is going on here, the US is preparing for a grand conflict with China and constructing an anti-China coalition.” He added, “In that scenario, India is even more valuable as a nuclear power, rather than as a non-nuclear country.”

This important view was, however, not surprising. A Pentagon report on the Indo-US military relationship commissioned in October 2002, had noted that “the era of permanent large scale overseas deployment was over” and that “military options of the future would require small bases, or ‘lily pads’, and a network of close allies with compatible capabilities”.

This is exactly where US planners see a role for India. They are now so confident of obtaining India’s support in the promotion of American interests that a senior State Department official was quoted in the same report, as having said that “India’s strategic importance increases in the event that US relationships with other traditional allies, such as Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia, become more acrimonious and politically uncomfortable for both parties.”

Indo-US military collaboration began in January 1992 during Narasimha Rao’s government. But, the Indo-US Defence agreement of June 2005, is in a different class, and envisages a broad range of joint activities, including multinational operations, strengthening of the two armed forces to promote security and defeat terrorism and strengthening capacity to counter WMD proliferation. As regards weapons systems, the US has promised New Delhi virtually anything it wants. More importantly, their agreement to “collaborate” in multinational operations, even those which do not enjoy UN sanction, means that India has signed on to the US concept of “unilateralism”. Admittedly, in the current global situation, inter-state relations have become far more complex. Most relationships now are multi-layered, with many cross-currents and even more subtle nuances. For example, the US is China’s largest trading partner, and more importantly, enjoys a massive $130 billion annual trade surplus. It also looks upon the US as a source of investment and sophisticated technology. India is also engaged in improving relations with China and has joined it in promoting the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, notwithstanding its growing anti-American orientation. The Chinese president is also likely to visit India towards the end of the year in what is being portrayed as a major effort by China to reinforce its ties with India.

In view of these factors, India will certainly not become an American client state. It will want to retain independence of action and credibility in its operations by playing a more nuanced role. But the Americans are convinced that when the chips are down, India will be its strategic ally. What does all this portend for Pakistan? We may have been right to declare that we are not in competition with India. It was nevertheless tactically wrong on our part to have initially ignored the Indo-US agreements of June and July 2005. Not that our protestations would have weakened the Bush administration’s resolve to craft new arrangements with India, but in the game of diplomacy, these would have sent the right signals all around.

The options available to Pakistan are not too many and yet some of them are worthy of consideration. For the foreseeable future, the US will remain the world’s lone superpower. It is also the source for economic assistance and weapons systems for Pakistan. We, therefore, have no option but to continue fostering close and friendly relations with Washington, especially in areas where there are common interests. But we must share our concerns with China and take concrete measures to reinforce our ties with Beijing.

Moscow is dismissed by many because of the historic baggage of mistrust and suspicion, but with Russia’s impressive growth rates and its tremendous oil and gas reserves, it is now actively involved in the politics of the region. We must, therefore, make a special effort to identify areas of common interest with Moscow. The EU, notwithstanding its natural alliance with the US, will remain our major trading partner and should receive the attention that it merits. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Iran, as neighbours and important friends, should be cultivated.

But when all is said and done, the harsh reality is that foreign policy can only supplement what we have to offer at home. It cannot be a substitute for our domestic failings. A major debilitating factor is growing political uncertainty in the country. With the president reluctant to shed his uniform and the army engaged in large-scale operations in Balochistan and Fata, we appear to be headed for stormy seas. A truly democratic dispensation that enjoys credibility, both at home and abroad, alone can ensure national cohesion and domestic unity, essential to face the challenges abroad.

The writer is a former ambassador.

WHENEVER I have visited Bangladesh in the past, I have wondered whether the country would ever make it. The words like “a failed state” has haunted me and I have often expressed apprehension about the future of 150 million people with practically no natural resources, except gas.

Still I have never lost faith in the Bangladesh people because I have followed them in their liberation struggle. How bravely they had defied the ruthless Pakistan army to be on their own. There is nothing more difficult than to initiate a new order of things. The Bangladeshis did it. First, they created an environment of independence and then established the democratic system which even Pakistan envied.

No doubt, the ever-increasing number of bomb blasts scare you in Bangladesh but back home I found in Mumbai a series of blasts which were no less alarming. Fundamentalists are responsible in Bangladesh and so is my inference in the case of Mumbai. Too much fanaticism is killing the best in all the three countries — Bangladesh, Pakistan and India. Some of their nationals seem involved. Who is controlling them is yet to be known. But their designs are obvious. They do not want any nation to stay secular or democratic.

There were only freedom fighters when I went to Dhaka within a few days of its independence. I heard the slogan ‘Joy Bangla’ at the airport itself. Passengers looked like people returning to the promised land. They were willing to make any sacrifice to stay free. When Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, founder and father of Bangladesh, said: “We will have to turn the independence movement into a struggle for building our country,” it sounded more like an expression of faith than a programme.

Dhaka was then an over-grown town. The countryside was poor and the teeming millions had all the aspirations. Today, Dhaka is an expanding city beaming with confidence and spreading like any world capital. So many offices and restaurants are coming up that I lost the count by the time I reached my hotel from the airport. The country has already recorded an annual growth rate of six per cent. The yearly remittances are $6 billion and the trade with India exceeds $3 billion.

Some 33 years ago, I saw nearly every rickshaw-puller in ‘banyan’. Today they wear shirts. Poverty still stares at your face. But then neither the eight per cent growth in India nor the seven per cent in Pakistan has reduced poverty.

The plus point in Bangladesh is that its people are conscious of their limitations and realise that they have a long distance to go. In contrast, civil society in India and Pakistan believes that it has already arrived. They are oblivious to their social obligation and lead a life which has the parameters of class, caste and the region to which they originally belong.

Unlike India and Pakistan, non-government organisations in Bangladesh have done a tremendous job. The credit given by voluntary bodies has changed the complexion of several parts in the countryside and made people self-sufficient. They are so confident now that the perennial floods do not drive them to cities as was the case a decade ago. They manage their own affairs locally, without depending on the government which in any case is far behind the people’s initiative.

The postponement by the Tatas of $3 billion investment till after the elections early next year is unfortunate. It looks as if Dhaka was not willing to offer the required use of gas lest it should become a poll issue. But the fact is that the impression built over the years is that India’s use of gas, however remunerative, is not in the interest of Bangladeshis. The ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is said to be responsible for this.

Probably, things will work out after the elections. But, in the meanwhile, the Tata deal postponement may become grist to the propaganda mills in India against Bangladesh. Still when its trade with India exceeds $3 billion — and it is increasing all the time — a reverse in the deal should be taken in its stride both in India and Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is a viable proposition now. Sooner or later, many Tata-like projects will come. All that the people in Bangladesh have to understand is that gas is a source of wealth when used. It will earn them money for development. The successive governments have used gas for political battles. Dhaka has come a cropper, not New Delhi. Already more than three decades have been wasted. Imagine the amount of foreign exchange Bangladesh would have earned to spend on development.

In fact, the bias against India, visible during the BNP’s rule, is disconcerting. A country cannot live with its neighbour in enmity when the two have so much in common, besides the long border. Culturally, Dhaka and Kolkata are so close to each other that even at hostile meetings the songs of Rabindra Nath Tagore and Nazar-ul-Islam are sung at both places.

However, Bangladesh’s problems, regarding minorities, a recent report by South Asian Human Rights says, are no different from those of India and Pakistan. This similarity emanates from the centuries-old common, historical, cultural and political background. The point to worry about in Bangladesh is that public and political culture appear increasingly premised on playing the religious majority card and marginalising minority groups despite a long history of accommodation and tolerance of diversity.

The Jamaat-i-Islami, a constituent of Prime Minister Khalida Zia’s government, has played havoc in the country because it has all the official patronage to vitiate the atmosphere. It has spread fundamentalism even in remote villages where Muslims and Hindus have lived side by side for centuries. It is evident that Bangladesh is undergoing a process of belated Islamisation that has eclipsed a more inclusive and hybrid Bengali national ideology.

The Jamaat is after the Ahmedis these days. The hate politics is being engineered against them and they are a victim of the worst type of crimes. The pressure on the government is so immense and relentless that the Ahmedis may be declared non-Muslims as is the case in Pakistan. Still, a Bangladeshi is offended if you compare him with a Pakistani in any way. I find in Pakistan a sort of nostalgia for the days when Bangladesh (the then East Pakistan) was part of Pakistan. Many want the two countries to become one again. But they are living in a fool’s paradise.

The Bangladeshis have neither forgotten nor forgiven the Pakistanis for what their army or the Punjabi culture did to them. Time may heal wounds. In the meanwhile, Islamabad would do well to repatriate some three lakh Biharis, the stranded Pakistanis, who have been living in Bangladesh for the last 34 years in deplorable physical and psychological conditions.

The writer is a leading columnist based at New Delhi.