THE recently concluded fifth summit of the six-member Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) could not have come at a more opportune moment. It now appears that the SCO is emerging as a major player on the world stage, at the right time and under the right circumstances, and is seen to be moving beyond its original mandate of resolving border disputes and combating terrorism.

Comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China and Russia, the SCO is enhancing its role as part of a conscious effort by its two most important members, Russia and China, to assert themselves in the region.

To understand this phenomenon, we need to go back to 9/11 and the US decision to oust the Taliban regime from Afghanistan. Both Moscow and Beijing were supportive of this action and extended some assistance to the US, reflecting not only their own concerns about the influence and strength of terrorist forces, but also because they wanted to enhance bilateral ties with Washington.

However, the Bush administration, with its proclivity for unilateralism, took their support for granted. What perturbed China and Russia even more was the US decision entrench itself in Central Asia on the pretext that it needed to establish bases to counter terrorism. Both powers realised that the US had expanded its agenda far beyond the war on terror and was planning to extend its influence in a region that had huge energy resources and was important geo-politically as well.

This common concern with growing American penetration of Central Asia — a region perceived as a natural area of influence by both Russia and China — has led to a remarkable strengthening of Sino-Russian ties, bilaterally and in the context of multilateral organisations, such as the SCO. The two countries have already declared their common resolve “to strengthen their strategic coordination”, especially as “the international and regional situation is becoming increasingly complex”. There is evidence of this in the staggering growth in bilateral trade which registered a jump of over 37 per cent over the previous year’s total. Even more important has been their coordination in the defence field including China’s purchase of sophisticated weapons systems from Russia and joint exercises of their armed forces.

It is, therefore, no surprise that the two capitals should coordinate their Central Asian policies in their common desire to oppose the expansion of American influence in the area. To this end, they have encouraged those countries that permitted the US to establish bases to close them down, as Uzbekistan asked the US to do. Others will be provided with political support, economic assistance and trade concessions, to keep them out of America’s reach.

Japan’s assertiveness, as demonstrated by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s decision to support American policies in the region, has also helped bring Russia and China together. Last but not least, energy issues and politics are deeply intertwined in the dynamics at play in the region. Russia’s current economic boom is being driven by massive earnings from its energy sales worldwide. China, on the other hand, with its remarkable annual growth rate, requires huge amounts of energy for the foreseeable future. Russia and Central Asia are obviously the closest and most secure sources of energy for China, which is pushing for strategic pipelines to bring in gas and oil from these countries to fuel its economy.

The crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme has also given Russia and China an opportunity to enhance their influence. They are convinced that the Bush administration’s concern goes far beyond the Iranian nuclear programme and is meant to bring about a regime change in Tehran. They, therefore, have a strategic interest in ensuring Iran’s independence and the survival of this regime, in which they have invested considerable political and economic capital. There is a remarkable coordination between them and they continue to be part of the international coalition that opposes Iran’s nuclear weapons programme and yet support its right to civilian nuclear technology.

Writing in major newspapers on the eve of the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that “The SCO has gained influence and has now evolved into a powerful regional organisation and a significant stability factor across the vast Eurasian continent.” He emphasised that Russia did not want the SCO to confine itself to merely fighting the original three “evils”, as identified by the Chinese, namely terrorism, separatism and extremism, but to “engage in efficient mechanisms of regional integration, and benefit from their intrinsic edge in energy, natural resources, transport flow management and traditional as well as innovative manufacturing, science and technology.”

The West is aware of the SCO’s growing credibility and attraction. This is evident from the increasingly sharp nature of western criticism. Some commentators have alleged that the SCO is an effort by Russia and China to create an organisation similar to Nato, even though there is no evidence of this and the Russians and the Chinese deny any such plans. In any case, would it be such a sin if this were so? After all, Nato has expanded its membership and is now moving into regions where it never ventured before.

Moscow is understandably concerned with this policy of slow creep that is bringing the western military alliance closer to its doorsteps. Putin made this clear when he publicly expressed his opposition to Ukraine joining Nato. On the other hand, the US has questioned the nature of the regimes in the SCO member states, alleging that most are authoritarian. Russian and Chinese leaders have rebutted these charges by emphasising that the SCO was neither exclusive nor did it wish to target any country.

Whatever the western allegations, the SCO is not a military alliance. Nor is it an instrument for the projection of any state’s interests at the cost of those of others. In fact, its founders have repeatedly emphasised that the organisation is devoted to mutual recognition of the right of member states to follow their own chosen paths to economic and political development, without interference or pressure. In fact, the communique issued at the end of the SCO summit, criticised those powers that wished to foist their own political systems on other states, with little regard for cultural and other differences. It is for these reasons why Pakistan should strengthen its linkages with the SCO, especially with Russia and China, which have the political influence and the economic potential to make a difference to growth and development in the region.

The absence of a high-level Indian delegation from the SCO summit raised eyebrows. Some political observers were of the view that it was a scheduling problem. Others said it was a deliberate decision by the Indian prime minister to curry favour with Washington, which had expressed its unhappiness with the orientation of the SCO deliberations and, in particular, with the presence of the Iranian president at the conference. Most Indian observers now say that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s decision to stay away from the summit was meant to reassure the US legislators, in the process of reviewing the US-India nuclear deal, that India is now “playing ball” with the US.

According to reports from Moscow, the Bush administration made known its strong opposition to Iran’s participation in the SCO deliberations. While the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alekseyev tried to assuage US concerns by affirming that the SCO had no wish or even the capability of involving itself in the Iranian imbroglio, President Ahmedinejad was able to extract full advantage from his presence at the summit. He was not only able to project Iran’s case with great vigour and conviction, but also held extremely useful exchanges with the participating leaders, specially the presidents of Russia and China.

After all, it is these two countries that will play a critical role in determining not only the deliberations at the UN Security Council, but even the US attitude to the Iranian nuclear programme. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad must have been gratified to hear Presidents Putin and Hu Jintao affirm Iran’s right to nuclear technology. In fact, he left little to the imagination when he made an impassioned appeal to the summit that the SCO should “develop into a powerful body influential in regional and international politics, economics and trade, serving to block threats and unlawful strong-arm interference from various countries.” He would also have been happy to hear Putin affirm that the Russian energy giant, Gazprom, would be willing to participate in the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project, that the Bush administration publicly opposes.

The SCO’s coming of age is a matter of special importance to Pakistan, not only because of the increasing role that the organisation is playing in the region, but also because China, one of its founders and most active members, is Pakistan’s friend. Many of us have been advocating concerted efforts to impart greater substance and purpose to our relations with China, especially in view of developments in the region that do not portend well for Pakistan. In fact, no effort or opportunity should be missed to build closer linkages to Beijing.

President Musharraf’s two visits to China in the past few months, the first for a bilateral dialogue and now for the SCO, will convey the right message to the Chinese leadership of the importance that we attach not only to relations with China, but to those with the SCO as well. While China’s support is already there, Pakistan will need to reassure Russia that links have been cut off with extremist forces. We should also convince other SCO members that Pakistan has both the desire and the ability to make a meaningful contribution to the SCO, both in terms of promoting inter-regional and intra-regional trade, within the SCO and South Asia and the Gulf, specially as Pakistan provides much needed sea access to the regional states.

Maximising options means increasing room for manoeuvre, which is what we badly need. The US is the world’s only superpower and Pakistan is right to maintain its current relations with it, but this is only a tactical arrangement. Pakistan’s strategic friend and ally has been and will remain China. At the same time, we should endeavour to strengthen our relations with Russia and the Central Asian states. This will surely provide greater depth and credibility to our foreign policy.

The writer is a former ambassador.

IF the number of bus services started between India and Pakistan was the criterion for judging their relationship, the latter would have been considered normal. The fact is that the enthusiasm over the inauguration of a bus service does not last beyond the duration of the ceremony.

Many bus services have been started — I have lost the count — but they generally carry more officials and staff than passengers. There are too many hassles — an unending series of checks and rechecks, besides the inconvenience of going to Islamabad and New Delhi, as the case may be, to get a visa for the bus journey. I wish the two governments would explain the purpose behind this frustrating and non-productive exercise. I find people-to-people contact lessening, not increasing.

Apart from the bureaucratic lethargy, the recurring violence in Kashmir is pouring cold water on whatever work has been done to improve relations between the two countries. Who is instigating the militants or, more aptly, who is using them to sabotage the peace parleys? Many such questions bewilder the public. The bigger worrying point is: how does violence help to solve the Kashmir problem?

This is not the first time that the militants have gone haywire. They go over the exercise every now and then throwing bombs in crowded places or shooting indiscriminately at people, including women and children. The security forces respond to the incidents, equally ruthlessly, caring little for the violation of human rights. At times, the security forces have themselves been the cause of violence. One side blames the other. This vicious circle has continued for almost two decades.

I thought that the militants or their masters would have realised by this time that no amount of violence is going to force India to consent to something which it does not want to agree to. If anything, violence has made the Indian mind more determined than before. The process began after the Kargil war.

The recent killing of pilgrims and labourers, when shown on TV, gave rise to a sense of horror throughout the country. Tourists who had flocked in thousands quitted the valley quickly. An average Kashmiri is finding it difficult. What he earned from visitors meets his yearly bill and also provides him with some leeway for the winter when he produces handicrafts and woollen shawls and carpets.

True, the militants do not want normality to return lest Kashmir goes out of the world’s gaze. But how does it matter whether the problem is on the backburner or on the front one? Kashmir is at the point where it was decades ago. The only thing which has happened in the meanwhile is that thousands of people have been killed. The militants have alienated more Indians than before. Still worse is the communal dimension that the problem has acquired, restricting the space of secular Kashmiriyat.

I concede that the parties concerned — Kashmiris, Indians and the Pakistanis — have to agree among themselves for a settlement. But this does not seem to be coming in the near future. What will happen until then? Even a layman will admit that individual and state terrorism have to stop for a congenial atmosphere to evolve for talks. But here all three have a holier-than-thou attitude.

Let me begin with the Kashmiris. They are at best indifferent to the militants, if they are not their sympathisers. Once in a while, I hear words of condemnation from JKLF leaders. The Hurriyat too chips in at times. The Abdullahs and Muftis, when in power, are worked up against the militants. But once they are not rulers, they rationalise their acts. In fact, I find a conspiracy of silence among political parties in Kashmir. The Congress is no exception. Otherwise, it is difficult to comprehend why the militants get shelter in Srinagar itself.

My suspicion is that political elements in Kashmir have come to develop a vested interest in terrorism. They feel that it acts as pressure on India. Probably, it does. The idea of the roundtable conference of militants (called separatists) and others cropped up only after violence cut a swathe through Kashmir.

India’s own response to terrorism suffers from a particular slant. There is more dependence on the army than the political machinery even though the top brass has characterised Kashmir as a military problem. This may well be the reason why the proposal for demilitarisation is not taking off. Even otherwise, when violence remains unchecked, no government can afford to take a chance, even though the groundswell of opinion is in its favour in the valley.

New Delhi is convinced that Islamabad has not given up terrorism as an option and “retains” the training camps and recruitment centres. Pakistan does not seem to understand the compulsions of a democratic system. The militants cannot hijack it with attacks here and there. Parliament is in no way cowed down by the attack on it. I am afraid New Delhi is not getting the Kashmir problem right. True, there are separatists in the state and I do not rule out Pakistan’s assistance to them. But that is only a part of the problem.

The real problem is the people’s alienation. Sheikh Abdullah, who was instrumental in integrating Jammu and Kashmir with India, told New Delhi as far back as 1952 that the Kashmiris should never be made to look like supplicants in the Delhi durbar.

He said his people would rather starve than accept India’s wheat given as charity or gift. The state had acceded to the Union of India on only three subjects: defence, foreign affairs and communications. Sheikh Abdullah did not want New Delhi’s encroachment in any other field. His straight talk cost him not only the state’s prime ministership but also some 12 years of his life in detention in Kodaikanal in the south.

With his exit, New Delhi, under the very nose of his friend, Jawaharlal Nehru, changed the complexion of Kashmir and disfigured its identity on the plea that all the states in the country had to have, more or less, uniformity. Despite the limit of three subjects New Delhi usurped much more authority.

Worse, after the Sheikh’s detention, the chief minister of Kashmir was first selected by Delhi and then imposed on the people through elections. The state never had free polls except in 1977 when the Sheikh swept the polls.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was wrong when he sent a letter to the state chief minister to justify the Sheikh’s arrest. Nehru realised his mistake. But by then the damage had been done. The country is still paying for it.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.