“IF authoritarianism is well entrenched in a country — that is, if the governing elite is not willing to give up any of the levers of power — then the opposition may have only one tool to take over the state: political violence.”

—- Carles Boix in ‘The Roots of Democracy’

FORMER prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif have put aside a decade of mutual antagonism and signed a charter of democracy at a delicate moment in our history when segments of our people in politically sensitive parts of the country are turning away from electoral processes and resorting to armed insurgency. The contents of the document merit a serious discussion on this consideration alone. Ideas tend to have a life of their own and should be judged on their intrinsic value, irrespective of who put them together.

Regrettably, the debate so far has been polarised between the applause of those bound by partisan linkages with the authors of the charter and the derision of those who see in it a threat to their monopoly of power. In a classic confusion between the message and the messenger, the authors have been advised first to heal themselves. This is to blink away from the larger malaise in society. Democracy today may be a prerequisite not only to development but also to the basic function of the state — the maintenance of law and order.

The charter is not a perfect document but it is a forceful reiteration of the basic principles of constitutionalism. It is deliberately focused on civil-military relations, a subject identified by it as the main source of the present national crisis. If it was a fuller manifesto, it would also have addressed the social and economic causes underlying the distortion of these relations. Its fundamental thrust is to persuade the armed forces to accept civilian oversight within the framework of parliamentary politics.

Consolidation of democracy in a Third World country depends on many factors. A major impediment is social inequality which tends to make the electoral process rather explosive. The disadvantaged groups constituting a big majority see in it an opportunity to destroy the supremacy of the affluent elite. Sensing this ominous prospect, the entrenched classes frustrate elections or unabashedly manipulate them.

The essay from which I borrowed the epigraph above recalls that both Aristotle and Machiavelli wrote about the dangers of social inequality. Aristotle observed that to be successful, a city “ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars”. A state comprised of very rich despots and very poor slaves could not be properly governed; it will be “a city, not of free persons but of slaves and masters, the ones consumed by envy, the others by contempt.”

Carles Boix also quotes Machiavelli’s famous remark that a republic could only be constructed “where there exists, or can be brought into being, notable equality.”

The latest budget is being hyped as providing relief to the disadvantaged sections of the society. It is an implicit admission that the vast majority has suffered grievously during the last seven years of neo-liberal economics and that this majority, if not appeased now, would make the next elections unpredictable. The last election in united Pakistan was a spectacular example of the revenge of the masses. Half the country just broke away during the whirlwind unleashed by that election.

If the two former prime ministers wish their charter to carry conviction with the people, they would have to reinforce it with a clearer statement on social and economic issues. To be fair, they seem to recognise that economic disparities have led to serious strains between three of the provinces and the federal centre. For this tension, they find a solution in the abolition of the concurrent list. But the social stresses that are tearing our society apart in all the provinces, including Punjab, demand that the two leaders and their potential allies from the ARD articulate a clear policy on the dilemma conceptualised by Aristotle as antagonism between masters and slaves.

Under electoral compulsions, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, the architect of the present growth-led economic recovery, is at the moment trying to preempt the opposition by adopting populist semantics. The authors of the charter have to come up with a sharper definition of their vision of distributive justice and social equality.

By far, the most challenging part of the charter is the set of ideas calculated to overturn the new hierarchy of power established by President Musharraf by making the armed forces the principal arbiter of national destiny. Amongst the proposals is the threat to investigate the Kargil debacle. Another proposal that would cause much alarm in the presidential camp is the replacement of the National Security Council (NSC) by the traditional defence committee of the Cabinet. These provocative ideas in the charter are enough to send President Musharraf to the ramparts.

Without his huge personal stake in the status quo, a modus vivendi between the political class and the military would not be such a difficult proposition even though an eventual contraction of the army’s pervasive presence in every walk of life would cause some pain. After all, there have been army chiefs who in the wake of President Ziaul Haq’s tragic death and the more recent crisis over Nawaz Sharif’s alleged bid to assume dictatorial powers in his second tenure resisted the temptation to seize power.

Instead, the army remained content to create a civil-military coalition with some areas of policy, especially in the domain of foreign affairs and national security, tacitly marked off the civilian jurisdiction. For good or bad, the two former prime ministers acquiesced in such a demarcation of authority; its unhappy memory may be the reason why the charter they have written now tends to be dismissive about similar arrangements in future.

Musharraf’s seizure of power has a specific background of its own though there may well be aspects of it that will remain hidden from the public view for a long time. Like his predecessors in supreme power, he too faced the challenge of legitimacy. External exigencies, especially in Afghanistan, provided him with new options for meeting this challenge. In turn, the options exercised by him, including the war on terrorism, also limited his room for political manoeuvre. Amongst the consequences was his perception that he could not relinquish the office of the army’s chief of staff. This perception stands in the way of Musharraf taking the risk of becoming a properly elected president without his uniform.

Pakistan’s social situation being what it is, a truly free and unfettered election can always produce unintended results. This fear again loads the dice against the chartists inasmuch as their primary aim is to bring about a change in the power structure at the apex. President Musharraf is obviously averse to leaving his next term to the new assemblies. But invoking the existing electoral college for his re-election for another term is likely to encounter much legal and political resistance.

So if the chartists of democracy pursue maximalist demands, they would create a serious dilemma for President Musharraf. The presidential dilemma can easily become Pakistan’s main predicament. A retrospective look on similar situations in our history would revive the apprehension that, if not deftly handled, it may lead to an existential crisis for Pakistan.

In the midst of widespread concern for Pakistan’s future, there are people who want the principal protagonists to make concessions before the battle gets out of hand. They would like the political parties rallying around the charter of democracy to use it as a normative document but revert to a pragmatic quest for a grand compromise. The bargain would imply a gradualist approach to a complete realisation of the objectives of the charter.

On his part, President Musharraf would be expected to restore the Constitution as far as feasible to the pre-coup text, hold free elections and allow the office of the prime minister to regain its full authority under the Constitution. If elected for another term by the new assemblies, he should gracefully accept the constitutional limitations on his absolute power. If the situation warrants a readjustment of powers between the present ad hoc presidentism and the all-powerful prime minister of the 1973 Constitution, it should be made through the new parliament on the basis of a general consensus on a package of reforms.

It is fit and proper that the two parties that have pioneered the charter seek support from the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy and even other political groups. This would certainly add to their leverage for promoting constitutionalism in Pakistan. But there is also an equally strong need to invite the government, in the larger interest of the country, to negotiate a mutually acceptable version of the ideas underpinning the document.

The quasi-political superstructure that the military has once again created during the last seven years is busy pouring scorn on the charter. It is clearly counter-productive as it destroys hopes for a peaceful change in national politics. President Musharraf’s easy option is to rely exclusively on this structure even if its inherent fragility is hard to conceal.

A more difficult but wiser course is to negotiate with the opposition so that the government can devote itself wholeheartedly to social and economic uplift without which Pakistan will sink deeper and deeper into a morass of lawlessness, sub-regional insurgencies and ideological extremism. We need to unite not only for democracy but also for the fast diminishing national solidarity.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

THE completion of the national unity government on Thursday in Iraq marks the starting point for repaying Iraqis’ commitment to and thirst for democracy. We are at this juncture, thanks to the bravery of the soldiers, police and citizens who have paid the highest price to give Iraq its freedom.

Our national unity government will honour these sacrifices by pursuing an uncompromising agenda to deliver security and services to the Iraqi people and to combat rampant corruption.

This government will build on the additional momentum gained from the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in order to defeat terrorism and sectarianism and to deliver on the Iraqi people’s hope of a united, stable and prosperous democracy by following a three-pronged strategy:

We will draw on the country’s untapped workforce to kick-start extensive reconstruction, put into motion an initiative for genuine national reconciliation, and increase the intensity and efficacy of building the military and police. While some parts of the country have been very quiet and secure, this has not resulted in increased investment or reconstruction. Our government will correct this imbalance and develop the infrastructure and services in these more secure regions, making them a model for the rest of the country. We will mobilise the impressive energy and skills of Iraq’s young population to invigorate the rebuilding effort.

This government will embark on a national reconciliation initiative, which is important if Iraqis are to begin to heal the divisions and wounds brought on by Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial rule and further widened by terrorism. This, along with genuine cooperation among all of Iraq’s ethnic and religious groupings in this national unity government, will allow us to pursue the terrorists with maximum force.

Baghdad is home to a quarter of Iraq’s population and is its financial and political centre. This government of national unity will launch an initiative to secure the capital and confront the ethnic cleansing that is taking place in many areas around it. We will meet head-on the armed gangs and terrorists who we believe constitute the main threat to security. Furthermore, we will develop and strengthen the country’s intelligence services, which represent the best form of defence against terrorist bombings.

We believe we will soon reach a tipping point in our battle against the terrorists as Iraqi security services increase in size and capacity, taking more and more responsibility away from the multinational forces. Key to meeting this target is ensuring that current forces are properly equipped and competent to take over security, while at the same time enhancing and expanding the training programme.

To provide the security Iraqis desire and deserve, it is imperative that we reestablish a state monopoly on weapons by putting an end to militias. This government will implement Law 91 to incorporate the militias into the national security services. Unlike previous efforts, this will be done in a way that ensures that militia members are identified at the start, dispersed to avoid any concentration of one group in a department or unit, and then monitored to ensure loyalty only to the state. In addition, we will engage with the political leaders of the militias to create the will to disband these groups.

While security represents the major impediment to reconstruction and the provision of essential services such as electricity, administrative corruption is also contributing to the problem and robbing Iraq of its wealth. We will fight corruption from the top down. We will revamp and strengthen our anti-corruption watchdog, the Commission for Public Integrity, and initiate necessary political, economic and civil reforms. This will include gradual reductions in government subsidies, which impede Iraq’s economic recovery and abet corruption, coupled with the establishment of a social security programme for the least privileged.

The political and economic reforms outlined here are guided by a common belief in democracy. Liberty is the essence of a democratic system, which is why I believe they must go hand in hand.

Finally, to achieve this vision, it is necessary that Iraq’s neighbours do not interfere in its internal matters. While some neighbouring countries provided refuge for many Iraqis during the rule of the dictatorial Baathist regime, this does not give them a right to meddle in Iraq now or turn a blind eye to terrorists’ operations.

Iraqis have elected a national unity government that will always put national interests ahead of sectarian or ethnic agendas. This government will support the judiciary in relentlessly pursuing the murderers and kidnappers who have blighted Iraqi society. With the help of the international community and regional partners, we will be able to defeat the terrorist groups in Iraq.

The scale of the task ahead is humbling. Iraqis have time and time again demonstrated their patience and perseverance in the face of many challenges. With our allies, we will also persevere to make Iraq a prosperous democracy in the heart of the Middle East. —Dawn/Washington Post Service

The writer is prime minister of the Republic of Iraq.

On the evening of Monday June 12 the consulate general of the Russian Federation will be celebrating its national day. There will be the usual speeches and toasts and the same familiar faces that one sees at all consular receptions.

But there will also be a clutch of old troubadours who have been attending such ceremonies since the 1970s, who still wistfully mourn the demise of the former Soviet Union, that colossal monolith that stretched across two continents and 11 time zones.

There are Pakistanis that still believe that the destruction of the Soviet Union 15 years ago, when 15 former Soviet republics spun off on independent trajectories, was the greatest tragedy to befall the nations of the Third World. As long as the hammer and sickle fluttered proudly in the breeze, from Riga to the Bering Sea and from the Kara Sea to Ashkhabad, Asian and African governments were able to keep their options open as they played off one superpower against the other. That is now a thing of the past.

During the 1950s, the politicians who claimed to speak on behalf of the people of Pakistan and pretended to know what was best for them, had already made plans for the future. They had decided to look west, rather than north for inspiration, material and financial help. This was shortly after, what some analysts believe was a series of diplomatic gaffes by the Soviet foreign office who couldn’t decide just when they wanted Liaquat Ali Khan to set foot in the Kremlin and sit across the table with Stalin.

And so began that tenuous 56-year relationship with the Americans which witnessed wide oscillations of mood and temper. A lot of financial aid and military hardware poured into Pakistan after that. The wheels of propaganda also worked overtime. Russian nationalism was seen as a malevolent force that followed a tradition of belief in an unchanging national culture that has persisted from the days of the Czars to the Soviet period.

The Pakistani nation was told that communism, which bred an ethnic, collectivist and authoritarian nationalism, infused with anti-western sentiments, exaggerated claims of uniqueness and an apocalyptic sense of mission, was little more than one of the faces of eternal Russia. The masses swallowed it all hook, line and sinker. But one does, nevertheless, wonder what might have happened if the Nawabzada, who was an honest and upright man, had visited the Kremlin and had later sent small delegations of technocrats to talk to the workers in the factories and on the farms, the people who managed the co-operatives and the soldiers of the Red Army who played their balalaikas on the famous steps of Odessa.

They would have probably discovered that the proletariat had gotten used to the simple securities and certainties of life, like having a roof over his head, enough food to eat and clothes to keep him warm in winter. The question that must remain unanswered is: would the prime minister have been able to offer a viable alternative to the rhombus of rightist elements that have throttled this country and kept it in the grip of poverty for the last 54 years?

And so Pakistan became a frontline state of the United States in South Asia. That is, until 1990. At the end of the decade it was faced with a peculiar situation. The visible tilt of the US towards India, with an eye on the huge market it represents, only accentuated Pakistan’s growing dilemma. It was against this scenario that policymakers in Pakistan started to look at different foreign policy options; and so, what was unthinkable a few years ago — extending the hand of friendship to Russia — was being seriously considered a viable option.

In 2003 President Pervez Musharraf took the plunge. He visited Moscow, thus ending the 33-year diplomatic estrangement that existed between his country and Russia. Ever since the visit, analysts have been anxiously watching developments for signs of shifting strategic partnerships for the two South Asian rivals — India and Pakistan. But so far there have been no indications of any major change of political focus or direction. A basket of diplomatic and cultural accords was signed during the two-hour session between the two leaders.

The discussions ended on a severe indictment of the new international icon that has provoked a whole string of anti-terror treaties across the globe. This is the suicide bomber, the ultimate in logical negativism, the blind visionary who sends his enemy to hell because he believes that this will get him to paradise. Though the get-together was conducted in a spirit of bonhomie, with both leaders nursing certain grievances against the behaviour of established allies, it was nevertheless tempered somewhat by the fact that President Vladimir Putin had earlier informed the prime minister of India that his meeting with their arch rivals would not affect the cordial associations the Russians enjoyed with the Indians. He needn’t have worried.

Relations between Russia and India are, in fact, firmly anchored in the earlier agreements signed during the Soviet years. India is an important customer of the Russian military-industrial complex, which accounts for about 20 per cent of its exports. What is more, around 70-80 per cent of Indian military equipment is of Soviet origin, although India is now trying to diversify. In fact, in December 2003 the value of prospective Russo-Indian military contracts stood at around $10-12 billion.

Russian-Indian bonds notwithstanding, Pakistan has indicated on more than one occasion that it would like to forget the past and get involved in active trade with Russia whose most significant investment so far has been in the Karachi Steel Mill complex, erected in the days of the Soviet Union — a huge industrial enterprise whose privatisation is now being seen as a highly capricious exercise.

By the looks of it President Musharraf appears to be gearing up for another visit to the land that Winston Churchill once described as ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma’, His recent interview to a Russian news agency, in which he emphasised that bilateral relations should be developed on a bilateral basis and not on an Indo-centric approach, appears to point to this.

President Musharraf had certainly done his homework before he stepped into the plane for that historic meeting with Putin. Russia may no longer be a military giant, but it is still an industrial colossus. It nurtures an economy which, for all its clumsiness and gaucheness, still produces highly sophisticated weapons, and almost twice as much oil, steel, cement, aluminium and rubber than the United States. Putin’s response had been positive.

Russia’s welcome of Pakistan’s inclusion in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as an observer was seen in Islamabad as a positive step that will further strengthen relations between the two countries. However, the old alignments, though they have been given a bit of a squeeze, are nonetheless still in place. Pakistan is still very close to China, and President Bush periodically praises Pakistan’s efforts in the war against terrorism — while chiding the military leader for not doing enough.

In spite of occasional snubs and rebukes, no Pakistani government has ever been willing to cut the umbilical cord with the United States. The official position in Islamabad in 2003, therefore, was that Musharraf and Putin were only exploring new diplomatic horizons and channels so that they could widen the spectrum of trade. But those who read between the lines point out that there have been increasing signs of tension in Islamabad’s relations with Washington after the US and India signed a defence pact which charts a course for defence cooperation between the two countries during the next ten years.

In Pakistan, attitudes towards Russia are rapidly changing, particularly among the students who studied in Russian universities and members of the business community who see new possibilities for trade. In spite of the fact that Russia has now become a panoply of raw thrusting consumerism and newfound wealth, jostling with age-old images of ingrained poverty, it is still the land of the future.

Even the Pakistani clergy, who have an abiding grip on the popular imagination in the province that shares a border with Afghanistan, are beginning to look at the Russian bear in a different light, after repeated strikes by US warplanes on selected Taliban targets in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. In fact, it is the North-West Frontier Province that has now become the epicentre of intense anti-American sentiments.