A DRAMATIC upsurge in fighting in neighbouring Afghanistan is frequently linked to the deployment of Nato troops this summer in the southern regions of the country. General David Richards, the commander of Nato’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has described his mission as “a combat operation thousands of miles from Nato’s traditional territory” which makes his men a “truly expeditionary force”.

The transition from a military alliance put together to establish American leadership in ensuring European security and head off a perceived threat from the Stalinist USSR to a much enlarged alliance with a virtual global mission is nothing short of historic.

The end of the Cold War with the disintegration of the Soviet Union triggered off a lively debate if the greatest military alliance of human history was still needed. Amongst the several arguments advanced to justify not only its existence but also its enlargement was its unique ability to contain and eliminate risks in reshaping the world: the traditional threat from the East had been replaced by an array of new factors that could imperil security, democracy, economic liberalism and globalisation. The world, it was argued, could not conceivably dispense with a concert of major military powers led by the United States.

Some advocates of Nato’s enlargement found its increased relevance in a conjunction of shared values of its members with the historically unprecedented power of the United States to deploy its forces rapidly and effectively all over the world. This view was by no means confined to the original Nato partners. Some of its extreme versions were to be found in the countries of central and eastern Europe that had experienced Soviet hegemony since 1945.

Two scholars from that region came up with the thesis that the United Nations had played a strong deterrent role after the Second World War and conserved a balance of forces until the end of the Cold War but that its role was substantially reduced by post-Cold War realities. Lack of an effective machinery for enforcement of Security Council resolutions, in their opinion, had eroded the UN’s authority while Nato had upheld democracy with an “iron will and firm hand”. Their conclusion was that the UN would have to inevitably devolve to Nato the functions of a world trouble-shooter and that the general tendency for the coming two decades was for the UN “to pass the baton into Nato’s hands and to retire from the race”. Washington’s unilateralism has, indeed, been a retirement plan for the United Nations.

I have abstracted the above-mentioned view from a western-funded study made available to me by an indignant Russian friend who thought that it was an attempt at proclaiming American hegemony over the Balkans. If unchecked, Nato would push towards Russia by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Baltic states and even Ukraine. Even in his alarmist view, which I found to be widely shared by the Russian strategic community, there was perhaps no room for a scenario in which Nato troops would be battling insurgents in Helmand and Uruzgan.

It can, perhaps, be conceded that Balkans’ stabilisation depends considerably on Nato’s demonstrated threat to intervene. Consider the bloody fragmentation of Yugoslavia. It is still an unfinished business. Kosovo which saw a forceful intervention by Nato is still negotiating its qualified independence but Montenegro has already broken away from Serbia. There are other territories, such as Vojvodina, which may also cut the umbilical cord. According to some estimates, the eventual Serbia would be no more than one fifth of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Notably, all the successor states have joined the queue for Nato’s membership to become at least viable protectorates of Nato.

Enlargement of Nato has also been accompanied by partnership for peace. Gradually, a defensive alliance, the continued existence of which was questioned in the 1990s, has been transformed into a major pillar of a world order dominated by the United States. It is often described, occasionally pejoratively, as the strong arm of the empire that the United States has become. As it has always happened in human history, this role is feared and also resisted.

There are signs that under President Vladimir Putin the Russian reservations are hardening into a proactive policy of counter-balancing Nato’s influence. This is different from the earlier Russian efforts to moderate Nato’s thrust by creating joint consultative forums. Together with China, Russia has a particular focus on the perimeter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Fierce competition for energy resources is just one manifestation of this resolve.

Those of us who had seen the Bagram and Shindand air bases knew that the invasion of Afghanistan was not simply a case of reprisals against the Taliban for having provided a base to the Al Qaeda. It was the beginning of a military campaign to reorganise the world after a new gospel of power. Since the United States had to move on to a more valuable target in Iraq, Nato was the organisation of choice to stabilise Afghanistan and oversee its political and economic reconstruction. Many Afghans expected the European element in Nato to moderate the overkill tendency in the US army when resisted. A sense of awe at the destructive power of the United States was clearly modulated by an almost nostalgic memory of happier interaction with continental Europe.

Things are, however, going horribly wrong in Afghanistan. The resilience of resistance to the occupation has surprised all observers. Initially, it sprang from the alchemy that fused the Pushtun perception of dispossession by the ethnic groups used as the foot soldiers of the American invasion with the residual jihadist passion of the Taliban and some erstwhile Mujahideen groups. But now it seems to draw additional strength from other factors as well.

First, Karzai’s great distrust of political parties, probably shared by his American mentors, has prevented the bicameral parliament that was elected with almost 80,000 Pakistani troops sealing the international border from playing any significant role in promoting national reconciliation. Its potential is further hobbled by the influence of powerful figures of the past.

Secondly, reconstruction has been more of a mirage than reality. International assistance fell well short of the promise. Substantial percentages of what became available went into the pockets of the powerful and brought little relief to the people. Pervasive disillusionment is evidently facilitating the reinvigoration of the resistance. If nothing else, it provides logistical support to the insurgents.

Third, as the economy faltered, poppy cultivation and the international trade linked with it began to account for a hugely disproportionate share of it. The wealth generated by drugs is needed as much by the warlords as by the resistance fighters, and the Taliban, who once uprooted poppy, now encourage its cultivation. In many areas, there is a tacit alliance between the Taliban and the nominally pro-Karzai warlords to share the spoils.

Nato’s deployment is being heralded by a general intensification of the conflict. The nature of this conflict is materially different from what the military alliance faced in Europe. The insurgents will paint its intrusion into new areas as the arrival of the surrogates of the original invaders unless it can act fast to project a different image.

But can Nato craft a different image in the present circumstances when Afghanistan is once again being “lost”? Its commander says that many national caveats constrained Nato’s earlier operations in Afghanistan and that in the new combat operation, “commanders at every level cannot be constrained by the kinds of caveats you might just get away with in a peacekeeping operation”. Is this the drum roll of a military alliance being shifted from protecting reconstruction teams to the task of reconquering districts that keep slipping out of Kabul’s control? If so, its forces should expect a bitter battle, fluctuating in time and space, with 12,000 or more of the insurgents.

Whether or not Nato can make the dirty war in Afghanistan a trifle cleaner will not make much difference to the fallout on Pakistan. Notwithstanding the press release issued by the British High Commission in Islamabad, which a government minister thought important enough to wave on state television, the allegations of Pakistan’s complicity are widespread in the Nato community. Ominously enough, a recent article in the International Herald Tribune, recommended the need to renegotiate the Durand Line — as if Pakistan’s national borders can be realigned to fulfil the requirement of any counter-insurgency operation on the other side.

Pakistan should take a full measure of the global role acquired by Nato particularly in the context of the ingrained, almost theological, compulsion of the United States to rely on the use of force. The next meeting of the trilateral commission will have Nato as a direct interlocutor. It is time to overcome an apologetic approach to these discussions and insist, as a sovereign state must, on a candid and comprehensive exchange of views on the full picture. Pakistan should ask for the adoption of sustainable policies in Afghanistan. It is not interference; only the right to know what foreign occupiers of a neighbouring land propose to do about an insurgency that keeps being blamed on Pakistan.

For Nato also, it is the moment of truth. Afghan tribes have humbled two mighty empires — British and Russian — in the past; they can grievously hurt Nato’s new global role if not performed with wisdom, restraint and statesmanship. If President Musharraf has long-term regional interest at heart and the political will to defend these, he can help Nato move towards these requisites of the Afghan situation. He can tell Nato that the Soviet Union had a mightier killing machine and yet it failed.

The writer is a former foreign secretary who has served in Afghanistan.

IT was that kind of evening. With temperatures soaring around the 36 degree mark and humidity registering around 40 per cent, this writer was watching one of those talk shows that have started to inundate the local television news channels. He was joined by a guest who just happened to drop in because the area in which he lived hadn’t had any electricity for six hours.

Getting back to the talk show, there was this attractive anchor woman, gearing up to do a bit of constructive grilling, a public relations officer with a beautifully coiffured mane of gray hair and a warm, mellifluous voice which exuded a lugubrious dignity, and a very correct German gentleman who turned out to be his boss. They were representing the beleaguered KESC, a corporation which in recent weeks has hit absolute rock bottom in the popularity charts.

The subject was the frequent power breakdowns and the extraordinary long shutdowns — a theme on which every man, woman and child who lives in this blighted city has developed a firm opinion. The public relations executive gave it his best shot. In spite of the innumerable problems, the lads were working round the clock and doing all they could to establish normal transmission. He urged tolerance and patience.

It was all very pleasant and amiable and civilised. The managing director then took over. Unfortunately one didn’t get to hear what he had to say, because the electricity suddenly went off. When it was restored two hours later the television screen showed an extravagant display of the bhangra, where men and women of various shapes and sizes were united by the vague consciousness of a shared activity.

One read in the papers the next day that what the managing director of KESC had said was that the current state of partial collapse was likely to continue until September. This means that for the next three months the citizens of Pakistan’s largest city will continue to endure hardship and suffering and exports will continue to be affected. The rich who have their huge generators can always slip away to cooler climes.

But what does the average citizen do when he does not possess an alternative method of generating electricity? He will just have to suffer. The owner of the small generator is also in a quandary. He has developed what for want of a better phrase could be called “the expectancy syndrome”. When he switches on the generator at night he cannot sleep because he knows he has to be awake when electricity is restored. And when the power comes back he cannot sleep because he is worried it might go off again and he will have to switch on the generator.

One wonders how many of the people who sit around the governor or the chief minister, plotting on how to win the next election, have given a thought to the poor student or the poor housewife, or the worker who after enduring eight hours in the sweltering heat of a factory or a mill, and another 90 minutes strap hanging in an overheated, overcrowded bus goes home to be told that he would have to spend another night without a fan. The general perception is that things have never been as bad as they are today when whole areas have been without electricity for periods stretching over a week.

A writer, who is an avowed critic of autocratic rule, had to admit, somewhat ruefully, that things were a lot better when the KESC was being managed by the army. To start with, there were considerably fewer breakdowns and better customer relations. The consumer was at least able to get through to the complaint centres and received a courteous reply. There was also evidence of improvements in a number of other areas — the availability and quality of power supply, reductions in commercial losses and decreases in accounts receivable. The organisational restructuring was supposed to have resulted in substantially reducing the losses. However, this view is not shared by everybody and a number of critics have pointed out that it is the military that is primarily responsible for the mess the corporation finds itself in today.

The prime minister, the governor and the naib nazim of Karachi have been seen to be doing something, and others will probably follow in their wake. They have held detailed meetings with the management of the KESC — and each of these functionaries has been told the same story. The power generating units are not producing enough energy and there just isn’t enough electricity to go around. It’s as simple as that. In fact, with all the high rises and development schemes that are coming up, the kundas and other types of theft that are taking place, demand is likely to continue to outstrip supply for a number of years.

The KESC was incorporated on September 13, 1913 under the Indian Companies Act of 1882, which was amended to date under the Pakistani Companies Ordinance of 1984, and is listed on the Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad stock exchanges. The government of Pakistan took control of the corporation by acquiring majority share holdings in 1952, while the ministry of water and power looked after the affairs of the corporation at the federal level.

One doesn’t know the exact year when the rot set in and the slide started. But that there has been a gradual deterioration from the early 1980s cannot be denied. But then, one must not forget that over the years the KESC has become a behemoth. The corporation is principally engaged in the generation, transmission and distribution of electrical energy to industrial, commercial, agricultural and residential consumers within the Karachi division, the industrial part of Thatta and Lasbela District. The total area administered by the management covers more than 6,000 square kilometres and has a customer base of two million predominantly urban customers while the total population in its licensed area is estimated to be around 14 million.

Every year the losses continue to pile up, primarily due to the high levels of transmission and distribution and occasional unprofessional conduct. The 2001 annual report of the KESC, two years after the army took over, estimated transmission and distribution losses to be around 38 per cent — a pretty high figure by any standards. The age and condition of the asset base varies considerably. The commissioning dates of generation plants range from the 1960s to the late 1990s, and the transmission system has a similar age profile.

Although the KESC has been progressively replacing the older transmission infrastructure, much of the distribution system is old and requires replacement. Power generation also has its inbuilt problems. Though the KESC’s own generation is relatively inexpensive, the corporation has been and is still dependent on importing power from independent power producers and the national grid. That there is scope for improving the financial performance of the corporation can not be denied. But this would require a determined effort, considerable capital investment and all-round improvements in its technical and non-technical energy.

All said and done, privatising the KESC does not appear to have been a very happy experience. Last Wednesday, some political leaders and civil society organisations blamed privatisation for the current crisis. And the treasury benches came under fire in the Senate last Friday as PPP Senator Raza Rabbani lashed out at the sale of precious national assets like the Steel Mill and KESC to foreigners, and the refusal of the chairman to allow the issue to be discussed by the house standing committee.

That was when the nation came to know that the country was being pushed to purchase electricity from American firms in Central Asian states. Is this the real motive behind privatisation? However, the phrase that really nicked the nerve was uttered by Abbas Kumaili of the MQM who stated that “the people of Karachi should be rid of the incompetence of the foreign KESC management.”

The company that Abbas Kumaili is referring to, and which is responsible for managing the behemoth, happens to be one of the most efficiently run units in the country, and the managing director happens to belong to a nation whose work ethic, industrial efficiency, creativity, vision, output, scholarship and all round proficiency have been the envy of the world. The chief executive did say things would be very different after September. However, if he is really pushed by the politicians to achieve maximum output he would have to postpone the implementation of his plans until the start of winter. If nothing else the complaints would start to dry up.

From June 20, 2001, when President Tarar ceased to hold office, General Pervez Musharraf was administered oath as president of Pakistan and continues to hold that position.

On November 16, 2002, he relinquished office as Chief Executive and was given a fresh oath as President. This term was sanctified by the substituted Article 41(7) of the Constitution per CEO No. 24 of 2002 above mentioned. A proviso having been added to it by the Seventeenth Amendment that clause, as of now, reads as under:-

41(7) The Chief Executive of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (a) shall relinquish the office of Chief Executive on such day as he may determine in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan of the 12 May, 2000; and

(b) having received the democratic mandate to serve the nation as President of Pakistan for a period of five years shall, on relinquishing the office of the Chief Executive, notwithstanding anything contained in this Article or Article 43 or any other provision of the Constitution or any other law for the time being in force, assume the office of President of Pakistan forthwith and shall hold office for a term of five years under the Constitution, and Article 44 and other provisions of the Constitution shall apply accordingly: Provided that paragraph (d) of Clause (1) of Article 63 shall become operative on and from the 31st day of December, 2003.

President Pervez Musharraf, accordingly, is the second Article 41(7) President and his term of office is governed by Article 41(3) introduced by PO No. 14 of 1985 to cater to a dispensation accorded to General Ziaul Haque. Article 41(3) is as follows:-

“The President to be elected after the expiration of the term specified in Clause (7) shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of the Second Schedule by the members of an Electoral College consisting of (a) the members of both Houses; and (b) the members of the Provincial Assemblies.”

The above-said clauses (7) and (3) of Article 41 of the Constitution, standing together, suggest that the process of election or even re-election, of “The President to be elected after the expiration of the term specified in clause (7)” can be initiated or come afoot only after the term of the Article 41(7) President has expired and not before the efflux of the said term. Because, in some cases as here, the team of the president and that of the assemblies may expire in close proximity to each other, the presidential election needing to await the re-emergence of the electoral college, the proviso to Article 44, which as below would come into play:-

“Provided that the President shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continued to hold office until his successor enters upon his office.”

Since the current assemblies may prove to be more convenient as forming the nucleus of the electoral college in question, two arguments are being advanced:

Firstly, the president may resign before the efflux of his tenure, (the Senate chairman taking over as acting president under Article 49 of the Constitution) and seek re-election from the current electoral college. This does not seem to be permissible because, ordinarily, one who resigns an office can hardly be expected to run again for that office.

Further, a resignation of such a character, having moral implications, may operate as a fraud on the statute, affecting its sustainability. This needs to be viewed in the background that, following upon the induction of the present assemblies, the defection clause in the Constitution (Article 63-A) was held in abeyance and once the susceptible amongst the legislators stood charmed, the clause was revived.

The exercise can be equated to suspending the Pakistan Penal Code for a period, making it possible for all and sundry to do what they may and once the free for all has served its purpose to reintroduce the suspended Code. In the same context, a resignation does not seem to be allowable to an Article 41(7) President because of the bar contained in Article 41(3) for the cognate election being postulated “after the expiration of the term specified in clause (7)”.

Alternatively, if a sooner termination of the term under Article 41(7) comes about the acting president under Article 49 may have to hold over till the efflux of the unexpired term.

Secondly, for re-election through the current Electoral College reliance is being placed on Article 41 (4)(5) which ran thus:

“(4) Election to the office of President shall be held not earlier than sixty days and not later than thirty days before the expiration of the term of the President in office:

Provided that, if the election cannot be held within the period aforesaid because the National Assembly is dissolved, it shall be held within thirty days of the general election to the Assembly.

(5) An election to fill a vacancy in the office of President shall be held not later than thirty days from the occurrence of the vacancy: Provided that, if the election cannot be held within the period aforesaid because the National Assembly is dissolved, it shall be held within thirty days of the general election to the Assembly.” This alternative, lately spelled out by the general himself, also does not provide a way out. Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 41, above reproduced, have remained on the statute book since 1973 whereas clauses (3) and (7) of the same Article are subsequent grafts. The said two 1973 survivors followed upon clause (3) of Article 41 which, at the time, provided for a limited electoral college in these words:-

“(3) The President shall be elected by the members of Parliament in Joint sitting in accordance with the provisions of the Second Schedule”.

It is for this reason that clauses (4) & (5) of Article 41 take cognizance only of the National Assembly standing dissolved at the time a presidential election is slated to be held and remain conspicuously silent as to the possibility of one or more of the provincial assemblies being similarly out of currency. Even so, Article 41 (4) (5) would be attracted but only when the first election, following upon the induction under Article 41(7), has been held and is out of the way.

For that election, however, Article 41 (3), as it currently stands, is a complete code and the expiration of the presidential term under Article 41(7) is a sine qua non. To put it more simply, and relatedly, a term under Article 41(7) must expire before any step can be taken in terms of Article 41 (3) and till the successor enters upon his office the Article 41(7) President, in terms of Article 44 shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office.

Having dilated upon the applicable constitutional provisions, fact remains that the issue needs to be resolved on the touch-stone of political desirability and even of political morality.

The writer is a former Chief Justice of the Sindh High Court and Judge of the Pakistan Supreme Court.