ACCORDING to a news report, more than 100 earthquake survivors clashed with the police recently in Mujohi, a village near Muzaffarabad, over new rules regarding compensation for quake-damaged homes, leaving a few people injured. Similar protests in several other quake-affected towns and cities were also held, and in Muzaffarabad, about 400 people staged a peaceful demonstration, denouncing the government and the earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction agency Erra.

The protesters said that they were demonstrating because the government had announced compensation only for those whose land had been registered in their names. The government has announced it will give Rs 75,000 to people whose homes were partially damaged in the quake, and Rs 175,000 to those whose homes were destroyed.

Six months and six billion dollars after the earthquake and the massive response, both national and international, to the plight of about 3.5 million survivors, the ineptitude of the government’s top-down relief and reconstruction strategy is coming home to roost. Thousands of victims, in whose name it has amassed a fortune half the size of its exchange reserves, are at their wits end about what to do after their virtually forced return from the temporary shelters where they were lodged in the aftermath of the earthquake.

As many as 30,000 families have not yet received even the initial payment of Rs 25,000 which was promised right at the beginning of the relief operation. The government has made the procedure of receiving compensation for rebuilding houses increasingly complex and full of hassles. The resulting unrest reported in the media against the government in general and Erra in particular needs to be seen in this context.

There are several reasons why the government’s plans are not working and why it is facing a mini-revolt in the quake-hit zone. Some of these include the lack of transparency in the measures undertaken, frequent changes in arbitrary decisions, poor coordination among the various actors involved in relief and rehabilitation, inadequate dissemination of information to affected people and their almost total exclusion from any process of consultation and involvement in rehabilitation.

The government’s fundamental mistake in dealing with the Oct 8 disaster was to arrogate almost entirely to itself and principally to its military arm the overall responsibility for the management of relief and rehabilitation, without involving parliament and the civilian administration at the local and provincial levels in decision-making. While no one could begrudge the military for its lead role in rescue and relief efforts, which were highly commendable, the management and coordination as well as handling of large-scale humanitarian problems should have been recognised as not being its forte.

Regrettably, the government gave precedence to its own narrow political objective of survival and asserting the supremacy of the military over the goal of ensuring the welfare and rehabilitation of the survivors through efficient and effective planning. Although the UN and other international organisations and NGOs were involved almost from the beginning and the public groundswell for the earthquake victims became a veritable emotional tsunami, the government failed to galvanise this unprecedented human and financial accumulation of resources, which was capable of providing much more than emergency relief and longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. It could have been used, for example, to change the national mind-set about dealing with the larger problems of alleviating poverty and eliminating vainglorious lifestyles

The government appointed two senior army generals as the custodians of the relief and reconstruction programmes, with vast plenipotentiary powers exercised without adequate consultation with parliament or other state agencies nor with donor agencies and NGOs. The general who was assigned to head the reconstruction agency, Erra, gave up his job two months before the reconstruction phase was to begin, without any explanation, although there were rumours of his non-cooperative behaviour towards donors. He was succeeded by a civilian, with strong political links with the regime and considerable business interests, although an army general continues to be in effective control of Erra. The Federal Relief Commission has been wound up and its residual activities have been assigned to a “transition relief cell” which has been merged with ERRA.

The mechanisms of coordination among various organisations participating in the relief effort were generally very weak and often resulted in the duplication and wastage of resources. While the UN and other agencies set up a system of cluster meetings in about 10 different substantive areas, such as protection, shelter and livelihoods, chaired by one or more agencies in Islamabad, Mansehra, Bagh and Muzaffarabad, the purpose was generally to collect and disseminate information rather than task-sharing.

There was generally a high rate of turnover of participants, which made these meetings formalistic with little effort to formulate new positions or persuade the government to adopt feasible and equitable strategies. More than 400 foreign experts were involved in the monitoring and implementation of relief programmes, an excessively large number, yet full advantage of their expertise was not taken. Perceptions of foreign and domestic experts often differed widely and resulted in contradictory positions.

Among the controversial issues that have surfaced in the last six months and which have greatly agitated the earthquake-affected population, four need to be highlighted.

The first issue refers to the way in which relief supplies were accessed by the weak and the vulnerable and the residents of remote and inaccessible areas. This was indeed a difficult task in which the role of the army and NGOs was extremely critical and helpful. However, the lack of mobilisation of local governments and representatives of earthquake affectees made the process rather bureaucratic and insensitive to the needs of different groups, often leading to the sidelining of the weaker ones among them.

The second issue concerns the running of the relief camps in locations away from the affectees’ homes. The population of these camps, estimated to be 300,000 in March, were run by NGOs with minimum help from the government. The NGOs in turn depended on their donors, both domestic and international, for the extent and quality of services provided which varied greatly among them. No common minimum standard seem to have been observed in the facilities provided.

A common feature of many of these camps was the lack of attention to providing assistance or incentive to adult males to find employment near the camps. In some cases, employed adults left jobs to look after their families in the camps. This often led to the “dependency syndrome”.

Third, the management of the process of return of earthquake refugees from the relief camps to their places of origin needs comment. This was perhaps one of the major areas where sensitivity on the part of the government was conspicuous by its absence. The government did not carefully think through the process of return and had vainly hoped that the internally displaced persons would return to their homes, like migrant birds, with the onset of spring.

Moreover, the sleight of hand used to close the camps without consulting or taking into account the will of the inmates or offering them alternatives deserves to be strongly censured. A UN document on the framework of return of the displaced clearly lays down the manner in which the views of these people especially of women and children, would be integrated “in the planning and management of the return or resettlement process”, ensuring that “the principle of voluntary, safe and dignified return” enjoined by international protocols were observed. Unfortunately, these stipulations were totally breached and neither the UN nor the NGOs raised any voice against their violations.

Fourth, what must also be scrutinised are the modalities of compensation for deaths, injuries, destruction and damage of the houses in the earthquake affected areas and the monthly compensation for households in the transitional phase. The difficulties experienced by the recipients have been amply aired by the media. They require intensive investigations. The question of the adequacy of the amounts and the modality of payments also needs to be reviewed.

Finally, there is a total lack of a credible game plan, which needs to be evolved in consultation with the affected people, civil society, think tanks and domestic and international experts.

If the government remains as insensitive on these issues as it has been and continues not to respond positively to the needs of the affected, then it will only have itself to blame for creating yet another trouble spot in the country, one that could stir a countrywide movement against the current military-led regime and intensify demands for early elections and regime change.

Email: m_naseem@hotmail.com