‘The Kashmiris are bitten by the nationalist bug.’ Observed Dr. Mubashir Hasan in his presentation at a recent seminar in Karachi. The paradox about the Kashmir imbroglio has been that while it is, in every sense, an issue impacting the future of the land and the people of Kashmir, it remains a dispute between India and Pakistan.

The Kashmiris have now joined the issue in a big way to upset the correlation of forces from a simple India-Pakistan equation to a complex India-Pakistan-Kashmiri conundrum.

Now who exactly are the Kashmiris? The state stands divided into five distinct regions viz. Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas on our side, Jammu, Ladakh and the Valley on the other. The apple of discord, however, remains the Valley with its overwhelming (nearly eight million) Muslim population — the hard core of Kashmiriat — accounting for more than half the combined population of the two parts of the state.

The status of Kashmir as a conglomerate of different zones rather than a single entity was first notified by Sir Owen Dixon in his 1950 plan. Accordingly, he recommended zonal plebiscites to let the Kashmiris decide whether to join India or Pakistan. The question of independence did not figure even remotely.

It is to be noted that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) excluded the Kashmiris as a party to the dispute to be settled finally between the two rivals. The Kashmiris would wait in the wings until called into play to exercise their right of self-determination to opt for India or Pakistan.

Until the start of their own freedom fight or jihad, the Kashmiris left it practically to India and Pakistan to have it out between themselves by all the means at their command, military, diplomatic, political and moral. They stayed conspicuously, absent from the dispute except as a debating partner.

Their active and militant involvement in the dispute coincided fortuitously, even uncannily somewhat, with the end of the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad. The Afghan mujahideen joined the ranks of the Kashmiri insurgents to escalate their low intensity, episodic conflict with the occupation forces to the level of a full-scale liberation war.

The intensive jihadi phase of the guerrilla encounters went on incrementally for the next well over a decade (Circa 1991-2001).

It reached its high watermark in 1999 in the aftermath of the Kargil episode. Kargil, a reckless military venture, surprised both Pakistan and India. Pakistan because of the operation losing steam half way through and India for its abysmal intelligence failure until the Pakistan-backed Kashmiri insurgents had penetrated deep inside its part of Kashmir.

Rudely awakened Indians reacted vigorously to throw the Kashmiri irregulars out at a heavy cost in men and materials.

Kargil also acted as a spoiler of the peace process initiated by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart, Mian Nawaz Sharif in February 1999.

The Kargil episode ended with the intruders withdrawing in disarray after President Clinton intervened following an emergency meeting with Mr Nawaz Sharif in Washington (July 4, 1999).

The US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in November of that year transformed the entire geostrategic landscape of South Asia. Thereafter, Pakistan withdrew much of its support to the Kashmiri freedom fighters.

In December that year India and Pakistan came face to face once again in what turned out to be the longest and potentially the most dangerous stand-off (December 2001-July 2002). India ordered its forces deployed along the Pakistan border to return to their peace time locations.

President Musharraf responded promptly to India’s peace initiative to pave the way for the initiation of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) and a composite dialogue to discuss all issues from Jammu and Kashmir to trade and commerce to create the framework for enduring peace.

The current peace process may have little to show for it as yet by way of getting any closer to a full and final settlement of the Kashmir issue. However, the mere fact that it endures, is by itself, unique in the troubled history of India-Pakistan dialogue.

The intrusion of ‘the bug of Kashmiri nationalism’ together with the jihadi forces, and the overt US involvement in South Asian affairs with a strong pro-Indian tilt give the issue a sudden, unforeseen turn.

India and Pakistan remain no longer the only parties to the dispute in the context of the emerging correlation of forces roughly as follows:

One, the Kashmiris as a whole, divided along territorial, political, religious and ethnic lines; two, the jihadis pursuing their own agenda, three, the armies of India and Pakistan, especially the latter and finally the United States with its global perceptions and priorities.

The Kashmiris of the Indian-held Kashmir would appear to be more divided today since the start of their liberation struggle under the banner of the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference. The lines previously drawn among the various known political groups, mainly Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Yasin Malik Amanullah Khan), J&K Democratic Freedom Party (Shabbir Shah) and the vertical split within the ranks of the APHS itself into the mainstream Ansari Group led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and the breakaway Syed Ali Gilani’s, hardly promise a consensual approach to the final settlement of the dispute. Each would be pulling its weight in support of its own partisan/ personal agenda.

Mirwaiz Umar Farooq’s proposed ‘United States of Jammu and Kashmir’ still remains more of a vision than a clearly-stated proposition. Whether it would be a federal/ confederal arrangement or a loose conglomerate of the five clearly demarcated areas (viz Azad Kashmir, Northern areas, Jammu, Ladakh and the Valley) without a border, is yet to be spelt out.

Yasin Malik, Amanullah Khan and Shabbir Shah would settle for nothing less than an independent Kashmir while Ali Gilani supports accession to Pakistan. As regards the jihadi groups, while they have retired back stage, they vow to continue with their armed struggle with or without Pakistanis support. Chief of the United Jihad Council Syed Salahuddin and Hafiz Mohammad Saeed of Jamaat-ul-Dawah’(Lashkar-i-Taiba formerly) remain committed to the liberation war until the occupation forces vacate the state.

As for the Pakistan armed forces, Kashmir remains essentially a security and territorial issue more than a purely ideological and humanitarian issue. No solution would satisfy them without addressing their security concerns.

— The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army.