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| April 9, 2006 | Sunday | Rabi-ul-Awwal 10, 1427 |
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Dialogue in tribal areas
Turmoil in Nepal
Imperatives of good governance
PAKISTAN faced two very unfortunate and nerve-wrecking situations recently. On the first occasion, parts of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir were devastated by an earthquake of unprecedented severity about six months ago. More than 80,000 people lost their lives and a large number were injured. The loss of infrastructure, and public and private property was colossal.
ONE hopes India will respond positively — as Pakistan has done — to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s proposal for a moratorium on nuclear weapons production in South Asia. Reacting to Ms Rice’s statement, the foreign office spokesperson said on Friday that Pakistan had already made a proposal for “a strategic restraint regime”, and Ms Rice’s proposal could be discussed within the framework of the Pakistani proposal. The moratorium issue needs to be seen against the background of the US-India nuclear deal, which is awaiting congressional approval, and the appeal by Mr Richard Boucher, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, to Pakistan and India to work out a mutual understanding “to build confidence in both conventional and nuclear arms”.
In his speech to a business club in New Delhi, Mr Boucher touched upon a variety of topics ranging from trade and travel to the nuclear and Kashmir issues. But the irony of what Mr Boucher said should not be lost on us. It was India which introduced nuclear weapons in the subcontinent by carrying out a test at Pokhran as far back as in 1974, and now a US official is asking that very country to take the lead in stabilising nuclear and defence relations with its neighbours. Two and a half decades later, India again flexed its nuclear muscles, in 1998, leaving no option for Pakistan but to respond in kind. India is now going to get preferential treatment from America through a nuclear agreement that Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz the other day termed “selective and discriminatory”.
In spite of the difficulties in the way, there is every possibility that the US Congress will approve of the deal, and Washington will prevail upon the 45-member nuclear suppliers’ group to amend its rules to accommodate the US-India accord. Even Mr Mohammad ElBradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency will have to acquiesce in a non-NPT signatory getting the kind of assistance India will get from the US. While the deal stipulates the categorisation of India’s nuclear facilities into civilian and non-civilian and places 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards, the most disturbing feature of the accord is the supply of nuclear fissile material by America to a country that is deficient in uranium production. The supply of fissile material will enable India to divert its own uranium supplies into unsafeguarded facilities devoted to weapons production. That is the reason why Pakistan believes that the Indo-American nuclear accord has serious implications for South Asia’s security environment.
In spite of having considerable hydro-electric power potential, Pakistan can meet the widening gap in the power sector only through nuclear energy. In the past, it has received modest nuclear help from friendly countries, including Belgium and the US. China, too, has helped build a power plant (Chashma I), while Chashma II is under construction. Islamabad thus rightly expects America to extend the same kind of nuclear cooperation to it that it is giving to India. A “package approach” that deals with the two countries on the same footing will help advance the cause of confidence-building in both conventional and nuclear arms and quicken the process of normalisation. In its present shape, the deal will enable India to stockpile nuclear arms, thus encouraging an arms race in South Asia contrary to Ms Rice’s idea of a moratorium on nuclear arms production. A moratorium in South Asia may in time lead to a worldwide halt to the manufacture and stocking of nuclear weapons and eventually universal nuclear disarmament, which must remain the objective.
MR Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao has suggested that the Political Parties’ Act be extended to the tribal areas of Pakistan. The interior minister has also admitted that the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal already has its presence in these areas while the parties that are excluded are the liberal ones. This anomaly, combined with the tribal structure of the agencies, their economic underdevelopment and their exclusion from the political, social and economic mainstream of the country, have helped create the insurgency we have on hand today in regions such as Waziristan. True, a major factor in the happenings in Waziristan is the infiltration of a large number of foreign militants with pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda leanings. But had the political conditions on our side of the Durand Line been stable, it would not have been difficult to counter the violence unleashed by the outsiders, especially when 78,000 soldiers of the Pakistan Army have been inducted into the region to root out terrorism. The fact is that the militants enjoy the support of a substantial section of the local population. That enables the outsiders to mingle with the people living in these areas and remain sheltered and protected there.
The need of the hour is a political dialogue. The question is with whom should the government be talking. In the absence of legally recognised political parties and institutions of governance, Islamabad will have to talk to the local leadership at the grassroots level to root out militancy and stabilise the region. Since the leadership is basically tribal and heavily influenced by the MMA, the government should be prepared for a strong anti-American and pro-Islamist line with plenty of sympathy for the militants, local or foreign. But a combination of the carrot and the stick might make it possible to wean away the rational and the sensible among the tribal leaders to Pakistan’s point of view. A major cause for the tribal areas’ confused approach in such matters is not just their exclusion from the national mainstream but also for their lack of interaction with modern political processes. Had these regions been in touch with political parties of all shades, they would have developed a different outlook over the years.
THE twin menace of rebel operations and the monarchy’s stranglehold on democratic politics in Nepal has created a situation that is fast leading to anarchy in that country. Ever since he became the ruler in 2001, King Gyanendra has consistently acted to weaken Nepal’s fledgling democracy. In February 2005, he dismissed his cabinet and assumed direct powers, ostensibly to strengthen his hand against the rebel Maoists, although critics see it as a move to pave the way for the restoration of absolute monarchy. With a surge in anti-Gyanendra feelings among common citizens, Nepal’s turmoil and violence have intensified. The opposition parties, which have a loose agreement with the rebels on the restoration of democracy and the dynamics of a future political dispensation, have called for a series of strikes that the king has sought to suppress by imposing curfew and shooting at protesters. Meanwhile, hundreds of activists and politicians were arrested on the eve of a strike planned for Saturday which has now been deferred.
It is difficult to foresee a victory for King Gyanendra, especially since the rebels already control almost 40 per cent of Nepalese territory and have at least temporary support from mainstream political forces that are arrayed against the monarchy. Besides, there is enormous international pressure on King Gyanendra to hold elections. Even if he intends to do so in 2007, as he has promised, there are other concerns that must be addressed on an urgent basis, including the attack on civil liberties and the curbs on freedom of the press. The judiciary has also been reined in as security forces, taking their cue from the palace, do not carry out judicial instructions for the release of detainees. If the king does not abandon his autocratic ways and if the Maoists continue to benefit from the current disarray, the monarchy might well be on its way out.
On the second, more recent occasion, demonstrations against the publication of blasphemous cartoons in some European countries created a very serious law and order problem that engulfed most of the country, particularly Islamabad, Lahore and Peshawar. Scenes of vandalism, looting, destruction of property and arson involving vehicles, banks and multinational fast food outlets created such images of lawlessness on the streets as seldom seen before.
What was common on both these occasions was the visible failure of the administrative machinery to handle the situation. In the aftermath of the earthquake, there was an inexplicable delay in the response of the administration to the crisis. In Islamabad, where only one multistoreyed building had collapsed, the entire administration of the capital city, including the chief commissioner, Islamabad, chairman CDA and the minister for interior were being shown by television cameras standing near the debris, at a loss as to how to launch the rescue operation. What was being done in Azad Kashmir and the worst-hit Hazara division in the NWFP was not visible.
It was only after President Musharraf ordered the army to move in that rescue operations commenced. Does this imply that in similar situations in the future, mobilisation will take place only on the orders from the top? If so, this is not good governance. In the past, in such a situation, the local units of the army would have moved in on requisition by the deputy commissioner.
On February 14, Lahore and later Islamabad and Peshawar were left at the mercy of the demonstrators and vandalising mobs. The law-enforcement agencies were hardly visible on the streets where acts of vandalism and arson were taking place. One gathers from newspaper reports that intelligence agencies had indicated a massive turnout at the demonstrations. Why was the show of strength by law enforcement agencies missing? The SSP Lahore, who urged sanity, was exposed to the wrath of the violent mob.
In Peshawar, the demonstrators were on the rampage throughout the day. In Islamabad even teenage children in their school uniforms could not be stopped from hooliganism for better part of the day. What had gone amiss? The simple answer is that a well-conceived and well-designed administrative structure, responsive to crises and emergencies, and having stood the test of the time, has been scrapped and replaced by a hodge-podge hierarchy in which no one knows who is responsible for what.
The administrative structure that was left behind by the British has been labelled ad nauseam as the legacy of the colonial rule, put in place to safeguard the interests of the Raj. To an extent no one can deny this. But no one can also deny the fact that this system was well geared to ensure justice and the maintenance of law and order.
In a typical settled district, the administrative structure comprised of the district and sessions judge, the deputy commissioner and the superintendent of police. The district judge was the district head of civil and criminal litigation. The deputy commissioner was the eyes and ears of the government and a linchpin of the system. As head of the magistracy he was responsible for administering local laws. More importantly, he was responsible for the maintenance of law and order and ensuring protection of life and public and private property.
The superintendent of police assisted him to enforce the writ of government and to maintain peace and security. He was subservient to the district magistrate but was autonomous insofar as the administration of the police force was concerned. The triangle worked well, with each understanding his role and responsibility and with a well-defined and well-understood chain of command in place. It also had an inbuilt system of checks and balances.
Unfortunately, this finely-tuned system was scrapped with the ostensible objective of devolving power at the local level. What has emerged, however, is a highly confusing system with new nomenclatures and a nebulous chain of command. A cardinal principle of administration is that responsibility is commensurate with authority. Now the office of deputy commissioner has been abolished and in his place we have a nazim, the DCO, the DPO and a plethora of EDOs, DDOs and God knows what.
In place of the well-understood nomenclatures like SP and DIG (well known even to the illiterate rural populace) we have DPO’s investigation, DPO’s operation, capital city police officers and regional additional inspectors-general. The new chain of command has very seriously diluted authority.
For instance, what is the role of the zila nazim in maintaining law and order? The remarks, of the district nazim, Lahore, in the midst of lawlessness on February 14 “where is the police?” speaks volumes about the disarray. In the past, whenever a law and order situation was foreseen, the superintendent of police would chalk out an elaborate contingency plan. The minutest details of police deployment were spelt out. Police and the magistracy would coordinate at the police station, subdivisions and district level. The station house officer or the DSP and their counterpart magistrate would move together and remain present at the possible trouble spots. The deputy commissioner and the superintendent police would oversee the contingency plan and monitor the situation.
Now the district nazim, who has stepped into the shoes of the deputy commissioner is a silent spectator in such situations. It is not clear if the SP is subservient to the nazim and if he is to what extent. The magistracy has been placed under the district and sessions judge (who has no role in the maintenance of law and order). Thus the police is left to handle crisis situations.
The police is generally viewed as the muscle of the government, with use of brute force as its only instrument to control lawlessness. It is also looked upon as a party in the conflict rather than as an agent for crisis resolution.
The non-partisan, conciliatory role of the deputy commissioner and the magistracy is now lacking. This is why in any law and order situation, meaningful dialogue between the mob and administration is missing. One could cite the example of the notorious Sialkot jail incident where some prisoners, involved in heinous crimes, took the district and session judge and civil judges hostages.
On such occasions, engaging the culprits in protracted negotiations is the strategy. There was no one to perform this role. The nazim was reportedly at a loss as to how to deal with such a situation. No one should blame him for this as he is not trained to deal with such emergencies. The situation was left to the police. In the shoot-out that followed quite a few judges were killed. There was no magistrate to assist the police. The magistracy provide a buffer to the police force. It had sobering effect on the crowd.
On February 14, the SSP Lahore was insulted and beaten up by the crowd as he tried to pacify them. While one would appreciate his earnestness, it was evident that he was not cut out for the role. Rather than being critical of the police one should sympathize with them for having been denied the support of the magistracy, and this is notwithstanding the fact that to a great extent this situation has been brought about by some senior serving and retired police officers who were working as consultants in the National Reconstruction Bureau.
Secondly, the district magistrate, appreciative of the nature of the role of the police officers, would protect them wherever he would feel that any act of omission or commission by them was in good faith and in the public interest. Now with that protective shield gone, one sees more and more police officers being summoned by the High Court judges.
With the population becoming more and more aggressive, assertive and volatile because of complex socio-economic, political, ethnic, sectarian, and demographic factors it is not prudent to leave the maintenance of law and order to the police force or the nazims. There is a need to have an executive magistracy to assist the district administration in enforcing local laws and in maintaining peace and order. The executive magistracy should be placed under the DCO who should be responsible for maintenance of law and order and the handling natural calamities and emergencies. Only professionals with the necessary wherewithal and training can handle such situations.
The writer is a former chief secretary, Punjab.