Dialogue of the deaf?

EVEN though pessimists have already called it “a dialogue of the deaf”, the very fact that Iran and America are said to be exploring the possibility of talks on the Iraqi situation shows the two sides’ desire to open a channel of communication. While President George Bush says the talks will enable his country to tell Tehran “what is right or wrong in their activities” in Iraq, Iran’s supreme spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has said Tehran will not accept American “bullying” and will use the occasion to “make them understand Iran’s views”. Essentially, it is the situation in Iraq that will bring the two countries to the negotiating table, for neither side wants Iraq to descend into a civil war — a possibility that is real. Iran’s political and religion hold on Iraq is obvious. The US thinks Iran is encouraging sectarianism by giving military support to Shia militants with a view to creating what America calls a “Shia-dominated Iraq”. To Tehran, the very presence of American troops on Iraqi soil is the root cause of the problem. It also believes that it is the US which is encouraging sectarianism in Iraq and says the attacks on Shia places of worship — like the one on a mosque in Samarra on Feb 22 — are the work of “the Zionist forces in Iraq”. In a speech recently, Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president and now chairman of the Expediency Council, said the Americans want to “weaken the solidarity gradually shaping in the world of Islam”.

A major question here is the scope of talks. Will they remain confined to Iraq or would the two sides want to tackle the wider aspect of their relationship? US officials have said they will not talk about Iran’s nuclear programme. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said the talks will be about “a narrow set of security issues” in Iraq. However, it would be impossible for the two delegations not to be drawn into a larger discussion of their antagonistic relationship. The talks are to take place against the background of heightened tensions between the two. Not a day passes without some Israeli or American official threatening Iran with military action over its nuclear programme. The Security Council’s non-binding resolution of March 29 gives Iran a month in which to abandon its uranium enrichment programme. But on Thursday, John Bolton, America’s UN envoy, threatened Iran with more sanctions and “other alternatives” to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. For its part, Tehran has shown no signs of wavering and tested a series of missiles to show its defiance. All in all, the talks deserve to be welcomed, for they could enable the two sides to keep their confrontation in check and work out a modus vivendi. Failure to negotiate will obviously be happy news for the neocons in Washington and the Islamic hardliners in Iran, for they will feel their hawkish lines justified. To help end violence in Iraq and in the overall interest of peace in the region, it is essential that Iran and America should talk. It is of course absurd to think that between them the Americans and Iranians can ensure peace in Iraq, for the key to peace in that country rests essentially with the Iraqi leadership. However, the mere fact that Washington and Tehran may be ready to engage in a dialogue holds out hopes that at a later stage they can broaden the agenda and put an end to their confrontation.

Incredible

IT IS quite incredible that the authorities, so quick in blocking or outlawing some TV channels, should be unable to control the plague of illegal FM radio stations in the NWFP that are stirring up factional hatred and religiosity. On March 28, the war between two clerics running such illegal stations had led to a fierce clash in which 25 people were killed. Subsequently, the installation of one of the clerics was dismantled by paramilitary forces. Now that same religious figure has re-started his station from another part of the Landi Kotal agency in the name of ‘Lashkar-i-Islam’, describing its mission as cleansing the area of ‘terrorists and anti-social elements’ (partly, and strangely, echoing the official line). The administration has tried to get the issue settled through jirgas, but has failed to deter the clerics. An elementary FM station is easy to set up, and some of the mullahs have now found this a convenient means of spreading their fiery rhetoric. FM stations may be easy to establish, but at least in the Frontier they are proving difficult to control or demolish. This reflects poorly on the NWFP government and the political officers concerned. It is said that the writ of the government must be established in restive areas. How can this happen if the government cannot even crackdown on illegal radio stations?

The FM episode underlines the anomaly marking the status of the tribal regions, which are both within the law and outside it. It may not be possible to suddenly change the system, but in half a century and more since independence we should at least have tried to incorporate those regions into the rest of the country. We haven’t because successive rulers have found it politically convenient to continue with the status quo. The induction of a cleric-led government in the NWFP has complicated the situation since it considers the preachers as ideological allies. How is the mess to be sorted out?

Questions about PS sale

THE privatization of Pakistan Steel has become controversial with many questions being raised by its employees, independent economists and market analysts. These parties are contending that the country’s only integrated steel mill, one that was doing well for the past three years, has been sold at a very low price. In fact, the price is believed to be so low that even the value of the 4,546 acres of land that has been sold along with the plant, is said to be higher than the total amount of Rs 21.68 billion pledged by the successful bidders. Other questions relate to the exact figure for the reference price for PS set by the government, and the identities of the consultant for the deal and those who valued its assets.

Furthermore, it has been reported that the acting privatization minister — who was given the portfolio a couple of days prior to the bidding — issued the letter of approval without waiting for the cabinet committee on privatization to first examine the bid, which is standard procedure. Answering these questions will considerably enhance the transparency surrounding the deal or otherwise people will get the impression that either the government is in a great hurry to sell off its strategic companies or that such public assets are being sold at a throwaway price for other considerations. Transparency, especially in a country with a bad track record of such deals, is the key to a successful privatization programme and one that inspires public confidence. Holding a bidding process in front of live television does not necessarily mean that everything is transparent since selling a public company such as PS involves a long, complicated process and each stage needs to be transparent. The commission should make its reference price for the sale known and explain the big difference in valuation of the land that has been sold with the mill.

In the wake of the Bush visit

IN the aftermath of President George Bush’s visit, too much importance is being attached to inanities, while among the important points only the nuclear deal with India has monopolised comments, giving an impression as if all that matters to Pakistan is America’s nuclear policy towards the two South Asian neighbours.

This is a gross distortion of the multifaceted relationship between the two countries. Mr Shahid Amin’s article (March 20) serves to correct the imbalance that has characterized comments on the outcome of the visit.

President Bush’s overnight stay in Pakistan, his “stealth” arrival in Islamabad and the departure in similar fashion have drawn more flak than they deserved. What some analysts fail to note is that the mode of arrival in Islamabad and the short stay there reflected security compulsions, not policy. The difference between a night’s stay in Pakistan and two nights’ in India can hardly be cited as solid geopolitical evidence of America’s preferences in a complex web of relationships between Pakistan, America and India.

Developments in these relationships cannot be divorced from Pakistan and India’s equally vital ties with other countries and regional groupings. In the case of Pakistan this includes China (which is a source of extraordinary strength for Pakistan) and in the case of India, not only China but also its warm ties with the nations of the Middle East — areas where India has so far avoided flaunting its big-power ambitions. In the long run, as that country gains greater economic and military strength, these ambitions will become more pronounced, will be hard to suppress and invite widespread suspicions. These realities must be examined against the all-too-simplistic theory that the US wants to bolster India as a counter-weight to China. This theory also assumes that India will play ball.

Indeed, it would flout all known rules of realpolitik if we were to assume that one power wants to build up another power, least of all a potential rival and hegemonic state whose people have been raised on the Hindu people’s lost glory, to a point where the latter becomes a Frankenstein monster. A powerful state may like to help a friendly country fill gaps in its economic and military structures if it fits into the former’s scheme of things, but this help cannot be unlimited and taken to a point where it proves counterproductive and has the potential to harm the patron’s interests. Washington has not allowed a de-Nazified and democratised Nato partner Germany to develop nuclear weapons even 61 years after the end of World War II. As for Japan, its constitution renounces war in perpetuity.

During the Cold War, India — while being an active member of the non-aligned movement — never failed to obtain the maximum economic and military aid from the West. The first big dose of aid came in the wake of the China-India war in the winter of 1962, and India began equipping new mountain divisions — presumably for a future Chinese thrust which never came. Later, western aid, including assistance in nuclear energy, became a regular feature of the relationship between India and the US-led West. But, it is important to note that, in spite of accepting western aid, New Delhi did not toe the American line in world politics. In fact, as late as 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, India made it absolutely clear where its sympathy lay.

The relationship between the West and India during the Cold War is a complex phenomenon and does not readily suggest a pattern which we could apply to what is happening now. But one message emerges clear: India will make the maximum use of this opportunity to ingratiate itself with the US (and the EU), acquire sophisticated nuclear technology, extract maximum economic benefits and consolidate a solid economic and political relationship with the West. This will help India talk to China with a greater degree of confidence. But to assume that India will take on China at America’s biddings is to have a poor opinion of Indian policymakers. India’s interests are best served by having a friendly China and not a hostile one breathing down its neck.

India’s interests in the Himalayas are limited. It watches the situation in Nepal very carefully, and it will jealously guard its protectorate over Bhutan. It also would like to crush the separatists in the north-east and bully Bangladesh. Beyond that it has no geopolitical interests in the Himalayas, because there is little room for a territorial grab. Nehru conceded Tibet to China in the ‘50s, and Beijing wrote off its claim on Sikkim only in recent years. As for Aksai-Chin, Beijing is not even prepared to open the issue, and India knows it. A Chinese-built highway now connects Tibet with Sinkiang through Aksai-Chin, and Beijing is not going to give up this strategic advantage. Thus, when China speaks of resolving its border dispute with India, it means only the north-eastern border areas. Except for record’s sake, India has all but written off Aksai-Chin.

For reasons of history, India has greater geopolitical interests to its west, for despite its size and a much larger defence outfit, it has displayed an extraordinary Pakistan-phobia — far worse than Islamabad’s India-centric approach. It has always attempted to have an anti-Pakistan set-up in Kabul (the process is in evidence today), and it has a special interest in Iran. Sooner or later, America is bound to discover where Indias real priorities lie, and for that reason the nascent strategic partnership is unlikely to assume the frightening dimensions most Pakistani commentators fear.

America has vital interests in the region where Pakistan is located and where, as history has shown, Pakistan has pulled America’s chestnuts out of the fire more than once. The strategic, multi-faceted relationship and the cooperation in defence fields which the joint statement issued in Islamabad speak of cannot be dismissed merely as a one-time expression included in the communique as a mere formality. The statement needs to be juxtaposed with statements which President Bush made back home before and after his Pakistan visit. They are a greater indication of America’s policy towards Pakistan than the difference which a night’s or two nights’ stay would seem to make.

Today, terrorism defines American foreign policy; that was not the case yesterday. Already, one can detect deviations. The war in Iraq and the nuclear deal with India have nothing to do with terrorism. The idea here is to emphasise the point that it is wrong to consider America’s warmth for India as an immutable principle of American foreign policy on the same level as Washington’s commitment to Israel. Pakistan, the Muslim world’s only nuclear power, has advantages of its own. There are more military-to-military contacts between the US and Pakistan than between it and India, and there is no indication yet that Washington wants to bolster India’s military might. That the nuclear deal may enable India to stockpile nuclear weapons only to gather dust does not necessarily mean a qualitative increase in the firepower of India’s war machine in a non-conventional battle scenario.

States in the triangle of trouble with its tip in Afghanistan and base as Iran’s southern coastline and both sides of the Straits of Hormuz are unlikely to enter an era of calm and fruitful cooperation with the region and the world in the foreseeable future. This triangle could create trouble even further north in Central Asia where Russian, Chinese and American interests collide. Under no circumstances, would the US like to see its existing alliance relationship weaken in an area where Washington is utterly friendless and where India has no influence whatsoever.

Aware of its unpopularity in the Muslim world, America is desperate to seek new allies. This means that, while cherishing its new-found love for India, the US would hate to lose an existing Muslim ally like Pakistan in a very turbulent region.

The existing relationship between Washington and Islamabad may appear demeaning to some — Pakistan being asked to “do its frontline duty” or, worse still, Pakistan doing “America’s bidding” — but that is only one way of looking at it. Pakistan and America have a lot in common: their interests synchronise in the region, and Islamabad would be well-advised not to commit hara-kiri by failing to grasp the broad picture because of domestic pressures or the US-India nuclear deal.

Pakistan must remain firm in its commitment to the war on terror. The task is difficult for two reasons: one is the domestic opposition in certain sections which, representing a minority view, have a power base in the social and state structures; two, a section of the media in the US and some congressional lobbies are intensely hostile to Pakistan and very keen that this country become part of an extended “axis of evil”. This lobby wants Pakistan to “do more”, questions Islamabad’s commitment to the war on terror and calls for ditching Pakistan. This propaganda in turn helps the religious lobby here, which cites this pressure as proof of America’s “betrayal” of Pakistan and demands ending our American alliance.

No country felt more disappointed than India by Pakistan’s “yes” to President Bush’s well-known phone call to Islamabad. Let us recall that the then Indian foreign minister, Mr Jaswant Singh, offered bases to the US for an attack of Afghanistan even before Pakistan signalled its readiness to go along with the US. Pakistan’s correct response to the 9/11 tragedy ended its isolation, with an economic and military aid spin-off that need not be repeated.

Any renunciation of Pakistan’s commitment to the war on terror will be the happiest news for India in years and produce exactly the kind of results which some congressional lobbies and sections of the American media want. If the “yes” to America in the wake of 9/11 was a mistake — which it was not — a reversal of the process could turn out to be a disaster.