IN the aftermath of President George Bush’s visit, too much importance is being attached to inanities, while among the important points only the nuclear deal with India has monopolised comments, giving an impression as if all that matters to Pakistan is America’s nuclear policy towards the two South Asian neighbours.

This is a gross distortion of the multifaceted relationship between the two countries. Mr Shahid Amin’s article (March 20) serves to correct the imbalance that has characterized comments on the outcome of the visit.

President Bush’s overnight stay in Pakistan, his “stealth” arrival in Islamabad and the departure in similar fashion have drawn more flak than they deserved. What some analysts fail to note is that the mode of arrival in Islamabad and the short stay there reflected security compulsions, not policy. The difference between a night’s stay in Pakistan and two nights’ in India can hardly be cited as solid geopolitical evidence of America’s preferences in a complex web of relationships between Pakistan, America and India.

Developments in these relationships cannot be divorced from Pakistan and India’s equally vital ties with other countries and regional groupings. In the case of Pakistan this includes China (which is a source of extraordinary strength for Pakistan) and in the case of India, not only China but also its warm ties with the nations of the Middle East — areas where India has so far avoided flaunting its big-power ambitions. In the long run, as that country gains greater economic and military strength, these ambitions will become more pronounced, will be hard to suppress and invite widespread suspicions. These realities must be examined against the all-too-simplistic theory that the US wants to bolster India as a counter-weight to China. This theory also assumes that India will play ball.

Indeed, it would flout all known rules of realpolitik if we were to assume that one power wants to build up another power, least of all a potential rival and hegemonic state whose people have been raised on the Hindu people’s lost glory, to a point where the latter becomes a Frankenstein monster. A powerful state may like to help a friendly country fill gaps in its economic and military structures if it fits into the former’s scheme of things, but this help cannot be unlimited and taken to a point where it proves counterproductive and has the potential to harm the patron’s interests. Washington has not allowed a de-Nazified and democratised Nato partner Germany to develop nuclear weapons even 61 years after the end of World War II. As for Japan, its constitution renounces war in perpetuity.

During the Cold War, India — while being an active member of the non-aligned movement — never failed to obtain the maximum economic and military aid from the West. The first big dose of aid came in the wake of the China-India war in the winter of 1962, and India began equipping new mountain divisions — presumably for a future Chinese thrust which never came. Later, western aid, including assistance in nuclear energy, became a regular feature of the relationship between India and the US-led West. But, it is important to note that, in spite of accepting western aid, New Delhi did not toe the American line in world politics. In fact, as late as 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, India made it absolutely clear where its sympathy lay.

The relationship between the West and India during the Cold War is a complex phenomenon and does not readily suggest a pattern which we could apply to what is happening now. But one message emerges clear: India will make the maximum use of this opportunity to ingratiate itself with the US (and the EU), acquire sophisticated nuclear technology, extract maximum economic benefits and consolidate a solid economic and political relationship with the West. This will help India talk to China with a greater degree of confidence. But to assume that India will take on China at America’s biddings is to have a poor opinion of Indian policymakers. India’s interests are best served by having a friendly China and not a hostile one breathing down its neck.

India’s interests in the Himalayas are limited. It watches the situation in Nepal very carefully, and it will jealously guard its protectorate over Bhutan. It also would like to crush the separatists in the north-east and bully Bangladesh. Beyond that it has no geopolitical interests in the Himalayas, because there is little room for a territorial grab. Nehru conceded Tibet to China in the ‘50s, and Beijing wrote off its claim on Sikkim only in recent years. As for Aksai-Chin, Beijing is not even prepared to open the issue, and India knows it. A Chinese-built highway now connects Tibet with Sinkiang through Aksai-Chin, and Beijing is not going to give up this strategic advantage. Thus, when China speaks of resolving its border dispute with India, it means only the north-eastern border areas. Except for record’s sake, India has all but written off Aksai-Chin.

For reasons of history, India has greater geopolitical interests to its west, for despite its size and a much larger defence outfit, it has displayed an extraordinary Pakistan-phobia — far worse than Islamabad’s India-centric approach. It has always attempted to have an anti-Pakistan set-up in Kabul (the process is in evidence today), and it has a special interest in Iran. Sooner or later, America is bound to discover where Indias real priorities lie, and for that reason the nascent strategic partnership is unlikely to assume the frightening dimensions most Pakistani commentators fear.

America has vital interests in the region where Pakistan is located and where, as history has shown, Pakistan has pulled America’s chestnuts out of the fire more than once. The strategic, multi-faceted relationship and the cooperation in defence fields which the joint statement issued in Islamabad speak of cannot be dismissed merely as a one-time expression included in the communique as a mere formality. The statement needs to be juxtaposed with statements which President Bush made back home before and after his Pakistan visit. They are a greater indication of America’s policy towards Pakistan than the difference which a night’s or two nights’ stay would seem to make.

Today, terrorism defines American foreign policy; that was not the case yesterday. Already, one can detect deviations. The war in Iraq and the nuclear deal with India have nothing to do with terrorism. The idea here is to emphasise the point that it is wrong to consider America’s warmth for India as an immutable principle of American foreign policy on the same level as Washington’s commitment to Israel. Pakistan, the Muslim world’s only nuclear power, has advantages of its own. There are more military-to-military contacts between the US and Pakistan than between it and India, and there is no indication yet that Washington wants to bolster India’s military might. That the nuclear deal may enable India to stockpile nuclear weapons only to gather dust does not necessarily mean a qualitative increase in the firepower of India’s war machine in a non-conventional battle scenario.

States in the triangle of trouble with its tip in Afghanistan and base as Iran’s southern coastline and both sides of the Straits of Hormuz are unlikely to enter an era of calm and fruitful cooperation with the region and the world in the foreseeable future. This triangle could create trouble even further north in Central Asia where Russian, Chinese and American interests collide. Under no circumstances, would the US like to see its existing alliance relationship weaken in an area where Washington is utterly friendless and where India has no influence whatsoever.

Aware of its unpopularity in the Muslim world, America is desperate to seek new allies. This means that, while cherishing its new-found love for India, the US would hate to lose an existing Muslim ally like Pakistan in a very turbulent region.

The existing relationship between Washington and Islamabad may appear demeaning to some — Pakistan being asked to “do its frontline duty” or, worse still, Pakistan doing “America’s bidding” — but that is only one way of looking at it. Pakistan and America have a lot in common: their interests synchronise in the region, and Islamabad would be well-advised not to commit hara-kiri by failing to grasp the broad picture because of domestic pressures or the US-India nuclear deal.

Pakistan must remain firm in its commitment to the war on terror. The task is difficult for two reasons: one is the domestic opposition in certain sections which, representing a minority view, have a power base in the social and state structures; two, a section of the media in the US and some congressional lobbies are intensely hostile to Pakistan and very keen that this country become part of an extended “axis of evil”. This lobby wants Pakistan to “do more”, questions Islamabad’s commitment to the war on terror and calls for ditching Pakistan. This propaganda in turn helps the religious lobby here, which cites this pressure as proof of America’s “betrayal” of Pakistan and demands ending our American alliance.

No country felt more disappointed than India by Pakistan’s “yes” to President Bush’s well-known phone call to Islamabad. Let us recall that the then Indian foreign minister, Mr Jaswant Singh, offered bases to the US for an attack of Afghanistan even before Pakistan signalled its readiness to go along with the US. Pakistan’s correct response to the 9/11 tragedy ended its isolation, with an economic and military aid spin-off that need not be repeated.

Any renunciation of Pakistan’s commitment to the war on terror will be the happiest news for India in years and produce exactly the kind of results which some congressional lobbies and sections of the American media want. If the “yes” to America in the wake of 9/11 was a mistake — which it was not — a reversal of the process could turn out to be a disaster.