Changing dynamics of South Asia
By Fateh M. Chaudhri
THE recent whirlwind trip of President George W. Bush to South Asia was a sort of political tsunami after which the region has not been the same. To define the paradigm shift in the emerging relationships between the US and India compared with those existing between the US and Pakistan, the word ‘de-hyphenated’ has acquired extensive use in post-visit reviews and comments. Several assessments have dwelt on different aspects of the visit.
Despite extensive reviews both in India and Pakistan as well as abroad, it is still unclear as to how the changing dynamics of South Asia will affect the political, economic and security scenarios in the region in the years ahead.
There is general consensus that the most significant outcome of the March 2006 visit was the culmination of the Indo-US nuclear deal on which the discussions started in July, 2005 and the signing took place during President Bush’s visit to the subcontinent. There are various dimensions of the deal but in my judgment one insightful perspective enveloping the deal is provided in the recently issued US government’s document entitled, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’.
According to several reviews of that document, it is clear that the United States is unlikely to pursue unilateralism and will be moving towards the strengthening of bilateral or regional alliances with some attention given to effective multilateral efforts. This thinking follows the basic principle of international relations, namely, there is no permanent friend or permanent adversary, and the only thing that is permanent is the country’s self-interest.
Given India’s largest functional democracy and its status as a spectacular economic power of our time, it is quite natural for the United States to want to forge a strong alliance and mutually attractive deals with India. However, this American desire is not new. America would have developed friendly relations and economic links with India right after partition in 1948 but Prime Minister Nehru opted for friendship with Soviet Union. The first opportunity to oblige India came when the Sino-India war broke out in 1962 and the US offered military and economic aid to India despite Pakistan’s protests. When the Soviet Union collapsed and ideological changes swept the world, America started an intensive effort to forge relations with India. At the same time, India also realized that developing close relations with the United States was in its self-interest.
We must also recall that the collapse of the Soviet Union spurred the opening up of the Indian economy when Dr Manmohan Singh was the finance minister. Even at that time Indian leaders knew that a liberalized Indian economy would be a magnet for US business interests and their close cooperation with the US would help them overcome possible impediments to the economic sector especially with aspect to the supply of energy that is the lifeline of a fast growing economy. The mutual interests of India and the US coincided very firmly.
Let us now look at the nuclear deal itself. In India, it has been hailed as an unprecedented, historic deal. In Pakistan it is termed as an unfair deal that would lead to destabilization and an arms race thereby jeopardizing security paradigms. It is quite clear that the deal is not an event but a process that would change South Asian dynamics in the foreseeable future.
The following remarks in the joint statement at the conclusion of talks between the US president and the Indian prime Minister will guide the process related to the nuclear deal. “For energy security and clear environment, (the two sides) welcomed the successful completion of discussions in India’s separation plans and look forward to the full implementation of the commitment in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation. This historic accomplishment will permit our countries to move forward towards our common objective of full civil nuclear cooperation between India and the United States and between India and the International Community as a whole”.
Under this agreement, India will open up 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors to IAEA inspection but will not allow IAEA access to the remaining eight reactors dedicated to the production of nuclear weapons. In return, the US will provide nuclear technology and fuel to India. The same deal was not offered to Pakistan. Some reviewers have called these arrangements unfair and lopsided.
Pakistan government is understandably uneasy and trying its best to convince the US authorities to revisit the nuclear deal not only because Pakistan is a non-Nato ally but also because: 1) its energy needs are as pressing as those of India and its non-renewable energy sources are limited; 2) preferential treatment to India would trigger an expensive race for civil nuclear technology acquisition and jeopardize socio-economic development, thereby threatening the country’s capacity to fight poverty and terrorism; 3) the deal undermines the NPT because India is a non-NPT country; 4) other countries like Australia, Russia and France have already become interested in selling nuclear reactors to India; 5) the deal does not conform to the US Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group guidelines, and 6) since the enrichment uranium inputs are fungible, India could divert its own fuel resources to nuclear weapons, thereby accentuating tensions and possibly derailing the peace process with Pakistan.
The US authorities have defended the nuclear deal with India on the grounds that: 1) the two countries have different needs and the Indian goal of nuclear power generation in total energy supply by 2030 would be about 20 per cent while Pakistan’s is only five per cent; 2) the US would not allow the NPT to unravel; 3) the deal would bring 65 per cent of India’s nuclear facilities under international safeguards up from 19 per cent at present; and 4) the US was doing many things with Pakistan that it was not doing with India. For example, Pakistan’s taking over command of the Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF), duty-free entry of products from industrial zones in the quake-hit areas in the US.
Prior to the effective enforcement of the deal, the US Congress will have to make the necessary amendments to its previously authorized act and the NSG must also be approached to bless the deal. However, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei has already welcomed the deal saying it would boost non-proliferation efforts (without saying, how) and would satisfy India’s growing needs for energy including technology and fuel. The US administration has sent its officials to Vienna to mobilize support for the Indo-US nuclear deal and has launched a forceful campaign at home to convince the US Congress of the desirability and merits of the case, urging it to approve it.
“India can be trusted”, is the major theme in the campaign. But critics and sceptics wonder if India can be trusted. They argue that India was one of the first beneficiaries of the “Atom for Peace” programme launched in 1953 offering access to civil use of nuclear technology in exchange for a pledge that the technology will not be applied for weapon purposes but that India did not keep its promise and exploded a nuclear device in 1974.
In the landmark Indo-US nuclear deal, reactions of two important countries — China and Russia — count very much. China has made it clear that the deal should follow the rules of the non-proliferation regime. Russia has been aligned with India for decades. It would not want to leave India in the US camp. Of late, Russia is getting closer to China even though the two were once moving in their own circles and spheres of influence. What would come out of these shifting alliances is still an open question.
Given the passionate “wooing” of India by the major powers of the day, Pakistan needs to revisit its survival strategy. Per force, it would have to rely heavily on indigenous resources not only for nuclear civil technology but also for harnessing alternative sources of energy. More importantly Pakistan needs to put its own house in order and achieve a well-galvanized federation with smaller provinces becoming active players in the nation’s advancement. It needs to build its economy on a sound basis with low inflation and high jobs growth and benefits accruing to all segments of the society, not just the upper 20 per cent. Besides crucial problems have to be addressed. These include poor quality education, inadequate human resource development, high levels of poverty, a high population growth rate, poor governance and judicial system, serious environmental concerns, an aging infrastructure, a looming water crisis, etc.
It must live in peace with its neighbours using thoughtful public diplomacy and nudging the peace process forward. The daunting tasks ahead would require extraordinary efforts and resources. If we fail to rise up to the challenges, then the commanding heights in the league of nations will remain beyond our reach.
The writer is a former adviser to the World Bank.


