The politics of Iran’s N-programme
By Javid Husain
IRAN’S nuclear programme has been the focus of intense international scrutiny and controversy for more than three years now.
While it is true that some of the technical aspects of this programme bank yet to be clarified to the satisfaction of the International Atomic Energy Agency resulting in its referral to the UN Security Council, it has also undeniably been sucked into the vortex of regional and international politics making it more and more difficult to consider the issues relevant to it objectively. Consequently, the task of reaching a negotiated settlement has been made that much more difficult.
The central issue relates to the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme: whereas Iran continues to claim that its nuclear programme is peaceful in character and consistent with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the western countries led by the United States allege that it is geared to the development of nuclear weapons forbidden by the NPT. Further, the Western countries and some other members of the international community want Iran to forego uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities, which are allowed under the NPT, because they can be used both for peaceful purposes and for the development of nuclear weapons. Iran so far has refused to accept this demand on a permanent basis although it suspended such activities in November 2004 as a voluntary confidence building measure.
Iran, following its rejection of the EU package of economic and political incentives on August 5, 2005, resumed uranium conversion activities by feeding uranium ore into its uranium conversion facility at Isfahan.
On September 24, 2005, the IAEA board of governors adopted a resolution by 22 votes in favour, one against and 12 abstentions accusing Iran of non-compliance with its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, calling upon it to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities, and determining that Iran’s nuclear programme had given rise to questions which were within the competence of the UN Security Council.
Iran rejected the resolution as unacceptable and illegal, and in January this year it resumed uranium enrichment at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz consisting of a cascade of 20 centrifuges.
The IAEA board of governors adopted another resolution on February 4, repeating its earlier demands but also asking the IAEA director-general to report the matter to the UN Security Council on an interim basis pending the board’s next meeting. Thus the stage was set for consideration of the matter by the Security Council in case of lack of progress. Since no progress could be made on the matter at the next meeting of the board held in the beginning of March, the matter was again referred to the Security Council on March 8.
There is no doubt that terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs are currently the most important items on the agenda of the international community. The western countries are particularly concerned about the danger of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of states espousing extremist views.
However, political factors have vitiated the atmosphere and queered the pitch for a negotiated settlement of the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme. The top most among them is the hostility between the US and Iran rooted in historical grievances against each other and strong policy differences on such issues as terrorism and the Middle East peace process.
President Bush branded Iran as part of the ‘axis of evil’ in the beginning of 2002 even before the controversy about Iran’s nuclear programme started. The new US National Security Strategy report released on March 16, 2006, considers Iran as the main enemy. Besides the nuclear issue, it lists other US concerns regarding Iran as follows: “The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom.”
Iran’s complaints against the US, on the other hand, include charges of gross interference in Iran’s internal affairs going back to the overthrow of the government of Prime Minister Mossadegh in the 1950s, freezing of Iranian assets and imposition of economic sanctions against Iran.
The situation at the national level both in Iran and the US does not augur well for a negotiated settlement concerning Iran’s nuclear programme. In Iran, the hardliners have assumed control of the executive and legislative branches of the government besides other powerful organs of the state. It will be very difficult for them to make the painful concessions necessary for a negotiated settlement of the issue. The conditions are not much better in the US where the neoconservatives wedded to extremist views on foreign policy issues still seem to be in the driving seat despite the setbacks in Iraq and the steep decline in President Bush’s popularity ratings.
The recent statements by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran questioning Israel’s right to exist and the authenticity of the Holocaust have served to aggravate the US hostility towards Iran and harden the western position in general and the US position in particular on the Iranian nuclear programme.
The ball is now in the court of the UN Security Council which is currently considering a draft presidential statement submitted by Britain and France. The draft basically repeats the demands of the IAEA board of governors by calling upon Iran to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, take steps to build confidence in the peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and ratify the additional protocol which allows snap inspections of nuclear facilities. It also requires the director-general of the IAEA to report to the Security Council in 14 days on Iran’s compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board.
For obvious strategic and economic reasons, Russia and China, during the discussions in the UN Security Council, have expressed their opposition to sanctions and insisted that the IAEA should keep the lead role in handling the issue. They have also called for a longer time-frame for a report by the IAEA director-general.
According to the latest reports, some progress has been made in reaching on agreement in the Security Council on the draft presidential statement. The consensus seems to be developing towards a report by the IAEA director-general to be submitted simultaneously both to the IAEA board of governors and the UN Security Council after about four to six weeks.
From a purely technical point of view, the issue does not pose insurmountable difficulties. One option could be to allow Iran to carry out enrichment and reprocessing activities under especially stringent IAEA safeguards which would make it impossible for Iran to divert its nuclear programme to non-peaceful purposes. It is quite clear that the western countries are totally opposed to this option even though some of them have been engaged in enrichment and reprocessing activities themselves without calling into question the peaceful character of their nuclear programmes.
The other option is the one offered by the Russian proposal under which uranium enrichment would be carried out in Russia perhaps as a joint Iranian-Russian venture and low enriched uranium would be supplied to Iran as fuel for its nuclear power reactors. Iran seems to be inching towards this proposal as its talks with the Russian authorities indicate. However, both as a matter of its legal right under the NPT and perhaps also for the purpose of face-saving, it would like to carry out on its soil uranium enrichment R&D work involving a small number of centrifuges while foregoing for a specified period industrial scale uranium enrichment.
Washington is adding to the pressure on Iran by not ruling out the possibility of a military strike on Iran. Separately but surely in coordination with the US, Israel has also been hinting at the possibility of such a military strike. But the military option is not cost-free for Washington as it would inflame and destabilize the Middle East, intensify anti-US feelings and weaken pro-US governments in the Islamic world, aggravate US difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, worsen the problem of “terrorism” targeted against US interests, and result in skyrocketing oil prices with devastating consequences for the world economy. Further, the success of such a military strike is not guaranteed because of the dispersal of Iranian nuclear facilities many of which are underground.
An article in the Washington Post of March 13, reported that the Bush administration had shifted to a more robust policy aimed at the Iranian government. Richard N. Haas, former head of the policy planning wing of the state department during Bush’s first term, was quoted as having said that “the upper hand (in the Bush administration) is with those who are pushing regime change (in Iran) rather than those advocating more diplomacy.”
The US administration has also launched a $75 million programme to “advance democracy in Iran” which are code words for bringing about a change of regime in Iran. The state department has created an Iran desk which will consist of 10 officials working full time on Iran as against only two last year. It is also strengthening its embassies in the vicinity of Iran to watch Tehran. Clearly, the US seems to be gearing up for significant activities involving Iran.
Iran is confronted by a policy dilemma of the highest order. It faces painful choices concerning its nuclear programme. One would like to hope that in the face of this challenge, its leadership will respond with sagacity and sobriety as would be expected from a nation known for its wisdom and culture. Above all, it should not commit the fallacy of treating rhetoric as a substitute for policy, or become preoccupied with form rather than substance of the issue. It should certainly not walk into the trap that the US has laid for it by showing a judicious combination of flexibility and firmness in the negotiations on its nuclear programme.
The writer is a former ambassador to Iran.
E-mail: javid_husain@yahoo.com


