WASHINGTON, March 15: The Bush administration’s argument that anticipated geo-strategic gains of the Indo-US nuclear deal outweigh prospective proliferation risks is wrong, argues a prominent scholar, Michael Krepon.
Mr Krepon, President Emeritus and co-founder of Washington’s Henry L. Stimson Centre, says that the key assumptions on which this argument is based ‘are wildly optimistic’.
In a paper released on Wednesday, Mr Krepon critically examines the administration’s new India policy as spelled out in an opinion piece by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in the Washington Post earlier this week and describes the US offer of nuclear cooperation to India as a ‘bold gamble’.
While agreeing with the policy of promoting greater cooperation with India in other fields, he questions whether cooperation in nuclear energy should have been added to this mix.
Closely examining the assumption that the benefits of the geo-strategic partnership will be profound and will extend to sensitive areas of considerable US interest, Mr Krepon points out: “New Delhi has not sloughed off three centuries of colonialism in order to do Washington’s bidding. The Indian government has gained considerable advantages by bandwagoning with the Bush administration, but it will continue to make decisions based on its own national security interests.”
Mr Krepon believes that the long-term energy requirements that prompted New Delhi to seek Washington’s help in the nuclear deal will also require India to remain on good terms with Iran. “Similarly, those anticipating a united front between Washington and New Delhi against Beijing are likely to be disappointed,” he adds.
Reviewing the Bush administration’s argument that the deal is worth doing because it brings New Delhi into the ‘non-proliferation mainstream’, Mr Krepon adds: “Regrettably, the deal struck under the deadline presented by the President’s trip to India accepts New Delhi’s place far outside the non-proliferation mainstream.”
He recalls that administration officials promised to Congress they would negotiate a deal in which the government of India would separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities in a way that would be credible and defensible on non-proliferation grounds. Such a deal, the administration promised, would require that few power reactors – especially those designed to facilitate production of large quantities of bomb-making material – be placed on the military list; that fast breeder reactors would be designated for civilian purposes; and that civilian facilities would be safeguarded in perpetuity.
Mr Krepon, however, believes that ‘on all of these core non-proliferation principles, the administration caved in to allow New Delhi to accommodate its bomb lobby.”
He notes: India’s fast breeder programs that now exist or are under construction will not be safeguarded. Eight reactors will not be placed under safeguards, including six knockoffs of a Canadian design well suited for bomb-making.
The practical effect of this agreement would be that if India tests a new and improved nuclear weapon design – as most close observers of New Delhi’s nuclear ambitions expect – then the United States would be obliged to continue supporting India’s nuclear ambitions.
Given the great lengths to which the administration has gone to strike this deal, it is reasonable to expect that it will go to similar lengths in the NSG to help India. If, in the process, the consensus rule in the NSG is weakened or busted in pursuit of this presumed geo-strategic partnership, the prediction of the NPT’s collapse would be on much firmer ground.
