Negative fallout of Bush’s visit
By Ghayoor Ahmed
THE government and the people of India are jubilant over the visit of the US President George W. Bush to New Delhi to seal a “new relationship” between the United States and India. India has certainly secured a stunning diplomatic success by concluding the nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. The people of Pakistan, who are the main loser of this agreement, are dismayed at the discriminatory American attitude towards them. Their lament is justified.
Under the agreement in question, the United States would end decades-long moratorium on sales of nuclear fuel and reactor components to India. In return, India has agreed to classify 14 of its 22 nuclear power reactors as civilian facilities. These reactors will be subject to international inspections or safeguards. However, the remaining eight reactors will remain as military facilities and will not be subject to inspections. India will also retain the right to develop future fast-breeder reactors for its military programme.
The Indo-US civil nuclear deal has stirred a controversy all over the world, including the United States itself. The main thrust of the criticism is that the deal has given India complete freedom not only to continue but also expand its fissile material for weapons which amounts to virtually accepting it as a nuclear weapons state. Robert Einhorn, senior analyst at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and an expert on nuclear proliferation, has said that as the deal does not restrict India’s ability to produce weapons-grade materials at its military reactors, it could make six to eight bombs a year.
Senator Edward Markey has termed the deal a “historic disaster” that undermines the security not only of the United States but of the rest of the world by setting one standard for India and another for any other nation that seeks to acquire nuclear weapons. He also said that “with one simple move President Bush has blown a hole in the nuclear rules that the entire world has been playing by”.
While criticizing the deal, China has said that New Delhi first renounce nuclear weapons and sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) before being allowed to acquire fuel for its reactors and nuclear technology.
One should not, however, be surprised at Washington’s present nuclear deal with New Delhi. It may be recalled that in 1961 the United States had contemplated assisting India in the field of nuclear energy with a view to promoting it as a counterweight to China, However, the idea of making India an “atomic ally” had to be shelved because of some problems in its implementation. China’s growing military might and its emergence as an economic giant is perceived by Washington and New Delhi as a potential threat to their long-term interest in the region and beyond.
The idea of a “strategic relationship” between the United States and India was thus motivated by this consideration. The current US law does not allow nuclear trade with countries, like India, that have not signed the NPT. It remains to be seen if President Bush with his dwindling popularity rating in his country would be able to get this law amended that would not only run counter to the US policy on non-proliferation but also weaken its credibility as one of the major exponents of the NPT.
Being a close ally of the US in its war on terrorism and also a de facto nuclear weapons state, Pakistan expected to receive the same treatment that was accorded to India. However, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, recently said that Pakistan could not expect the same treatment as was accorded to India. It is not in the place as India. President Bush also said the same thing in polite in these words: “Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories. So as we proceed forward, our strategy will take in effect those well known differences”.
The Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns, however, pointed out that there had been no proliferation problems with India. He also noted that while India developed its nuclear programme indigenously, Pakistan built its arsenal with western technology obtained through dubious means. These misperceptions about India’s strict adherence to nuclear non-proliferation and Pakistan’s involvement in the sordid proliferation activities need to be placed in perspective.
It is inconceivable that the United States, with its most advanced intelligence network around the world, was not aware that in July 1978, India had entered into an agreement with Libya to help it in acquiring nuclear capability. This agreement was terminated by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in August 1984. Subsequently, Libya concluded similar agreements, at different times, with the Soviet Union, Belgium, Argentina and Brazil.
As for Pakistan’s involvement in transferring nuclear technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea, it may be mentioned that during the 1970s when Libya evinced an interest in acquiring nuclear capability and approached Pakistan for that purpose, it expressed its inability to do so and the matter ended there. Similarly, following the fall of Shah Mohammad Raza Pehalvi of Iran in 1979, there was considerable uncertainty about the state of relationship between Pakistan and Iran.
As a matter of fact, the relations between them not only remained lukewarm all these years but also reached a new low after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989. It does not, therefore, stand to reason that in these circumstances Pakistan would have cooperated with Iran in the pursuit of its nuclear ambition. As for North Korea, owing to the peculiar nature of its nuclear infrastructure it does not seek external nuclear assistance.
It may also be pertinent to point out that a report by the United States prime anti-proliferation organization, the Institute for Science and International Security, published in the spring of 2005 edition of Washington Quarterly, has endorsed Islamabad’s claim that Dr. A. Q. Khan’s network that sold nuclear technology in the black market was a transnational organization and not a Pakistan set-up. This should also help in quelling the doubts about Pakistan’s alleged involvement in proliferation activities. One hardly needs to remind the Americans that the technology and material needed to manufacture nuclear weapons are freely available in the black market and can be acquired by the emerging nuclear states through the middlemen based in Western Europe and America.
Regrettably, the United States has the propensity for unilateral actions with little regard for consequences. Its nuclear deal with India, based on political expediency, is a case in point. Washington should not, however, blink the fact that its partisan policy in favour of India may not only have adverse implications for Pakistan but also its strategic interests in the region may also be adversely affected.
After the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and a standoff over Iran’s nuclear programme, the United States has already made itself very unpopular in the Muslim world. Its nuclear deal with India ignoring Pakistan’s security and energy concerns may further alienate the Muslim countries from America. The US policy-makers should, therefore, take a longer view and rectify the situation before the prevailing disillusionment in Pakistan becomes more acute.
President Pervez Musharraf’s advice to avoid an India-centric attitude in Pakistan does not fit into the country’s peculiar circumstances. It is not a cliche but a confirmed reality that, since its establishment in 1947, Pakistan’s main concern remains to safeguard its security and national integrity. A continuing conflict with India, which imposed three wars on Pakistan and played a crucial role in its dismemberment in 1971, necessitates that it should not lower its guard or preparedness counter the threat to its security. Needless to say, the nuclear deal between India and America has emerged as a serious threat to the country’s economy and security which it cannot simply overlook, or underrate.
The writer is a former ambassador.

