Bush visit: not just a stopover
By Iqbal Akhund
INVIDIOUS comparison is virtually built into an American president’s visit to the subcontinent. So it has been again, as President Bush has come and gone. As a foreign journalist put it, India got a hug, Pakistan a pat on the back.
I think a more meaningful comparison should be with the reluctant visit made by a censorious president Clinton not so long ago. The scolding Pakistan received on that occasion shows the long way Pakistan has come since General Musharraf’s prompt response to America’s ‘with us or against us’ ultimatum.
Of course the visit to Pakistan was (like all previous presidential visits) an appendix to the India visit. This does not necessarily detract from its importance. Media-wise, the India visit was perhaps over-sold, the Pakistan visit under-sold. That Bush came at all despite the existing turmoil in the country and the bomb attack in Karachi shows that he meant what he said about the importance of visiting Pakistan. However, in doing so he also defined it in a restrictive way: Pakistan was important to America because it was an ‘indispensable’ ally in the war against terror. As everyone knows the ‘indispensability’ lies in geography, rather than in a national commitment to this war. This was evident also in the president’s emphasis on the personal role of General Musharraf as a friend and ally.
In both countries, Bush spoke of developing a ‘strategic relationship’. These are diplomatic buzzwords that can be given whatever meaning one wishes to. In India they are taken as recognition of India’s global status and Americans have used the phrase for some years, in the words of an American commentator, to flatter India’s self-esteem. The nuclear agreement (and the offer to sell it hi-tech military equipment) is the first concrete step in America’s promise to help India achieve the status of a global power. America has sympathized with this Indian ambition since the time of John Kennedy who saw India as offering an alternative, democratic model of development in contrast to China. Bush praised India as a pluralistic democracy and free-market economy which fully merited American admiration, support and investment.
There is a hard-line view that sees China as threatening or challenging America’s status as the sole superpower. In this view, India can be a counterweight to the Chinese challenge. How exactly this might work for America is not clear. India is developing its relations with China and will be careful not to enter into overt rivalry with China (dooming thereby its chance for a permanent Security Council seat). On the other hand, allowing India to strengthen its nuclear weapons capacity is more likely to destabilize the military equilibrium in the region than to counter-balance China. An incidental consequence would be a closer alignment between Chinese and Pakistani policies in the region.
The nuclear agreement is also a concrete expression of the ‘dehyphenation’ of US policy in the subcontinent. This fancy word means that in pursuing a certain policy towards one country the United States will disregard the objections or interests of the other. This is by no means a new policy. The US paid no heed to Indian protestations in agreeing to arm Pakistan in the ‘50s. In the nuclear field, when India exploded its first nuclear device, the US ignored Pakistan’s efforts to restrain the Indian nuclear programme (e.g. by not supporting our nuclear free zone resolution) and instead put Pakistan under heavy pressure and sanctions.
Does the nuclear agreement threaten Pakistan’s security? General Musharraf says that there is nothing to worry about and no doubt in military terms the agreement does not put Pakistan at a disadvantage. As for energy, we are looking to China to help in the nuclear field and Bush promised help in the non-nuclear field. The US is committed to a fairly large amount as military aid over several years and has agreed to sell Pakistan F-16 aircraft. If Pakistan is not taking up the offer because of lack of money, so much the better. It was refreshing to hear the army chief say that Pakistan must cut its defence coat according to its cloth. Hitherto this logic had not prevailed in this field.
There was some media speculation, provoked by the minimalist airport reception, strained smiles, an edgy press conference, that all may not be well between Pakistan and the United States. This has been denied on both sides but was lent substance when Bush said that he had come to reassess General Musharraf’s commitment to the war against terror. While Bush said that he was satisfied on that score, testy exchanges between Musharraf and Afghan leaders appear to be taking the two countries back to the tensions of the early years.
The general’s irritation at Afghan carping is understandable for Pakistan has done a great deal against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, killed or captured their adherents in large numbers, and lost lives. But he admitted that slippages may have occurred in the implementation of agreed measures; considering the hold that the Taliban credo has on the minds of sections of our political, administrative and military establishment, it cannot be ruled out that the deficiency in implementation may be deliberate.
The real problem in Afghanistan is the war on terror itself. The Taliban/Al Qaeda ethos exists in the minds of men; it cannot be eradicated by cluster bombs and bunker-busters or only by killing or caging in Guantanamo its followers. Not many objective observers believe that the war in Afghanistan (or in Iraq) is being won or democracy is replacing the rule of warlords. As things stand both wars look like going on for a very long time and it is far from certain whether the United States has the political stamina to stick it out.
What will be the shape and substance of the Pakistan-US relationship after the US ceases to need Pakistan as an ally in Afghanistan? Past experience may justify some scepticism on this score but the past is the past and the future is in ones hands. The Islamabad joint statement outlines the basis of a strategic partnership between the two countries: ‘building a stable and sustainable democracy, promoting peace and security, stability, prosperity and democracy in South Asia and across the globe.’
In more specific terms the statement visualized a significant expansion of trade and investment, a role for Pakistan as a land bridge between the economic potentials of South Asia and Central Asia. Education, health, energy, science and technology were specified as fields for cooperation. In regard to all this the ball is in Pakistan’s court and it is mainly up to Pakistan to give substance to these promises. This is the only valid basis on which a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship can be sustained with the United States and not in seeking its support in our rivalry with India. This is indeed the thrust of the policy President Musharraf has been trying to follow since he found himself in the president’s seat six odd years ago. The fact that he has chosen to do so without the needed popular support is no doubt the reason why the policy is not making much headway.
The writer is a former ambassador.


