THE recent visit of President Bush to Afghanistan, India and Pakistan has brought home the point once again that India is and likely to remain for a long time the centrepiece of the US policy towards South Asia. In contrast, Pakistan, despite its services in the war on terror, seems to have lost its earlier pre-eminent position in US foreign policy calculations.

It was clear even before Bush left for South Asia that the fast developing US strategic partnership with India was deeper in substance and wider in scope than its relationship with Pakistan. The US declaration of March last year regarding its intention to help India become a “major world power in the 21st century”, the US-India defence pact of June 2005 and the Indo-US nuclear agreement of July 2005 had already laid down the foundation for their qualitatively upgraded strategic relationship. Bush’s visit to India was the logical culmination of the process set in motion by the two countries earlier and a confirmation of the decision taken by the US to develop special strategic ties with India in pursuance of its global agenda.

The fact that India is a well-established democracy is a source of great strength to its strategic ties with the US which under President Bush has made the promotion of democracy one of the salient features of its foreign policy. Their joint cooperation in combating nuclear proliferation and terrorism is another link bringing the two countries closer together as is the prospect of mutually beneficial cooperation in the fields of economics, commerce, defence and civil nuclear technology.

Above all, it is the prospect of the emergence of India as a major power in the 21st century and as a counterweight to China on its southern periphery that is acting like a magnet in attracting US policymakers towards India. Thus, the growing Indo-US strategic relationship neatly dovetails the strategic objectives of a global hegemon and an aspiring regional hegemon.

The two countries not only finalized the nuclear deal which would allow the transfer of US civil nuclear technology to India but also talked about their rapidly growing strategic partnership to meet the global challenges of the 21st century. They further agreed to support efforts for doubling bilateral trade in three years.

President Bush in a widely televised address in New Delhi on March 3 stated that in the 21st century India and the US were brothers in the cause of human liberty. He also expressed his appreciation of the role that India had played in strengthening democratic institutions in Afghanistan thus assigning to New Delhi the task of nurturing democracy in Afghanistan.

Washington’s strategic relationship with Pakistan lacks the strength of the one with India and is full of uncertainties regarding its future course. Our record as a democracy is patchy at best, punctuated as it is by military takeovers. The activities of the A.Q. Khan network have put in doubt our credentials on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, notwithstanding later steps taken by us to strengthen our command and control system.

The fact that President Bush and other US officials keep on asking Pakistan to do more in fighting terrorism and the reports about the presence of terrorist elements on our soil show that they regard Pakistan both as a problem and an asset in the war against terrorism. In Kabul, Bush assured President Karzai of continued US support and promised to take up with President Musharraf the issue of the infiltration of the Taliban into Afghanistan from Pakistan’s tribal areas. In Washington even before his departure for South Asia, he had spoken of his intention to take up with President Musharraf the issue of the alleged presence of terrorist training camps on our soil for infiltration into Indian-occupied Kashmir.

But above all, Pakistan unlike India is not part of any grand US strategic design for Asia. Pakistan’s value to the US is limited to its status as an ally in the war against terrorism, as a moderating force in the Islamic world, and as a country located on the crossroads of Central Asia, West Asia and South Asia and their potential trade and energy corridors.

If there was any doubt about the nature of Pakistan-US relationship, it was removed by President Bush who stressed during the joint press conference with President Musharraf in Islamabad that the strategic partnership between Pakistan and the US “begins with close cooperation in the war on terror.” Significantly, he also announced that “part of my mission today was to determine whether or not the president (Musharraf) is as committed as he has been to bringing these terrorists to justice, and he is. He understands the responsibility, and he understands the need to make sure our strategy is able to defeat the enemy.”

If this observation is analysed together with Bush’s earlier statements on the subject in Washington and Kabul, it becomes crystal clear that the US had developed misgivings about Pakistan’s commitment to fighting terrorism and that a large part of the talks between the two leaders was spent by Bush on seeking and obtaining assurances from President Musharraf about Pakistan’s continued commitment and cooperation in combating terrorism.

The Pakistan-US joint statement issued on March 4, after recalling that the US had designated Pakistan as a major non-Nato ally in 2004, talks about strengthening the “foundation for a strong, stable and enduring relationship”, cooperation in combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, expansion of bilateral ties in the economic, defence and social sectors, and the commencement of a strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the US. But on the issue of Kashmir, Bush stuck to his position stated earlier of not acting as a facilitator of the Pakistan-India peace process and merely urging both the countries to intensify their dialogue to resolve it.

As for the transfer of the US civil nuclear technology to Pakistan on the pattern of the Indo-US deal, President Bush ruled it out for the time being by saying that “Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was more blunt in pronouncing that it was “not the right time” for such a deal with Pakistan.

It was not very flattering for President Musharraf or for the nation to hear from a visiting president pointed references about the importance of democracy for Pakistan’s future and the need for open and honest elections in 2007. One does not hear such remarks from visiting dignitaries in India. The obvious conclusion that one can draw is that from the US point of view the functioning of democracy in Pakistan leaves a lot to be desired.

The strategic relationship between Pakistan and the US which has developed in the wake of the events of 9/11 is of critical importance to us. It has already ended our virtually pariah status in the international community from which we suffered before 9/11 primarily because of the October 1999 military coup in Pakistan (e.g. our membership of the Commonwealth was suspended) and our pro-Taliban policy which isolated us at regional and international levels. In addition, it has resulted in the US commitment to provide $3 billion in economic and military assistance over a period of five years besides the offer to sell advanced weapon systems including F-16 aircraft to Pakistan and a pledge of $510 million for earthquake relief and reconstruction over the next four years. It is, therefore, in our interest to develop Pakistan-US relations further but with dignity and self-respect, and keeping in view both its potential and limitations.

In a nutshell, the limitations of the current Pakistan-US relationship are three-fold: it is based mainly, if not exclusively, on Pakistan’s supporting role in the war against terrorism; it is fraught with uncertainty regarding its future course because of America’s past track record in handling its relations with Pakistan and our suspect credentials in the US view on issues such as democracy, nuclear non-proliferation and terrorism, and the fact that it is not part of the US grand strategic design for Asia. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, the Pakistan-US strategic relationship will continue to lack the scope and depth of the Indo-US strategic partnership.

Some of the answers to these problems are within our reach. For instance, it should be possible for us to develop sound democratic institutions within a political framework which enjoys national consensus, in which the final say on national affairs rests with the representatives of the people and in which each organ of the state plays a role strictly within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. Such unadulterated democracy will not only be in our own long-term national interest but will also serve to strengthen our relations with the US.

Similarly the struggle against extremism and terrorism serves our national interest besides being a source of strength to Pakistan-US relations. But we cannot win this fight if we keep on marginalizing the moderate political forces in the country.

There are other areas, however, in which we will have to accept the current realities and future developments as they occur. For instance, we cannot change the fact that the US has chosen India to act as a counterweight to China, a role that we neither have the capacity nor the desire to play.

Keeping in view the limitations of the existing Pakistan-US strategic partnership and the uncertainties about its future course, we must broaden our foreign policy options. It doesn’t need a genius to see that our strategic relationship with China will be the linchpin in the conceptual framework of our future foreign policy. It is, therefore, reassuring that President Musharraf undertook a state visit to China before receiving President Bush in Islamabad. The continuation of the peace process with India and the improvement of our relations with the Central Asian republics and Russia should be other important elements of our regional policy.

Besides the above, our relations with Iran and Afghanistan are of critical importance to us in the regional context. We cannot afford to be on less than friendly terms with these two brotherly neighbouring countries.

One cannot, therefore, over-emphasize the importance of removing the existing misunderstandings between Kabul and Islamabad. The least the two capitals can do is to stop conducting their relations through the media and instead use the quiet diplomatic channels for this purpose.

Similarly, both Pakistan and Iran, in their common interest, should take steps to repair the damage caused to their relationship because of the clash of their Afghan policies during the pre-9/11 period and build up mutual friendship and cooperation in various fields. Further, despite US reservations, we should seriously pursue the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project which is not only in the interest of the three countries but would also serve the cause of regional peace and stability.

The writer is a former ambassador. Email: javid_husain@yahoo.com

UNFORTUNATELY, both China and Pakistan have reacted adversely to the President George Bush-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh nuclear agreement. There is nothing against them except their own anti-India perception.

China has said that New Delhi should have been a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) which Beijing itself has not signed. Pakistan wants the same type of nuclear deal which America has rejected firmly.

The first remark that President General Pervez Musharraf made after the agreement announcement from New Delhi was that China was Pakistan’s “strategical partner.” Probably it is. But such phrases bring back memories of the Cold War. It would be dangerous to revive the same type of attitudes because they have cost humanity more than 50 years of sterile policies, mistrust and fear, apart from several bush wars and a colossal wasteful armament race.

Musharaff’s irritation is not understandable because Pakistan continues to be America’s ally, the point which Bush underlined while in India. He applauded Pakistan’s role in fighting terrorists although he wanted it to do more. Some 120 terrorists were killed on the Waziristan-Afghanistan border within a few hours as if Bush had only to order and Islamabad was ready to deliver.

Musharraf has himself said in a television interview that he was “satisfied” with the outcome of Bush’s visit and that Pakistan’s needs were different from India’s. Manmohan Singh’s statement before parliament should have allayed any fears. This being the case, why can’t Delhi, Islamabad and, for that matter, Beijing develop a common understanding independent of Washington? All three countries have a growth rate of more than eight per cent. All three have millions of poor who are getting poorer day by day. All three are natural partners because they have suffered at the hands of imperialism and have been able to free themselves on their own. Worlds like the “strategical alliance” suggest some sort of confrontation. Alliance against whom? All three have already waged wars against one another. India and China fought in 1962 and India and Pakistan in 1948, 1965 and 1971. What did they gain through hostilities? They had to sit across the table to sort out the same problems which had provoked them to go to war. They can decimate one another if anyone of them opts for war to settle the problems they face. There is no alternative to peace. They should have learnt the lesson by now.

Proximity between New Delhi and Washington does not mean alienation with Islamabad or Beijing. India and China are getting closer to each other and may well be signing an agreement on the border before long. Trade between the two countries is galloping and economic ties becoming stronger. New Delhi and Islamabad are processing confidence-building measures even though haltingly.

On China, I know we are discussing “substantial” points on how to draw a permanent border. India seems to be willing to accept China’s claim over the Aksai Chin which New Delhi did not concede when Beijing argued that the Aksai Chin was its only link between Sinkiang and the rest of China. What is stalling the agreement, I am told, is Beijing’s insistence to have a foothold in Arunachal. (Its assembly speaker was never given a visa by China.)

I only hope that the Indo-US nuclear deal does not cast its shadow on further talks between New Delhi and Beijing. Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee has already postponed his visit to China. Probably, Beijing wants to know how far New Delhi has bought America’s thesis that India can be a counterweight to China. This is the thesis which the US administration proposes to sell to Congress to get approval for the nuclear deal.

The counterweight theory is, however, far from the minds of India’s policy makers. But, ideologically, both are so apart that their interests may collide in South Asia some day. And the two “giants”, as Jawaharlal Nehru predicted, were bound to clash. America’s reading too is on these lines. But that clash has already taken place. Whether it can recur or not depends both on New Delhi and Beijing.

I am worried about the fallout on India-Pakistan relations. The two are scheduled to meet later this month for talks. However, India’s equation with America will be at the back of Pakistan’s mind. Islamabad has been Washington’s close ally since the Cold War days. There was a cooling off period but since 9/11, Pakistan has been America’s dependable friend. Washington has been able to reach many Islamic countries through Islamabad. Why should it worry about America?

Pakistan is sore that it did not get the same nuclear status as India has. But Islamabad knew beforehand that Washington was only using the deal to reach New Delhi. American economic interests coincide with India’s needs. It is a big market opening up. New Delhi may want to go slow but Washington’s pressure will be relentless, particularly when both reactors and fuel for civil nuclear energy are going to come from America.

Many years, ago a Pakistan foreign secretary told me that the way to reach Beijing was through Islamabad. Pakistan would do better if it were to go to New York through New Delhi. But India would first need to see that the training camps for the jihadis are dismantled and the ISI plan on infiltration is jettisoned as an option. Cross-border terrorism, even Bush was convinced while in Delhi, remained one of the planks of Pakistan’s policy towards India.

Pakistan’s main concern must be Kashmir. America did not mention it even in the joint statement from Islamabad. Bush referred to it while replying to a question by a Pakistani journalist. Bush repeated the earlier stand that it was for the two countries to sort out the Kashmir problem, with America’s assistance, if required.

For the religious parties the reply was such a disappointment that Qazi Hussain of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal said Musharraf’s request to Bush to help resolve the Kashmir issue was “a mistake” because America would never play a neutral role. If so, where does Islamabad go?

Both New Delhi and Islamabad after years of talks, open and secret, have found no meeting point. People-to-people contact has helped and there are now more channels to meet than before. However, Pakistan is not willing to have free trade before Kashmir is settled. This is a wrong approach because economic ties would have forged closer relations and created a better atmosphere.

Pakistan will be amazed to know how the opinion in India is veering round to a sort of autonomy provided the problem is settled once and for all. Since America has said “no” to mediation again, Islamabad should come out of the box and present a solution which does not give the impression of Kashmir seceding from India.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.