Getting out of the crevice
By Irshad Abdul Kadir
THE proverb: “Whom the gods wish to destroy, they first drive mad”, may seem at first to approximate the vandalism visited on Lahore and Peshawar consecutively on February 14 and 15, by radical mobsters protesting against the publication in Denmark and elsewhere of the offending cartoons on the Prophet (PBUH).
On second thoughts, however, the destructiveness seems to have been prompted by design rather than dementia, since the perpetrators were promoting the anti-Musharraf, anti-West agenda of the rightist bloc.
By now, the whole world, let alone Denmark, is aware of the Muslim reaction, so it is difficult to perceive how the sanctity of the Prophet (PBUH) has been served either by such wanton destruction of state and private properties or by the anti-Musharraf sloganeering.
And what is one to make of the reaction of the MMA to the outcome of these shocking events? While ascribing the devastation to non-MMA unruly elements, no leading cleric has so far condemned the destruction, or expressed regret for loss of life and property. Instead, more strikes are called for, regardless of the loss suffered by the people and the economy.
One wonders too about the failure of the Punjab government to anticipate mob violence by securing downtown Lahore from the rampage. More astoundingly, such a situation was allowed to recur in Peshawar the following day. First Lahore — the stronghold of the Chaudhry brothers and then Peshawar the cradle of the MMA administration.
One wonders also about the role of the central government and its military backers. It is one thing to have the writ of state flaunted in the tribal areas of the NWFP and Balochistan, but quite another to have it trampled upon in Lahore and Peshawar, especially when the country has many Indian visitors following the Indo-Pakistan cricket series, and Islamabad is playing host successively to the Saudi monarch, President Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh, President Karzai of Afghanistan, and the mightiest of all, President George Bush of the US.
Such developments have given rise to the view that the reaction of the various players in the affairs of state to the situations confronting them is symptomatic of the general affliction permeating the country. We are all trapped in a plethora of irrational behaviour patterns.
The deeper malaise is, of course, ascribable to two unresolved causes, namely: the supreme status of the military in our midst and the authenticity of our Islamic identity, both malingering concerns requiring long term therapy.
Currently, however, it is the contradictions at the day-to-day level of state affairs that has assumed alarming proportions, reducing hapless citizens to terrified spectators or ostrich-like entities burying their heads in sand. Of primary concern are the insurgencies in the NWFP tribal area of Waziristan and Dera Bugti, Balochistan.
The Waziristan scenario is the outcome of bungling, ineptitude and duplicity of the military handlers. Such mishandling has been occasioned by the unresolved dilemma of Al Qaeda sympathizers embedded in the army, who, from time to time, are constrained by state policy to eliminate the Al Qaeda threat. The problem is compounded by administrative reluctance to neutralize the nexus existing between the Pakistani Taliban and the Arab/Central Asian jihadis, because military functionaries operate on the dubious assumption that foreign elements can be dealt with without prejudicing local elements.
This dichotomy, which has persisted since the pre-9/11 Taliban heyday — has resulted today in the creation of a sanctuary in Waziristan where foreign jihadis, Taliban adherents (Afghan and Pakistani), militant radicals proliferating in our country and Pakistan army sympathisers commingle and plan strategy under the watchful eyes of indigenous tribesmen who are either bribed or intimidated into silence or who believe in the cause.
To effectuate official policy on this matter, logic dictates the implementation of certain basic measures. If Al Qaeda has to go (and go it must, as it is a foreign presence challenging the government while infiltrating into Pakistani soil) then all shelters must be eliminated, even if this entails bolstering the military forces operating in Waziristan with foreign forces and bunker busting weaponry equal to the task. Otherwise, we shall remain involved in a war of attrition for years to come. Justification for involving foreign forces in Pakistan lies in the realm of realpolitik, for just as acceptable explanation was found for the instant switchover after 9/11, a plausible one can be found for this move too.
Furthermore, such a campaign will necessitate additional steps to neutralize in-house jihadi sympathisers, eliminate militant radicals and redirect the Pakistani Taliban towards an Islamic reality reflecting the Pakistani ethos based squarely within national boundaries.
As for Balochistan, where the insurgency has been exacerbated by the intervention of foreign interests, these interventionists can be neutralized by resuming the dialogue at the highest level between government policy-makers and representatives of all significant Baloch interests (not restricted simply to the dissident sardars). This is a better option than the current strategy of bombing and strafing by one side, countered by the decimation of infrastructural amenities by the other, which harms the interests of both sides.
In the talks initiated for dispute resolution, three issues that, despite the sensitivities of both sides, need to be addressed initially, include, meaningful Baloch contribution in policy-making and participation in the Balochistan development projects themselves; cessation of the disruption of infrastructural facilities; and an objective review of alleged excesses attributable to, and compensation heretofore paid to, controversial Baloch personalities (in order to preclude future finger-pointing on this particular issue).
Several other issues also call for a balanced approach based on objective analysis and reason instead of the ad-hocism which plagues the system. There is a need for reliance on excellence instead of the mediocrity that impinges matters of policy or rides roughshod over the concerns of the electorate in the legislative assemblies. Then, there is a need for restoration of humanitarian and cultural values and decency in place of the prevailing lifestyle of pelf, criminality and self-interest.
There is also a need for disclosure of policy imperatives and consultation of interests on matters like the silting of dams (which affect the lives of major segments of the pollution) instead of the arbitrary approach which came up against strong resistance from Sindh and the NWFP so that the government had no option but to backtrack on the issue. There is a need for a return to constitutionalism, for revival of the democratic order, for strengthening of party system, for recourse to participatory government. There is a need for striking a balance between the interests of the central and provincial governments. There is also a need for neutralizing the omnipotence of the army and the authoritarianism of the religio-political parties which perceive their agendas as mandatory codes of conduct for all to follow.
Whether any of these will come to pass remains to be seen. The alternative course may lead inexorably to civil disorder, anarchy (exemplified by the mob violence unleashed in Lahore and Peshawar) and much worse.
However, if democracy is restored, a resuscitated Pakistan would continue to be influenced by global trends and international norms. Sadly, a review of current trends and developments generates despondency rather than hope. For Pakistan to face up to this situation is to put its own house in order under a democratic system oriented towards good governance, alleviation of poverty and illiteracy, public welfare and peace, stability and harmony in the country.
The writer is a barrister-at-law and lecturer in legal studies.

