Urgency of Kalabagh dam project
By Ahmad Fraz Khan
AS the debate on the Kalabagh dam, essentially a technical issue, starts assuming emotional, political and subjective character far out of proportion to its core technicalities, one wonders where all this will lead us. Is it helping clear confusion surrounding the project and building a political consensus or is it just adding to the emotive controversies that have bedevilled the project for the last five decades?
Looking at the manner and direction of the debate so far, it seems that emotional, political and subjects views are being projected at the cost of legal and fiscal realities of the KBD. The debate has resulted in hardening of positions taken by most of the supporters and opponents of the project rather than help de-emotionalize and depoliticize the issue. In the heat of arguments, only a few debaters are ready to concede that the federal government is under intense pressure to act on the water-sharing front on two counts: domestic and international, the last in the form of legal demands made by the Indus Basin Water Treaty as well as food self-sufficiency and the financial sovereignty of the country.
The Indus Basin Water Treaty of 1960, which the then federal government had signed as a sovereign entity, created two storages in order to compensate for the loss of three eastern rivers. Since Punjab was the largest beneficiary of the three rivers, it was given exclusive rights on the 9.4 million acre feet water (MAF) out of a total storage capacity of about 15MAF. The country has already lost three MAF of this because of the silting up of the dams. As silt eats up the storage capacity, and that of water-holding depletes every day, the federation is faced with a potentially disastrous threat: what will happen when the total storage drops to around 9.4MAF in the next decade or so?
According to the Indus Basin Water Treaty, Punjab had legally exclusive rights over those 9.4MAF, leaving the other three federating units on the run-of-the-river supplies. Punjab should then be approaching the federal government, equipped as it is with legal rights under the treaty which has international guarantees. This scenario is threatening enough for the rulers to claim that keeping a craven silence on the water issue will be a “national harakiri.”
The second, and equally ominous, scenario that generates more pressure on the federal government to act is perpetual water shortages, especially in the Rabi season, again because of the silting up of up to 30 per cent of the existing capacity of the dams. At present, if both the dams are filled up, Pakistan will suffer from over 20 per cent of water shortage in the Rabi season. These shortages will only grow if new storage is not created.
The Tarbela dam’s storage at the time of its construction used to last up to the end of May when the new filling season had already started, thus meeting the country’s water needs round the year. With silt moving into the lake every year, the storage now lasts only up to the month of February. The rate of the Tarbela dam’s silting up process costs ten days of supplies every year, which means that it has been hitting the dead level 10 days earlier every year. Within the next five years, the Tarbela dam would be empty by early January, and the country would have no water for a second and third watering of the wheat crop and for the beginning of the cotton sowing.
Within the next five years, Pakistan’s food and cash crops would slowly but progressively be exposed to a potent danger of being ultimately wiped out. The federal government now feels that the country not only needs additional water storage, but it needs it critically, that is, within the next five years if it is to stave off the impending danger.
If these two points are made the mainstay of the on-going debate on water resources, one can easily see the urgency of weighing the available options. This is precisely what was pointed out by the members of the Technical Committee on Water Resources. In their report they have indicated that new storages could only be built on the Indus and there were three potential sites for these: Kalabagh, Bhasha and Skardu. Fortunately or unfortunately, Kalabagh is the only site that could be readied within the next five to six years, and help the country and its agriculture sector win the race against time.
The construction requirements for a dam at Kalabagh have been under consideration over the last three decades. Bhasha dam would take another three to four years to come at the stage of the Kalabagh dam because its design, drawings and tender documents are yet to be finalized.
The truth is that the Bhasha dam is a ten-year-hence project. It also has some other question marks that need to be evaluated and addressed. These include the widening and reconstruction of the portions of the Karakoram Highway. The first would be necessary for taking the earth-moving equipment to the dam site and the second in the face of the submerging of 120 kilometres of the KKH in the lake which necessasitates the building of a detour. This is not to say that the required engineering solutions are not possible but only to underline the phenomenal cost that doing so would entail.
As for Skardu, it is still more at a conceptual stage where even the basic work is still to be done. These are the simple facts about building new water storages on which most of the water experts, both the committees on water resources — the parliamentary and the technical — agree.
Apart from the compelling realities of the required storage capacity and the need to prioritize the process of its implementation, it seems that critics of the Kalabagh dam have been unable, or unwilling, to de-link the urgency of the project from the supposed lack of credibility of those in favour of the dam. To be fair to everyone, the government has not helped matters by not undertaking any such de-linking exercise. Rather, its action has kept the debate as subjective as possible.
President Pervez Musharraf also did no good by to project when he offered “personal guarantees” to the critics of the dam. By linking the credibility of the project with his own, the president only provided further fuel to the critics. In this way, he has personalized a national project and the debate over it. It would be unfair if the project itself ends up paying the cost of bad politics on the part of the president and his supporters.
The so-called political team of the president seems more eager to prove personal loyalties to the president. This they are doing by projecting the entire issue as a personal initiative of the president, and by trying to remind the nation that it is his sagacity that lies behind the critical urgency of the timing of the project.
Instead of focussing on the technical merits of the project and its urgency for the country’s agriculture sector and its financial and legal compulsion, the president’s handpicked politicians have busied themselves with eulogizing the general. To be fair to them too, the president’s political team has its own limitations. A virtually non-political set-up created by Gen Musharraf has been asked to build a political consensus on a highly contentious issue, and that too while keeping the political heavyweights, with roots among the people, out of the fray. This is an untenable position, and the sooner the president realizes this the better it would be for the project as well as the country.

