Governance of stock exchanges
By Dr Tariq Hassan
ON November 29, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) issued directives to the Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad stock exchanges directing them to amend their constituting and governing documents to ensure that the chairperson of the exchanges would be elected only from amongst the independent, non-member directors, rather than from among the member directors, of the exchanges.
The directives met with a mixed reception. The Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE) welcomed and unanimously adopted the direction at a meeting of its Board held in Islamabad on December 1 and has now called an extraordinary general meeting (EOGM) for December 9 to approve of the amendments to its Articles of Association. The Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE) is not required to hold an EOGM to approve of the amendments, its board, having endorsed the concept in principle as part of the proposed demutualization process, is expected to adopt the measure at its next meeting, while the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) represen-tatives have also endorsed the concept as part of the demutual-ization process. It appears from media reports that certain members of the KSE are of the view that the timeframe stipulated in the directive does not allow them sufficient time to hold an EOGM and to approve of the required amendments.
The issue raised by certain members of the KSE is being given wide publicity in the print and electronic media and, unless clarified, it is likely to have a negative impact on investor confidence in the working of the capital market. The purpose of this discussion is, therefore, twofold: to clarify some of the issues being raised in the media and to allay any misgivings created thereby in the minds of the investing public.
The first issue highlighted by the media is the timing of the directive, that is, immediately before the elections of the Board of KSE (scheduled for December 16) and on the eve of the meeting of the demutualization committee of the KSE which was held on November 30. The first aspect of the timing of the directive, immediately prior to the date of the elections of the KSE Board, is deliberate and well thought out. Had this directive been issued earlier, it would have negatively impacted on the position of the incumbent chairman and the board and therefore the institution of the exchange; had it been issued any later, there would have been a hue and cry against failure to make appropriate disclosure prior to the election. The present timing resolves both these issues: it does not affect the incumbents and ensures that the persons seeking election to the Board of the exchanges are fully aware of the rules of the game at the very outset.
The second aspect of the timing of the directive, pertaining to its issuance on the eve of the SECP’s meeting with the Demutualization Committee, is unfounded. The directive has been issued as part of SECP’s ongoing implementation of the recommend-ations made in the report of the task force to review the Stock Market Situation (June 30). Paragraph 87 of the report, specifi-cally states that: “Until demutualization is achieved, the independence of the KSE Board should be further enhanced, by requiring the appointment of an independent, non-broker, chairperson of significant standing in the community.”
The process of implementation of the recommendations made in the report of the task force commenced in July, with the support of the government and the Parliament. To this end, the SECP has already levied fines on more than 97 brokerage houses for indulging in market distorting practices such as insider trading and wash trades. The SECP is also investigating other market abuses as indicated in the report. The issuance of the present directive is, therefore, just one more step in this process. The fact that it came on the eve of the meeting of the demutualization committee was by way of coincidence and not design.
The second issue being given much importance in the media is that the directive is not capable of implementation because of paucity of time. This issue is entirely misconceived and without any foundation. The media is referring to a section in the Companies Ordinance, 1984, which stipulates a 21-day time period required by the exchanges to hold an EOGM. In this selective reference to the Companies Ordinance, 1984, the media has ignored the proviso in the very section it refers to, which allows the exchanges to obtain a waiver of 21 days from the Registrar of Companies. The ISE has already exercised this option and has obtained the necessary waiver: it is holding its EOGM within ten days of the meeting of its board.
It also needs to be clarified in this regard that the SECP is not required to allow the exchanges to refer the matter to their general bodies for final approval. The SECP is fully empowered to issue a directive and require it to be complied with, within a time period stated in the directive (in this case, 10 days). In case that the exchanges fail to implement the directive given, the SECP may then implement it itself. A directive so implemented takes effect in the same manner as if it had been implemented by the exchanges. The SECP has, however, been supportive of the move of the exchanges to refer the matter to their general bodies, in order to build the maximum consensus in the reform process, and thereby to bring about viable and sustainable change.
The media’s critique of the directive, sponsored perhaps by certain financial intermediaries who have a vested interest in maintaining a status quo, is not uncharacteristic. Whenever reforms have been introduced in the exchanges anywhere in the world, they have been greeted with initial misgivings. Reforms in the Pakistani capital market have met with a similar fate. Any attempt at improving the governance of the exchanges and thereby empowering the investors, is perceived by the interested financial intermediaries as wresting power and control from them.
In criticizing the timing and implementation of the directive, the media has detracted from the inherent value of the reform measure proposed. Most importantly, the media has failed to note that the directive does not seek to impose a chairperson on the exchanges, but merely requires them to elect an independent non-member person as their chairman. The ultimate choice of the chairperson rests with the board, which comprises of both member and non-member directors. Therefore, anyone who is chosen for this office will do so only if the collective will of the board is exercised in his or her favour.
Furthermore, the media has failed to emphasize the fact that this measure is not only in keeping with the principles of international best practices but has also been specifically recommended in the Pakistani context, not only by the task force report referred to earlier, but also by the report of the expert committee on demutualization and integration of Sept 2, 2004.
The norms of international practice are evident from examining the management trend for exchanges across different jurisdictions: the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Limited (HKEx), Singapore Exchange Limited, London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the New York Stock Exchange — all have independent non-broker members as their chairpersons. Closer at home, in India, a group constituted by the securities and exchange board of India (SEBI) under the chairmanship of Justice (Retd.) M.H. Kania, former Chief Justice of India, had recommended that: “the Chairman should be a person who has considerable knowledge and experience of the functioning of the stock exchange and the capital market and the Chairman of the Board should not be a practising broker”.
The view of the Indian committee has been echoed for the Pakistani capital market in the Report of the Expert Committee on Demutualization and Integration, which states at point (iii) and (iv) that: “all elected and nominated directors, including the Chairman, should be non-executive and that the Chairman should not be associated with brokerage business.” This issue was, however, lent immediacy by the report of the task force, which specifically recommended that the measure be recommended in the run-up to demutualization.
It is interesting to note in this regard that the SECP and the exchanges are in complete agreement on the issue of an independent, non-member chairperson, post-demutualization. This agreement exists because of the universal realization that appointment of a member director as the chairperson of an exchange is more likely than not to give rise to issues of conflict of interest.
It is then entirely unwarranted to decry this measure in the pre-demutualization scenario, when the value of this measure is of even greater practical and symbolic value. In the present mutualized structure of the exchange, the brokers are also the owners of the exchange. This has led to the criticism that the exchanges are merely “clubs” run by the brokers to further their own interests. It is also widely believed that these brokers are either unable or, worse still, unwilling to discipline their peers and to take appropriate and speedy decisions in the interests of the investors.
The SECP has made a firm commitment to the Special Standing Committees of the Senate and the National Assembly established specifically to examine the stock market situation of March this year that it would take all necessary steps to implement the recommendations of the task force report and to ensure transparency and good governance in the exchanges at an accelerated pace.
The writer is chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan.


