US media’s slanted role on Iraq
By Omar R. Quraishi
THE recent drama surrounding the 85-day incarceration of New York Times reporter Judith Miller for not divulging the source of her story in which she had disclosed the name of an undercover CIA agent raises many questions about the way the US media covers crucial foreign policy issues, the close nexus between some journalists and the White House and Pentagon, and the lack of editorial oversight at a newspaper that is believed by many to be America’s ‘newspaper of record’.
After being released from prison, it emerged that the reporter was not really trying to protect the identity of her source but that the issue was much more complex. It seemed that part of her reluctance stemmed from not wanting to expose her own close ties with the Bush administration. Eventually, she had to leave her newspaper, ending an association that had lasted 28 years.
However, Miller’s critics have been far less charitable. They have been scathing of the way she had conducted herself; passing herself off as a champion of press freedom and then doing a volte face and revealing her source who turned out to be none other than L. Lewis Libby, the controversial chief of staff of the US vice-president. In fact, in the days leading to her being sent to jail, her employer also stood by her and hired an expensive legal team to plead her case before a federal judge.
However, once it became clear that Miller was not fighting so much for press freedom as to hide her own proximity to controversial (and very hawkish) members of the Bush administration, the newspaper backed off. Another reason perhaps was that White House officials (including President Bush’s chief political strategist and deputy chief of staff Karl Rove) were being closely examined for having leaked the identity of the undercover CIA agent, a criminal offence under the law.
By not disclosing the identity of her source, Miller seemed to be shielding him from possible prosecution — something which in fact did happen once Libby’s identity became known (he was indicted on Oct 28 for committing perjury). Clearly, all this was quite different from Miller’s initial — and seemingly loftier — reason not to divulge the source’s identity: protection of a source of information.
After the reporter’s release, the NYT editor admitted that he was partly to blame for not subjecting Miller’s reports to greater editorial scrutiny. Clearly, he was trying to deflect some of the blame that inevitably must fall on the newspaper’s senior editors, still reeling after the infamous Jayson Blair episode where another apparently rising star reporter was found to have concocted most of his stories filed over a two-year period. However, it wasn’t as if Miller had all of a sudden begun to write unsubstantiated or irresponsible stories — she had been covering Iraq for years and apparently had notched up several exclusives on it, in the process winning in 2002 a Pulitzer prize for coverage of the Middle East after 9/11.
The newspaper’s failure to subject Miller’s articles to greater scrutiny should be seen as part of a wider failing among mainstream US media to subject the policies of the Bush administration to greater questioning and journalistic scepticism. Those who have followed Judith Miller’s stories, especially after 9/11 and in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, will know that she often came up with exclusives detailing the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in that country.
That such stories appeared prominently in what many consider America’s newspaper of record meant that President George W. Bush’s controversial case for invading Iraq was immensely bolstered in the eyes of the American public, and more so in the eyes of the paper’s influential readership.
It also should be remembered that these stories were published at a time when various American allies — notably France and Germany — and many independent observers and former UN weapons inspectors (especially Scott Ritter) had cried themselves hoarse saying that eight years of stringent weapons inspections had left Iraq with practically no WMDs or a chemical weapons stockpile.
In a now famous — or should one say infamous — report citing reliable sources, Judith Miller wrote that Saddam Hussain had hidden his cache of WMDs and chemical weapons close to the Syrian border. President Bush’s main argument for invasion — for which a resolution was moved in the UN Security Council — was to capture and disable Iraq’s WMDs. But when America and its allies did invade, the WMDs were nowhere to be found. That probably wouldn’t have mattered much to the architects of the US invasion, the neocons of Bush and Cheney’s inner circle, because by then it was clear that finding Iraqi WMDs was just a pretext to get into a country with a quarter of the world’s proven oil reserves, and placed strategically next to America’s implacable foe, Iran.
Not only were the WMDs never found in Iraq, many of Judith Miller’s stories used sources that were either suspect or too close to the US administration to have any real credibility. The source of the story quoted above — and of many others that Miller later confirmed — was none other than Ahmed Chalabi, a well-known foe of Saddam’s and a convicted embezzler and fugitive from Jordan.
For many years, he had been lobbying the US to overthrow Saddam and in that time had acquired a reputation for being close to the CIA. A journalist with even a little bit of judgment and integrity would have taken Chalabi’s “information” with a pinch of salt. Miller, by her own admission, used him as a reliable source for years, and the NYT let all those stories run.
As Miller’s own story further unravelled, it came to light that as an embedded reporter she had access to classified military information but that the rules for accessing and sharing such information were set by the Pentagon. In effect, the Pentagon was allowing her to view classified information — obviously for use in her stories which were run prominently — but she could not discuss the details or sources of this information with those who were responsible for editing her stories. That the NYT allowed this to happen also speaks for the newspaper’s lack of editorial oversight.
In fact, according to the US-based media watchdog, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, one of her (also now discredited) stories was about an Iraqi scientist in US custody who led soldiers to a cache of buried chemicals that he claimed had been part of an illegal weapons programme. The scientist said that the materials were being smuggled into Syria and that the Saddam government was working with Al Qaeda (another false claim).
The watchdog noted, with quite a bit of dismay that for this article Miller was not allowed by the US military to talk to the scientist, could not name the chemicals in question and had a three-day embargo on its publication. Despite the external rules imposed by the Pentagon the newspaper ran the story on its front page.
Going a bit deeper into Miller’s past, one comes across several sensational stories but which often contained unverifiable information. The direct source for stories like ‘Secret arsenal: The hunt for germs of war’ (Feb 26, 1998); ‘Defector describes Iraq’s atom bomb push’ (Aug 15, 1998) or ‘Iraqi tells of renovations at sites for chemical and nuclear arms’ (Dec 20, 2001) was either Chalabi or Iraqi defectors or exiles provided by him.
In what can only be called as a campaign orchestrated by Miller and her sources in the Bush administration to make a strong case for invading Iraq, neither the New York Times nor any major newspaper in America seemed to take much note of repeated remarks to the contrary from experts who actually had more credible knowledge of Iraq’s alleged possession of WMDS.
Rolf Ekeus, the former head of UNSCOM (the UN monitoring body that oversaw weapons inspectors in Iraq) was reported on August 16, 2000, by the Associated Press as saying that Iraq’s WMD capabilities had been “fundamentally eliminated” well before 9/11. There was also Scott Ritter who publicly aired doubts on the claims made in Miller’s stories — his own credentials were later questioned in slanted stories run in both the NYT and the Washington Post and it cannot be too difficult to see who or what must have motivated those particular reports.
In fact, one of Saddam’s close aides, Lt Gen Hussain Kamel, later told the Americans that Iraq had in fact destroyed on its own, in 1991, all its secret stockpiles to evade sanctions.
That the then chief of Iraq’s secret weapons industries was making this statement should have made a credible story but the mainstream US media ignored his comments presumably because it would have diluted the case for Iraq’s invasion. Certainly, all of Miller’s reports on Iraq’s WMDs took no note of Kamel’s remarks, or of people like Ritter or Ekeus.
Now, nearly three years after the invasion of Iraq, Judith Miller stands thoroughly discredited as do some of those who proved to be her key sources. The only question is will the mainstream US media learn anything from this episode, or will it continue to have (mostly) unquestioning faith in the policies of the Pentagon and the White House, especially when advocating the case for invading a sovereign nation.
Email: omarq@cyber.net.pk


