Saarc: implications of Afghan membership
By Muhammad Ali Siddiqi
WITH Afghanistan’s entry into the seven-nation South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation a foregone conclosion, one hopes Islamabad has considered what the full implications of that country’s membership of this regional grouping could mean to Pakistan.
It should be noted here that all Saarc countries recognize the international borders of all fellow-members. There may be a dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, but Pakistan’s border with India — starting from the Raan of Kutch on the Arabian Sea coast to what is called the “working boundary” between occupied Kashmir and (Pakistani) Punjab — remains an internationally recognized border. India has accepted it without reservations since 1947.
However, if admitted, Afghanistan will be the only Saarc member which does not recognize a member-country’s international border which is 2,300 kilometres long. Not only that, Afghanistan has not officially renounced its claim to areas to the east of the Durand Line.
There is no sign yet of a resolution of the Kashmir dispute, thanks to the Nehruite mindset that still has New Delhi firmly in its grip when it comes to Kashmir. If the Line of Control has now become soft, let us thank cruel nature and not New Delhi for the movement that we now see across the LoC. However, a resolution of the Kashmir dispute — if and when it takes place — will mean that Pakistan and India will have renounced irredentist claims on each other.
Has Afghanistan renounced its irredentist claims on Pakistan’s territory, or has Islamabad secured Kabul’s guarantee that it will do so after it becomes a Saarc member? More importantly, has Afghanistan given Pakistan any assurance that it will conduct itself correctly at the Saarc forum?
The truth is that by making Afghanistan a Saarc member, Islamabad is giving New Delhi an ally on the silver platter. India suffers from a sense of acute isolation at Saarc forums. Barring Bhutan, which is in its pocket, India has no genuine friends in Saarc. Thus, for the first time in Saarc’s history, India will find a natural ally and friend in Mr Hamid Karzai’s Afghanistan.
The Karzai government’s posture towards Pakistan is dubious, full of distrust and based on expediency, and the friendly remarks that sometimes come from Kabul stem from the compulsion of circumstances existing in Afghanistan and the region following 9/11. His administration is dominated by the pro-Indian Northern Alliance, which in turn is led by Tajik warlords and Uzbek bandit Rashid Dostum. (It was in Dostum’s airless and sizzling containers that many Pakistanis caught and herded into them like animals after the fall of Kabul were asphyxiated.)
The Karzai government looks at Pakistan as a potential enemy who could re-exercise its Taliban option if and when it finds it necessary to do so. Of course, it recognizes that America’s military operation leading to the fall of the Taliban government would not have been possible without Pakistan’s help. But it feels — and perhaps not without justification — that Islamabad went along with the US on this question because it had no other option but to cooperate.
Let us note here Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmud Kasuri’s statement in Islamabad when he announced that he would propose Afghanistan’s membership at the Dhaka summit. The foreign minister said, “Pakistan and Afghanistan share the bonds of history, culture, tradition, values as well as a common perception of peace, stability and harmony in our region”.
He may be right with regard to the first four — history, culture, tradition and values — but do Kabul and Islamabad really have a common perception of “peace, stability and harmony” in the region?
Until the advent of the Taliban, Afghanistan considered India its ally in its claims on what it called Pakhtoonistan. The Taliban — nurtured, armed and funded by Pakistan and operating from bases in this country — had little time for anything else besides warring on other Afghan factions and consolidating their hold on power. But even they never for a moment gave any indication that they would recognize the Durand Line as an international boundary if they came to power.
This writer interviewed Gulbadin Hikmatyar — a key figure in the Taliban hierarchy and a man so intelligent that he had both Bhutto and Zia give him money and arms — and asked him if the Taliban would recognize the Durand Line as the official border between the two countries if they finally won? He said this was a superfluous question, because the Durand Line in any case was an artificial barrier created by the British, and people were moving across it so freely that it had lost all meaning as a dividing line.
That was, of course, true. Given the constant movement of troops, supplies and smugglers, the Durand Line had virtually ceased to exist. But that was not in Pakistan’s interest, for Islamabad would have wanted then, and will want Kabul now to recognize the Durand Line as the international boundary. But Hikmatyar, who was once embraced by President Reagan in the White House, said everything that was charming, sweet and “Islamic” — yes, we are brothers, this is an artificial line created by the British, and so on.
Yet, the one thing he would not say was that the Taliban would accept it as the official boundary between the two countries when the Taliban finally won. This being the Taliban’s position, does any Pakistani in his right mind really feel it ever possible that the post-Taliban Afghanistan with a dominance of Tajik warlords and harbouring inimical intentions against Pakistan would recognize the Durand Line as the official boundary?
Let us accept the harsh truth: Taliban or no Taliban, the Afghans have a broad consensus on the Durand Line — they do not accept it as an international frontier. During the Zahir Shah-Daud days — with Moscow and New Delhi fully on their side — Kabul never missed an opportunity to create problems in the Frontier. At present, the Karzai government cannot resurrect the Pakhtoonistan bogey because nobody — not even India, at least for the present — would encourage it to do so. But one does not know what the situation would be like say half a decade from now.
There are indications that the US is in the process of scaling down its military operations in Afghanistan and wants Nato — the unwilling Nato that considers its soldiers more precious than the neocons in Washington consider theirs — to share greater responsibility for security in Afghanistan. The Republican administration is already low on the popularity ratings, and if a Democratic president moves into the White House in 2008, most probably a new era of chaos will begin in Afghanistan. Mr Karzai may not politically survive an American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and what happens next is anybody’s guess.
It could be a repeat of the ferocious civil war Afghanistan saw in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, and such questions as a Durand Line recognition will be on hold. Having such a country in Saarc will be of no help to anyone, and most certainly not to Pakistan.


