Coping with the quake calamity
By Dr Parvez Hasan
THE devastating earthquake that has caused horrendous loss of life, great human suffering, and widespread loss of private property and physical infrastructure, is likely to become a defining moment in Pakistan’s history by the sheer magnitude of challenges it has posed and would continue to pose for institutions of governance and key aspects of public policy.
The immediate priority of course is saving tens of thousands of lives and providing temporary but adequate shelter and other relief to millions of displaced persons. The role of private organizations and individuals in providing assistance and alleviating suffering has already emerged as a heartening and a rather rare example of national unity.
But a very large part of the responsibility for both immediate relief and longer-term reconstruction inevitably must rest with the government. Its role would be vital for mobilizing and coordinating external assistance, setting standards, and integrating new needs with existing economic priorities. How the army and the government agencies at various levels perform in the coming weeks and months could influence the course of political developments.
The future course of Pakistan’s relations with India would no doubt also be influenced by the extent of cooperation and movement across the LoC in Kashmir in coming weeks and months. President Musharraf’s goal of making the LoC irrelevant is worth pursuing seriously by both sides because it would not only help the Kashmiris in distress but also perhaps provide an important step towards the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.
How will the earthquake affect the Pakistan economy and the economic momentum of the last three years is also a central question. Sustained high growth and serious poverty reduction efforts are the key platforms of the Musharraf government. Is there a danger that growth could slow down and the direct poverty reduction efforts, which by all accounts have yet to yield very visible results, would be hampered? These are important issues and must be debated. Initial reactions by some policy officials and private sector analysts implying that the impact on growth and the economy would be minimal were too hasty.
The full magnitude of the economic loss is yet to be ascertained, but estimates of needs have been revised steadily upwards. Even the latest government estimate that public funding requirements would be around five billion dollars could turn out to be a serious underestimate.
If the initial estimate of the need for 500,000 new dwelling units is correct, the replacement of housing stock alone may cost $2.5 billion to $4.0 billion, assuming the average construction cost per dwelling unit in the range of $ 5,000 to $ 8000. Clearly new dwelling units would have to be built to higher earthquake resistant standards. The loss of physical infrastructure — roads, schools, hospitals, government and private non-residential buildings — is also very extensive.
Reconstruction of Muzaffarabad, Balakot and Rawalkot would be quite costly. Thus, the reconstruction, relief, and rehabilitation bill could easily top $ 10 billion. It may also be politically undesirable and morally incorrect to spread the reconstruction effort over ten years. The annual spending largely for replacement of physical capital destroyed by the earthquake could thus be as much as two billion dollars for next five years.
The important thing is to get a firm assessment of needs. At the government request, World Bank and ADB have already initiated a damage assessment. This is crucial work but must be supported by a high-level counterpart government team of economists, engineers and administrators so that the government ownership of the report is assured at the outset, practical considerations in devising spending plans are kept in view, and a beginning is made in integrating reconstruction needs with the overall medium-term economic framework.
How much additional external assistance can Pakistan expect to finance earthquake-related needs? First, for this purpose, only grant assistance or assistance on very concessionary terms should be counted because borrowing on market or near-market terms is not really assistance because it has to be placed in the context of overall public debt management. The response so far to Pakistan’s appeal for assistance has not been very satisfactory in relation to the need; the total amount committed is around $1.2 billion and actual flows are small.
Also, it is not clear that the assistance indicated by the World Bank and ADB would be all truly additional because concessionary funds available with these organizations are limited and largely pre-allocated. President Musharraf is right in expressing frustration with the response of the international community. Pakistan’s friends — the US, Japan, EU, and oil-exporting Middle Eastern countries — can and should do more. The goal of mobilization of additional concessionary assistance should be aggressively pursued. But to be realistic, unless counties like the US and Saudi Arabia are willing to make a major commitment to reconstruction, it is not likely that additional concessionary assistance will total more than three or four billion dollars, only a fraction of the likely needs.
Even in the best case scenario, it would not be wise to count on more than 40-50 per cent of financing to be provided by additional external grants and concessionary loans. In the worst case scenario, Pakistan’s own resources (including borrowing abroad and at home) might have to provide two-thirds to three- quarters of the resources needed.
It must be recognized that a substantial part of the cost of earthquake relief and reconstruction (possibly in the range of $4-6 billion, in 2005 prices, over the next five years) would have to come from fiscal resources.
How can this be handled? In normal circumstances, the likely additional claims on government resources of 1-1.5 per cent of GDP annually for the next five years need not be an impossible burden to manage. However, three points that may limit the government’s ability to respond flexibly need to be noted.
First, the sharp rise in the international oil prices during the last two years has caused a major loss of terms of trade for Pakistan. The continued high oil price of over $60 per barrel is likely to increase the oil import bill by two billion dollars or nearly one per cent of GDP during 2005-06.
The government is facing stiff consumer resistance and has been unable to fully pass the higher energy costs on to the consumers in the form of higher gasoline prices, power rates, etc. To the extent that the government is not able or willing to adjust energy prices fully, the hit would be taken by the budget.
Second, notwithstanding the very strong GDP growth in the economy and continuing efforts to strengthen the tax machinery, the tax to GDP ratio fell in 2004-05. The elasticity of the tax system, that is growth translating automatically into higher tax revenues, is far from being assured.
Thirdly, the pro-poor programmes which suffered deeply in the 1990s because of declining fiscal space have just began to expand and have not yet reached a critical level. Under the circumstances, the competition between funding earthquake-related projects fully and protecting growth momentum and direct poverty reduction spending would be unavoidable.
The dilemma that the government faces is real. It needs to develop a comprehensive response to the calamity that has befallen Pakistan without sacrificing growth momentum and poverty reduction efforts. Choices have to be made. The country must be prepared and the public must be educated to accept the loss of consumption that higher international oil prices, over which Pakistan has little control, entails.
No doubt it increases the hardship for the middle classes and lower income groups but delayed adjustment in energy costs cannot be justified as protection for the poor. For instance, the very large numbers of rural poor consume little or no electricity because most of them do not have access to it.
Mobilizing larger tax revenue through effective taxation of the well-to-do groups was a big challenge even before the earthquake. Now it needs to be tackled on a war footing. Hopefully, in the spirit of national response to the tragedy, the progress towards a more responsive and fair tax system can be accelerated. The rich must be asked to do more because the burden of taxation on them remains low and this distorts even the distribution of benefits of growth.
Priorities of spending must also be revised. Postponement of large items of defence spending and long gestation period projects must also be considered. Cuts on low priority spending, either developmental or non-developmental, must be undertaken.
There may be some scope for expanding the budget deficit and increasing government borrowing over the planned levels. But this should be considered only if containment of inflationary pressures and protection of official inflationary targets would not be jeopardized. Pakistan cannot afford to sacrifice its hard-earned and well deserved monetary and exchange rate stability.
To sum up, a speedy, adequate — indeed generous — response to the plight of millions of Kashmiris devastated by the earthquake is both a national and international imperative. Pakistan is right in seeking large-scale external assistance. But it needs to be realistic about the scale of additional grant and concessionary assistance that would be forthcoming.
Even in the best case scenario, the government is likely to have to provide half of the cost of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction that could top $10 billion.
The writer is a former chief economist of the World Bank.


